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ABSTRACT
The 'peace process' is a common expression in international politics. It describes and 
explains events in seemingly disparate locations as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and 
Southern Africa, which share only the common occurrence of violent conflict. One 
outstanding feature of these peace processes is the active participation of international 
actors or external 'third parties'. Whether they are states, international organisations or non- 
governmental organisations, these external actors comprise an industry focussed on the 
peace process. However, in providing assistance to countries making the transition from 
war to peace, as an industry these external third parties often reconfigure the political space 
of host societies in a manner which frustrates the intended goal of attaining peace.
The following analysis focuses on the process of implementing a comprehensive peace 
settlement to show how the peace process industry operates, using the case of Mozambique. 
The Mozambican peace process was selected because it is generally presented as a success 
which justifies similar activities in future cases. Therefore it is crucial to examine whether 
the intervention was a success, what kind of success and a success for whom. As 
Mozambique was inundated with international actors engaged in all kinds of activities, 
supported by substantial funding, it serves as a useful example from which to study the 
peace process industry at work. Mozambique is also one of the poorest countries in the 
world and is thus representative of larger processes in the developing world and its 
relationship with donors and the United Nations.
This thesis draws out a number of themes on the aggregate impact of external third parties 
on the political space of Mozambique and uses this as a basis for reaching conclusions 
applicable to other cases. It seeks to contribute to debates in international relations on how 
questions regarding the role of international actors in peace processes and the assistance 
they provide should be answered.
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Table 1
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'The General Peace Agreement called for the establishment of a National Elections 
Commission (CNE), but this was the responsibility of the government. The National 
Commission for Territorial Administration (CNAT) was agreed to by the parties during the 
peace process but did not function.
INTRODUCTION
Reconsidering international intervention 
in the transition from war to peace
The 'peace process' is a common expression in international politics. One seemingly 
inevitable feature of a peace process is the active participation of international actors or 
external third parties. The purpose of their participation is to resolve or end conflicts, out 
of which 'peace' is expected to materialise. 1 Whether they are states, international 
organisations or non-governmental organisations, these external actors are coalescing into 
a peace process industry.2 However, in providing assistance to countries making the 
transition from war to peace, external third parties often reconfigure the political space of 
host societies in a manner which frustrates the intended goal of attaining peace.
Political space refers to the arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which 
organise political life, and as such, is the basis for the exercise of politics. By understanding 
how the peace process industry reshapes political space, the chapters which follow seek to 
highlight and analyse the political consequences of the industry and its activities. It 
examines the outcomes of a peace process and the actors and processes which produce 
them. It explicitly focuses on the process of implementing a comprehensive peace 
settlement and aims to show how the peace process industry operates, using the example 
of Mozambique. Although I use the case of Mozambique to make the argument, the idea 
that external third parties reconfigure political space applies elsewhere.
The aim of this introduction is to show that the current literature in international relations
'The definition of peace will be discussed in chapter two.
2By industry, I mean a collective group of producers engaged in activities that result 
in an aggregate output of certain goods, where the ownership and design of the goods 
lies with the producer and not the purchaser. The idea of a peace process industry 
parallels the idea of a 'development industry' articulated by James Ferguson in The 
Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in 
Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. The idea of an industry is 
explained further in chapter one.
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does not reflect upon the political impact of external third parties and in particular their 
impact on political space. It begins with a review of the concept of intervention which 
encompasses those activities by international actors targeting the domestic affairs of another 
state. As the literature on intervention expanded to include ethical issues, second generation 
peacekeeping and peace-building activities, it has increasingly drawn from the conflict 
resolution literature. This literature analyses the roles of third parties, but does so within an 
understanding of a structure of conflict. Both literatures are converging in the area of post- 
conflict transitions, but neither is sufficient to provide a framework for understanding the 
political implications of intervention in this area. An expanded framework for intervention 
which accounts for political space is then presented. This is followed by a plan of the thesis 
and the role the case of Mozambique plays in the thesis.
Is intervention still relevant?
In international relations, activities by external actors targeting the internal affairs of 
another state fall within the concept of intervention. R.J. Vincent articulated the traditional 
definition of intervention as,
that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states 
or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic 
affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, 
and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not 
necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of 
international relations.3
Vincent's definition focuses on intervention as an activity that breaches the principle of 
sovereignty which preserves the international system of states. It targets the authority 
structure of the sovereign state, defined by Rosenau as "the identity of those who make the 
decisions that are binding for the entire society [and/or] the processes through which such 
decisions are made."4 Although Vincent's taxonomy remains useful as a framework for 
debates about intervention, his definition appears anachronistic and restrictive in light of
3R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1974, p. 13.
4James Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution., 13(2), June 1969, p. 163.
transformations in the post-Cold War international system. Practices of intervention have 
moved beyond the traditional definition, which has both expanded the concept of 
intervention, while seeming to render it less pertinent.
The ending of the Cold War has brought five major consequences to the study of 
intervention. First, although states remain important intervening actors, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and international organisations have gained greater significance and 
legitimacy. Under the resuscitated Security Council, 32 UN peacekeeping operations have 
been launched since 1989, compared to the 15 operations established between 1948 and 
1988. 5 Second, one of the perceived legacies from the Cold War is that civil or intrastate 
wars, rather than conflicts between states, pose the central threat to international peace and 
security.6 These civil or internal wars are now the primary and legitimate target for 
intervention.7 Third, the objectives of intervention have shifted from participating in 
conflicts to ending or resolving them. King observed that "[promoting negotiations has 
supplanted victory as the chief objective of Western involvement in civil wars."8 Fourth, 
the ethical dimension of intervention has gained greater prominence which has increased 
the legitimacy and urgency of humanitarian intervention. In addition, the notion of what 
constitutes humanitarianism has expanded from its origins in human rights to include the
5United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, New 
York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 3; and Kofi Annan, The causes 
of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 
Report of the UN Secretary General, New York, April 1998, paragraph 29.
6However, the frequency of civil wars has not increased after the end of the Cold 
War. Intrastate wars have outnumbered interstate wars since 1945. See Roy Licklider 
(ed.) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, New York: New York University 
Press, 1993, pp. 5-6.
7For the first time in its 24 year history, the 1993 edition of SIPRI's Yearbook on 
World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security included non-military 
aspects of security such as the number and location of interstate and intrastate conflicts, 
preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies also shifted its focus to civil conflicts as a threat to security, see 
Survival, Issue on Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 35(1), Spring 1993, and 
Issue on Conflict, Diplomacy and Intervention, 37(4), Winter 1995-1996, and Adelphi 
Papers 305 and 308.
8Charles King, Ending Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 308, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 81.
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use of military convoys to facilitate the delivery of emergency assistance, safe havens and 
military strikes against perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and genocide. And fifth, in part 
because of humanitarian incentives, a strong consensus has emerged that intervention is a 
useful policy instrument. The 'new interventionism'9 expresses an activism, particularly 
within U.S. foreign policy, to respond to crises and conflicts anywhere in the world. It 
describes an "outlook combining] an awareness that civil war is a legitimate issue of 
international security with a sentiment for crusading liberal internationalism." 10
The literature on intervention has evolved in response to these changes in the international 
system. With the expanded scope for legitimate intervention, intervention is studied less as 
a problem in international relations, than as a practice requiring justification and 
evaluation." In addition to the proliferation of volumes on humanitarian intervention12 , the 
selection of essays edited by Forbes and Hoffman13 sought to push the limits of 
justifications for intervention by contesting the ethical status of the state through questions
9This activism has been tempered by experiences in Somalia and Rwanda.
'"Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs, 72(1), Winter 
1993, pp. 1-16.
1 'The approach to studying intervention as a problem can be found in Stanley 
Hoffmann, "The problem of intervention," in Hedley Bull, (ed.) Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 7-28; and James Mayall, (ed.) The New 
Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. On the idea of 
intervention as a set of practices see Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 
Humanitarian intervention in contemporary conflicts: a reconceptualization, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996; and Thomas Weiss and Larry Minear, (eds.) 
Humanitarianism Across Borders: sustaining civilians in times of war, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993.
l2On humanitarian intervention see, Michael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," 
in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, pp. 93-118; Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, 
(eds.) Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders, Ithaca, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1981; Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, (eds.) Beyond 
Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995; Bhikhu Parekh, "Rethinking Humanitarian 
Intervention," International Political Science Review, 18(1), January 1997, pp. 49-70.
I3 lan Forbes and Mark Hoffman, (eds.) Political Theory, International Relations and 
the Ethics of Intervention, London: Macmillan Press, 1993.
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about the moral dilemmas raised by concerns for human rights, identity and agency. This 
volume also incorporated ideas developed in the field of conflict resolution and marked a 
shift away from the legality of intervention to a preoccupation with the resolution of 
conflicts and conflict itself. This trend was also evident in more policy-oriented studies 
which specifically focussed on ending civil wars. 14 Most of this literature posed the 
likelihood of ending civil wars through stable negotiated settlements against military 
outcomes where one side is defeated. They assumed that the unique features of civil wars 
structure and limit the possibilities of external intervention and sought to define a role for 
external actors in facilitating peaceful settlements.
The deployment of UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Somalia and Bosnia has also generated extensive empirical studies on UN peacekeeping. 
Not surprisingly, this research focuses on the capacity of the UN to respond to conflicts in 
terms of its functions, resources, and political will. The study of UN peacekeeping branched 
into two directions. The first, which received the most attention, was a preoccupation with 
peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention, where force was to be used to transform 
war into peace and peace was often designed by third parties. 15 The second, was a focus on 
second generation peacekeeping, which involved UN peacekeepers in new functions 
including monitoring human rights and the police; overseeing the repatriation of refugees 
and displaced persons; and preparing, holding and monitoring elections. 16 Under the schema
l4See King, Ending Civil Wars; Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War 
Settlement," International Organization, 51(3), 1997, pp. 335-364.; Licklider, Stopping 
the Killing.
l5Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305, London: 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996. See also Survival, 37(4), Winter 1995- 
1996 including Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use 
of Force," pp. 7-28, Stanley Hoffman, "The Politics and Ethics of Military 
Intervention," pp. 29-51; and Shashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to 
Basics'?", pp. 52-64.
16On second generation UN peacekeeping, see Mats Berdal, Whither UN 
Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281, London: Brasseys for International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1993; Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring," in 
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, (eds.) United Nations: Divided World, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 183-239; Cedric Thornberry, The Development of 
International Peacekeeping, London: LSE Centenary Lectures; Alan James, "Problems
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set out in Agenda for Peace, these activities constituted peace-building beyond traditional 
peacekeeping. The area of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction or rehabilitation, as 
it has invariably been called, is a new and vibrant area of research. 17 The wide range of 
activities encompassed within this area has brought together those interested in complex 
emergencies and in longer-term development, generating research into the links between 
relief and development, and between development and conflict prevention. 18
As a consequence of the enlarged scope for legitimate intervention, there are fewer 
arguments against intervention to counter the 'new interventionism'. Those that have been 
advanced are less concerned with upholding the principle of sovereignty, than arguing that 
intrinsic features of civil wars make them more intractable and less amenable to external 
intervention. In the aftermath of Somalia and Bosnia, arguments against intervention centre 
on the inability of the UN to adequately respond to such situations and favour caution 
instead of activism. Stedman argued the UN "must acknowledge the limitations imposed 
by civil war - what can realistically be accomplished by outside forces in violent internal 
conflict - and the limitations imposed by its own organisational makeup and procedures."19 
Peace enforcement, he warned, based on poor preparation, a lack of coherent strategy, 
insufficient leverage or resources and poor timing can just as easily prolong conflicts than 
bring about negotiated ends. Similarly, Berts cautioned against unfettered intervention 
based on the assumption that intervention "should be both limited and impartial, because 
weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of
of Internal Peacekeeping," Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5(1), 1994, pp. 21-46; Donald C. 
Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, (eds.) Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1993; Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando, (eds.) 
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War 
Conflicts, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.
17This area of research will be examined in the next chapter.
18Mary B. Anderson, Doing No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace 
Through Aid, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, 1996; Mark 
Duffield, "Complex emergencies and the crisis of developmentalism," IDS Bulletin, 
25(4), 1994, pp. 37-45; and Krishna Kumar, (ed.) Rebuilding War-Torn Societies: 
Critical roles for International Assistance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997.
''Stephen John Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and 
Strategy," in Daniel and Hayes, Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, p. 40.
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outside involvement."20 Using force to impose peace and maintaining neutrality are 
incompatible and can lead to dangerous consequences. Nevertheless, Belts claimed that 
limited and impartial intervention still holds true for monitoring cease-fires and other 
peace-building activities. Stedman as well, favoured a stronger role in peace-building and 
argued the UN "must be more muscular in pressing antagonists to fulfil their obligations 
to peace and isolating those parties who violate their commitment to peace."21 Peace- 
building activities are suitable for international activism because they are less strictly acts 
of intervention.
While peace enforcement is considered within the framework of intervention, the activity 
of post-conflict peace-building seems to move outside of the concept. Peace-building and 
post-conflict activities may not constitute intervention because they rest on the consent of 
the warring parties and third parties participate as impartial and neutral actors. The nature 
of these activities in building peace are not seen to be coercive or dictatorial and therefore 
are not deemed to be interventionary. However, post-conflict activities still fall within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state and still concern the authority structure of the 
target state. Moreover, peace-building activities target more than the legal sovereignty of 
the state, they address the fundamental structures of a state and its relations to society. 
Peace-building missions "intervene directly in the internal affairs of states, redefining the 
relationship between the government and its citizens and, in many cases, supporting popular 
legitimacy over traditional claims of state sovereignty."22 The boundaries between 
peacekeeping and peace-building are also thinly drawn, especially in situations such as 
Angola where peace-building activities verge on peace enforcement when dealing with 
cease-fire violations. Post-conflict activities are acts of intervention but the present 
framework for understanding intervention is inadequate for understanding such activities.
This inadequacy is derived from a flawed assumption in the framework which treats all
20Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs, 73(6), 
November/December 1994, p. 20.
2 'Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars," p. 40.
22Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United 
Nations Peace Building," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(3), 1995, p. 392.
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dimensions of intervention (the actor, target, activity, type, purpose and context) equably 
and begins by presuming the international system is composed of equal sovereign states. 
Intervention is conceived as a neutral category of activity undertaken by any state or other 
actor depending on the context. In practice, intervention is rather more endemic in some 
parts of the world than others and undertaken by some actors more than others. Hedley Bull 
highlighted the frequency of interventions in the 'Third World'. He concluded that not only 
is the intervening actor superior in power to the object of intervention, but that it is 
"because the former is relatively strong and the latter relatively weak that the question 
arises of a form of interference that is dictatorial or coercive."23 Dictatorial or coercive 
interference is a defining feature of the structural inequality between powerful states and 
their agents more likely to undertake intervention, and those states and their citizens more 
likely to be the target of intervention. The international system is defined by this inequality, 
divided between the more powerful and the less powerful, developed and non-developed, 
Western and non-Western, and states with peace and those without. Intervention is a feature 
of the structural inequality of sovereignty.
Apart from Bull, curiously very little has been written from the perspective of non-Western, 
developing countries where most interventions take place. The few existing examples 
focussed mainly on developing countries as the intervening actor and not just the object of 
intervention. 24 Others focussed on the endemic nature of foreign military intervention in 
particular regions, such as Africa.25 One notable exception to this, was the work of Caroline 
Thomas who studied the developing world as a particular target of intervention.26 Thomas 
argued that the attitudes and experiences of developing countries play "a formative role in
23Hedley Bull, "Introduction," in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 1,
24Hedley Bull, "Intervention in the Third World," in Bull, Intervention in World 
Politics, pp. 135-155; Martin Zuberi, "Intervention in the Developing World: A 
Southern Perspective," in Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamutu, (eds.) 
Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, pp. 135-143.
25Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter, 1990.
26Caroline Thomas, The Debate on Intervention in World Politics: Challenges from 
the Developing World, Doctoral Thesis, University of London, 1983.
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the ethical debate surrounding the non-intervention norm,"27 but that they are also the 
objects of new forms of intervention from technical agencies that systematically disregard 
sovereign rights such as international financial institutions. Hoffmann also categorised 
these kinds of activities as intervention when he observed that "[wjhile most states resent 
attempts by other states to intervene through the use of economic instruments, the resort to 
such tools of intervention by bodies like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the OECD has become perfectly normal."28 Without attracting attention, the forms and 
instruments of intervention have expanded to encompass international financial and lending 
practices, extending the targeted area of domestic jurisdiction to include fiscal and 
monetary authority. In such countries, the areas of domestic jurisdiction open to 
international intervention are vast.
Despite pleas for greater respect for state sovereignty from developing countries, the 
absence of a perspective from the target of intervention means that a range of intervention 
practices are either kept outside the framework for intervention, or have expanded the 
concept of intervention by nullifying its political significance and impact. For those states 
that are the objects of interference from stronger states, "the recognition of the rule of non­ 
intervention at least gives weak states some legitimacy in their protestations against the 
stronger ones... Without such notions they have no chance of any degree of autonomous 
decision-making."29 This applies to all aspects of the transition from war to peace, including 
post-conflict activities. Intervention is still at the very crux of international activity for the 
targeted state but this perspective has yet to be incorporated in the framework for 
understanding intervention.
The Turn to Conflict Resolution
An alternative perspective on external third parties is provided by the literature on conflict
27Thomas, The Debate on Intervention, p. 16. 
28Hoffmann, "The problem of intervention," p. 22.
29Caroline Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," in Forbes and 
Hoffman, Political Theory, p. 95.
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resolution. This literature comprises a number of sub-categories: these are the study of 
conflict, peace research, third party mediation, conflict management and the specific area 
of conflict resolution. A third party is defined as "someone who is external to a certain 
conflict and who interposes between the conflict parties in order to help them with their 
conflict management efforts."30 Third parties can be individuals, states, international or 
non-governmental organisations.31 Third parties are not assumed to be states or configured 
around the state, nor are they necessarily external or international. The literature, however, 
differs with respect to the roles and activities of third parties in terms of the motives, 
resources, capacities, and functions. 32
This literature is not only open to the type of intervening actor, but also attempts to 
accommodate the dynamic nature of the process allowing for multiple actors to engage in 
many and different kinds of interventions in one process. Scholars in this field 
systematically break down the process of conflict and its resolution into different stages, 
describing a cycle of conflict from latent to manifest to escalating conflict or a sequence of 
activities from pre-negotiation to negotiations, mediation or conflict facilitation workshops,
3(1.Iacob Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict 
Resolution, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 13.
''On third parties or intermediaries, see Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third 
Parties in International Crises, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967; Saadia 
Touval and I. William Zartman, (eds.) International Mediation in Theory and Practice, 
Washington, D.C.: Westview Press, Foreign Policy Institute, 1985; Jacob Bercovitch 
and Jeffrey Rubin, (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to 
Conflict Management, London: Macmillan Press, 1992; Jacob Bercovitch, (ed.) 
Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1996; Thomas Princen," Intermediaries in International Conflict, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945, London: Macmillan Press, 1992; Mark 
Hoffman, "Third Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era," in 
J. Bayliss and N.J. Rengger, (eds.) Dilemmas in World Politics: International Issues in a 
Changing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 261-86.
32For an explanation of the differences in third party roles and resources, see 
Hoffman, "Third Party Mediation"; Christopher Mitchell and Keith Webb, (eds.) New 
Approaches to International Mediation, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. See in 
particular, Keith Webb, "The Morality of Mediation," pp. 16-28 and Christopher 
Mitchell, "The Motives for Mediation," pp. 29-51.
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to post-negotiation strategies.33 Third party intervention is also ad-hoc, although different 
actors and activities may overlap, and some engage and disengage frequently in a single 
process. Mitchell has created a list of third party mediation roles potentially applicable to 
any phase of the process.34 But little else has been written on what happens after a peace 
agreement has been signed. Hampson has explored why peace agreements succeed or fail, 
emphasising the role of external third parties in ensuring the successful implementation of 
an agreement;35 while Stedman has argued for a more robust peace-building strategy from 
the UN, particularly in managing the threats posed by 'spoilers' to peace processes.36
This set of literature has also been merging with the traditional intervention literature and 
influencing its development in two ways. First, the objective of third party intervention is 
now characterised as solving conflicts as a means of attaining peace. What all third parties 
are expected to do, as the name conflict resolution implies, is to resolve, manage or 
transform conflicts. Although there is a debate as to whether conflicts are resolved, settled 
or managed and what outcomes constitute success, the common denominator is faith in a 
pacific process to end conflicts. By focussing on the process, third parties assist conflicting 
parties to reach agreement on a peaceful outcome. The outcome should not be determined 
by the dynamics of conflict, of having one side win or lose, but through a shared process 
of resolving the conflict peacefully. Therefore the means that are employed by third parties 
are necessarily pacific and are juxtaposed to other types of conflict management such as
"See Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, "Towards a Contingency Theory of 
Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflicts: A Cyprus Illustration," International 
Journal, 45(2), 1990, pp. 424-53; Janice Gross Stein, (ed.) Getting to the Table: The 
Processes of International Prenegotiation, London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989; Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, (eds.) Timing the De-Escalation of 
International Conflict, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991; Michael Lund 
Preventing Violent Conflict: a strategy for preventive diplomacy, Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1996.
34Christopher Mitchell, "The Processes and Stages of Mediation: Two Sudanese 
Cases," in David R. Smock, (ed.) Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention 
in Africa, Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, 1993 pp. 107-38
35Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail? 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996.
36Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars," and Stephen J. Stedman, "Spoiler 
Problems in Peace Processes," Foreign Affairs, 22(2), Fall 1997, pp. 5-53.
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coercion, violence and war. Many in this field would deny their activities constitute 
traditional intervention because "the basis of third party involvement is voluntary. Its 
intervention, moreover, is of an ad hoc nature and the influence a third party exerts is 
supposed to be beneficial."37 If they are engaging in intervention at all, it is intervention that 
only interposes between parties to a conflict.38
Second, the target of external third parties is specifically the conflict itself. This exclusive 
focus on conflict draws on ideas which isolate the phenomenon of conflict as a social 
process. Conflict analysis and peace research, according to Banks and Mitchell,
sees conflict as an approximately similar phenomenon at different social 
levels at which it occurs. It distinguishes characteristic attitudes and 
behaviour by parties to conflict and it identifies repeated patterns in the 
dynamics of the relations between the parties when they are in conflict.39
Conflict occurs at all social levels and displays basic structural characteristics across those 
levels. The structure of conflict, identified by Galtung, is composed of three components: 
a conflict situation, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes and perceptions.40 A conflict 
emerges when two or more parties are mobilised to obtain incompatible goals. It describes 
a relationship between those parties, whether they are individuals, communal groups or 
states. Conflict, however is not problematic, rather the violent manifestation of conflict, 
resulting from an inability to manage or express conflict leads to violence and war.
By intervening into a conflict relationship, the issue of neutrality and impartiality is a core 
concern of the literature. Carnevale and Arad argue that impartiality and neutrality can refer 
to any aspect of the process, from the parties, to the interests of the intermediaries, to the
"Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, p. 13.
38See Bruce Jones '"Intervention without Borders': Humanitarian Intervention in 
Rwanda, 1990-1994," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24(2), 1995, pp. 
225-249.
39Michael Banks and C.R. Mitchell, "Conflict Theory, Peace Research and the 
Analysis of Communal Conflicts," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 3(3), 
Winter 1974-5, p. 252. See also Christopher Mitchell, The Structure of International 
Conflict, London: Macmillan Press, 1981.
40Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, 
6, 1969, pp. 167-191.
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content of the settled outcome. 1 According to Young,
the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the 
party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having 
nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able 
to control any feelings of favoritism) in the eyes of the principal
protagonists.42
However, Young did not think third parties could remain neutral if neutrality refers to the 
outcome of the process and the effect that third party actions have on terminating the 
conflict. Bercovitch concurred that "a third party is not, and can not be neutral. By its very 
presence, it affects the process..."43 Touval and Zartman similarly thought third parties 
become part of the conflict triangle and that this is a useful resource or source of leverage.44
Although the conflict resolution literature developed outside the mainstream in the Cold 
War era, many of its ideas are a product of the Cold War and developed in reaction to 
international relations' preoccupation with 'realism' and power politics. During the Cold 
War, conflict and peace scholars within international relations specialised in identity and 
communal-based violent conflicts, with reference to cases such as Northern Ireland, 
Lebanon and Cyprus. Azar and Burton, for example, developed a theory of protracted social 
conflict.45 These intractable conflicts emerged when communal groups defined by their 
shared ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural characteristics were denied their identity 
or collective development needs.46 When the Cold War ended, the shift in analysis towards
4 'Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International 
Mediation," in Bercovitch, (ed.) Resolving International Conflicts, pp. 39-54.
42Young, The Intermediaries, p. 81.
43Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, p. 16.
44Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory," in 
Touval and Zartman, International Mediation, p. 13-14.
45Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, 
Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990; and Edward Azar and John Burton, 
(eds.) International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, London: Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1986.
46Francis Deng and I. William Zartman, (eds.) Conflict Resolution in Africa, 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991; I. William Zartman, Ripe for 
Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; 
Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in
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civil wars seemed to confirm and vindicate the field, particularly arguments linking identity 
and communal needs to the root causes of conflict.47 However, theories about conflict in 
the literature did not specifically look at civil wars as a special category of conflict. Rather, 
civil conflicts were social conflicts and as such could be understood by the dynamics and 
structures of conflict in general. Without reassessing itself in light of the end of the Cold 
War, the conflict resolution field applied these generic ideas regarding conflict to civil wars 
without defending the application or the commonalities of civil wars to all social conflicts. 
The problematic nature of some of these assumptions has not been addressed.
One problematic assumption is the reification of the phenomenon of conflict which 
obviates or preempts concern with the authority of the state in which civil conflicts take 
place. In lieu of the state, the boundaries of the conflict define the political context and the 
self-identified 'parties' to the conflict define the parameters of the potential intervention. 
Intervention takes place in the space between the parties defined by the conflict relationship 
and third parties become part of the conflict dynamic. The marginalisation of the larger 
political context outside the conflict dynamic is problematic for understanding civil 
conflicts where the state is a defining part of the dynamic. Although some scholars have 
introduced the state to studies on conflict resolution, through analyses of failed or collapsed 
states, this has not yet applied to the roles of third party intervention.48 In reifying conflict 
and third party processes, most scholars overlook the social and political processes in which 
they take place. Similarly, by predetermining the outcome as peaceful peacemaking and 
banishing violence, the role violence plays in political processes, such as state formation 
and the struggle for political community, is rejected without arguing that it is possible for 
such processes to be effected through peaceful means.49
Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991.
47For a critique of this assumption see King, Ending Civil Wars.
48Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New is Not 
Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1994; I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and 
Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
49Mats Berdal and David Keen "Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: 
Some Policy Implications, " Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 26(3), 1997, 
pp. 795-818. Mark Duffield "The political economy of internal war: asset transfer,
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As the conflict resolution literatures expands into the area of post-conflict transitions to 
peace, the parameters for understanding and explaining this transition remain limited by 
the abstracted understanding of conflict as a relationship between two or more parties. An 
understanding of the target receiving assistance from external third parties is incomplete. 
If this framework is too restricted by overlooking the social, historical or political context, 
while the intervention framework is rarely concerned with the target altogether, is it 
possible to develop a more inclusive framework for understanding third party intervention 
in post-conflict processes?
Constructing a new framework
The boundaries between traditional intervention and conflict resolution are increasingly 
blurred. While one studies the problem of intervention and the other the problem of 
conflict, they are both converging in the areas of post-conflict transition, second generation 
peacekeeping and relief-to-development activities. While scholars in both fields are 
studying the myriad roles and activities of external actors in these processes, the 
convergence of the two has consequently expanded the concept of intervention. Returning 
to Vincent's definition, the actor no longer revolves around the state, but includes non­ 
governmental organisations, international financial institutions, donors and other agencies 
within a state, as well as individuals. The activities that are undertaken have opened further 
areas of domestic jurisdiction to intervention, such as running elections, establishing 
judicial tribunals and rehabilitating public sectors such as health and road building. The 
context is more favourable towards intervention because of impatience with violent conflict 
and an unwillingness to preserve state sovereignty over a greater moral good. The act of 
intervention is less problematic than the consequences of conflict. Therefore the question 
is less frequently whether to intervene, but who is to intervene and how.
The intervention and conflict resolution literatures on peace processes are also converging
complex emergencies and international aid," in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, (eds.) 
War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, 
London: Zed Books, 1994.
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with research produced and inspired by experience in the field. This draws heavily from 
activities already underway in a number of specific countries. Consequently, research in 
post-conflict transitions often takes the form of field reports, evaluations of programmes 
and operations, and inventories of activities and recommendations. This in turn is 
generating demand for more case-study research as a basis for comparative analysis from 
which general lessons and recommendations on 'best practices' can be drawn. The World 
Bank has produced studies on the transition from war to peace focussing on the problems 
of demobilising and reintegrating soldiers. The United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) has started a War-Torn Societies Project, while UNESCO has 
launched programmes embracing a culture of peace. In addition to the UN, the numbers and 
types of actors involved in post-conflict peace processes have multiplied to include NGOs, 
donors and regional organisations, who also produce and disseminate their own reports.
Nevertheless, there are a few underlying problems with these studies on the peace process 
and the research that results from it. First, almost all of these policy prescriptions contain 
concepts such as capacity-building, good governance, civil society, or multi-party 
democracy which are used loosely, yet are upheld as a kind of scripture that is not debated 
or contested. Second, there is an underlying premise of social engineering, that the right 
policy, rightly implemented will lead to the right outcome. What is involved is a technical 
process relying on the efficient implementation of an inventory or recipe of activities.50 
Thus a new form of discourse constructed on this recipe of acceptable concepts and 
activities is circulating amongst field personnel, agencies and research institutes, policy- 
makers and scholars. These ideas in turn are reinforcing and encouraging the continuation 
of activities in transition countries that are already in operation. As a result, experts on the 
various components of the peace process are converging into a specialised industry based 
on their knowledge and experience in implementing these concepts and activities. As a 
direct consequence, both the discourse and practice of external third party intervention into
50United Nations Task Force, An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building 
Activities, New York, NY: United Nations Department for Economic and Social 
Information and Policy Analysis, 1996.; Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo 
Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1996.
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peace processes are being systematically de-politicised.
By focussing on technical activities, the peace process industry has mobilised notions of 
conflict, democracy, or peace-building that de-emphasise their political significance. The 
political content of peace and the peace process is not fully recognised because the target 
of this assistance receives less attention than the nature of third party activities. The objects 
of post-conflict activities or the target in the sense of both the "the thing which is having 
something done to it by an outside actor and that part of the target at which the intervention 
is aimed"51 is rarely the central or primary object of analysis. This seems to confirm King's 
idea of narcissistic intervention. King suggests that "external involvement is sometimes 
judged less in terms of its impact on the termination of the conflict and more in terms of 
its effects on the intervening state or coalition of states... with questions about the long-term 
effects of external involvement pushed to the back of the queue."52 A positive outcome in 
the target country is presumed, whereas the impact on intervening actors and their 
credibility is examined or problematised.
While two dimensions of the target of intervention have been considered, the sovereign 
state and violent conflict, the connections between them have not been fully explored in 
relation to intervention. One of the reasons explanations are unsatisfactory is that rarely do 
such explanations start from or focus on politics. Politics and the space in which it is 
conducted is overlooked in understanding the state, civil conflict and the target of 
intervention. This is problematic because contemporary civil conflicts are fundamentally 
contests over what constitutes political space, that is the norms, institutions and procedures 
which order and organise political life. Without basic agreement on this arrangement or 
system of norms, institutions and procedures, the exercise of politics is made difficult 
which prevents the management of conflict. By ignoring or retreating from politics, the 
activities of the peace process industry are likely to exacerbate tensions which fuel conflict, 
because what is at stake is how that society is politically organised.
51 Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, p. 5. 
52King, Ending Civil Wars, p. 12.
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Thus external third parties have an impact on conflict, but in doing so they also exert a 
formative influence on the configuration of political space. In other words, as Navari 
suggested, "implicit in the very idea of intervention is an outsider's entrance into a political 
space, "53 where the interveners or outsiders join the insiders. The peace process industry 
operates in the political space of another society and inevitably has a political impact on 
that space. It is not only the legal validity of the state, or a particular policy or activity of 
a state that is disrupted by intervention, but rather the totality of norms, structures and 
institutions which give meaning to politics. Intervention transgresses state sovereignty, but 
it also alters the state's relation to its society and society's relation to the state. According 
to Navari, "[o]ne of the reasons we are concerned about intervention is the external 
disruption to the real circumstances within which we live and the way we organise our 
activities."54 This takes place not only through the act of intervention, but as Anderson 
argued, in the procedures and practices of intervention which convey political ideas and 
influence the development of norms, values, expectations and attitudes. 55 However, this 
also takes place in an existing context of disruption occasioned by conflict creating a 
complex of discontinuities and confusion which conditions the impact of external 
intervention.
The aim of the thesis is to broaden the framework for looking at intervention in the 
transition from war to peace by looking at how the range of international actors and their 
activities involved in this transition impact on political space. Examining the impact of 
external third parties on political space reorients the framework for understanding 
intervention by focussing on the outcomes of the peace process for the target of 
intervention. In other words, the conceptual tools by which we understand the nature of the 
assistance that has been given, how we analyse and evaluate third parties and their 
activities, and of whether they have assisted the insiders relates to the question of political 
space. For the countries receiving international assistance, it is imperative to assess whether
"Cornelia Navari, "Intervention, Non-intervention and the Construction of the 
State,"in Forbes and Hoffman, Political Theory, p. 43.
54Navari, "Intervention, Non-Intervention" p. 44. 
55Anderson, Doing No Harm, p. 4.
25
this assistance leads to outcomes which are beneficial or not, whether in fact a transition 
to peace is being made.
The plan of the thesis
This thesis attempts to look at the role of external third parties in shaping political space 
through the example of Mozambique's transition from war to peace. Mozambique is used 
in the thesis as a case study in which to present and assess certain ideas. This work is not 
intended to be a comprehensive empirical record of events or a systematic examination of 
the process in Mozambique. The following analysis presents an overview of the whole 
process which may not satisfy someone interested in a particular aspect of the process, a 
particular international actor, or even with Mozambique itself. Within the constraints of the 
space available, the thesis aims to draw out a number of themes on the aggregate impact of 
external third parties on the reconfiguration of political space in Mozambique as a basis for 
drawing larger conclusions pertinent to other examples.
Mozambique has been selected as a case study because it is presented as a success, which 
justifies similar activities in future cases, particularly for the United Nations. Therefore it 
is crucial to examine whether the intervention was a success, what kind of success and a 
success for whom. As Mozambique was overrun by international actors engaged in every 
imaginable activity, supported by a substantial amount of funding, it serves as a useful 
example from which to study the peace process industry at work. Mozambique is also one 
of the poorest countries in the world, of which nine of the ten poorest are found in Sub- 
Saharan Africa,56 and is thus representative of larger processes and features in Africa and 
Africa's relationship to the developed world through donors and the United Nations. 
However, as with any case study, there are features specific to Mozambique. For example, 
Mozambique's conflict was primarily one between two belligerents, with few ethnic 
dimensions, which had many ideological overtones relating to apartheid South Africa and 
the Cold War. Second, the money that was available for Mozambique was a rare example
56The World Bank, World Development Report, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
1997.
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of donor largesse. Bearing these specificities in mind, Mozambique is still a useful case 
study for an explanation of the concentration of international actors in order to draw out 
themes for future comparative analysis.
Part I carries on the discussion introduced in this chapter. Chapter one explores the different 
conceptual approaches to post-conflict transitions, and assesses the impact of international 
actors during the transition from war to peace by explicitly focussing on the implementation 
of a peace agreement. However, unlike most approaches to post-conflict transitions, it 
argues that not only operational, but political assumptions underlie the process. A broader 
framework is needed. This is explored in chapter two which introduces the idea of political 
space and how it is structured by the state and its relationship to society. The transition from 
war to peace depends upon reconfiguring political space in order to create the conditions 
for the exercise of politics which is the basis for peace. It is in this political space that 
external actors operate during their intervention in the peace process and which they 
ultimately reshape in their attempts to help bring about peace.
Part II introduces the case study of Mozambique. Chapter three presents an overview of the 
history of Mozambique as a history of weak state and civil society formation with frequent 
external interventions. This extended historical narrative provides a much overlooked 
context in which to understand Mozambique as a society and political community and 
subsequently the war with Renamo. This is followed in chapter four by a narrative on the 
peace process negotiations, from 1983 to 1992, which culminated in the signing of the 
General Peace Agreement in Rome. It ends by giving a broad outline of the agreement and 
the roles to be played by the multiplicity of actors during the implementation. It sets out the 
three dimensions of the peace process which follow and explains why the economic 
dimension is not considered on its own but is woven throughout the text.
Part III looks at how the General Peace Agreement was implemented in Mozambique from 
1992 to 1995. It focuses on the three major components of the peace process in which 
external third parties were active: demilitarisation, humanitarian assistance and political 
assistance. Chapter five examines the process of demilitarisation which was a key
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component to the process and a key area of external third party participation. Chapter six 
focuses on the provision of humanitarian assistance where again international actors were 
heavily involved. This assistance was complicated by tensions between UN peacekeepers 
and humanitarian agencies, amongst the humanitarian actors themselves, and between 
international humanitarian actors and domestic political actors. Chapter seven focuses on 
the explicit political provisions and the assistance provided by external actors for the first 
multi-party elections in Mozambique. It highlights how the future shape of politics in 
Mozambique was influenced by the impact of international actors in encouraging or closing 
off political space and debate.
The conclusion draws attention to the limitations of intervention in post-conflict processes. 
It begins by evaluating the apparent success of the peace process in Mozambique, and the 
legacies of the peace process industry on Mozambique's political space. It explores the 
features and impact of the peace process industry and then assesses the framework for 
understanding intervention in peace processes. The assistance external third parties extend 
to countries making the transition from war to peace is limited by their own operational 
shortcomings and by the political space in which they intervene. Drawing from the example 
of Mozambique, the peace process industry needs a greater awareness of its innately 
political nature in order to understand, evaluate and accommodate the inevitable impact on 
political space in such a way that sustains and consolidates peace. However, if this political 
impact is not recognised, and if the limitations of what intervention can accomplish are not 
respected, then a strong case can be made against external intervention in post-conflict 
transitions.
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CHAPTER ONE
The peace process industry: bringing back the political
There appears to be an assumption that societies in conflict cannot independently make the 
transition from war to peace. It is almost unthinkable for any aspect of the peace process 
to take place without the participation of at least one international actor, although most 
often there are many. When civil wars end through a peace settlement, the presence of 
external third party actors is frequently built into the mechanisms for implementing 
agreements during negotiations. After agreements are signed, the international community 
is actively involved in sustaining and consolidating peace. In recent years, the international 
community has assisted post-conflict peace processes in Mozambique, Cambodia, El 
Salvador, Namibia and more.
Because of their on-going and concentrated presence, external actors are comprising an 
industry working to promote, support and define peace processes around the world. 
However, there are as yet few standards on what this industry ought to be doing, how it 
should operate and how to evaluate its performance. Rather, those who comprise the 
industry have been deciding on an ad hoc basis the areas of activity to get involved in, how, 
and when. Three blueprints have entered the discourse on post-conflict assistance: the 
implementation of a peace agreement, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction or 
rebuilding war-torn societies. However these three approaches lack clear and coherent 
objectives and seem to revolve around checklists of similar activities. While the mandates 
of the peace process industry may be politically ambitious, they lack substance and 
coherence. The objectives of the peace process industry remain unclear because the industry 
does not fully appreciate the political implications of the transition from war to peace. 
International actors participating in peace processes do not sufficiently account for their 
innately political nature and their political impact on host societies.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section argues that international actors 
comprise a peace process industry and examines the actors in the industry, the activities
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they engage in, and the roles and functions they perform. The second section studies the 
three blueprints that are circulating amongst the actors in the industry: implementing peace 
settlements, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. After looking at the actors in 
the peace process industry and their objectives, the final section looks at the role of the 
industry in shaping the outcomes from a peace process. I argue that the peace process 
industry cannot account for these outcomes until they fully appreciate the different 
dimensions of their own political character. The subsequent chapters on Mozambique will 
elaborate on the political nature of the peace process industry in greater detail.
Is there a 'peace process industry ''?
To speak of an industry focussed on the peace process, rather than on any particular 
international actor, highlights the increasing numbers of such actors involved in peace 
processes around the world.2 As a direct consequence of the number, variety and 
concentration of international agencies and personnel operating in a country making the 
transition from war to peace, the significance of this collective presence extends beyond the 
performance and operation of any single actor. Collectively, many such actors have an 
aggregate impact on society which may not have been intended or desired. This is not to 
suggest that these actors work towards a common goal or share the same values and 
intentions, although 'peace' is the affirmed objective. The industry is a loose and inchoate 
collection of international actors, but to constitute these actors as an industry draws 
attention to a shared perspective as the providers of assistance in relation to the host society, 
the recipients. It also points to the relationships and tensions amongst those who comprise 
the industry and their varied interests, while focussing attention on the 'peace process' 
above other activities.
'The 'peace process' is an all-encompassing phrase. I am primarily concerned with 
what happens after negotiations have produced an agreement which involves two or 
more parties in reconstructing political society.
2This section draws from the argument put forward by James Ferguson with respect 
to the operation of a development industry. James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 
'Development', depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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The combination of a prodigious number of actors, the volume and breadth of activities, the 
amount of money and resources being spent, and the number of peace processes that are 
taking place, all suggest that the industry is growing. But the survival and growth of this 
industry is not tied to the success or failure of a particular peace process, but to the 
perceived demands of 'the peace process'. Certain states, organisations and individuals are 
building up experience and developing an expertise on the general mechanics of peace 
processes which is applied from process to process. The idea of an industry highlights the 
fact that these actors and the activities they engage in are becoming more professional and 
institutionalised, acquiring more practical and technical experience. While some 
organisations have emerged specifically to engage in peace processes, it is more frequently 
the case that old ones have reoriented and expanded their remit to include the demands of 
post-conflict activities. In either case, there are numerous offices, bureaucratic systems, and 
a network of experts moving from agency to agency, and from process to process, 
specialising in 'the peace process'. 3 Although there are country specialists, neither the 
industry, nor any particular actor, is tied to a specific process, but retains the option of 
pulling out and participating in the next process.
The peace process, in other words, provides a point of entry for international actors to 
operate in another society without a permanent or sustained presence. The idea of an 
industry highlights this distinction between external actors4 and a society directly affected 
by the peace process and its consequences, not only parties to conflict, but the political 
values, institutions and procedures which structure society. Although most international 
actors involved in peace processes rarely interpret their role as political, as an institution, 
they produce political effects. Looking at international actors as an industry suggests that
3Personnel often overlap through secondment from resident development agencies to 
peace operations, while some personnel move from operation to operation. Personnel 
from UNAVEMI in Angola and UNTAC in Cambodia were directly transferred to 
ONUMOZ.
4The peace process industry excludes domestic actors since such actors are tied to a 
specific peace process and participation in other peace processes would transform them 
into external actors. The external dimension of these actors draws attention to their ad 
hoc and 'neutral' quality. External actors sometimes form partnerships with local NGOs 
for greater legitimacy to implement programmes.
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the collective resources, personnel and knowledge of the industry are generating forms of 
power in relation to the recipients of international assistance which may constitute a form 
of intervention. Questions of power and discrepancies between plans and outcomes are 
associated not only with a peace process, but is more readily apparent with development. 
Ferguson has suggested that with respect to development, the "outcomes of planned social 
interventions can end up coming together into powerful constellations of control that were 
never intended and in some cases never even recognized, but are all the more effective for 
being 'subjectless'."5 This observation holds as much to peace processes as it does to 
development, but in a peace process the subjects of intervention encompass the entire 
society and its political organisation.
This section describes the leading actors in the industry, the three main types of activities 
they engage in, and the roles that are undertaken. It presents a picture of what the industry 
does in any given peace process.
THE ACTORS
The peace process industry comprises four main types of actors, all of whom were active 
in Mozambique: international organisations, states, non-state actors and international 
financial institutions. International organisations involved in peace processes include the 
United Nations and other regional organisations. The UN is the most actively involved 
organisation with a number of its agencies involved in post-conflict assistance and peace- 
building. The Secretary-General instigates and oversees UN peace operations, particularly 
through his special representative on the ground. He is supported by and receives a mandate 
from the Security Council; while operationally, many activities take place through the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance and the Department of Political Affairs, not to mention other accounting, 
procurement and management divisions. Other UN specialised agencies active in the field 
in any one process include UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and WHO.
5Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 19.
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The second category comprises individual states, whether regional powers, donor agencies, 
or the former superpowers. While neighbouring states may be crucial players in a peace 
process, they are not necessarily part of the industry unless they consistently participate in 
different processes and in a technical not just political capacity. In other words, the 
participation of West African states in ECOMOG in Liberia does not qualify them as part 
of the industry unless these states consistently participate in African peacekeeping 
continent-wide. Rather, the states that dominate the industry are primarily Western, 
developed and 'peaceful'. These states have developed an institutional capacity and 
memory for participation in post-conflict peace processes, but they are not one unified 
actor. They comprise several components including government leaders, the ministry of 
foreign affairs, the department of defence, development agencies, and their field level 
representatives. Donor agencies and the development community have been taking an 
active interest in leading the peace-building agenda to establish the principles and 
procedures for post-conflict assistance.6
The third category are non-state actors, individuals and consultants, religious groups, 
private sector firms and in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs refer 
to a wide range of organisations, but distinctions must be drawn between '"the big eight' 
that control half the US$ 8 billion market for NGOs,"7 and the thousands of smaller 
organisations proliferating at any given time. Although some NGOs are primarily 
concerned with conflict resolution, most international NGOs involved in post-conflict 
activities tend to be either relief, development or human rights organisations reorienting 
themselves to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, such as MSF, OXFAM, and
6Nicole Ball with Tammy Halevy, Making Peace Work: The Role of the International 
Development Community, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996, is 
one example from the donor community attempting to develop an agenda for peace- 
building. See also OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co­ 
operation, Paris: OECD, 1997.
7The big eight are CARE, World Vision International, OXFAM, MSF, Save the 
Children Federation, CIDSE (Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la 
Solidarite), the Coalition of Catholic NGOs, APDOVE (Association of Protestant 
Development Organizations in Europe), and Eurostep (Secular European NGOs). See 
Riva Krut, Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision- 
Making, UNRISD Discussion Paper 83, Geneva, April 1997, fn 29.
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CARE. These NGOs set up their own offices in the field and recruit local staff, while 
coordinating with headquarters in their home countries. The private sector may also play 
a role, for example in Mozambique, LONRHO, which had commercial interests across 
Africa, facilitated access to Renamo and offered many inducements and encouragements 
to Renamo to keep them in the negotiating process.
A fourth category of actors, whose role in a peace process is rarely made explicit, are 
international financial institutions. Although most peace agreements do not refer to the 
World Bank, the IMF, or Club of Paris, their ad hoc participation often conditions the 
feasibility of the transition process. The parallel participation of these powerful actors in 
financing activities, devising macroeconomic policy and setting limits on spending, is a 
fundamental part of post-conflict processes which does not receive enough attention. This 
poses problems because of the potential for an economic process to overlap with, or even 
threaten a peace process. This occurred in El Salvador, where the UN-sponsored peace 
process was at risk from the objectives of the IMF, World Bank and other UN agencies. El 
Salvador was faced with the dilemma of instituting ambitious reforms in the peace 
agreement or implementing a rigorous economic stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programme.8 It is important to detect when and how economic and financial institutions 
participate in a post-conflict transition in order to understand their likely impact.
Which actors become involved in a peace process depends on the context of a conflict, but 
certain actors such as the UN, major donors and larger NGOs are involved more frequently 
than others and dominate the industry. Actors differ according to their motives, mandate, 
constituencies, prestige, capacity, expertise, resources and leverage, but also the interests, 
values and goals they are trying to promote. This plurality is exacerbated by the multiple 
identities and functions assumed by any one actor in a process, for example, a state may be 
a donor agency, a funding agency to NGOs, and a diplomatic personality through the UN. 
These diverse actors operate by setting up local offices, work according to their own 
operational procedures including processes for budgeting, accounting, recruiting and
8Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding,"Fore/g« 
Policy, No. 94, Spring 1994, p. 70.
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evaluating projects. It has been noted that relief agencies "[spawn] bureaucratic structures, 
lines of communication and organizational cultures which duplicate development 
institutions and sometimes cut across them."9 The relationship and interaction amongst 
these actors is as important a factor as the actors themselves. Relations amongst external 
actors often reflect a combination of competition and coordination, both personal and 
institutional. Given that a combination of actors are typically engaged in a variety of 
capacities at different times, there are often overlapping and unclear mandates, conflicts 
between coordinating and executing agencies, and other tensions amongst the array of 
actors. Although all claim the need for greater coordination and integration, few in fact 
want to be coordinated because of contrasting operating styles and the need to compete for 
funding, media and public attention.
THE ACTIVITIES 10
Drawing from the experience in Mozambique and the limited research on this subject, there 
appears to be a standard package of activities deployed in process to process. Analysis of 
these activities has mainly taken place in evaluations of assistance programmes, 
compilations of lessons learned, and lists of recommendations and guidelines for best 
practices produced by the external interveners themselves. Although there is no apparent
'Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Simon Maxwell, "Linking Relief and Development: 
An Introduction and Overview," in IDS Bulletin, 25 (4), 1994, p. 2.
10This survey is based on United Nations Task Force, Inventory on Post-Conflict 
Peace-building Activities, New York, NY: United Nations Department for Economic 
and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1996; Ball, Making Peace Work; Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1992; Krishna Kumar, (ed.) 
Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict; Nat J. 
Colletta, Markus Kostner, Ingo Wiederhofer, Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: 
The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and 
Uganda, Discussion Paper No. 331, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996, p. xiii, 
and The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1996; J. David Whaley and Barbara Piazza-Georgi, "The Linkage 
Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding," in Mark Malan, (ed.) Conflict Management, 
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past, ISS 
Monograph Series, No. 10, p. 74.
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consensus on how to categorise them, for analytical purposes it will serve here to 
distinguish three main spheres of activities. These are (1) military/security, (2) 
humanitarian/social and (3) political/electoral. This section briefly outlines each of these 
dimensions and discusses the relationship amongst them as part of the framework for the 
following discussion of the peace process in Mozambique.
The military/security dimension is concerned with removing the threat of and recourse to 
violence. There are two main priorities: upholding cease-fire arrangements to ensure that 
fighting has stopped and preventing the resumption of fighting. The first involves 
monitoring cease-fires, reporting violations, and ensuring compliance to provisions on the 
movement and activities of troops. The second includes a range of activities from removing 
foreign forces, assembling and demobilising combatants, disarming and destroying 
weaponry, monitoring security and police forces to restructuring national armed forces and 
integrating former combatants as in Mozambique. Meeting the needs of child, disabled or 
women soldiers, and reintegrating ex-combatants back into society follows on from 
demobilisation, but can also be a part of the humanitarian sphere. It is intended that through 
the security provisions, confidence and trust is built into the process to reinforce and 
consolidate peace. Reducing the threat of violence is a precondition for the social and 
political components by restoring a degree of security for people to return, resume their way 
of life and rebuild social and political institutions, but it also depends on progress in other 
spheres to build confidence.
The second dimension, the humanitarian/social category, focuses on emergency needs and 
on the long-term development needs of society. International actors are heavily involved 
in providing emergency relief such as delivering food aid and medical care. They are also 
involved in rebuilding society, by relocating and reintegrating dislocated segments of the 
population found either within the country or in neighbouring countries. This might involve 
repatriating refugees, reuniting families, assisting women and children and healing society 
through reconciliation and rebuilding trust. It frequently includes the removal of land mines 
and overlaps with the first dimension by dealing with the reintegration of former 
combatants and meeting the needs of vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.
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It often involves the rehabilitation of basic services, from health and sanitation, schools, 
water sources, roads, houses, to economic production and distribution. It could also include 
reforms in the social sector to improve the design and delivery of basic services. In 
Mozambique, very few activities within the humanitarian/social sphere were not undertaken 
by different international agencies.
The political/electoral component of a peace process also comprises many things: the 
political management of the process; reconciliation between the parties; institution building, 
and an electoral process leading to multi-party elections. International actors often 
supervise, monitor and organise peace processes. They may also assist in the reunification 
of territorial administration, create truth commissions, encourage and pressure democratic 
processes and greater press freedom. Rebuilding political institutions might involve 
providing assistance on writing or rewriting constitutions, monitoring human rights, 
creating war crimes tribunals, reviving justice systems and regulating or training civilian 
police. The electoral process involves external actors in everything from building political 
parties, rewriting the electoral law, promoting civic education, and holding elections. As 
in Mozambique, multi-party elections are often the culmination of a peace process which 
require the completion of military and humanitarian dimensions before proceeding, 
otherwise the possibility of violence may disrupt or challenge the political outcome.
These three sets of activities are outlined in peace settlements, peacekeeping mandates and 
operational mandates of different external actors subsequent to an agreement which may 
result in overlap, duplication and confusion. Although each dimension is a distinct sphere 
of activity, no activity can be seen in isolation from the others, both temporally and 
substantially. Delays in the process of demobilisation affect the confidence, timing and 
outcome of the entire process, while elections before complete demobilisation may lead to 
renewed violence. Similarly rebuilding political institutions and starting up development 
activities makes little sense unless acknowledging financial constraints. Sometimes 
elections overshadow other aspects of a peace process, to the detriment of securing 
complete demobilisation and disarmament. The long-term objective of development 
overlaps with and overshadows the whole process and thus the duration of these activities
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may extend beyond the official process itself. These activities will be further elaborated in 
the chapters on Mozambique detailing these spheres of activities.
Underlining all three kinds of activities is an economic and financial dimension. Economic 
and financial considerations are not ignored, but the overall economic implications of and 
for a peace process are rarely made explicit. This economic factor takes two forms: the need 
to finance the various components of the peace process, and the more structural need to 
provide for long term development to sustain peace. These economic conditions and the 
access to financial resources often determine the success of the transition from war to peace 
because of the obvious constraints it places on political action. But as economic 
considerations are important throughout the entire transition from war to peace, it 
constitutes an underlying context or condition rather than a discreet kind of activity. 
Presently, financial commitments from donor agencies and international financial 
institutions remain ad-hoc and short term which reflect donor preferences to maintain 
flexibility and sometimes their reluctance to carry the financial burden.
It is not clear from this outline of activities, what the priorities are, the balance amongst the 
three categories, or how to deal with contradictions between them. These dilemmas are a 
product of the nature of the industry which has little regulation or direction, yet is engaged 
in all manner of activity, reaching all aspects of society. According to an UNRISD study,
[cjonfusion exists as to the relative policy mix with which the international 
community should intervene in post-conflict situations: how to integrate 
into one coherent approach different tools and forms of action 
(humanitarian, developmental, political, military) so that they reinforce each 
other rather than operate independently or against each other, and how to 
simultaneously pursue relief, development, political and security objectives 
within one coherent and efficient policy approach."
Often this is determined less by the needs of the recipients and more by practical 
considerations for the international actors that some activities are easier to fund than others. 
For example, integrating national armies is considered to be an important part of the 
process, but donors maybe unable to provide financing because of legal restrictions on
'' Problems of International Assistance in Post-Conflict Situations cited in Whaley 
and Piazza-Georgi, "The Linkage Between," p. 72.
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supporting foreign armies. 12 Similarly, support for the reform of the internal security sector 
is "outside the mandate of practically all NGOs, most IGOs, and most relief agencies. In 
fact, many bilateral agencies are prohibited by law from giving assistance to police."13 At 
present, international actors engage in most kinds of activities according to the perceived 
demands of a peace process at the time. However, focussing on the activities of the peace 
process industry keeps the focus on international agencies and not the recipients of their 
assistance and whether the outcomes from this assistance meet the needs of those receiving 
it. This preoccupation and lack of attention respectively is based on understandings of the 
role of the peace process industry in the process.
THE ROLES 14
Through these activities, international actors perform different roles in relation to the 
protagonists of a peace process. It is frequently argued that the presence of international 
actors facilitates the compliance of belligerents to an agreement and increases the chances 
for a successful peace process by offering encouragement and support, demonstrating 
concern and commitment, providing a catalyst for the process and helping to sustain its 
momentum. This section highlights some of the different roles they assume.
The most basic role is to monitor the implementation of an agreement or the progress of a 
peace process by verifying whether each party has fulfilled its commitment to the 
provisions in an agreement. External parties also ensure that the parties refrain from 
violating the terms and spirit of an agreement and give explanations for non-compliance.
I2ln Mozambique US AID was unable to provide financial assistance to the assembly 
areas because some combatants would join the new army. This problem was resolved by 
limiting assistance to the percentage of soldiers expected to demobilise. See Kimberly 
Mahling Clark, "The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Perspectives from 
US AID" Africa Today, 1 st and 2nd Quarters, 1995, pp. 50-51.
' 3Kumar, Rebuilding Societies After Civil War, p. 13.
14An outline of third party roles can be found in Christopher Mitchell, "The processes 
and stages of mediation: Two Sudanese Cases," in David R. Smock, (ed.) Making War 
and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1993, pp. 139-159.
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This function serves to reassure each party that other parties are meeting their obligations, 
thereby minimising the costs of participation. A monitoring function is seen as an important 
but passive role. In Angola, many observers blamed the collapse of the Bicesse process to 
a weak and limited monitoring role for the UN. A slightly more active role is to supervise 
the process. This can mean a number of things. In Cambodia, "the UN effort was defined 
in the peace agreement as strictly supervisory; the combatants themselves were responsible 
for confining and disarming their troops. Although the demobilisation failed, the UN was 
able to carry out an election."15 But Cambodia also demonstrated the extent of supervisory 
powers as UNTAC exercised control over all aspects of the process including civil 
administration, military functions, elections and human rights. 16 The UN operation in 
Mozambique attempted to bridge the roles of monitoring and supervising the process by 
chairing the working body created in the peace agreement to manage the process.
In performing any of these functions, such actors legitimate the process and help 
adversaries accept the process and outcome "by adding prestige to the procedure, 
...lendfing] their symbolic weight and prestige to endorse and legitimize the agreement, 
making its acceptance by constituencies more likely and enhancing its stability and 
probable longevity."17 By providing resources and incentives in the settlement package to 
induce the parties to follow the process through, external third parties can be seen as 
patrons of the process or as Stedman suggests "custodians of peace."18 They sometimes 
offer guarantees on the process, providing insurance against possible breakdowns of the 
process "by lowering the risks to the warring parties of entering and remaining in the peace
15Stephen John Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and 
Strategy," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, (eds.) Beyond Traditional 
Peacekeeping, London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 43.
16Carlyle A. Thayer, "The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The 
Restoration of Sovereignty," in Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando, 
(eds.) Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold 
War Conflicts, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 151.
l7Mitchell, "The Processes and Stages," p. 145.
1 "Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International 
Security, 22(2), Fall 1997, p. 6.
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process." 19 Outside parties can also take a more forceful role by enforcing the terms of the 
agreement should the antagonists fail to meet their obligations. As enforcers, they police 
behaviour by adversaries and impose sanctions for non-performance or non-compliance of 
agreed terms of the settlement.20
International actors also take on more overtly political roles by facilitating dialogue, 
convening discussions, chairing talks, interpreting statements, communicating positions, 
providing ideas and solutions, exploring compromises etc. Quite often external actors are 
called on to referee disagreements, assist in long term reconciliation, help to build new 
relationships, bridge distrust and reduce suspicion. They also provide technical assistance 
in institution building, holding elections, campaigning, and writing constitutions. External 
actors may even assist weaker parties or insurgents in developing the political skills and 
organisational capacity necessary to fulfil their obligations in the agreement. In 
Mozambique, for example, the UN set up a controversial trust fund to finance Renamo's 
transformation into a political party.
These multi-faceted and multi-functional roles are usually combined and assumed by 
various actors. The assignment of roles to different parties can result from requests by the 
combatants, be found in the terms of a peace settlement or be outlined in mandates for 
peacekeeping operations. Others arise from the dynamics of the process and the demands 
that may arise such as overcoming deadlocks and maintaining momentum. The nature of 
these roles and the combination of actors involved depend on the nature of the objectives 
guiding actors in the peace process industry which is the subject of the next section.
l9Gerardo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, "Civil conflicts and the conditions for 
successful intervention: a comparative study of Cambodia and El Salvador,"/?ev/ew of 
International Studies, 21(2), p. 160.
20Mitchell, "The Processes and Stages," p. 147.
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The objectives of a post-conflict peace process
The first section provided a lengthy description of the actors, activities and roles of the 
peace process industry in any given process. What has not been made clear yet is what are 
the objectives of the international community in a post-conflict peace process? There are 
three difficulties in answering this question. First, it is difficult to speak of collective 
objectives of the peace process industry as a whole, as the industry is unregulated and 
disaggregated. Contradictions and tensions amongst different actors are built into the 
industry. Second, the actors in the industry are also not clear in what they seek to achieve. 
Third, it is difficult to synthesise the vast array of activities and claim that they cohere into 
one kind of approach or another. Nevertheless, within the emerging literature on peace 
processes, three constructs or blueprints are shaping the discourse on post-conflict 
assistance. These three blueprints are (1) implementing a peace agreement, (2) peace- 
building, and (3) post-conflict reconstruction or rebuilding war-torn societies. This section 
attempts to identify the objectives defining each approach, how each approach corresponds 
to the peace process, and the connections and overlaps between them.
IMPLEMENTING A PEACE AGREEMENT
In recent peace processes, external third parties have assisted a number of countries 
implement their peace agreements. Although 'implementing a peace agreement' is the least 
clear construct since it refers to an activity moreso than an objective, it is most closely 
associated with the peace process. A post-conflict peace process begins with the signing of 
an agreement and ends when the conditions in the agreement have been met, often taking 
no more than one to a few years. Thus on one level, a peace process is defined by, limited 
to, and structured by an agreement and how it is to be implemented. On another level, the 
actual progress of a peace process is shaped by the dynamics of the process and 
international actors frequently become involved in ways unforeseen by an agreement. 
Although a few people have written on the role of the international community in making 
peace settlements work, the ideas generated thus far are derived mostly from the practice 
of implementing agreements in specific cases. This section attempts to generalise the
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features, objectives and boundaries of implementing a peace agreement by discussing the 
nature of agreements and the process of implementing them.
Although there is a broad range of peace agreements, the focus of this thesis is on complex 
and comprehensive settlements that encompass a wide range of objectives, activities, 
procedures and structures to 'end' conflicts, not just the fighting. It is only with this kind 
of ambitious agreement that it is possible to speak of a post-conflict phase, suggesting that 
violent conflict has effectively stopped. Comprehensive agreements contain objectives 
relating to the three main dimensions of security, humanitarian and political activities. They 
detail provisions securing the end of conflict, through the demobilisation of armies, the 
reintegration of ex-soldiers, and the creation of impartial security structures. They may also 
include objectives relating to refugees, land reform, and economic development. Most 
agreements outline explicit political goals, from setting up truth commissions to creating 
new forms of government. Various agreements in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Mozambique, included all of the above, along with the objective of holding multi-party 
elections.
Peace settlements also outline mechanisms for carrying out these objectives and sometimes 
contain transitional institutional frameworks detailing the management of the process. They 
detail how objectives in the agreement are to be realised and provide benchmarks on 
whether parties have met their obligations. In so doing, agreements specify the parties in 
the process, and confer on them specific responsibilities, obligations and concessions to 
facilitate their compliance. Good agreements also establish norms and values for the parties 
to live up to. Agreements set deadlines, give order to activities, and link success in one area 
to the start of another. It is in the technical detail, the modalities of an agreement, that the 
role of the peace process industry is introduced. In addition to the roles they undertake, 
international actors provide technical assistance by helping parties to implement their 
agreements. International actors also provide financial assistance, even though agreements 
rarely clarify the financial details of the process or long term economic need.
The process of implementing an agreement revolves around two things, the agreement and
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the dynamics of the process. No matter how comprehensive the negotiations, no agreement 
can anticipate all the issues preoccupying the antagonists. It is during implementation that 
there is a fuller appreciation of the interests, goals and strategies by the parties, as they 
realise what has been lost and gained at the table and the implications of their 
commitments. Every agreement also contains elements which prove to be unrealistic. What 
might appear good on paper becomes complicated or inconvenient in reality. Monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms may be inadequate or unsuited to the conditions on the 
ground. An ambitious framework within which the conflicting parties attempt to reconstruct 
society and address the underlying causes of conflict may overwhelm the capacities of the 
parties and institutions. During negotiations, the pressure to reach consensus can force 
compromises in order to overcome deadlocks in discussion, or it may dictate that certain 
issues be overlooked. Peace agreements "include what they can get and omit what they 
can't. This is sensible as far as negotiation goes, but often results in a blueprint containing 
gaps and distortions which come back to haunt the implementors."21 Depending on the 
inclusiveness of the process, settlements may also exclude extremist factions, who threaten 
to disrupt the agreement during implementation.
These kinds of dilemmas were evident in Mozambique, Angola and El Salvador. The 
Mozambican agreement contained an ambitious timetable which required the completion 
of demobilisation, repatriation and elections within 12 months in conditions of near 
complete destruction. In the case of Angola, one US adviser to the 1990-91 peace talks,
admitted that the demobilization and integration of armies was an 
afterthought to the successful negotiations of the Bicesse accords. Unwilling 
to risk the progress made on other issues in the peace settlement and eager 
to generate momentum for peace, the mediators fudged the details of how 
demobilization and reintegration would take place.22
The consequence was a return to civil war. In another example, in El Salvador, the 'arms
21 Jonathan Moore, The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third 
World Transitions, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 
1996, p. 4.
22Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, "Peace Operations: From Short- 
Term to Long-Term Commitment," International Peacekeeping, 3(2), Summer 1996, p.
25.
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for land deal' was intended to demobilise and reintegrate former combatants into society 
through the transfer of land. Although not seeking to institute land reform, it was suspended 
because it effectively required changes to deep-rooted economic and cultural traditions.
The implementation of agreements also depends on the dynamics of the process which 
alters expectations, perceptions and behaviour of the protagonists. "However deep the 
desire for peace, practical commitment to it depends on the belief that political goals can 
be realized though peaceful means."23 The implementation of a peace settlement tests this 
commitment and political will. Deadlocks, setbacks, and unforeseen disagreements during 
the process of implementation create new challenges and require timely interventions and 
assistance from the peace process industry to facilitate the ongoing compliance of the 
parties to their obligations in the agreement.
Thus it seems that the objectives of the international community are found within the 
agreement and the dynamics of the process. However, the objectives of the peace process 
industry are not only derived from an agreement apparently created by the protagonists. The 
peace process industry also helps to formulate those objectives by assisting in the design 
of the agreement during negotiation. Subsequently during implementation, in devising their 
own mandates and operational programmes, they reinterpret the agreement and may 
incorporate their own interests and agendas. In every reinterpretation, the role of 
international actors can be redefined and redefined in ways not always consistent with the 
agreement or what the host parties envisaged. In other words, there are frequent openings 
for international actors to inject their own ideas and objectives into the process which 
complicates implementation. International actors can also complicate the dynamics of the 
process and the timing of implementation by delaying deployment, concluding the process 
or withdrawing even if it is incomplete, or emphasising some components over others.
Focussing on the implementation of an agreement connects the peace process to a specific 
settlement and its implementation. Implementing a peace agreement is about getting to the
23 The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995. New York, NY: Department of 
Public Information, 1995, Introduction, p.68.
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end of the process by fulfilling the terms of the agreement. This suggests that implementing 
a peace agreement is a technical rather than a political process which focusses on the 
concrete modalities of implementation in the short term. The problem with favouring the 
short term demands of an immediate transition is that it neglects longer term structures and 
processes needed to consolidate peace. Some scholars query whether the implementation 
of an agreement is the end of a peace process and argue that the peace process should be 
extended beyond the limits set out in an agreement. Given the breadth and scope of the 
activities involved, the objectives of the peace process encompass more than just technical 
implementation, they also imply ambitions of peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction.
THE IDEA OF PEACE-BUILDING
The problem of setting limits for the implementation phase suggests that this construct may 
not encompass all the objectives of the post-conflict phase. An alternative approach is the 
idea of post-conflict peace-building which aims to remove the root causes of conflict and 
create structures that will consolidate peace. The concept of post-conflict peace-building 
emerged in reference to United Nations activities, and follows the sequential activities of 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. As articulated by Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, post-conflict peace-building refers to "actionfs] to identify 
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict."24 He adds its goal is "the construction of a new environment... 
[where] sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and 
humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation."25 However, 
peace-building is no longer the preserve of the UN, it is a general objective aiming to 
sustain and consolidate peace which does not have to take place through a peace agreement. 
Peace-building can begin in pre-conflict situations, or before an agreement has been signed 
to add pressure to negotiations. In other words, peace-building does not necessarily result 
from a violent conflict or a peace process.
24Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 32. 
25Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 33.
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Although the concept of peace-building implies a more abstract and ambitious approach 
based on the notion of peace, thus far, there do not appear to be many serious attempts to 
define peace itself. With the exception of a few peace scholars who define peace-building 
in relation to a process of social change and justice,26 most practitioners implementing the 
idea of peace-building focus on activities which are assumed will produce peace. The most 
illustrative example of this is a UN interdepartmental Task Force, assigned with the task 
of identifying the tools for post-conflict peace-building. This Task Force produced a 
comprehensive list of activities in An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities.27 
These were broadly divided into relief and humanitarian assistance; disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration; enhancement of human rights and building a participatory 
system of government; and rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. UN Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan has since defined peace-building as "the creation or strengthening of 
national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for 
reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed 
development."28 Both the Task Force and the Secretary-General left open the strategy for 
how these activities were to be accomplished and the delegation of responsibility amongst 
actors and agencies.29
However, this focus on activities, which again appears to be technical in orientation, leads 
to practical and conceptual overlaps with peacekeeping. Multi-functional, second- 
generation UN peacekeeping operations now include tasks relating to electoral support, 
humanitarian assistance in the return of refugees and displaced persons and disaster-relief
26Ronald J. Fisher, "The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from 
Peacekeeping to Peacemaking," Peace and Change, 18(3), July 1993, p. 250.
27UN Task Force, An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities.
28Kofi Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa, Report of the UN Secretary General, New York, 
April 1998, Paragraph 63.
29Hence the criticism that "UN intervention in civil wars since 1989 has been dictated 
by humanitarian concerns, good intentions and assumptions of reasonableness on the 
part of warring factions. Absent has been a coherent strategy or understanding of 
peacemaking or peacebuilding in civil war." Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars," 
p. 50.
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operations, mine clearance, observation and verification of cease-fires, separation offerees, 
their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weaponry.30 There are 
clear parallels and overlaps between the functions of UN peacekeepers and the activities 
of peace-building which has generated tensions between military and development 
personnel. These definitions also bear a striking resemblance to the implementation phase. 
It could be argued that the implementation phase is a stage that precedes the more advanced 
idea of peace-building,31 but the objectives of consolidating peace and preventing the 
relapse into conflict are very much the goals of the implementation phase.
The increasing overlap of these concepts draws attention to the fact that the definition of 
peace-building is remarkably vague and expansive. There are no clear parameters to the 
concept to enable assessment of whether peace-building is successful or not. Cox observed 
of An Agenda for Peace that,
The section on peace-building... moves beyond immediate remedial 
measures to longer-term programmes when it discusses the need for 
agricultural, transportation and resource co-operation amongst states as a 
means of ensuring that the future likelihood of conflict is reduced/2
This confidence in economic and social development as the foundation for durable peace 
is based on an assumption that the root causes of conflict lie in the problems of 
underdevelopment and poverty which is not explained. On this assumption, it is argued that 
"without a greater emphasis on developmental practice and some of the philosophical 
precepts that underpin development, the UN is unlikely to arrive at a sophisticated, 
workable understanding of what it takes to reconstitute war-torn societies."33 If peace- 
building is in effect development, then peace-building is an indefinite process with no clear 
beginning or ending, or a distinguishable mandate.
30Mats Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281, London: Brasseys for 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 12.
31Nicole Ball takes this approach by dividing peace-building into transition and 
consolidation phases. See Making Peace Work.
32David Cox, Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the 
Secretary-General. Aurora Paper #20, Ottawa: Global Security Programme, 1993, p. 8.
33Jeremy Ginifer, "Development and the UN Peace Mission: A New Interface 
Required?" International Peacekeeping, 3(2), Summer 1996, pp. 11-12.
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Cox also observed that Agenda for Peace simultaneously argues that, "[t]here is an obvious 
connection between democratic practices -such as the rule of law and transparency in 
decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new stable 
political order."34 Peace is also liberal-democracy. Peace-building as democratisation 
appears to promote the values of liberal internationalism as the basis for peace. It is
in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that 
involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic 
organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in 
other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.35
Again, there are no clear markers clarifying when a democratic transition has been effected 
or why democracy sustains peace. Instituting democratic principles and multi-party 
elections may in fact destabilise peace and reconciliation because liberalfdemocracy 
revolves around contest and competition. Democratisation and development together 
suggests that "peace-building efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation-building; they 
seek to remake a state's political institutions, security forces, and economic 
arrangements."36 Nevertheless, these implicit definitions of peace as development and/or 
liberal-democracy have not been fully articulated or openly acknowledged. It is still unclear 
what the mandate for peace-building entails or why these particular political values ascribed 
to peace in fact produce peace.
REBUILDING WAR-TORN SOCIETIES AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
The third construct to understanding the objectives of a post-conflict transition process also 
overlaps with development by centring on the societies which are recovering from 
prolonged war. Many recent civil conflicts have taken place in poorer, underdeveloped 
nations. In addition to a post-conflict peace process, war-torn societies share many of the 
same challenges of development and reform processes with peaceful societies. War-torn
34Cox, Exploring An Agenda for Peace, p. 8.
35Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," 
International Security, 22(2), Fall 1997, p. 56.
36Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United 
Nations Peace Building," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(3), September 1995, p. 389.
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societies are nevertheless distinguished by
[t]he magnitude of the damage to infrastructure, depletion of human 
resources, militarization of society, low regime legitimacy, societal 
disruption, and institutional weakness [which places them] on a different 
plane from societies undergoing relatively peaceful transformation.37
In order to resume the normal challenges of development, there must be a transitional 
process of reconstructing, rebuilding or rehabilitating society. Although this process is more 
than a return to pre-conflict conditions, the underlying premise is one of transforming the 
physical conditions and structures of society.
The objectives of rebuilding war-torn societies concentrate on reversing the damage 
effected by war and reconstructing society. War-torn societies are distinguished by the 
destruction caused by war, in physical, human, economic, and political terms. In physical 
terms, transportation links such as roads, railways, and ports; power stations; buildings and 
homes; hospitals, schools and other institutions have been damaged or destroyed. Access 
to much of the country and people is usually restricted and remains treacherous in light of 
the indiscriminate scattering of land mines. Agricultural, resource and industrial production 
has declined or been destroyed, thereby weakening the economic capacity of the country 
to sustain itself and finance aspects of the settlement. Consequently, a country's financial 
resources are often depleted, leading to unsustainable foreign debts. The legacy of physical 
and economic destruction is exacerbated by the human cost of war, the overall loss of lives 
and the weariness, disaffection and psychological scars of those who survived. Moreover, 
the skills needed most to rebuild society have often been lost because the "[individuals 
with professional training such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and government officials are 
often targeted during civil wars."38 War-torn societies are also characterised by the erosion 
of authority structures, weak political institutions, and competing political organisations. 
The proliferation of the means to violence adds to general insecurity caused by a partially 
or wholly absent framework for governance, weak justice system and lack of civil and 
political order.
'Ball, Making Peace Work, p. 18. 
'Ball, Making Peace Work, p. 22.
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The comprehensive and exhaustive list of challenges included in post-conflict 
reconstruction reflects the broad and ambitious framework of thinking behind it. The World 
Bank has been developing a framework for post-conflict reconstruction that focuses on "the 
rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of the society..., the reconstruction of the 
enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society."39 Kumar's definition of 
rehabilitation of war-torn societies
involves redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority 
and the citizenry, revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social 
groups, creating a civil society in its broadest sense, promoting psycho- • 
social healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic policies and 
institutions that foster entrepreneurship and individual initiative.40
Kumar argues political rehabilitation is the most critical element in rebuilding war-torn 
societies, but although "the need for political rebuilding is widely recognized, the 
international community lacks a well-defined framework for political reform and 
reconstruction that can inform its interventions."41 These broad political objectives lack 
substance without further articulation of how the different dimensions of rehabilitation 
cohere together into peace. The World Bank's overall objectives "to facilitate the transition 
to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social 
development,"42 is applicable to everything and consequently means nothing.
Although this approach is concerned with identifying the needs of war-torn societies, it 
originates with external agencies seeking a framework for how they provide assistance.43 
Post-conflict reconstruction focuses on activities and programmes designed by external 
third party actors. The reason for this lies in the origins of post-conflict reconstruction: the
39The World Bank, A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997, p. iii.
40Kumar, Rebuilding Societies After Civil War, p. 2. 
4 'Kumar, Rebuilding Societies After Civil War, p. 4. 
42The World Bank, A Framework for World Bank Involvement, p. iii.
43Kumar's book, Rebuilding Societies After Civil War, focuses on the "challenges for 
the international community" and the "lessons learned for strategies for effective 
international involvement."
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Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan after World War Two; and 
emergency assistance in response to natural disasters in poorer countries. Emergency relief 
has expanded to include complex emergencies resulting from the combined impact of 
disasters, war, and famine. The increase in emergency assistance has drained resources from 
development assistance, leading practitioners to draw links between relief and 
development.44 The discourse on rehabilitating war-torn societies corresponds to the idea 
that there is a continuum from relief to development. It is an attempt by donor agencies to 
account for activities that qualify as neither strict emergency nor development assistance, 
but include elements of both and reaffirms the importance of development.
Focussing on war-torn societies also includes post-conflict situations without peace 
settlements through military victory of one side, as in the case of Uganda or Ethiopia. As 
a result, rehabilitating war torn societies is identified least with a peace process because it 
assumes that conflict has ended and there is a measure of security to begin reconstruction. 
But it is not clear when post-conflict reconstruction begins and when it can be assumed war 
has ended. As seen in Mozambique, many rehabilitation activities began before there was 
effective demobilisation of soldiers and disarmament during the implementation of the 
peace agreement. Rebuilding war-torn societies overlaps with both peace-building and the 
implementation of an agreement through the idea that peace is built through the 
rehabilitation of material conditions and services. Although there is a fuller appreciation 
of political outcomes found within this construct, there is not yet enough appreciation of 
the political implications of what they are trying to achieve. Moreover, post-conflict 
reconstruction focuses mainly on what has been destroyed, it does not account for what has 
been created, that is the changes to society wrought by war including new winners and 
losers in society.
All three blueprints outline broad areas of activities which are presumed will lead to peace 
and are based on practical experiences in conflict-afflicted countries. International 
assistance in a peace process will combine elements of all three. Although the terms of
44See IDS Bulletin, Issue on Linking Relief and Development, 25(4), 1994.
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discourse and the emphasis differ, these constructs are often used interchangeably.45 Other 
times they represent distinct stages in an overall process, where the transition from war to 
peace begins with the implementation of a peace agreement, incorporates the objectives of 
peace-building, and is superceded by the rehabilitation of society. What these definitional 
and conceptual problems demonstrate is that an effective and coherent strategy for 
undertaking these activities is still absent. Consequently, there is a danger that in the 
absence of a coherent strategy, external actors are tempted to do everything simultaneously. 
Anthony Lake has warned that
it is vital that careful attention be paid to priorities in reconstruction 
planning - that in every case there be a clear strategy rather than merely a 
summons to every possible task. As a number of private commissions and 
study groups have shown, when the needs are so great it is tempting to call 
for a massive effort to resolve all the problems at once. But an effort to do 
everything quickly will inevitably lead to waste, confusion and disillusion.46
This scenario occurred in Mozambique where the whole range of actors in the peace 
process industry engaged in numerous activities with little cross-sector or long term 
integration which left a legacy of incomplete and unsustainable projects across the country.
To attempt to take on every task effectively leads to taking over the administration of 
another society. Assuming such vast powers within another society often leads to 
unforeseen problems, but to attempt to do so haphazardly is potentially more threatening 
to peace. A framework that concentrates only on activities and objectives is incomplete if 
it does not account for outcomes. After discussing the peace process industry, then its 
objectives, the final section considers the outcomes of a peace process and the role of the 
peace process industry in shaping these outcomes.
45These three concepts were used interchangeably in Mozambique, while the process 
was structured along sectoral activities. Thus the following chapters on the peace 
process in Mozambique are structured along the three dimensions of activities rather 
than any of these blueprints.
46Anthony Lake, "After the Wars - What kind of peace?", in Anthony Lake, (ed.) 
After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern 
Africa and the Horn of Africa, Oxford: Transactions Publishers, 1990, p. 16.
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Problematising the outcomes from a peace process: bringing back the political
The poorly articulated objectives and inadequate strategic framework for realising them put 
forward by the peace process industry are carried through to understandings of the 
outcomes from a peace process. It often appears that the peace process has one outcome: 
success or failure. This success or failure is defined by the peace process industry mostly 
in terms of their own participation. It is based on a preoccupation with themselves which 
supports King's idea of narcissistic intervention. This section seeks to problematise this 
current framework of how to evaluate the outcomes from a peace process and seeks to 
proffer a more complete framework.
Many writers see the role of external third parties as pivotal to the success of a peace 
process. Hampson and Crocker argue that third parties "have a critical role to play in 
nurturing peace," because very often "[wjithout outsiders to sustain the settlement through 
several years of implementation, the underlying agreements would have collapsed."*7 The 
outcome from a peace process depends on the performance of external actors. Hampson 
argues that "it takes strong support and unified political direction from outside actors to 
help the parties realize their desire for peace."48 Although Hampson offers a definition of 
success as "directly related to a society's ability to make an effective transition from a state 
of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the re-emergence of civil 
society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions,"49 his work focuses 
almost exclusively on the argument that "success and failure are indeed linked to the quality 
and level of support given by third parties to the peace process, especially during the 
implementation of an agreement."50 He does not make clear how the latter contributes to 
securing the former. The implication of his argument, is that if a peace process is neglected 
by international actors, it is more prone to collapse and failure. Hampson argues that
47Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," 
Foreign Policy, No. 104, Fall 1996, p. 55, 57.
48Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail? 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p. 206.
49Hampson, Nurturing Peace, p. 10. 
50Hampson, Nurturing Peace, p. 210.
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"[settlements that fail have generally been 'orphaned,' because third parties either failed 
to remain fully engaged in implementing the settlement or were unable to muster the 
requisite level of resources, both economic and political, to build the foundations for a 
secure settlement."51 The committed participation of the peace process industry is 
instrumental to the success or failure of a peace process.
Stedman is similarly convinced that the responsibility for a successful peace process lies 
with the international community who serve as 'custodians of peace'. He counters the
adage that solutions to internal conflicts must come from the participants 
themselves. In this study successful management of internal conflict has 
resulted from the willingness of external actors to take sides as to which 
demands and grievances are legitimate and which are not.52
He argues that "where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, 
effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited 
and peace has triumphed."53 Stedman is an advocate of a strategic approach that maximises 
the long term commitment by warring parties to agreements through the methods of 
implementing those agreements.54 This means that "the UN must encourage the parties to 
choose political, cultural, social and economic security-building measures during the 
negotiation phase and systematically apply confidence-building measures to the military 
components of implementation."55 A coherent strategy for a successful post-conflict 
transition requires designing a more appropriate and effective international response that 
concentrates on the compliance of the parties, particularly parties that could become 
'spoilers' to the process.
5 'Fen Osier Hampson, "Why orphaned peace settlements are more prone to failure," 
in Chester Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, (eds.) Managing Global Chaos: Sources 
and Responses to International Conflict, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1996, p. 533.
"Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars," p. 52. 
"Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars," p. 6.
54Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, "Peace Operations: From Short- 
Term to Long-Term Commitment," International Peacekeeping, 3(2), Summer 1996, p. 
18.
55Stedman and Rothchild, "Peace Operations,"p. 17.
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In comparing El Salvador and Cambodia, Munck and Kumar share with the others a focus 
on the interactions between the parties and international third party actors, but give a 
stronger emphasis to the cooperation of the conflicting parties as the foundation for success. 
They argue that four variables account for the outcome of the implementation phase: "the 
number, inclusiveness and cohesion of the parties to the peace accords; the number and 
interests of external parties; the transitional institutional framework; and the peace 
signatories' perceptions of their electoral chances."56 The greater the number of internal and 
external parties, the more interests there are to appease, the more difficult to coordinate, and 
hence the more difficult implementation is likely to be. They emphasise that successful 
implementation is more likely
when institutional mechanisms are provided for regular contact between 
signatories to the peace accords. This allows for the containment and 
gradual overcoming of the natural distrust among parties, reinforcing the 
guarantees that no party will be worse off provided by international 
intervention. Both points are crucial, then, inasmuch as they determine the 
ability for mid-course corrections, which can help resolve unforeseeable 
problems in a way that prevents the derailing of the entire peace process.57
The parties must also perceive their chances of electoral success to be uncertain so that 
whoever loses still retains status in the new system. This uncertainty ensures their continued 
participation in the process of implementation.
These examples share three features which seem to prevail across the broad spectrum of 
actors engaged in peace processes. First, none of the examples seem to question what the 
outcome(s) of a peace process is or ought to be. Although the objectives of external third 
parties are intended to lead to peace, a definition of peace is often absent or simplistic and 
seems to refer to the successful conclusion of a peace process. Even where definitions of 
peace are offered, the institutions and mechanisms for realising peace are not explained. In 
the transition from war to peace, it is doubtful that there is either success or failure, there 
is only the degree and quality of peace and the relative absence of violence and its means. 
The content of peace may also differ between external actors and those who are supposed
56Munck and Kumar, "Civil conflicts," p. 160. 
"Munck and Kumar, "Civil conflicts," p. 164.
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to benefit from international intervention, as well as the mechanisms for achieving it. It is 
not enough and it is also inaccurate to suggest that external actors sustain the interests of 
the peace process as neutral 'custodians of peace'. Peace is not an abstract and neutral 
condition, it is a ongoing process connected to power and politics. The outcome from a 
peace process is less about the successful conclusion of the process than the political 
legacies from the process, both short and long term.
Second, these three examples seem to presume that the right plan leads to the right outcome 
pointing to a linear relationship between cause and effect. They suggest that the process in 
fact produces an outcome which is either successful or not. Assessing the impact of 
external actors in post-conflict transitions frequently involves studying the activities they 
undertake and whether these have been successfully carried through. However, little 
consideration is given to how the combination of actors and activities secure an outcome 
called peace. A peace process produces a constellation of outcomes, some more visible than 
others and some which strengthen peace more than others. Insufficient attention is paid to 
the multiple and partial outcomes of a process which result from the collective impact of 
all actors. Moreover, the outcomes of a process pertain not only to a condition that is 
produced, but in the experience of the process, particularly the experience of resolving 
disagreements.
Third, although there is mention of larger political and historical processes, the 
operationalisation of the concept of politics by the peace process industry seems at times 
limited and confined to the parties in the peace process, and at other times vast and 
ambitious, yet hollow. Hampson claims the focus for third parties is "the commitment and 
cooperation of the disputing parties in the overall peacemaking and peace-building 
process."58 Stedman's 'spoilers' in a peace process refer to the parties involved. Kumar and 
Munck discuss the composition of the parties and their relationship to external third parties. 
Thus the peace process in Mozambique refers to the Frelimo government and Renamo, in 
Angola, the government and UNITA, in El Salvador, the FMLN and the government. It 
would seem the official peace process is restricted to the politics between warring parties,
58Hampson, "Why orphaned peace settlements "p. 534.
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while discounting the political, social and historical conditions in which they emerged. By 
concentrating on the parties, some analysts have turned Clausewitz's dictum on its head, 
so that the outcome of a peace process is the continuation of war by other means,59 which 
freezes the conflict relationship. At the same time, the peace process industry deploys 
concepts like democracy, civil society, and justice which seem both wide-ranging and 
shallow. Notwithstanding the explicit values behind such concepts, these concepts embody 
different institutions and procedures, the variety, complexity and rationality of which are 
obfuscated by the single-mindedness of the peace process. The politics of the peace process 
seems obscured, buried deep within the language of assistance or distilled through 
unexplained or ill-defined concepts.
This underlies a further assumption that war overrides, reduces or makes impossible all 
other aspects of social and political life. The discourse on war seems to overshadow or 
isolate other aspects of governance and the ordinary politics of society from conflict. The 
normal everyday politics of collecting taxes, passing laws, maintaining hospitals, and the 
institutions and people that perform or fail to carry out these functions do not figure in the 
language of the 'peace process'. And yet, in relation to the industry, governments have or 
set up special counterpart agencies for external actors, different departments liaise with 
foreign officials, local staff are hired, offices and houses are rented, material and equipment 
are imported which affects the local market and society; all of which attests to the political 
and social institutions beyond the parties themselves. Undoubtedly, many of these 
institutions have been disrupted and weakened through violent conflict, but rarely have they 
completely and absolutely disappeared. More often they are part of the conflict and need 
to be reconfigured as part of the peace.
Tensions over the demands of short term versus long term goals, the priorities of the peace 
process versus a self-sustaining peace, and intended versus actual outcomes arise because 
of the inherently political nature of the industry. This political quality refers to the political
59Nicole Ball used this phrase in a talk given to the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1996 and Eva Bertram wrote if "war is a continuation of politics by other 
means, then a negotiated settlement is a continuation of war by political means." 
Bertram, "Reinventing Governments," p. 394.
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attributes of the peace process industry, the political nature of the activities they undertake, 
and the larger political context in which they operate. Whatever their claims to neutrality, 
or arguments that they are "devoid of extraneous agendas, political religious or 
otherwise,"60given their size, financial resources, and logistical capabilities, international 
actors are powerful actors, especially in extremely poor countries. When external actors are 
comparable or greater in power, scope, and size to the warring parties, they take on a 
profoundly powerful and political role. This disparity in power and resources is exacerbated 
by the aggregate impact of external actors and is manifested through the means and 
methods that are employed. On one level, political representatives who manage peace 
processes have at their command budgets sometimes surpassing the GDP of a host country, 
better armed and equipped military troops, and access to international leaders and financial 
lenders. On another level, the technical implementation of activities involves a discretionary 
influence which is rarely transparent or accountable. Such actors do not generally recognise 
the political nature of their activities because of a widely-shared preoccupation with 
technical, short-term activities.
These problems are not unique to the peace process but prevail in other forms of 
international assistance. They parallel problems in the development industry where there 
are often
overdesigned interventions that lack flexibility, untested intervention 
models, multiplicity of international actors, poor coordination among 
donors, bureaucratic red tapC delays in disbursing funds, inappropriate 
placement of projects, failure to create ownership of programs in 
implementing agencies, high costs of implementation and limited 
involvement of beneficiaries in interventions.61
NGOs have developed a record of interference in African states that has taken decision- 
making out of the hands of the state. They have "sought to supplement or displace African 
governments in every field, from famine relief and human rights monitoring to the
60Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global 
Humanitarian Community, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 20.
61Kumar, Rebuilding Societies After Civil War, pp. 33-4.
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protection of the elephant and the rhinoceros."62 NGOs are reluctant to concede they engage 
in politics, but "the resources which they distributed, the mechanisms through which these 
were distributed, necessarily conferred power on some groups and in the process at least 
relatively disadvantaged others."63 In Mozambique, expatriate experts have had a profound 
effect on the running of the country. They have created counterparts in the state, 
"economists, planners, and public administrators, who will share the assumptions and speak 
the language of aid agency employees, in order to facilitate the acceptance and 
implementation of their policy prescriptions."64 In the example of health, officials
spend most of their working hours entertaining visiting delegations, meeting 
donors, and preparing project documents.... Financial planning is almost 
impossible, as the MOH [Ministry of Health] does not know the true extent 
of donor contributions. Most project aid is short-term, preventing long-term 
planning... Few [donors] are willing to transfer funds and give management 
responsibility to the MOH... Some donors have chosen to set up parallel 
offices to run their own projects, as they regard MOH departments as weak 
and inefficient...There is no skills transfer and the offices close when the 
project ends.65
This compounds what for many developing countries, particularly in Africa, is an 
established pattern of the extemalisation of authority from states to international financial 
institutions and other creditors.
These problems are compounded during a transition from war to peace. The number of 
external agencies increase substantially. For example, in Rwanda 150 NGOs arrived after 
the genocide66, while in Mozambique, NGOs increased from 100 to 250 NGOs by the end 
of the peace process. Notwithstanding the efficiency and effectiveness of services, issues 
of coordination, competition and fragmentation impact on the local system. International
"Christopher Clapham, "Discerning the New Africa," International Affairs, 74(2), 
April 1998, pp. 266,265
63Clapham, "Discerning the New Africa," p. 260.
64David N. Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its 
Donors," Journal of Modern African Studies, 31(3), 1993, p. 426.
65Julie Cliff, "Donor-dependence or donor control?: The case of Mozambique," 
Community Development Journal, 28(3), 1993, p. 239.
66Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The politics of state 
survival, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 259.
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agencies channel efforts through different government agencies while the pressure to solve 
urgent problems leads to the employment of expatriate staffer the few qualified staff from 
the public sector which causes labour shortages for the government. In Mozambique, by 
providing security, delivering basic health services and managing the process, external 
actors assumed functions normally undertaken by the state. The Supervisory and Control 
Commission chaired by the UN became a powerful executive body running the peace 
process, responsible for settling all disputes of interpretation of the agreement until the new 
government took office. This level of intrusiveness eroded public confidence in political 
institutions and further weakened those institutions. Each of the three spheres of activities 
in the post-conflict transition offered opportunities for external actors to redefine political 
norms, institutions and procedures by forming attitudes, behaviour and customs, creating 
expectations and instilling institutional practices in Mozambican politics which might not 
have been otherwise.
The plurality and diversity of responsibilities international actors assume in a peace process 
implies that such actors are not simply instrumental and administrative. In seeking to 
restore peace to another country they cannot maintain a limited and defined role because 
they are effectively engaging in a political process to restore order and rebuild society. 
Comprehensive peace agreements contain a conception of political community and may 
serve as a constitutional framework structuring political relations for resolving disputes and 
establishing the rules of the political process. By establishing future rules of conduct and 
instilling principles, the implementation of a peace accord involves a process of forming 
and altering political values, practices, and structures. If external actors as mediators 
"becomes the agent of trust and the assessor of risk,"67 then they are not encouraging the 
practice of politics but engaging in it themselves. The functions of communication, 
overcoming misperceptions, distrust and suspicion, settling differences and disputes are the 
very heart of politics. In continuing to mediate between the parties and the society at large, 
international actors effectively define the shape of politics. International actors may not see
67I. William Zartman, "Inter-African Negotiation," in John Harbeson and Donald 
Rothchild, (eds.) Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995, p. 237.
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their actions as governing or administering another country, but in fulfilling the mandate 
of a peace settlement, they may exercise authority which effectively make them executive 
and judicial bodies.
Without acknowledging their innately political nature, the peace process industry may do 
more harm than good by preventing a sustainable peace from taking hold. Most post- 
conflict situations occur in political space shaped by weak or incomplete states and civil 
societies. By entering into this kind of political space, international actors have a more 
pervasive effect because by obscuring the state, already fragile state institutions are easily 
undermined. External actors do not always act in consultation with the host country, display 
operational transparency, or prove responsible or accountable to the people of the host 
society which may be inimical to the goal of supporting a sustainable peace.
Conclusion
Many interventions by international actors seem almost experimental in nature, with war- 
torn societies the testing ground. However, "[i]t is neither fair nor prudent to leave such 
dilemmas solely to peace builders on the ground to resolve ad hoc."68 This short term and 
myopic approach limits the framework to understanding post-conflict assistance to the 
process alone. It overlooks the outcomes from that assistance, whether those outcomes 
resemble the intended objectives, and how those objectives were supposed to lead to peace. 
Successful outcomes seem to happen by accident rather than by design. Without 
understanding the outcomes, actors in the peace process industry are unable to assess their 
overall impact and contribution to the process of making a transition from war to peace. 
Without stepping back from meeting immediate needs in the field there is little pressure for 
better regulation, accountability or transparency of the industry to improve the assistance 
they provide so that they meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries.
By looking at the whole picture of the peace process and its outcomes, it becomes apparent 
that there are tensions between the needs and priorities of the peace process industry and
68Bertram, "Reinventing governments," p. 416.
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the interests of host societies undergoing the transition from war to peace. The peace 
process industry is driven by a dual set of concerns, ambitious but unsubstantiated political 
mandates and self-serving interests to sustain their own significance, credibility and status. 
These concerns draw attention away from the recipients of international assistance. The 
actors in the peace process industry are political actors and have a political impact on the 
societies they assist. This impact is not monolithic but involves a constellation of multiple 
impacts. Without a serious debate on post-conflict activities, the peace process industry will 
continue to impose their ideas more forcefully on those to whom their expertise is targeted. 
Therefore in assessing the impact of external actors, in defining success, and in 
understanding the transition from war to peace, the society undergoing the transition ought 
to be at the centre of analysis. The next chapter presents a framework to study the targeted 
society of international intervention by focussing on political space.
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CHAPTER TWO
Peace, politics and political space: 
framing the recipients of international assistance
... there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that 
they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are 
fortunate, but in any event, governed. 1
In chapter one, I argued that international actors are innately political in providing 
assistance to countries making the transition from war to peace. The political character of 
the peace process industry shapes the outcomes resulting from a peace process and helps 
explain discrepancies between these outcomes and the original objectives. The political 
nature of external third parties is reinforced by their operation in a pre-existing political 
framework or context. At present, the peace process industry does not operate with a full 
understanding of the political context in which it intervenes and thus it is unable to account 
for the variety of outcomes from a peace process. Most often, the focus of the peace process 
industry is on itself and its activities, rather than the recipients of its assistance, that is the 
host society and political context that are the target of intervention practices. In other words, 
without considering the political context, the peace process industry may provide assistance 
that does not secure and consolidate peace because it cannot fully appreciate what the 
outcome of peace is supposed to be and how the manner in which it operates constrains the 
realisation of this objective.
This chapter presents a framework that explains the political context in which the peace 
process industry intervenes to enable them to think through the transition from war to 
peace. It seeks to explain the political structures, relations and organisation of society by 
defining this context as political space. The chapter begins by problematising the objective 
of peace which I shall argue, is a political project. Peace is defined by the activity of politics 
which only has meaning in a political context defined as political space. I then articulate 
what I mean by political space. The second section uses this account of political space to 
explain how particular configurations of political space create specific conditions for peace
'Walter Lippmann cited in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies, New Haven,CT: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 2.
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or conflict, which may lead to civil conflict and war. The final section examines the specific 
features of political space in Africa in which there have been frequent interventions by the 
peace process industry. In conclusion, I argue that an account of political space provides an 
alternative framework for evaluating the assistance provided by the peace process industry 
and makes clearer some of the problems confronting the industry when providing 
assistance.
Peace, politics and political space: the recipients 
THE MEANING OF PEACE
When external third parties engage in a peace process, the implied objective is to help in 
the realisation of peace. However, the definition of this objective, that is the meaning of 
peace, does not figure very prominently in the thinking and practices of the peace process 
industry. Yet without an understanding peace, it is difficult to evaluate whether the 
outcomes from a peace process produce peace. The problem with defining peace is that it 
is often presented as a universal, uncontentious and desirable good. While peace may be a 
universal norm, peace is embodied in particular institutions and practices which also make 
it an intellectual and political project. In short, peace has a political content. It takes place 
within a political context, whether this context is the international system, the state, a 
community or the overlapping jurisdictions between them. However, the political content 
of peace is generally neglected because peace is defined by absence. Peace is most often 
defined negatively as the absence of war. War as an organised form of violence is not 
peace, since violence contradicts peace.
While the absence of violence is a necessary condition for peace, it does not provide a 
sufficient definition of peace. Peace has positive qualities. Windsor argued that war is the 
ultimate act of liberation because it unleashes the bonds of restraint upholding society.2 
Peace, then, even as the absence of war, implies the practice of restraint according to rules
2Philip Windsor, "The State and War," in Cornelia Navari, (ed.) The Condition of 
States, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991, pp. 125-142.
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outlined by society and humanity. Peace is civilised behaviour which serves a social 
function. Peace is also equated with order or harmony. However, Banks rejects this 
equation as unnecessary and inadequate if it implies the elimination of all disagreement and 
conflict. Disagreement and conflict are both
inevitable and necessary. It is inevitable because both people and groups 
have basic needs, expressed in society through competing values and 
clashing interests. It is necessary in order to provide the catalyst for social 
processes without which life would hardly be worthwhile: stimulus, 
challenge, change and progress.3
However, in extolling the benefits of conflict, Banks nevertheless recognises that not all 
conflict is functional. Conflicts often become violent and lead to war rather than progress. 
The tendency towards destructive outcomes does not discredit the value inhering in conflict 
but points to the failure to constructively express and manage it.
Some authors and policy-makers in the peace process industry define peace as either 
development, liberal-democracy and/or government. As explained in chapter one, this 
particular articulation of peace equates peace with both development and democracy 
without distinguishing any characteristics specific to peace. This approach also ascribes 
specific liberal values to the political content of peace which weakens its universality 
without having first and foremost acknowledged the political quality of peace. Bertram 
takes a step back by defining the political content of peace more generally as government 
or state institutions. However, Bertram does not problematise the state or government, thus 
her definition also remains historically and culturally contingent. Banks recognises but also 
opens up the political content of peace by defining peace as the successful management of 
conflict. Peace is a process, "in which the essential properties arise from how we do things, 
not what we do."4 The management of diversity and conflict occurs through the activity of 
politics. Thus peace is defined and realised through the practice of politics which obviates 
the need for and use of violence.
3Michael Banks, "Four conceptions of peace," in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole- 
Staroste, (eds.) Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to 
International Applications, London: Francis Pinter, 1987, p. 260.
4Banks, "Four conceptions of peace,"p. 269.
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IN POLITICS LIES PEACE
If peace is a practice and this practice is politics, politics then, is the basis for social and 
political order. Politics informs the nature and exercise of rule. According to Crick, politics 
"is a way of ruling divided societies without undue violence - and most societies are 
divided, though some think that is the very trouble."5 Crick explains that a political 
community is sustained by the management of conflicts and social divisions through a 
legitimate distribution of power. Politics is "the activity by which differing interests within 
a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their 
importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community."6 For Crick, the 
meaning of politics is more than simply acquiring or having power, it is about the functions 
that power serves in managing conflicts which confers legitimacy onto its exercise.7 It is 
through politics that power is neither arbitrary, nor an exercise of coercive force and it is 
through the predictability of political practice that power relations are mediated. Politics is 
the means by which a stable and sustainable political order is created and maintained.
Politics is a necessary and universal part of social life because each person in society 
manifests his or her own interests, goals, perceptions and ideas which collectively produces 
a plurality of difference and disagreement. Politics is the activity which mediates this 
diverse plurality and sustains social cohesion. Without the rituals and experience of politics, 
social life would be a cacophony of discordant interests and goals. Connolly idealises 
politics as "a form of interaction in which agents adjust, extend, resolve, accommodate and 
transcend initial differences within a context of partly shared assumptions, concepts and
5Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, London: Penguin Group, 1962, p. 33. 
6Crick, In Defence of Politics, p. 21.
7This contrasts with definitions of politics which focus solely on the distribution of 
power. Weber defines politics as the "striving to share power or striving to influence the 
distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." Max Weber, 
"Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Germ and C. Wright Mills, (eds.) From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge, 1948, p. 78. Lasswell defines politics as who 
gets what, when and how. Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, 
London: Whittlesey House, 1936.
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commitments."8 This accommodation does not imply harmonisation or homogenisation. 
Politics not only protects differences but realises an ideal form of unsettled accommodation 
which persistently questions its own resolution. Connolly explains that,
[pjolitics, at its best, is the medium through which essential ambiguities can 
be expressed and given some redress. It is simultaneously the best way to 
establish or confirm commonalities and to expose uncertainties, repressed 
voices, exclusions, and injuries lodged within them. Politics, again at its 
best, calls into question settlements sedimented into moral consensus,9
Politics rejects the claim to absolute truth and accepts ambiguous and uncertain outcomes.
Politics, then, entails a degree of forbearance and toleration of other traditions, viewpoints, 
ideas and goals. Self-restraint in dealing with other people results from an awareness of 
membership in a collective whole. Shils argues that to
practice politics, to be civil towards another human being, means regarding 
other persons, including one's adversaries, as members of the same 
inclusive collectivity, ie., as members of the same society.10
In the words of Crick again, politics "is a great and civilizing human activity."" It is 
civilising because the practice of politics entails civility which according to Shils,
limits the intensity of conflict. It reduces the distance between competing 
demands; it is a curb on centrifugal tendencies. Civility, by the attachment 
of its individual bearers to the society as a whole, places a limit on the 
irreconcilability of the parochial ends pursued. Attachment to the whole 
reduces the rigidity of attachment to the parts. 12
The intrinsic value of politics inheres in the activity of politics as a process of discussion 
amongst different and competing ends. Politics, fundamentally, is about words taking 
precedence over force; it is the force of argument not the force of arms which prevails.
8William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993 edition, pp. 6-7.
'William Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity, London: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Ltd., 1987, p. 16.
'°Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," Government and Opposition, 26(1), 
1991,p. 13.
"Crick, In Defence of Politics, p. 15. 
l2Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," p. 15.
68
Arendt argued that "to be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided 
through words and persuasion." 13 Politics is the articulation of conflicting ideas and 
deciding between them without recourse to violence. To trust the force of words means that 
human beings come to obey rules of civil intercourse, the standards of which, renders 
violence incompatible with participation in politics. Politics as an activity rejects the use 
of force, ensuring that power does not mask domination and coercion. It is through politics 
that peace is manifested.
It is evident that few actors in the peace process industry operate with this conception of 
politics. The activities of many NGOs, donors and other agencies seem to embody a 
definition of politics drawn from Weber which focuses on the distribution of power 
between parties or between the state and civil society, than on the functions politics serves 
in managing conflict and sustaining peace. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, the peace process industry has a strong tendency to denigrate the 
authority, accountability and transparency of local political actors. The presence and 
activities of the peace process industry often obstructs the activity of politics by 
compromising the ability of host societies to reconcile differences and make political 
choices that consolidate peace. With such impoverished notions of politics, the peace 
process industry can just as easily prolong conflict than assist in the transition to peace. 
However, care must also be taken to ensure this definition of politics does not override 
values found in the political societies under consideration. However a respect for 
indigenous values does not mean isolating them from the influence of universal norms 
which is an untenable position given that the distinction between inside and outside is no 
longer sharply defined. The value attached to reconciling differences is a universal norm 
intrinsic to most societies, but the mechanisms and means through which it is to be realised 
ought to reflect particular societies.
Nevertheless, there are forms of politics which are distorted, subverted and marginalised 
that do not mediate differences and manage disputes. The contradiction between the idea
13Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, London: University of Chicago Press, 
1958, p.26.
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and practice of politics results from the context in which politics is conducted. This context, 
defined as political space, comes in different configurations which produces different forms 
of politics. Not all of these forms create the conditions for peace. The next section discusses 
political space.
DEFINING POLITICAL SPACE
Every society is served by a particular political arrangement that helps to order and maintain 
social interactions in the face of competition, conflict and cooperation. 14 What emerges 
from these interactions is the activity of politics which sustains society by reconciling the 
differences which underlie conflict and competition, while uncovering the compromises 
which enable cooperation. But in order to understand politics, to explain what politics is, 
what functions it serves, how politics is conducted and where politics is located, depends 
on recognising and explaining what is meant by a political arrangement. The political 
arrangement of society or how society is politically organised is based on three 
interconnecting elements, norms, institutions and procedures; that is the values and 
preferences which give meaning to politics, and the mechanisms and processes through 
which these values are realised and politics is conducted.
Norms which define a political arrangement include moral values which guide political 
choices, rules of political behaviour which offer guidelines on custom and practice, and 
principles that locate the boundaries of where politics can take place. Norms inform and 
prescribe the rules of political conduct, the distribution and exercise of power and the 
nature of political authority which binds the ruler to the ruled. The rules of political conduct 
establish patterns of behaviour and define the practices of politics. Power refers to the 
ability to control society, compel compliance or effect change. Power is discussed in 
reference to its distribution and allocation amongst different social groups. Power is also 
exercised through political institutions and thus is also understood by the degree to which 
it is institutionalised. Authority differs from power by referring to the right to rule over
'"Edward Soja, The Political Organization of Space, Resource Paper No. 8, 
Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1971, p. 7.
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others, the entitlement to hold and exercise power, implying an acceptance and recognition 
of authority by those over whom it is discharged. Authority "precludes the use of external 
means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed." 15 The rules of politics, 
power and authority manifest the normative parameters of how society is to be politically 
organised.
However, these norms are articulated and manifested in institutions and procedures. These 
refer to the areas of jurisdiction over which politics applies, the process through which 
decisions are taken on these issues and the formal structures through which these decisions 
are executed. In other words,
the structures of meaning in which political conduct is defined and attitudes 
towards the accommodation of interests are closely related to an experience 
of authority (both its organizational/procedural form and manner of 
exercise) exercised through both public institutions and a particular set of 
social relations. 16
Formal structures, decision-making processes and areas of jurisdiction refer specifically to 
such things as institutions of the state or civil society, democratic procedures or political 
parties, federal divisions of power, majority versus proportional representation and so forth. 
However, within these formal procedures are ideas about politics which reflect values and 
preferences regarding the organisation of politics, that is the rules of the game, the exercise 
and distribution of power and the nature of authority. These procedures and institutions 
effect and transmit normative ideas by establishing regular and standardised patterns of 
political practice.
Thus the political arrangement of society is based on three interlocking elements, norms, 
institutions and procedures. The activity of politics emerges from the constellation of these 
elements and contributes to the process of working through them. The form of political 
activity which evolves is not only constituted by the kinds of norms, institutions and
l5Hannah Arendt, "What was authority?" in Carl J. Friedrich, (ed.) Authority, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 82.
16Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and an 
Institution, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980, p. 50.
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procedures which underlie the political organisation of society, but by how these elements 
are arranged and cohere together. However, politics also contributes to the process of how 
this arrangement comes together and takes shape. This arrangement or configuration is 
political space. Political space is defined as the configuration or arrangement of norms, 
institutions and procedures that organise and order political life. By recognising this 
arrangement of space, the concept of political space recaptures the totality of politics and 
the political organisation of society. It suggests that the whole constellation of what is 
politics emerges from a complex set of interrelationships between norms, institutions, and 
procedures; between the nexus of the rules, power and authority, and the jurisdictions of 
authority, decisions and institutional processes. It highlights the connections, the 
contradictions, the tensions, and the disjunctures which define any arrangement of politics. 
Political space captures more than just the state, civil society, or any particular aspect of a 
political system. Political space is interesting because it refers to the arrangement or 
configuration of how the system fits together and the framework that emerges from the 
whole nexus that is politics. 17
Political space implies that the spatial organisation of society structures the relations of 
those living within that space. However, not all political spaces are the same. Political space 
is an unfinished product that is defined by the degree of coherence in the constellation of 
norms, institutions and procedures and whether this configuration has meaning. Political 
space has a purpose, it is defined by its function. For political space to be functional and 
meaningful, it must embody a logic. 18 The logic of political space refers to the use and 
means through which political activity becomes possible and holds political space together. 
Political space functions when it encourages and allows for the practice of politics. But this 
function is also defined in the process of constructing political space, that is in the process
''Political space captures a different essence from concepts like political order, 
political society or political community. Political order seems to refer solely to the 
patterns which define society, while the idea of society or community emphasise the ties 
that bind, relate and separate the parts. Political space seems to capture both ideas while 
implying a structural form of organisation that serves a particular purpose.
18Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson, The Social Logic of Space, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 1.
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of defining politics and how politics is to be conducted. Political space conditions and 
gives meaning to how politics is conducted and the kind of context that emerges from 
political activity, while it simultaneously evolves through the ongoing process of political 
activity.
Political space can be likened to the political architecture of a society. Keeping to the 
architectural metaphor, the meaning of political space can be visualised by using the 
metaphor of a building. Every building has a certain logic to it both through its physical and 
abstract form. Through its exterior and interior composition, a building is an ordered 
arrangement of space, it functions because of how the space is organised.
Buildings may be comparable to other artefacts in that they assemble 
elements into a physical object with a certain form; but they are 
incomparable in that they also create and order the empty volumes of space 
resulting from that object into a pattern. It is this ordering of space that it is 
the purpose of the building, not the physical object itself. The physical 
object is the means to an end. 19
Political space provides the means to the end of politics. The ordering of space in buildings 
orders relations between people. A building is a system of spatial relations or patterns that 
joins and separates people and gives meaning to their relations with each other.20 Thus, the 
building serves both to bring people together in one entity, but also separates them within 
that entity. This organisation of space is similar to Arendt's image of a table to explain the 
notion of a public sphere.21 A table around which people are sitting, both joins those people 
together, yet keeps them separate. The image of the building however operates on a larger 
scale by relating groups of people in different arrangements as parts of a larger whole. This 
arrangement or organisation of space functions if these groups can be joined together within 
the whole while maintaining their separate spaces.
l9Hillier and Hanson, The social logic of space, p. 1. 
20Hillier and Hanson, The social logic of space, p. 3.
2 '"To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between 
those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the 
world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time." Arendt, The 
Human Condition, p. 52.
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A building always has an outer structure which encapsulates a space within. In terms of 
political space, the foundation of the building and its outer structure comprises the state 
which defines the shape, location and limits of political space. Inside the building, how that 
space is divided and structured internally in terms of the rooms, the connections between 
the rooms, the functions different rooms serve, is civil society. If there is little arrangement 
of the internal space this refers to society, however if there is an order to the division of 
space, then it suggests a 'civil' society.22 Like a building, the state has no meaning without
22I use 'civil' society loosely because of the many normative dimensions associated 
with the concept. As the chapter progresses, the concept becomes more defined through 
its application to African societies. I prefer to focus on the order and structure within 
civil society, which by no means captures the wealth of possible meanings attached to 
the concept. Definitions of the concept of civil society are often contradictory and 
confusing and can refer to diametrically opposing phenomenon. These problems stem 
from the expansive nature of the concept which is derived from the political purposes 
for which the concept is deployed and subsequently defined. Civil society is all that is 
outside, beyond and against the state. It has been defined negatively, as the "residue 
once the realm in which state power is exercised has been well defined." (Noberto 
Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, p. 23.) But Bobbio argued that this can lead to "various 
emphases depending on whether the identification of the non-state with the pre-state, the 
anti-state or the post-state prevails."(Bobbio, p. 24)
The confusion surrounding the state in civil society arises from its association with 
democracy and tensions within liberal-democracy itself over the state, ie. whether the 
state is a source of protection or a source of threat. Thus, civil society has been used as 
both as a critique and a defence of democracy. Although civil society has been used as 
part of the critique of capitalism and hence liberal-democracy by Marx, it is primarily 
associated today with the democratic impulse that reemerged in the struggles against 
totalitarianism in East and Central Europe. The revitalisation of the concept of civil 
society is intrinsically tied to these processes of transition to democracy, not only in 
Europe but also in the ongoing political crises of Latin America and Africa.
Civil society can be defined as a set of voluntary, market regulated or privately 
controlled associations, including everything from trade unions, voluntary associations, 
clubs, guilds, hospitals, churches, to the market, capitalist enterprises etc. which provide 
a buffer between citizen and state. Other times, civil society is conceived as a place or 
an arena of in which the norms and principle of political governance are constituted. 
"Civil society is the place where, especially in periods of institutional crisis, de facto 
powers are formed that aim at obtaining their own legitimacy even at the expense of 
legitimate power; where in other words, the processes of delegitimation and 
relegitimation take place." (Bobbio, p. 26) For my purposes, civil society will be used to 
refer to the norms and rules of political organisation, specifically "the point of 
agreement on what those working rules [of the political order or state] should be." (John 
Harbeson "Civil society and political renaissance in Africa," in John Harbeson, Donald
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society and society rests on the organisation of the state. Political space then does not just 
refer to one particular room within the building, it refers to the complex arrangement of all 
the rooms and the space within them. Thus it would be possible to speak of altering the 
spatial composition of a building by rearranging particular spaces, like knocking down 
walls. The decisions and preferences regarding the foundations of the building, the shape 
of the building, the division of space, the materials involved etc., refer to the norms, 
institutions and procedures arranged in political space.
While political space is tied to the territorial location of the state, decisions and plans 
regarding its design are not tied geographically or temporally. Inhabitants of buildings are 
often not responsible for the design of their own structure but move into the building, live 
in it, while it is under construction or after it has been constructed. These inhabitants may 
have their own ideas about the kind of building that would serve their purposes and may 
include trained architects. But the ideas of the inhabitants are never entirely derived locally, 
they include many exogenous influences, simply through seeing, hearing about and living 
in other buildings. Thus, it is not only the people who live in and use the building who 
influence its design, external architects are often called in to help improve the building. 
These architects are not constructing a new building, but work with and repair a pre­ 
existing structure that is most likely imperfectly and incompletely formed, yet operating on 
a basic but uncertain level for those who occupy it. This group of architects involved in the 
re-design or reconstruction of the building resembles the peace process industry. To argue 
that the peace process industry reconfigures political space implies that external agencies 
redesign and thus redefine the structure and organisation of another political society which 
affects the logic of how that society functions. Thus the relationship between the architects 
and the inhabitants plays an important role in the design and construction of the building. 
The question is how much the relationship between architects and inhabitants reflects 
relations of power, and to what degree decisions regarding the norms, institutions and 
procedures of political space, incorporated into the design and reflected in the construction
Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) Civil Society and the State in Africa, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp. 3-4.)
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of the building, are determined by this power relationship. Buildings function best when 
architects take into account the needs and wishes of those who use it, but more often reflect 
relations of power.
If political space is represented by a building, the peace process industry parallels both 
architect and contractor. Each architect appears to be designing a portion of the building, 
works on a section of one floor, perhaps on another, usually without a blueprint of the 
whole structure, while another architect does the same thing on some other part of the 
building. If one actor in the peace process industry works on one element of political space, 
it is unlikely that section will be well-connected to other spaces within the building, or to 
the structure as a whole, which will undermine how the building functions. There may be 
coordination and cooperation amongst the architects, but rarely is there a conception or 
agreement on what the overall structure ought to look like and how it should function by 
the entire group of architects which leads to a chaotic organisation of space. By their 
individual and independent actions, the peace process industry may frustrate the logic of 
the building, thus preventing the integration of state and society and the coherent 
arrangement of space. Moreover, like any industry, there are also few guarantees that 
everyone in the peace process industry who is engaged in the construction of the building 
is licensed, has similar or sufficient experience or qualifications, or the resources to carry 
out the work. Rogue contractors captures the idea of a proliferation of unqualified, 
unregulated agencies who endanger their own staff and those they seek to help which 
reflects negatively on the reputation of the industry as whole.
While the metaphor of a building provides a useful tool for visualising political space, 
nevertheless there are limitations to using the metaphor. Political space unlike a building 
is never fully completed, nor does it have the permanence of a building. Political space is 
always under construction and is more fluid than what is suggested by the building 
metaphor. However, focussing on the differences between buildings, for example, Windsor 
Castle versus a log cabin, illustrates that some buildings have more solid foundations than 
others. Second, the idea of architects implies a degree of training in a specialised skill and 
accreditation which gives them the authority and experience to advise the people in the
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building. However, it is not clear where members of the peace process industry receive their 
training, whether in fact they are trained in a specific skill, and hence where they derive 
their authority to offer advice. Also, architects and contractors in the peace process industry 
may not have even been invited to participate in constructing the building by the 
inhabitants. Third, the notion of design in a political sense carries with it connotations of 
social engineering, the expectation of having plans leading to a desired outcome. This is 
problematic not only when dealing with the nebulous sphere of politics, but also when 
operating on the scale of an entire country or society. But every policy and most political 
activities are undertaken with intended objectives, the point of using the building metaphor 
is to highlight that plans on one floor affect other floors and the building as a whole. The 
metaphor provides a useful image for visualising political space, the structure and its 
construction, but also its relation to other similar spaces within the larger system. What 
emerges from the image of the building is an account of political space as a whole structure 
that depends on the integration of the parts and the assimilation of inner and outer structures 
into a patterned whole.
Political space: the configuration of peace and conflict
THE CONFIGURATION OF PEACE IN POLITICAL SPACE
If political space is a building, then what kind of building ensures peace by enabling the 
practice of politics, and what are the problems with a building that frustrates politics and 
is susceptible to conflict? Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that peace and 
conflict are not opposite conditions. A building characterised by peace indicates conflicts 
are well-managed, whereas a building with little peace implies a proliferation of 
unmanageable conflicts, from which a civil conflict may evolve to tear at the whole 
building. The difference between the two is characterised by the degree of politics exercised 
within political space. Two 'physical' or institutional elements of the building will 
predispose it towards peace or conflict: (1) the foundations and outer structure of the 
building meaning the nature of political community (the state), and (2) the internal division 
of space meaning the political organisation within society, (a civil society). However,
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political space is also constituted by more abstract elements. These are (3) the integration 
of the outer and inner forms, which constitutes (4) a public sphere to serve all of the users 
of the building, all of which produces (5) a pattern or system that constitutes a configuration 
or arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures. Political space is defined by the 
nature of this arrangement and the extent to which there is an institutionalised pattern of 
rules to order political life so that the building functions for those it is intended to serve. 
This section discusses these parameters of political space first in terms of peace and then 
conflict.
A building will encourage politics and ensure peace if its foundations and outer structure 
are solid and there is a meaningful division of space within. In political terms, this means 
first, that there is a form of political community which encapsulates society. This form of 
political community is presently conceived of as the state given that the international 
system is composed of a collection of sovereign states. The state is defined by Mann as
(1) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, (2) embodying 
centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the 
centre to cover a, (3) territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises, 
(4) some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by some 
organized physical force.23
The structure provided by the state proscribes limits on where politics takes place, the 
institutions through which politics is to be exercised, how it is conducted and the authority 
which sustains it. However, the strength and solidity of the outer structure will depend on 
how strongly constructed the state is24, while its foundations are a product of the historical 
processes which formed particular states. There must be enough organisation to the polity 
to enfold society within its boundaries while its foundations must be rooted in society so 
that the building stands fast.
The space within a building refers to society. The activity of politics is encouraged when
23Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: The rise of classes and nation-states, 
1760-1914, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 55.
24This is different than a strong state which implies that the state is strong in relation 
to society and its capacity to control society.
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this inner space is arranged, that is when relations in society are structured in a meaningful 
way. The division of space implies the creation of private spaces that are connected to 
constitute a public space defined by the whole building. The public space of the building 
is constituted when there is an ordering and patterning to this arrangement of space, 
arbitrary and haphazard spaces prevent and potentially disrupt the coherence of the whole 
space. The connecting arrangements also determine the coherence of the building. This 
arrangement of space within must be fixed in such a way that is permanent but flexibile so 
that it does not threaten the foundations of the building. The arrangement may be simple 
or complex, but there must be enough order for the building to function. The more formal, 
complicated and patterned the division and arrangement of space suggest that society may 
constitute something that can be labelled as civil society.
Beyond these physical features, political space must also embody three abstract principles. 
Political space must embody a cohering logic based on an institutionalised system of rules 
giving order to political life and that these apply to a public who live in the building. The 
construct must be solid enough to withstand challenges and yet be capable of modification 
without threatening to bring the whole building down. The outer and inner structures must 
be incorporated together, since neither form of organisation is sufficient to capture all of 
political life, or can be defined in isolation from the other. This implies that the state and 
society/civil society are interdependent. The capacity for politics resides in the intersections 
which integrates the state with civil society and coheres political space. Keane argues
that without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous public 
spheres, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory planning and 
community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans. But without 
the protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, 
struggles to transform civil society will become ghettoized, divided and 
stagnant, or will spawn their own, new forms of inequality and unfreedom.25
Civil society acts within the limits set by the state on the understanding that it has a role in 
establishing those limits itself. This means that the state provides and maintains an 
environment propitious for civil society and civil society accepts the services of the state
25John Keane, "The Limits of State Action," in John Keane, (ed.) Democracy and 
Civil Society, London: Verso, 1988, p. 15.
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and participates in it. Peace requires deepening the connections between them.26
These connections are deepened if a public sphere is constituted through them. The 
integration of the outer and inner structures must also constitute a public space serving the 
common welfare of all the residents in the building. Political space must encapsulate the 
public sphere. The public sphere represents and protects what is common to the whole of 
society through an appreciation of difference and diversity. Arendt explained that "the 
reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives 
and aspects in which the common world presents itself."27 Each individual simultaneously 
affirms his or her individual freedom and expresses membership within the larger 
community, the individual is both related to and separated from the whole. Thus the public 
sphere represents "the points of intersection between various existing power vectors. It is 
at these locations that politics takes place and around these foci that authority is 
accumulated and support garnered.28 Politics is manifested in the public realm and the 
public realm is constituted by political discussion and practice. State institutions, personnel 
and leaders must serve all members of society based on an understanding of the inclusive 
moral universe. By upholding the principle of universality, the state maintains cohesion 
within society. This requires that agents within civil society pursue their parochial interests 
according to universal principles. What is good for the part must also be good for the 
whole. The significance of civil society
is not that they form a non-political social sphere, but rather that they form 
the basis for the fragmentation and diversity of power within the political 
system. What is relevant is not their life outside, but the way they are
26This discussion overlooks two important debates about state-civil society relations. 
First, these relations are often characterised as confrontation, where the state seeks to 
control civil society, and civil society is organised against the state. Second, it 
presupposes that the state and civil society are clearly separated. Other theorists have 
argued that civil society is a mirror of the state, or that the state is merely representative 
of interests in civil society.
27Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 57.
28Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in 
Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) The Precarious Balance: State 
and Society in Africa, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, p. 140.
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integrated into the political system, and the weight they have in it.29 
It is not just any civil society, but the organisation of a society consonant with the public 
sphere. "Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to 
realize its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to 
create public interests."30
Political space is "not just any coming together, but a regularized, stable and sustained 
coming together, the coming together must in short be institutionalized."31 Peace comes 
from regularised procedures and institutions, where processes are easily created and old 
ones disappear without threatening collapse of the overall structure of interaction. When 
there is a patterned relationship between state and society, a web of interaction and routine 
relations, political space coheres. This means there is a basic agreement on a system of 
norms, institutions and procedures to order and organise political life. In reference to 
Rustow, Manning argues that in politics,
agreement to abide by a set of rules must come first. Commitment to those 
rules, and institutionalization of the new system, can come only as a result 
of their use, and the realization (or not) by each party that the rules serve 
their own interests better than any realistically available alternative..32
The system of norms underpinning political authority, accountability and responsibility 
provide parameters for managing conflict without which other options involving violence 
may be used to resolve differences. Thus, the intersections of political space, the creation 
of agreed rules of the game, institutions of power and structures of authority determines the 
degree to which the practice of politics is possible within this political space. When the 
foundations and outer structure are strong, when the division of inner space is ordered and 
flexible, where both come together in a patterned arrangement to serve the public interest 
by constituting a system of rules, the exercise of politics generates and manifests peace.
29Charles Taylor, "Modes of Civil Society," Public Culture, 3(1), Fall 1990, p. 114. 
30Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 24. 
3lHuntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 10.
32Carrie Manning, "Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political 
Party," Journal of Southern African Studies, 24(1), March 1998, p. 189.
81
THE MANIFESTATION OF CONFLICT IN POLITICAL SPACE
When there are problems with the foundations and structures of space, the division, 
integration and the public constitution of space, and the ordered arrangement of this space 
through a system of rules, then political space is not fully functional and the practice of 
politics is made difficult. The nature of these deficiencies in political space will determine 
the degree or limits of politics in managing conflicts. If one of the five elements is missing, 
a combination of elements is missing or the whole construct is feeble, then the conditions 
for politics are absent and conflicts are unlikely to be managed and more likely to lead to 
civil conflict and violence. This in turn affects the condition of political space. A political 
space prone to conflict is one that may be weak or problematic but functioning as a system, 
structurally weak and only partially functioning or completely chaotic and near collapse.
Political space will be susceptible to unmanageable conflicts if any one of its five 
components is missing or minimal. Political space is virtually untenable if either of its two 
'physical' or organisational structures are missing or weak, meaning either that its 
foundations and external organising structure are feeble, or there is no or little ordered 
division of the internal space. Such a building is poorly constructed meaning that not all 
who are supposed to use the building take up residence in it, they may spill out of the 
building or not seek protection within the building. In political terms this implies a weak 
state where state institutions lack the capacity to exert political authority, an inability to 
implement policy, or take binding decisions. It could also mean the incoherence of the state 
as a form of political community arising from competition with alternative forms of 
political organisation, such as traditional authorities or international agencies, that manifest 
authority and usurp authority from the state. The idea of a building's weak foundations 
points to the uneven process of state formation if the state was a transplanted form of 
political organisation imposed on society, or if those who constructed the building were 
unconcerned with the functioning of the building. Problems with the division of space 
within a building points to varying degrees of tensions between social groups. It may be that 
the boundaries dividing the space within a building are mutually exclusive, implying that 
certain social groups refuse to acknowledge other groups even though they inhabit the same
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political space. It could also mean that the connections between the different private spaces 
are blocked or not well constructed inhibiting the relations between different parts of the 
same building. Disorder or an unworkable ordering of space within a building is a failing 
of the political relations between social groups in forming a society. If either of these basic 
organising structures are absent or dysfunctional, political space has little possibility of 
working and is susceptible to unmanageable conflict.
In addition to these structural weaknesses, the logic of political space as an integrated 
structure that embodies a public sphere and creates an ordered arrangement of norms, 
institutions and procedures, may be weak or non-existent. If the outer organisation and the 
inner division of space do not correspond to each other through a breakdown or absence of 
connections or one overwhelms the other, then such contests suggest that either the state 
or civil society seeks to define political space independent of the other. The state may seek 
to negate the political function of social activity or civil society to prevent the state from 
fulfilling its functions. States may attempt to control political space by closing off parts of 
society, excluding them from setting the rules and procedures of decision-making, denying 
access or resource to power, and relying on coercion rather than authority and 
accountability. When the state is trying to control society without being open to it by 
preventing social groups from accessing and modifying state power, pressures from society 
may lead to conflict. The partial and incomplete closures of political space animate conflict 
and create openings for its violent manifestation.
State-society relations can also be problematic if they fail to converge, and one seeks to 
evade or disengage from the other leaving vast areas free from interaction. This may reflect 
the state's loss or lack of jurisdiction over parts of its population, territorially, functionally 
or socially. This loss of control usually can be attributed to a lack of capacity and 
competence of the state, particularly in its ability to maintain order and security for its 
people. 33 Members of society often decide to disengage from the state. Disengagement
"However, states sometime withdraw from society if it is in their interest to do so, as 
in privatisation. The difference is the degree of choice and the ability to control the 
process and the terms of disengagement.
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"refers to ongoing societal activities conducted by individuals and groups beyond the public 
domain."34 This could mean physically leaving the country as refugees or migrants, ignoring 
state control in certain areas of jurisdiction, or not fulfilling the expectations and needs of 
the state, such as tax evasion. Disengagement is not specifically material but may also 
include opting out of the cultural and ideological symbols and values that the state is 
advocating,35 particularly national ideas.
This process has the potential to paralyse the state by creating a situation that one author 
has called of "states without citizens."36This is an acute problem because of the "increasing 
growth of spheres of society out of touch with the state,"37 particularly if society is opting 
out of the state's function of providing security and managing conflict. From this it can be 
inferred, that there is little sense of a common fate. The disintegration of relations between 
the state and society arises from an inability to construct a public domain. However, the 
absence of a public sphere or a clear differentiation of a public from a private sphere may 
also arise from the ongoing process of formation or evolution. It may also be that parts of 
society do not want to be joined in one political space. From this, a social group may seek 
to opt of the political arrangement and form an alternative political space which may 
dissolve or disintegrate the state and political space.
Some differences may be too threatening to be resolved by politics because they arise from
34Naomi Chazan, "State and Society in Africa: Images and Challenges," in Rothchild 
and Chazan, The Precarious Balance, p. 331. See also in the same volume, Victor 
Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement," pp. 3- 
21. The concept of disengagement parallels the idea of 'exit' defined by Hirschman as 
withdrawal from an organisation (ie. leaving the organisation or ceasing to use its goods 
and services) in response to its unsatisfactory performance. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty: responses to declines in firms, organizations, and states, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
35Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation," pp. 121-148.
36John A.A. Ayoade, "States without citizens: an emerging African phenomenon," in 
Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance, p. 100.
37Peter Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society in African history and politics," in B. 
Caron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, (eds.) Proceedings of the Symposium on 
Democratic Transition in Africa, Ibadan: CREDU Documents in Social Sciences and 
Humanities, 1992, p. 208.
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confusion over the rules of the game in which this resolution can take place, such as who 
is allowed to participate in politics. Authority relations produced by processes of 
organisational consolidation and fragmentation may be disputable within society and 
become a source of conflict. The logical conclusion of a degeneration of the state and/or 
society is the dissolution of political community,38 leaving a vacuum for violent conflict. 
If society is excluded from all forms of political participation by the state and it is 
destroyed, subverted, or negated, there is merely control, political space does not function. 
If civil society assumes control of political activity and the state withers away, as in 
revolutions where social actors take over the state, or state failure where there is a loss of 
centralised government and social groups assume responsibility for their own security 
challenging the monopoly of violence, political space will collapse. The disintegration of 
state and civil society means a viable political space cannot be sustained which creates 
openings for civil conflict and war with few mechanisms or options to manage or contain 
them. A constellation of problems which prevents the functioning of political space means 
there is no basis for a stable polity. It is impossible for the building to function and conflict 
is endemic within that the political space which has the potential to lead to civil conflict. 
Thus civil conflicts emerge from contests over political space, that is contests over the 
norms, institutions and procedures which organise political life.
While conflict may be endemic to a particular political space, whether this conflict becomes 
violent will depend on other factors, particularly access to the means to pursue war. Access 
is not restricted to local or endogenous actors, but is very often dependent on arms suppliers 
from other societies. Those who live in other political spaces can also influence tensions 
within a political space by weakening the foundations, the divisions of space, or their 
integration. For example the minimal state pursued by Western liberals reduces the number 
of intersections between the state and civil society, thereby weakening the integration of the 
two without strengthening the remaining intersections. Conversely, external assistance can 
help to strengthen and cohere a political space if policies promote peace, defined earlier as
38Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lawson, "The Interactions Between State and Civil 
Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines," in John Harbeson, Donald 
Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) Civil Society and the State in Africa, London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 269.
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strong foundations, and an ordered space, that leads to a system of rules. The discussion of 
Mozambique in chapters five, six and seven will examine how external third parties weaken 
or strengthen political space. The next section discusses the political space of African 
societies in more general terms.
The problem with politics in Africa
After explaining that the objectives of the peace process industry need to be located in a 
political context defined as political space, the previous section explained how certain 
configurations of political space encourage peace while others are more prone to conflict. 
This section examines in more detail the political space of a region considered to be riven 
with conflict and subject to frequent interventions by the peace process industry. It has 
already been suggested that the peace process industry intervenes more frequently in 
underdeveloped, non-Western countries. Nowhere is this observation more pertinent than 
the African continent. The peace process industry has operated in every region of the 
continent from Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia 
to the Horn of Africa. However, the proliferation of technical assistance has also been 
accompanied by the political neglect and marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is not 
contradictory but represents two sides of the same problem, since technical assistance often 
compensates for a policy vacuum. This problem reflects a reluctance of donors to get 
involved along with a limited understanding of the political context by those external third 
parties who do intervene. This section offers a cursory examination of the political 
structures, practices and norms in Africa by discussing the African state, 'civil' society and 
political order. It examines the features of political space in Africa which predisposes it 
towards conflict and a crisis of politics. In turn, this crisis generates a politics of crisis 
response from the peace process industry.
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THE FAILURE OF AFRICAN STATEHOOD39
The nature of politics in Africa finds its roots in the legacies of colonialism which imposed 
new forms of political organisation onto African society. Prior to colonialism, various 
forms of political organisation existed across Africa: empires, kinship groupings, tribes, 
city-states, etc. Although immensely diverse, these political groupings shared similarities 
in their connections with the external world, particularly through trade; the nature of rule 
over people rather than land; and the ability and propensity for outlying peoples to escape 
and separate from centres of rule and power.40 The 1884 Berlin Conference and the division 
of the continent into territorial units uniformly imposed the sovereign state across Africa. 
Although the colonial state existed for little more than half a century, it created new rules 
of politics, new dimensions of power and new relations of authority which left a lasting 
legacy on African political space.
The colonial state imposed artificial boundaries that separated African societies and joined 
new societies together. It was coercive and bureaucratic but prior to the end of the 19th 
century, state power rarely extended beyond capital cities or coastal frontiers. Control over 
colonies was established by co-opting urban elites and traditional authorities for indirect 
rule, which was "by and large a celebration of kinship institutions to which the colonial 
state delegated important state functions of providing for the security and welfare needs of 
the ordinary colonized African."41 But in this process of exercising social control, the 
colonisers left a legacy of patron-client politics and ethnic cleavages tied to the centralised 
state. In Sierra Leone for example,
[b]y building up the chiefdoms as the principal units of 'native 
administration' the British had made them and especially the chieftaincy 
itself prizes worth coveting and by confining the chieftaincy to 
representatives of specified families within each chiefdom, they had created
39For a discussion of the state in Africa, see Christopher Clapham, Africa and the 
International System: The politics of state survival, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996.
40Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to state failure in Africa," International Security, 
21(3), Winter 1996/97, p. 127-129.
41 Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," p. 192.
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a group of local patrons with their own clienteles within the chiefdom and 
a built-in basis for competition between them.42
The colonial state was also built on the conviction of redeeming the society over which it 
ruled. Through the belief that native African society was irredeemably flawed, the state was 
established to correct society's imperfections. The state was thus hostile to society. It was 
also predatory and aggressive, extracting labour in a coercive manner, although this varied 
between different colonial powers. The colonial state was also defined by its orientation 
towards the imperial capital, extracting and exploiting resources for the empire. It 
depended on revenue from the centre and "derived its power from legally sanctioned 
coercion unaccountable to the subjects of the state, but from outside."43 Thus, the African 
colonial state imposed new rules, institutions and procedures of statehood but it was also 
a mutated form of statehood since it never conformed to the model of the European state.
At independence, nationalist African leaders unanimously embraced the nation-state, 
assuming the reins of government within colonially designated boundaries. These new 
states gained immediate and unconditional recognition of their identity, sovereignty and the 
inviolability of territorial integrity. These were enshrined by African leaders in the 
formation of the Organization of African Unity. However, the legality of statehood 
contrasted sharply with the empirical substance of the state.44 In the struggles for liberation, 
nationalist leaders had "generated philosophical alienation from the colonial state for the 
purpose of political disengagement and by so doing ostracized the state."45 By setting up 
the state as false and foreign to society, liberation leaders at independence needed to
42Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 114.
43Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 76.
44African states have been labelled quasi-states. Despite their international 
legitimacy, quasi-states "have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and 
consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by 
classical international law." Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international 
relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 21; 
and Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The 
Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," World Politics, 35(1), October 1982, pp. 1-24.
45Ayoade, "States without citizens," p. 104.
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integrate society back into the state. However the struggles for liberation had made the task 
more difficult by leaving
a highly fragmented social prism through which the state entered the 
consciousness of Africans in different ways, reflecting in part the patterns 
of access and exclusion built into newly emergent state structures, and the 
manner in which these came to be perceived by specific social categories or 
communities.46
The task of consolidating the territorial state had to be implemented throughout the territory 
top-down, rather than arising from outward expansion and consolidation of authority. Apart 
from the cities, the state rarely had a social base from which it could extend its reach and 
rule. In part to address these difficulties, African elites configured the state into hig'hly 
personalised, one-party states, because "African political leaders were anxious to eliminate 
or, at least, effectively control all forms of political opposition in their countries by 
occupying all possible political space through their parties and the control of state power 
and institutions."47 Many African states became neo-patrimonial states, controlled by elites 
whose legitimacy depended on their ability to provide rewards to supporters. The army was 
both client and patron, taking power in a number of countries.
From the beginning, African statehood lacked coherence and its foundations were weak. 
The weakness of the African state and attempts by African leaders to compensate for this, 
reinforced the paradox that was the post-colonial state. The post-colonial state was both 
overdeveloped and soft, "overdeveloped because it was erected artificially on the 
foundations of the colonial state, soft because it lacked administrative and political 
means."48 It was overstaffed and inefficient, incongruent with the needs or resources of the 
people, structurally deficient, and lacking in political means and legitimacy. In the process 
of state consolidation, the scope of governmental responsibilities expanded far beyond the 
administrative capacities of government. This was compounded by the inability of "most
46Rene Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became 
Reality," Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(2), 1992, p. 183.
47John Mw Makumbe, "Is there a civil society in Africa," International Affairs, 
74(2), April 1998, p. 307.
48Patrick Chabal, "Introduction: Thinking About African Politics," in Patrick Chabal, 
(ed.)Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 13.
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African governments... to establish the minimum productive basis required for the 
economic well-being (and sometimes even the survival) of their people."49 The 
overdeveloped but weak state was sustained through international recognition and direct 
support through developmental and military aid. Relations with the former imperial powers 
and with the superpowers were critical to the survival of African states. With the ending of 
the Cold War, the weak foundations of the state were further exposed. Economic decline, 
pressure for state reform and structural adjustment from the IMF and World Bank, and the 
inability of leaders to provide for their supporters, led to the breakdown of the neo- 
patrimonial system and rise of internal discontent.
The state's response to social discontent was often to pulverise other forms of social control 
and rule-making ability outside state organisations.50 Migdal called this process the politics 
of survival. African leaders'
basic weakness in the face of continued fragmentation of social control has 
led them to a political style and politics - the politics of survival - that have 
prevented the state from enhancing its capabilities by not allowing the 
development of complex organizations in state institutions.51
Thus a cycle of the state's shrinking competence, followed by state repression, further 
decline in state capacity and ability to exercise physical control over the territory, 
characterised many African states. In extreme cases, the state is in or has gone through a 
process of failure and collapse. State failure occurs when "a minimal government 
structure... has experienced economic breakdown or political unrest but not complete civil 
destruction, where a country is incapable of governing itself and where there is no control 
or agreement frequently leading to violence and civil war."52 Others point to collapsed 
states which lack central coordination and decision-making rules, exhibit makeshift
"'Patrick Chabal, "A few considerations on democracy in Africa," International 
Affairs, 74(2), April 1998, p. 291.
50Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 2. 
5 'Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 236.
52G. Helman and S. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, 89, Winter 1992- 
93, p. 3.
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arrangements, and have lost the monopoly of violence.53 Collapsed states are both the cause 
and result of civil war, for example in Liberia, Somalia and potentially the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
Although there are few failed or collapsed states, the state's record in Africa is poor. The 
state is not only unable to manage conflict because its authority is weak, it is also a source 
of conflict. Chabal and Daloz argue the state is not just weak it is an empty shell. The state 
has "failed to become differentiated from the society over which it rules, it cannot acquire 
the neutral political status which alone would allow its legitimation and its proper 
institutionalization."54 Nevertheless, even as a shell, the state has provided a framework 
which organises politics in African societies. This framework may be dysfunctional and it 
may even create the conditions for conflict, but its existence is not something that can be 
ignored. The contradictions of the state attest to the fact that the state in Africa is not a 
finished product but still caught in a process of formation which is partial, incomplete and 
disproportionate. Political space in Africa is defined by the contradictions, partial 
formations and imbalances arising from aspects of the state-building project.55 Whereas in 
Europe the process of state-formation evolved over centuries and crystallised through many 
different evolutions, the state in Africa was imposed and has had to develop all the 
attributes of modern statehood simultaneously in less than half a century. The state in 
Africa does not fully encourage the practice of politics because there remains to be 
agreement on what the form of political organisation ought to be and how this is connected 
to the structure of relations within society.
53Ayoade, "States without citizens," p. 103.
54Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument, Oxford: The International Africa Institute in association with James Currey 
and Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 13.
55 See James Manor, (ed.) Rethinking Third World Politics, London: Longman, 1991, 
p. 5.
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THE PROBLEMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA
In Africa, the state is often seen to be "responsible for the [political] crisis, so now civil 
society is viewed as the solution."56 The current fascination with the concept of civil society 
and Africa is derived from populist protests against dictatorship and repression in the mid- 
1980s to 90s, but also against the hardships imposed by structural adjustment programmes. 
Political change and the pressures for multi-party democracy meant "the concept of civil 
society has been freely used in recent years to characterize efforts and structures that 
challenge dictatorship and maximize individual freedom in Africa."57 This does not imply 
that elements of civil society did not exist before the 1980s, but that the concept of civil 
society was not applied to such phenomenon.58 Voluntary associations and trade unions 
existed in both colonial and post-independence states, while many of the liberation 
movements of the 1950s and 60s emerged directly from civil society organisations. 
However, the present salience and fixation with civil society also reflects an alternative 
agenda within development and democratisation. It represents a backlash against 
modernisation theories which posited the state as the primary engine of development. This 
section will look at the problems defining civil society and its development in Africa.
Providing a sharply demarcated definition of civil society is highly problematic, especially 
with respect to Africa. Bayart defined civil society in Africa as "society in its relation to the 
state... in so far as it is in confrontation with the state or, more precisely, as the process by 
which society seeks to 'breach' and counteract the simultaneous 'totalisation' unleashed by 
the state."59 Civil society is founded upon the image of the state as a predator. Both the 
colonial and post-independence states sought to remake society and expunge potential civil 
societies, thus civil society typically refers to challenges to authoritarian and despotic
56Eboe Hutchful, "The civil society debate in Africa," International Journal, 5 1, 
Winter 1995-96, p. 64.
57Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," p. 188.
58Jean-Francois Bayart first popularised the concept of civil society with respect to 
Africa in his article, "Civil Society in Africa," in Chabal, Political Domination in 
Africa, pp. 109-125.
59Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," p. 111.
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politics. Confrontation however assumes a hegemonic state in control of the means of 
coercion. In Africa, more often it is weak, not hegemonic states that exist. Thus it is unclear 
what associational groupings are organised against. However, social groupings in civil 
society are not even necessarily oriented against the state. Ndgewa has suggested that there 
are two faces of civil society, one which may promote democracy and oppose 
authoritarianism and one which accommodates the state. Civil society organisations, even 
if arranged against the state, are not always progressive. Warlords, strongmen and war 
profiteers also emerge from civil society and benefit from challenging the state. 
Lemarchand points out that "certain key sectors of society are just as thoroughly discredited 
as the state."60 The political vacuum in Africa has also been filled with parochial ethnic 
groupings, religious fundamentalists, and those engaged in corruption and economic 
plundering.61
It is also problematic to assume that civil society is clearly separate from the state in Africa. 
Because the state in Africa attempted to politicise all of social life, many organisations and 
interests associated with civil society fall into the state and parastatal sector. It is from these 
forces that the popular intellectuals and 'civic strata' are preponderantly drawn,62 ensuring 
that many civil society leaders have close ties to the state. Civil society leaders also often 
come from the same economic strata as state officials because to "participate actively and 
effectively in voluntary organizations requires relatively high levels of education, easy 
access to financial resources, and free time - all attributes of upper-class lifestyles."63 Since 
these elites straddle both political spheres, it is difficult to argue that there is a clear 
separation between state and civil society. If however, the weak state excluded civil society 
from official and legitimate political space, civil society may have been forced outside the 
political arena into other spaces, particularly at the local level. The power of civil society 
is not generally formal and it is not always evident where civil society is active, since the
60j 
6h
"Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies," p. 191. 
1 Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies," pp. 177-191. 
62Hutchful, "The civil society debate in Africa," p. 69.
"Robert Fatten Jr. Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 5.
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politics of civil society in Africa could be one of resistance, rather than confrontation with 
the state.
African society is also structured along an urban/rural divide, as the vast majority of 
Africans live in rural areas. This has led to the inclusion and incorporation of traditional 
forms of authority within an African civil society that contrasts with European notions of 
civil society as distinct from traditional or pre-political society. However, in Africa, kinship 
structures and patrimonial linkages remain important elements of African politics.64 
Nevertheless, patron-client politics creates a number of tensions for African statehood and 
civil society. Ekeh argues that there are two public realms in Africa; one associated with 
the formal public sphere of the state, and the other with the primordial public linked to 
kinship lineages. Because of the predatorial character of the state, the formal, civic public 
sphere is considered to be amoral and to be taken advantage of, whereas morality and ethics 
reside in the primordial public and kinship groups.65 Thus he argues that "it is insufficient 
to argue that the mere presence and ever further growth of civil society will help the 
development of democracy in Africa."66
Others point to the inherent weaknesses in African civil society. Like the state, civic groups 
lack economic and human resources. Civic groups and NGOs are not in a position to find 
independent sources of income, such as membership dues or contributions. Most groups 
and NGOs depend on revenue from either the state, international donors or partnerships 
with foreign NGOs, and inevitably find themselves tied to the political imperatives and 
projects of those who finance them. This not only fosters dependency, but also fails to 
ensure accountability and transparency. If civil society is taken to mean fully formed 
autonomous civic organisations, then civil society does not appear to exist in Africa. 
Formal associations are few and play an insignificant role in African politics. NGOs in
64However, one should not conclude that patronage politics is specific to Africa, 
similar structures existed in European history.
65Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," and Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the 
Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 17(1), 1975, pp. 91-112.
66Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," p. 198.
94
Africa may not even signal a flourishing grass roots civil society. They may reflect "the 
successful adaptation to the conditions laid down by foreign donors on the part of local 
political actors who seek in this way to gain access to new resources."67 NCOS provide a 
new form of political and financial enrichment for African political elites.
The problems of defining civil society and applying it to Africa paradoxically demonstrates 
the usefulness of the concept by pointing to dilemmas and tensions in African politics. For 
example, for a variety of reasons, civic organisations are often "content to look after the 
affairs of other segments of the public realm out of reach of the state or those about which 
the state shows little concern."68 Yet,
[i]f civil society in Africa is to be able to effectively safeguard the people's 
rights and interests against government, it needs to acquire knowledge or at 
least awareness of the workings of government and state apparatus. A major 
inhibition to civil society's effectiveness in Africa today is the lack of this 
knowledge and awareness.69
Civil society is weak in Africa because there is a poor sense of a collective membership, 
the sense of being joined together in a society. Thus while there are undoubtedly strong 
private spheres, the public element of civil society is weak which means that it has a limited 
ability to fulfil its political functions of countering the state in a positive way to extend or 
enlarge political space, and not just subvert it. Disengagement from the state does not 
enlarge the public sphere unless civil society in Africa is interested in redefining the rules 
of the game. The absence of a collective sense in the notion of civil society suggests that 
there may be some confusion about civil society in Africa, mistaking civil society for 
society. For while civil society is weak in Africa, African societies are strong and have 
exercised a lot of power against the state. According to Harbeson, "civil society typically 
refers to the point of agreement on what those working rules [of the political order or state] 
should be."70 This look at civil society in Africa focuses on the ordered arrangements of 
society in Africa, or rather the process of developing and working through these working
67Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p. 22.
68Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," p. 197.
69Mw Makume, "Is there a civil society in Africa?", p. 312.
70Harbeson, "Civil society and political renaissance," pp. 3-4.
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rules of the political order, which may be pointing to an emergent or nascent civil society.71
The shortcomings of civil society and statehood attest to a crisis of politics in Africa. 
Because the state and civil society are both unfinished and muddled products, their 
integration and coherence are highly problematic. This is
attributable not only to such factors as resource scarcity and limited 
regulatory and coercive capacity; but also to social incoherence, ie. the lack 
of recurrent patterns of political exchange and reciprocity in the relations 
among social forces. To be sure, diversity of class, ethnic and regional 
interests makes competition and conflict among groups and leaders virtually 
inescapable; however, the destructive effects of these struggles can be 
reduced if the patterns of interaction among these contending elements can 
be regularized and if the state can play an effective mediatory role, helping 
set out the terms of relationship among competing interests.72
In Africa, politics is poorly defined because the distinctions between formal and informal, 
public and private are blurred. One of the reasons the public sphere is weak in Africa is the 
continued understanding of the political as the communal and personalised.73
The 'economy of affection' that reinforces personalized and paternalistic 
relations in Africa will continue to influence the manner in which 
organizations function and relationships are constituted by fostering 
dualities in Africa in which universal norms are in constant conflict with the 
particularistic behaviour of certain groups... African politics is a patchwork 
of discontinuities more than a seamless pattern of evolution. 74
Political space in Africa is characterised by weak and ill-formed political structures, 
exacerbated by failing economies, which has created political vacuums for social conflicts 
to develop into organised violence and civil war. Africa is susceptible to political instability 
and civil conflict because of "an absence of legitimized norms governing how society and
7 'The discrepancies between what is taking place in African politics and definitions 
of civil society also illustrate where there are contradictions and confusion with regards 
to the concept of civil society more generally.
72Donald Rothchild and Michael W. Foley, "African states and the politics of 
inclusive Coalitions," in Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance, p. 234.
73Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p. 156, p. 8.
74Dwayne Woods, "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through 
a Public Sphere," African Studies Review, 35(2), September 1992, p. 86.
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the state are to be constituted."75 The most fundamental political issues, the shape and 
structures of how politics is to be organised, the conditions for the integration of state and 
society, within a common political framework are all subject to disagreement. Civil conflict 
signals the breakdown or impossibility of any kind of agreement on what those rules should 
be. However, while Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by a great deal of political 
confusion, nevertheless a number of countries have not experienced conflict and maintain 
a peaceful existence. However imperfect, a working agreement on a system of rules in some 
societies means the possibility for peace exists in Africa, but its realisation requires a 
comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of political space.
Conclusion
If Africa is to overcome its political crises and establish peaceful polities, Africans must
search for ways that will enable the state and Africa's civil society to be 
mutually engaged in the public arena, lessening the claims of the state for 
total ownership of the political space of the public realm and encouraging 
the competence of the individual with respect to his view of who owns the 
public realm where the state operates.76
The crisis of politics in Africa requires a new configuration of political space that is based 
on an ordered arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures. When a basic agreement 
exists on this arrangement, the activity of politics to mediate differences and reconcile 
conflicts will be able to flourish. Peace lies in the degree and form of political space. Thus, 
peace requires a working form of political organisation that encapsulates society, is based 
on an ordered division of society which produces an integrated public space that reinforces 
a system of rules. Political space captures this essence of the arrangement of political 
society, both the structure and functions of the whole political arena, coherence of the 
system, and how all the elements fits together. The transition from war to peace depends 
on reconnecting, binding and cohering political space.
75John Harbeson, "Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa," in Harbeson, 
Rothchild and Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa, p. 25.
76Ekeh, "The constitution of civil society," p. 198.
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The point of departure for the preceding discussion was the intervention of the peace 
process industry in countries making the transition from war to peace. The outcomes from 
this process point to a certain fixing of political space. If the peace process industry does 
not wish to obstruct or weaken the prospects for peace, it needs to consider the contours of 
political space. It also implies that in assessing their assistance, they must be aware of how 
their actions impede on the state in the performance of its political functions, on civil 
society, and on the integration of the two. International actors must assess their impact upon 
political space and ensure that they do not interpose between the state and civil society, or 
mediate relations between them. Before exploring these ideas in the Mozambican peace 
process, it is necessary to understand the history and construction of Mozambique's 
political space.
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CHAPTER THREE
Mozambique: traditions of war and resistance
In the history of Mozambique, and for most of Southern Africa, peace has been the 
exception to the regular and repeated patterns of war, conquest, domination and 
insurrection. The peace accord signed in October 1992, sought to end 16 years of war 
between the government of Mozambique and Renamo. However, it also marked the 
conclusion of nearly 30 years of war involving Mozambicans from the launch of the 
liberation struggle in 1964. The roots of war and its recurrence can be found in the 
historical, political and social conditions of Mozambique and the region in which it plays 
a major role. These conditions are related to the processes of state and civil society 
formation in the development of political space. Historically, the state has always been 
weak. Establishing centralised authority in Mozambique has been constrained by the extent 
of its territory, its multi-ethnic composition, traditions of resistance to authority, raiding 
banditry and outside interference. In some sense, these pockets of social resistance were 
nascent forms of civil society. Although it is problematic to impose the language of 
contemporary social science on historical phenomena, the history of Mozambique is in part 
a history of weak state and weak civil society-formation.
I shall argue that at the time of the peace process, political space in Mozambique was 
constituted by a weak state unable to project itself and a nascent civil society still in the 
process of cohering. The political organisation of society was characterised by a lack of 
integration and coherence. In the following chapter, I shall create a composition of what 
political space looked like at the time of the peace process by sketching the history of 
Mozambique up to the 1990s. The chapter is divided chronologically into five sections: (1) 
early history and the Portuguese arrival, (2) the consolidation of Portuguese control, (3) the 
liberation struggle, 1962-1974, (4) the independence years under Frelimo, 1975-1990s, and 
(5) a return to war: Renamo, 1976-1992. The chapter outlines the contours of the political 
space in which the peace process industry will operate and interact with when the 
implementation of the peace agreement begins.
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The history of Mozambique reveals a remarkable continuity of themes which provide a 
much overlooked context in which to understand Mozambique as a society and its 
propensity for war. These themes are first, geographical conditions. The size of the country 
accessed by a network of rivers and its extended coastline along the Indian Ocean has 
played a crucial role in Mozambique's history and regional importance. Mozambique's 
north-south frontiers are delineated by the Rovuma and Maputo rivers; while the Limpopo, 
Save, and Zambesi rivers effectively carve the country into three regions, south, central and 
north. As a consequence, Mozambique has been oriented in an east-west direction, linking 
the south to South Africa, the centre to Zimbabwe, and the north to Tanzania and Malawi, 
at the expense of north-south or national integration. (See Map of Mozambique, p. 6)
The second theme is economic opportunity arising from the importance of Mozambique as 
the gateway to the interior, its established trading networks, the mining of precious metals 
and the exploitation of labour. The third theme is foreign penetration and assimilation. 
Mozambique is a product of the persistent imposition of foreign peoples, cultures, and 
power on local inhabitants, followed by the almost inevitable incorporation of foreigners 
with the native peoples. The fourth theme is the problem of establishing centralised 
authority over this diverse and localised population throughout parts of Mozambique and 
then the country as a whole. These attempts have encountered persistent acts of social 
resistance, violence and banditry which is the fifth theme pervasive throughout 
Mozambican history. The recurrence of these five themes provide the context in which the 
state and civil society in Mozambique, and hence its political space, has developed.
Early history and the Portuguese arrival
Amidst the missionary records and Portuguese tales, the history of Mozambique emerges 
as an ongoing story of foreign penetration and assimilation through invasion, conquest and 
trade. Long before Vasco de Gama arrived off Mozambique Island in 1498, major 
kingdoms had formed and collapsed as different bands of people invaded then ruled local 
inhabitants. The Portuguese noted three native African inhabitants, the Makua, north of the 
Zambesi, and the Karanga and Tonga to the south. One of the earliest attempts at
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centralised authority began with the Karanga kingdom, a sub-group of the Shona, who 
exerted their hegemony from the Dzimbabwe court near Fort Victoria across much of 
central Mozambique. Newitt describes the Karanga kingdom as
a kind of overrule grafted on to these pre-existing institutions with which 
they tried to form ties in various complex ways. In time of war or civil 
strife, the Karanga states could rapidly break down into their component 
sub-chieftaincies whose rulers either asserted their independence or 
transferred their payment of tribute (in effect their allegiance) to some other 
paramount chief or to the Portuguese. 1
In a pattern repeated until the 19th century, conquest by one overlord was eventually 
threatened by secession from rebellious regions which threw kingdoms into civil war 
allowing new invaders the opportunity to establish new suzereignties.
Expanding trading networks and the exposure to foreign influences was integral to this 
process. An advanced trading network along the Zambesi, Save and Limpopo rivers linked 
market fairs throughout the hinterland. Trade was primarily conducted by Muslim traders 
who had operated along the coast and inland rivers since about AD10002, controlling 
important trading centres and urban settlements. African chiefs relied on these traders who 
"in return for gold, copper and ivory, ...brought by caravan to Zimbabwe considerable 
amounts of Asian cloth, Indian beads, and even some Chinese porcelain."3 The close links 
between the Sheiks and chieftains were strengthened by intermarriage and the adoption of 
Islam by some African chiefs. Indian merchants also operated and lived in Mozambique. 
They included both Hindu Indians who provided capital for the economy and later on 
Catholic Goans who settled along the rivers.
It was into this established network of trade that Vasco de Garna landed off Mozambique 
Island in northern Mozambique during a voyage to India. Initially Portuguese interest in 
Mozambique was "for mineral wealth from coastal bases to pay Indian merchants for spices
'Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique, London: Hurst & Company, 1995, p. 43. 
2Thomas Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1978, p. 6. 
3Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 6.
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and wars; it was the beginning of a policy of trade, not territorial domination."4 However, 
the promise of gold in the interior lured the Portuguese inland and led to a more aggressive 
policy. Portugal's declining mercantile power and increasing inability to finance its trading 
expeditions led to attempts to impose their political and military authority in the Indian 
Ocean. Portugal also decided to eliminate rival Muslim middlemen to create a crown 
monopoly on trade. Allied with African chiefs, Portuguese crews attacked Muslim towns 
and installed puppet clients. However, Portuguese expansion often encountered Muslim 
resistance on the mainland, beginning a tradition of resistance amongst the Makua people 
in the north.
Although the Portuguese continued to attack coastal towns to assert control over the 
coastline, "by the second decade of the [16th] century the Portuguese were busy weaving 
themselves into the existing fabric of the coast's commercial life."5 As with the Muslim 
traders before them, the Portuguese began to assimilate into the local community, often 
through intermarriage, creating a new class of landed Afro-Portuguese. This class deepened 
the rift between the crown and its agents, creating competing centres of power which 
characterised Portuguese rule. The shortage of men and ships spread across the Portuguese 
empire from Brazil to Africa to Asia meant that Portugal's nominal control over 
Mozambique was almost always overstretched. Portugal recognised that their "thin 
resources and scarce manpower determined that the crown from the outset of expansion 
should delegate judicial, administrative and fiscal duties to individuals."6 Local rulers of 
the coastal cities granted trading licenses, dealt with African and Muslim chiefs, controlled 
all shipping and shipbuilding and were also the principal traders. The independence of 
Portuguese officials allowed them to personally profit from trade, stealing from and 
neglecting the crown's trade. According to Newitt, "as early as 1510 an estimate suggested 
that three-quarters of Portuguese trade was in private hands."7
4Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 17. 
5Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 22. 
6Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 56. 
7Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 26.
102
Allied with rival African chiefs, the Portuguese gradually established themselves along the 
Zambesi, the only area of Portuguese settlement. In the Zambesi valley, Portugal's authority 
was exerted through the prazos da coroa or crown estates along the Zambesi river. 
Originating in the sixteenth century, prazos were land grants from the crown to Portuguese 
backwoodsmen. Prazo estates varied in size from minor landholdings to vast empires ruled 
by competing families like the da Cruz, de Sousa and the Perreiras. What was particularly 
interesting about the prazos was the transformation of a feudal Portuguese system into an 
Africanised society. Through intermarriage to Africans, Muslims, and Goans, these 
muzungos (Afro-Portuguese) retained only the cultural symbols and family name from 
Portugal. They often took on the status of African chieftain because of their reliance on 
Africans for their defence and political authority. Living in the valley meant that
the muzungos adopted an African way of life, farming, mining, travelling, 
ruling and fighting according to local African custom, because they 
ultimately had to fit into patterns of inheritance, land use and reciprocal 
obligation that would satisfy their African kin and their African retainers 
and clients. 8
The vast armies, independent chieftaincies and general lawlessness of the prazo system 
however, threatened Portuguese control. The breakdown of Portugal's Estado da India, the 
Karanga civil wars, migrations from Central Africa into the north and south of the Zambesi, 
locusts and drought all contributed to chaos in the territory in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Portuguese authority was also challenged by other European powers in the region. From the 
16lh century, Dutch and English ships traversed the Indian Ocean, waylaying Portuguese 
vessels. The Dutch attempted to seize Mozambique from Portugal on three occasions. The 
Portuguese were able to fend them off but unable to establish control of the coastal waters. 
After peace treaties were signed, trade between the three countries began to flourish even 
if their commercial rivalry continued. In later centuries, Portugal was ineffective against 
British navy patrols along the coast enforcing the abolition of slavery, while Scottish 
missionaries such as David Livingstone set up religious missions near Malawi, condemning 
the Portuguese for brutal labour practices.
8Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 128.
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Towards the end of the 18th century into the 19th century, the slave trade dominated 
Mozambique. An interior slave trade had flourished in Mozambique under Muslim 
influence for centuries but the new demand from plantations in the New World revived and 
expanded the activity.9 It has been estimated that 15,000 slaves were taken from 
Mozambique every year in the 1820s and 1830s. Prazo owners enthusiastically took part 
in this trade, not only selling their own slaves, but free peasants and other members of their 
estates to slavers. The slave trade disrupted the social and economic base of their system 
by leading to "the emergence of large protected settlements, militarised societies and larger- 
scale political organisation. The depopulation created a vacuum and encouraged migration, 
so that whole chieftaincies relocated in the early nineteenth century."10 Smaller prazo 
estates disappeared, while power concentrated in a few settler families. The aggressive 
expansionary drives and competitive rivalries between the remaining families started the 
Zambesi wars in the 1840s which eventually destroyed the prazo system. Although they 
began as attempts to establish or resist the dominance of one African group over another, 
they "continued after the 1880s with appeals to wider unity against the extension of 
Portuguese sovereignty."11 The Portuguese exploited the wars, using one against another 
to establish control over the fractious landowners. However, they were unable to do so until 
after the turn of the century when the prazo system was finally abolished in 1930.
Mozambique's long history of upheaval and war was derived from these pressures to 
establish control and the strong traditions of resistance this generated. From this early 
history, the foundations of political space in Mozambique were slowly being structured to 
encapsulate the whole territory comprising modern Mozambique. This expansion of the 
boundaries of political space involved bringing in diverse groups of people into one 
collective political entity, generating persistent struggles for and against authority. Political 
space in Mozambique has always been characterised by this strong tension between
9The slave trade was also fuelled by instability from the Ngoni invasions in the 
1820s. Led by Zulu chiefs, they swept northward from Natal in South Africa into 
southern Mozambique, founding the Gaza kingdom.
'°Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 253. 
"Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 84.
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centralising and decentralising pressures, both pulling at the structure of political space.
The Portuguese colonial state
The colonial system dispossessed Africa, and it's the dispossession that 
matters. It's not that you knock people on the head and take their goods. It's 
that you dispossess them of their sense of person, their sense of value, their 
sense of history - everything. 12
Throughout their hold on Mozambique, Portuguese rule was highly decentralised, 
disorganised and run by poorly educated and corrupt administrators. As late as 1890, 
Portuguese control of Mozambique "was ..confined to a half-dozen... forts or... garrisons 
at Louren?o Marques, Sofala, Tete, Sena, Quelimane and on Mozambique and Ibo Islands... 
Twenty years later Portugal... occupied nearly all of the country.'" At war with the da Cruz 
family in the Zambesi wars, Portugal also began a pacification campaign against the Gaza 
king, Gungunhana, in southern Mozambique, which destroyed the Gaza kingdom. 
Nevertheless despite these military conquests, Portuguese domination was tenuous and 
frequently challenged. Towards the end of the 19th century, economic activity was 
expanding in Mozambique with the rise of plantation agriculture and the demand for labour 
from the diamond and gold mines of the Transvaal. With economic growth came further 
aggression from the Boers and the English who claimed sovereignty over parts of 
Mozambique. After the Berlin Congress in 1884-85 established the principle of effective 
occupation rather than prior discovery as the right to territorial possession, Portugal 
desperately sought to consolidate and demonstrate its control over Mozambique.
Although Cecil Rhodes sought to justify his claim to northern parts of the Zambesi, treaties 
between Britain and Portugal finally settled upon the boundaries which define Mozambique 
today. While the outward boundaries of Mozambique were settled, the colony still "lacked 
any unified system of administration or law, was largely unmapped, had little in the way 
of public revenues or communications infrastructure, and had few of even the most basic
' 2Basil Davidson, interview in The Guardian, 15 February 1997. 
l3Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 92.
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services." l4For most of Portuguese rule, Mozambique was administered by military 
personnel because Portugal never developed a professional colonial service. 15 Following 
the pacification campaigns, "military posts were established under Portuguese officers 
backed by black cipais [police], and these began to collect tax, recruit labour and carry out 
other rudimentary governmental functions using the regulos - petty chiefs or village 
headmen - as their agents and replacing them if they refused."16 The Portuguese used 
taxation as a means of binding Africans to colonial authority since taxes were a symbol of 
homage to a sovereign authority in Mozambique.
The effective administration of the colony was undermined by Portugal's position as the 
poorest European nation. Portugal itself lacked revenue and depended upon foreign 
investment to finance its overseas adventures. Consequently, much of Mozambique was 
under the authority of foreign charter companies. These concessionary companies such as 
the Mo9ambique Company, the Niassa Company, and the Zambesia Company had been 
granted land charters with extensive administrative powers. The Mo9ambique Company, 
originally financed by French and British capital, for example was granted
the right to raise taxes, to grant mineral and land concessions and to issue 
currency and postage stamps. In return it undertook the administration, 
pacification and settlement of the region between the Zambesi and latitude 
22 degrees south of the Sabi, and agreed to pay the Portuguese government 
7.5% of all profits. 17
The first railways were also built by foreign capital. In the late 19th century, it was France 
not Portugal who was Mozambique's largest European trading partner in both imports and 
exports and this was second to trade with India. 18
In marked contrast to other colonial powers which exported capital overseas, the wealth of
l4Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 356.
l5The absence of a settler class prevented the emergence of an autonomous class of 
settler administrators who might have governed the territory.
l6Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 382. 
' 7Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 369. 
l8Newitt, A History of Mozambique, pp. 320-1.
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Africa would develop Portugal. Portugal discovered that the most valuable resource in the 
colony was the African population itself. The Portuguese found that "the products of 
African agriculture could be exported, Africans could be sold Portuguese wine and textiles, 
they could be taxed, and their labour could be employed in various ways."19 As a result, 
Portugal instituted exploitative labour practices known as chibalo or forced labour. 
According to the 1899 labour code, "all natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are 
subject to the obligation, moral and legal, of attempting to obtain through work, the means 
that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition."20 They "must civilize 
themselves through work."21 In addition to this, laws decreed in 1901 that all land not 
privately owned became the property of the state. Since most Africans could not afford to 
own their land, they were dispossessed of their land and forced to become labourers.22
As the provincial economy was directed towards Portugal's needs, African farmers were 
forced to produce cash crops, such as cotton to support Portugal's textile industries. This 
was labour intensive and time-consuming which resulted in the neglect of food crops 
leading to starvation and famine. The system of production was reoriented towards large 
plantations producing sugar, tea, sisal and cashews. However, plantation owners found 
themselves in competition for African labour with South African mines. Mozambique and 
South Africa had formalised agreements in which the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association was given a monopoly to recruit Mozambicans, employing over 100,000 
Mozambicans in the 1920s. In exchange, gold reserves were directly given to the colonial 
government and there was a guaranteed level of traffic through the port at Maputo.
With the ending of the charter companies in the 1930s, the whole of Mozambique was 
solely under Portuguese control and influence for the first time. In 1932, the Portuguese 
monarchy was overthrown by the military, ushering in the dictatorship of Antonio Salazar.
l9Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 406.
20Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, London: Penguin Books, 1969, 
p. 33.
2lHenriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 116. 
22Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 31.
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Salazar's colonial policies were conservative and autarkic, disallowing foreign investment 
and nationalising industry and agriculture to ensure 60% Portuguese ownership. Salazar 
also encouraged rural and uneducated Portuguese peasants to migrate to Mozambique to 
relieve overpopulation in Portugal and to increase the number of settlers in the province. 
The white population in Mozambique increased from under 20,000 in 1930, doubling by 
1950 and again by 1960 with over a 100,000 new immigrants arriving in the 1970s.
It wasn't until after World War II however, that Portugal attempted to develop 
Mozambique, embarking on a number of large development and infrastructure projects. 
One of the most ambitious was the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province, jointly owned by 
Mozambique, Portugal and South Africa, which became the fifth largest hydro-electric dam 
in the world. Still, much of the country remained undeveloped and neglected. As late as 
1964, there were only 7366 miles of national highways built across the province. This 
particular neglect
had the effect of increasing isolation of the different regions from each 
other, emphasising their relationship with nearby countries to which they 
were linked by railway lines or simply by geographical proximity, and 
underlining yet again the dis-integration of the country as a whole.23
Moreover, this new energy towards developing the colony did not extend to Africans. Basic 
health and education services were neglected and any opposition was repressed.
Under Salazar, the Catholic Church was given "special recognition as an instrument of 
civilisation and national influence."24 In the absence of state education, "[mjission 
education became official education, and the missions thereby became a branch of the 
government with an important role in propaganda and social control."25 Protestant and 
Catholic missions were mostly located around urban centres with Protestant missions 
concentrated in the south. Where Islam dominated in the north, there were few formal 
educational opportunities. There were also restrictions on African advancement in schools
23Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 464. 
24Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 479. 
25Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 479.
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in the form of fees, labour, and religious requirements. There were no higher educational 
institutions because the Portuguese were "hesitant to create an intellectual elite similar to 
the one which played a leading role in the doom of the British and French colonial
empires."26
Although the Portuguese claimed to have a multi-racial policy, officially the Portuguese 
distinguished between indigenas and nao-indigenas, with the former subject to colonial law 
and the latter, full citizenship under metropolitan law. All indigenas were required to carry 
identity and work cards, without which could result in immediate arrest and labour 
recruitment. The Portuguese also distinguished between mestizos who were of mixed 
parentage and assimilados, those Africans who had assimilated Portuguese culture with an 
ability to read, write and speak Portuguese. Assimilados were few in number, reaching only 
4554 in 1955,27 and were never fully accepted in white European society. However, many 
of the leaders of the liberation struggle emerged from this class.
Only the threat of insurrection prompted Portugal to initiate reform and increase investment 
in Mozambique. In 1961, indigenas became full Portuguese citizens, while in 1962, forced 
labour was outlawed. From the 1950s, restrictions against foreign investment were relaxed 
and completely abandoned from 1965.28 Military and security threats due to the liberation 
struggle led to the building of roads, ports, docks, schools and hospitals. In 1972, 
Mozambique was made a state within Portugal with more power over taxation and 
expenditure but not over defence. These efforts were already too late, not only with respect 
to the progress of the war but the fact that Portugal's influence was already overshadowed 
by South Africa which became Mozambique's largest trading partner in 1971 and main 
source of foreign capital by 1974.29 Despite Portugal's belated attempts to effect centralised 
control over the colony, this period of Mozambique's history was dominated by
26Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 146.
27Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 475, see table 17.2.
28Thomas Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of 
Independence, 1964-1974, London: Greenwood Press, 1983, p. 163.
29Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 533.
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decentralised and fragmented pressures. Although symptomatic of colonial states, attempts 
by the Portuguese to exercise authority were characterised by force and coercion which is 
often the hollow base of centralised authority. The experience of centralised authority for 
the majority of Mozambicans was excessively violent, which in turn generated a violent 
response.
FRELIMO and the liberation struggle
The character of the government in Portugal itself makes a peaceful solution 
inherently unlikely. Within Portugal the government has promoted neither 
sound economic growth nor social well-being, and has gained little 
international respect. The possession of the colonies has helped to conceal 
these failures: the colonies contribute to the economy; they add to Portugal's 
consequence in the world,... they have provided a national myth of empire 
which helps discourage any grumbling by a fundamentally dissatisfied 
population. The government knows how ill it can afford to lose the 
colonies. 30
Eduardo Mondlane
The Portuguese colonial state was coercive and exploitative, repressing any expression of 
dissent. Yet resistance to the Portuguese and other kinds of domination had a long tradition 
in Mozambique. Mondlane, FRELIMO's founder, was descended from a chief in the Gaza 
kingdom who had fought against the Portuguese in the pacification campaign of 1895. 
Resistance against the Portuguese took many forms, often ethnically or regionally based. 
These protests included strikes, riots and local demonstrations, particularly amongst the 
Makonde in the North, the last region pacified by Portugal. Muslims in the north had 
always defied Portuguese control until Portugal conquered the region in 1910, although this 
control was shortlived with another rebellion in 1917 put down in 1920. In addition to 
popular rebellion there were also acts of personal resistance to the colonial state such as 
migrating, avoiding taxes, escaping labour projects, or working in South African mines.
The beginnings of national consciousness, however, lay with the intellectuals. It was the 
educated and assimilado Africans, caught between Portuguese discrimination and African
30Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 123-4.
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alienation, who mobilised criticism of Portuguese rule through newspapers such as O 
Africano and later O Brado Africano which were both closed by the government. These 
intellectuals and others were inspired by Nkrumah and Nyerere and the peaceful transition 
to independence under French and British colonialism. Intellectual resistance also included 
subversive poetry which mocked Portuguese exploitation and hypocrisy but resulted in 
police persecution for the poets. A number of political associations and student 
organisations emerged, but these quickly attracted police surveillance and eventual closure. 
The violent repression by the Portuguese and Portuguese hostility towards independence 
meant that resistance went underground with exile movements forming in neighbouring 
Tanzania and Zambia.
Three exile movements dominated the early 1960s. These were UDENAMO, a group of 
workers and exiles from south and central Mozambique formed in Tanzania, MANU, 
mostly Makonde from the north and dominated by English speakers and UNAMI, organised 
by Mozambicans from Tete in Malawi. At the insistence and encouragement of Julius 
Nyerere, these three movements formed a coalition called FRELIMO, the Frente de 
Libertaqao de Mozambique, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam 
in 1962. FRELIMO31 was immediately recognised by the OAU, as the "sole recipient of aid 
to Mozambican groups,"32 and a few months later, held its first party congress in Dar es 
Salaam with delegates from all regions in Mozambique.
From the beginning, FRELIMO was beset by factions and in-fighting over divergent 
interests, objectives and the definition of the enemy. Mondlane believed that the task of the 
liberation movement was not to replace white Europeans with black Africans but to 
transform the colonial system itself. Thus he advocated a multi-racial movement which 
welcomed all Mozambicans who believed in democracy, whether they were black, white, 
or mestizos. However, this open policy was resented by those who felt the influence of 
mestizos from the south was too strong. Other problems related to international support and
3 'FRELIMO refers to the liberation movement, while Frelimo is reserved for the 
official party and government of Mozambique.
32Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 170.
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ideological orientation. Within Frelimo
divergent groups each accused each other of pro-Western, pro-Soviet and 
pro-Chinese sympathies. Other reasons for cleavages were the stresses and 
strains of exile politics among a heterogeneous leadership of varied ethnic, 
language, religious, social and educational backgrounds who had little 
political experience. 33
Mondlane was considered to be too Western and accused of being a CIA spy, while his 
white American wife, Janet was resented for running the Mozambique Institute in Dar es 
Salaam. Students at the Mozambique Institute, part of Frelimo's educational system 
preparing students for education abroad, rebelled against her control and closed the school 
for months. Mondlane also faced criticism from students abroad who refused to give up 
their education and return to Mozambique to join the military effort.
Although defections plagued FRELIMO, none of the defectors were able to form a 
significant opposition to FRELIMO and none gained international recognition. The first to 
leave FRELIMO was Adelino Gwambe, the first president of UNDENAMO who had 
sought the presidency of FRELIMO himself. He was later expelled from Tanzania for being 
a Portuguese agent, a common and useful accusation, but he later formed another group in 
Uganda. Another high-level departure occurred during the war, when the Makonde chief 
and MANU leader, Lazaro Kavandame, was removed from office for 'exploiting' the 
peasantry. A conservative and traditional leader, Kavandame was alarmed by the growing 
radicalism in the movement, resented the burden of warfare in the north of the country and 
wanted the northern provinces to secede. With the Portuguese, Kavandame and others, were 
implicated in the assassination of Mondlane in 1969. His death created a severe setback for 
FRELIMO. A transition council led by Samora Machel, FRELIMO's army commander, 
Marcelino dos Santos, a prominent mesti9o and former poet, and Uria Simango, a 
conservative leader, led to another contest between radical and conservative elements. The 
further radicalisation of movement became inevitable after Machel became FRELIMO's 
new leader, and Simango was expelled as a Portuguese agent.
At the beginning, FRELIMO was torn between two options, political diplomacy to
33Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 173.
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negotiate independence or a guerrilla campaign. Portuguese intransigence, their refusal to 
recognise the principle of self-determination, and moreover their claim to Mozambique as 
an overseas province, convinced FRELIMO that only armed struggle would achieve 
independence. From 1963, militants including Machel, began guerrilla training in Algeria. 
With only 250 guerillas, FRELIMO began the war on 25 September 1964, with small units 
hitting administrative positions in Cabo Delgado province. Like other insurgent groups, 
FRELIMO used guerrilla warfare tactics of ambush, sabotage, hit-and-run raids, then fading 
into the bush. However, they were severely constrained by a lack of skills, most guerrillas 
couldn't drive or operate machinery, and the poor quality of weapons, some from World 
War II. At the beginning, the leaders avoided "[the] destruction of development schemes 
that independent Mozambicans would inherit."34 This would change as the war progressed.
The assault surprised the Portuguese. Since a revolt in Angola in 1961, Portuguese 
authorities had been preparing to defend against attacks from Tanzania, not inside 
Mozambique. They moved people from the border into fortified villages, called 
aldeamentos, to provide security and create village militias but also to deny guerrillas 
access to the people. Forced relocation into these villages, away from ancestral lands to face 
more restrictions and harassment by Portuguese officials, generated greater peasant 
resentment. This served to create more sympathy for FRELIMO as well as refugees, who 
having fled to Tanzania, were easily recruited by FRELIMO. The Portuguese also recruited 
a significant numbers of Africans into the colonial army, particularly from the Islamic 
Makua and Yao groups. From 4000 in 1961, this rapidly expanded to 35,000 by 1964, and 
65,000 by 1968. By 1974, Africans comprised 60% of the colonial army, with the greatest 
concentration in special commando units.35
After FRELIMO's initial successes, there was a lull in fighting until 1965 when FRELIMO 
opened another front in Niassa province. There they met stronger Portuguese resistance and 
hostility from the Yao and Makua peoples who were traditional enemies to the Makonde, 
and who as Muslims feared religious persecution given some of FRELIMO's rhetoric.
34Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 191. 
35Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 198.
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FRELIMO held its second party congress in 1968 in Niassa province to demonstrate that 
the struggle was taking place on Mozambican soil. But again, despite opening a third front 
in Tete province, Frelimo advances were stalled leading to more internal division. In 
response to FRELIMO's incursions the new Portuguese commander, Kaulza de Arriaga, 
launched a massive offensive using 35,000 troops in Cabo Delgado province in Operation 
Gordian Knot. Despite this effort and Portugal's use of syphoned NATO military 
assistance, neither side gained a real advantage. However, Portugal was increasingly losing 
money and men in a war it wasn't winning because of FRELIMO's use of the country's 
size to overextend Portuguese resources. FRELIMO also attacked the Cahora Bassa Dam 
for symbolic value and to draw Portuguese troops into a defensive position, diverting 
troops from other areas.
In 1972, FRELIMO began to target railways and white settlements in Manica and Sofala. 
With greater assistance, weapons and training from Eastern Bloc countries, the USSR, 
China and Vietnam, FRELIMO intensified their campaign, attacking strategic towns and 
targets. The level of violence directed at both settlers and Africans in central Mozambique 
generated hostility towards FRELIMO in the region which continues to persist. They also 
struck at transport routes leading to Salisbury and coordinated tactics with Zimbabwean 
insurgents which brought Rhodesian forces over the border. By 1974, FRELIMO was 
advancing into central Mozambique south of the Zambesi close to Gorongosa. They crossed 
the Save River and tentatively advanced towards Louren9o Marques. Stretched over three 
fronts in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the Portuguese army became 
increasingly demoralised.
The ongoing progress of the war radicalised FRELIMO's political orientation which 
intensified but also partially resolved FRELIMO's internal divisions. From an anti-colonial 
movement, FRELIMO evolved into a social revolution that "has as its point of departure 
the negation of the exploitation of man by man."36 This phrase, the exploitation of man by 
man figured in many FRELIMO speeches. Mondlane was behind much of FRELIMO's
36Tom Young, "The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique," African 
Affairs, 87, p. 167.
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socialist orientation, seeking to rebuild "Mozambican society, using the intensive solidarity 
of the revolutionary struggle to transform it into a state free from foreign or traditional 
exploitation."37 This included exploitation by petty bourgeois capitalists such as 
Kavandame. His expulsion and others like him allowed the movement to eliminate 
traditional elements and consolidate the revolution, which formed the basis for the future 
government. Although FRELIMO originated as a force prising open colonial political 
space, their internal development subsequently also closed off alternative conceptions of 
political space unsympathetic to the social revolution.
The guerrilla army was one of the agents for social change by which FRELIMO put their 
claims into practice. FRELIMO soldiers not only underwent ideological training, but 
different ethnic and regional groups were mixed together to foster solidarity and create 
national consciousness. Women as well, were allowed into combat units and given a voice 
in political meetings. The army was also used as a forward movement for mass 
mobilisation. In areas won by FRELIMO, the liberated zones in the north, FRELIMO set 
up a rudimentary administrative apparatus, encouraging cooperative agriculture, village 
committees, schools, a primary health system and women's politicisation. Although it is 
difficult to establish the verity of nationalist claims, "embryonic forms of socialist practice 
were forged in the liberated zones, in the development of political mobilization, new forms 
of collective production, new methods of socio-political organization and even the creation 
of a New Man."38 The war was not only a struggle for liberation but a social revolution.
By the middle of 1974 there was an undeclared truce between Portuguese and FRELIMO 
troops with Portuguese soldiers refusing to fight. The lack of progress in the war, the war 
in Angola, rising Portuguese casualties and mounting pressure for reform at home led to the 
Generals' coup in Lisbon in 1974. Although there were settler factions who dreamed of a 
Mozambican UDI, Portugal quickly agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations. The Lusaka 
Accord of September 1974 unconditionally handed power over to FRELIMO and brought 
in a 9-month transitional government. Apart from an aborted coup attempt by settlers, the
37Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, p. 174. 
38Young, "The Politics of Development," p. 169.
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transition was peaceful and Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975.
The independence years
Our people's experience of a State and government, the experience of all 
workers has been that State and government are oppressive structures, 
hostile forces compelling us to submit and resign ourselves to foreign 
domination, to the domination of big financial interests.39
Samara Machel
Although independence came to Mozambique, the war had not been won. FRELIMO's ten 
year struggle had invested it with legitimacy, military power and internal party strength, but 
its uneven success across the country meant that the south, centre and north had different 
experiences of the war with far reaching implications for the future. In the north where they 
had established the liberated zones, FRELIMO's authority was strongest. In the centre, they 
encountered more resistance, relying more on coercion and violence against the people, 
while the south escaped most of the fighting, although many of the leaders originated from 
there. Premature victory shortened the revolutionary process but FRELIMO's leaders were 
committed to transforming their guerrilla movement into a political vehicle through which 
to revolutionise the state. The elimination of traditional and conservative elements during 
the struggle left a core cadre of leaders unwilling to compromise over the revolution. 
However, the Frelimo government soon encountered hostility to its project and new 
challenges to its authority and moral integrity.
Frelimo's radical socialist rhetoric, the uncertainty of independence and reports of revenge 
killings hastened the flight of Portuguese settlers from the country. Although Frelimo had 
called for a new multi-racial society and encouraged Portuguese settlers to participate in 
building a new Mozambique, a rapid Portuguese exodus began. Between September 1974 
and April 1975, 52000 settlers from a total of 200,000 left, with only 20,000 settlers 
remaining by June 1976. Many of the fleeing Portuguese sabotaged the possessions they left 
behind, including cars, tractors, buses, houses, farm machinery, cattle, and produce.
39Samora Machel, "Frelimo's Tasks in the Struggle Ahead," in Mozambique: 
Revolution or Reaction, Richmond, B.C.: LSM Press, 1975, p. 7.
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Although most of the settlers were poorly-skilled and only semi-literate, they had formed 
the administrative class which had sustained Mozambique's infrastructure and economy. 
The mass exodus of drivers, technicians, teachers, health workers, shopkeepers, managers, 
businessmen, and state officials created a severe crisis for the new government,
Frelimo devised a policy called 'intervention' using the state to take over small abandoned 
businesses and farms. Frelimo also began to nationalise "all health services, education, legal 
services and especially rented property... the whole of the retail sector,"40 and land itself. 
With its faith in scientific socialism, Frelimo committed itself to state ownership of the 
productive resources and overall state control of the economy. They created a centrally 
planned economy and set up a Planning Commission to oversee the direction of economic 
targets and their implementation. From the outset, there was a contradiction between the 
ambitious reach of the state into every aspect of the economy, and the administrative 
capacity to carry it through. At the time of independence, illiteracy stood at 97% and there 
were some 150 university educated graduates41 to assume the country's administration.
Frelimo believed these obstacles could be overcome by the party and at its third party 
congress in 1977 declared itself to be the vanguard party of Marxism-Leninism.42 This 
reduced the state to a vehicle for the party, but also through the party extended the state. 
Frelimo created
a system of public administration in which the party secretary at a particular 
level was also the top official in the government hierarchy. The provincial 
first secretary was always the governor of the province. The district 
administrator was the first secretary of Frelimo at the level of the district.43
Frelimo also used 'dynamising groups' to transmit Frelimo's ideology to the masses in
40Young, "The Politics of Development", p. 174.
41Prakash Ratilal, Mozambique: Using Aid to End the Emergency, New York, NY: 
UNDP, 1990, p. 16.
42The credibility of Mozambique's Marxism has been debated, see Michel Cahen, 
"Check on Socialism? What Check, What Socialism," Review of African Political 
Economy, 57, 1993, pp. 46-59.
43Bridget O'Laughlin, "Interpretations Matter: Evaluating the War in Mozambique, 11 
Southern Africa Report, January 1992, p. 29.
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factories, schools, villages and neighbourhoods, for organising everything from literacy 
programmes to the running of factories.44 A number of mass organisations were created, 
such as the Mozambican Woman's Organisation, Mozambican Youth Organisation, and the 
Organisation of Mozambican Workers. They also established "people's assembly elections 
at local levels in 1977 and 1980 [to] provide the opportunity for voters to accept or reject 
party-proposed candidates... [as] the basis for indirect elections to provincial and national 
assemblies."45 In its external relations, Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the USSR in 1977, followed by similar treaties with Cuba and East 
Germany. This brought a cheap supply of oil from the USSR, material and technical 
assistance, especially military equipment and advisors.
Despite the claims to popular participation or poder popular (people's power), in reality,
certain people were barred from election, among them traditional chiefs and 
regulos who had held posts under the colonial regime; great tension was 
created in some areas where the 'natural' leaders of the community were 
replaced by party nominees with no local standing whatever.46
In seeking to modernise traditional society, Frelimo overlooked and reduced the authority 
of traditional chiefs, and minimised regional and ethnic differences. Frelimo concentrated 
on forging national unity and thus refused to '"recognise tribes, regions, race or religious 
beliefs,' ...'We only recognize Mozambicans who are equally exploited and equally 
desirous of freedom and revolution.'"47 Frelimo also sought to create a secular state, closing 
churches and confiscating church property. Frelimo's leaders, predominantly from the 
Protestant South, viewed the Catholic Church with suspicion because of its role in colonial 
education and its opposition to the independence struggle. One beneficiary of Frelimo 
ideology however were women. Machel declared the liberation of women "a fundamental 
necessity for the Revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition for its
44Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors in The Transformation of Frelimo," 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 31(2), 1993, p. 317.
45 William Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola 
and Mozambique, London: Zed Books, 1994, p. 26.
46Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 544.
47Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to 
Revolution, 1900-1982, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p. 112.
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victory."48 But liberating women posed another threat to traditional authority. Dogmatic 
faith in the modernising capacity of scientific socialism and its revolutionary potential, 
while rejecting a 'backward' peasantry, generated more enemies than Frelimo needed. 
Through the party, Frelimo created new norms, institutions and procedures to create and 
serve public interests, but it did so by closing off political space to certain groups and 
defining the public sphere in an exclusionary manner.
A large part of Frelimo's leadership came from the assimilado class, whose roots did not 
lie with the peasantry, ethnic or lineage associations. This created an urban bias that was 
exacerbated by the shift of power from the north to the south in the 19th century. The two 
major cities, Maputo and Beira, were "created out of nothing to serve the needs of the 
British hinterland, ...situated in the extreme south and the centre-south. As a result, the 
urban African elite had nothing on which to depend, no tradition."49 Although rural peasants 
formed the majority of Mozambicans (over 90% in 1983) and the backbone of the 
agricultural economy, the leadership rejected the peasantry as an obstacle to the expansion 
of agricultural output. This hostility towards the peasantry influenced Mozambique's 
development strategy of a capital intensive state farm sector. Government resources were 
given to large state farms and cooperatives, rather than small peasant holdings, the 
distribution network was run by the state through People's Shops, with producer and 
consumer prices set by state bodies, while industry produced heavy machinery for state 
farms rather than basic goods such as tires and hoes. It is estimated that 90 per cent of 
agricultural investment in 1977-1983 went to the state sector, 2 per cent to cooperatives, 
and virtually none to the small family sector .50As part of this policy and to provide better 
services, Frelimo also created communal villages based on the example of ujamaa in 
Tanzania creating 1500 villages containing over 1.5 million people by 1981.51 Peasant
48Samora Machel, Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution cited in Isaacman 
and Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism, p. 115.
49Cahen, "Check on Socialism," p. 49.
50Mark Chingono, The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of 
War in Mozambique, 1975-1992, Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1996, p. 37.
5 'Otto Roesch, "Rural Mozambique Since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress: The 
Situation in the Baixo Limpopo,"Review of African Political Economy, 41, 1988, p. 76.
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reluctance to communalisation led Frelimo to use more forceful tactics to move villagers. 
One notorious example was Operation Production carried out in 1983 which rounded up 
an estimated 50,00052 unemployed city-dwellers and sent them to work on farms in the far 
north. It was again primarily the coercive side of the state, that is the army and the police, 
that the vast majority of Mozambicans experienced the post-colonial state.
However, Frelimo was immensely successful in education and health services, its two 
proudest achievements. Giving priority to both,
between 1974 and 1981 the number of children attending primary school 
increased from 700,000 to 1,376,000, almost half of whom were girls, while 
secondary school enrolments went from 20,000 to more than 135,000. 
Moreover the rate of illiteracy dropped from 97 to 75 percent during the first 
five years of independence, and among Mozambicans aged ten to twenty- 
four, it declined to less than 60 percent. 53
Immunisation also took place with a national vaccination campaign against measles, tetanus 
and smallpox in 1979 reaching more than 90% of the population.54 In addition to this, 
Frelimo began to accept responsibility for their early mistakes in economic and agricultural 
policy and initiated policy reforms and structural changes. As one eminent Mozambican 
writer remarked,
We didn't realise how influential the traditional authorities were. We are 
obviously going to have to harmonize traditional beliefs with our political 
project. Otherwise we are going against things that the vast majority of our 
people believe; we will be like foreigners in our own country.55
The Fourth Party Congress in 1983 recognised this and promised greater support to the 
peasantry and family agriculture. But these promises failed to bring about real change, as 
state administrators failed to implement policy decisions and because of the fate of the war.
This lack of change was also in part due to the character of political leadership and the
52Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors," p. 328.
53Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism, p. 139.
54Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism, p. 139.
55Luis Honwana, the Mozambican writer, cited in Tom Young, "The MNR/ Rename: 
External Dynamics and Internal Dynamics," African Affairs, 89(357), p. 507.
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shape of the political process in Mozambique. Like other socialist countries, Frelimo 
considered dissent subversive and illegitimate, thus disallowing and punishing criticism. 
This was reinforced by the party's history of factionalism. Potential sources of opposition 
were repressed but also stifled by a bureaucratic vision of democratic centralism and a 
populist style of politics. As head of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, and leader of the ruling party, the charismatic and dominating presence of 
Samora Machel greatly influenced the shape of Mozambican politics from the liberation 
struggle to his death in 1986. He not only enjoyed tremendous personal popularity but also 
expected the people to meet his standards of morality and conform to his ideas of politics.56 
Mozambican politics offered little room for dissenting opinions, public debate or the 
involvement of others in political discussion, for fear that this implied sharing decision- 
making power and would be perceived as weakness.57
The return to war in the 1980s and the emergency it created, fundamentally transformed the 
country. The gains from the early years of independence were reversed followed by a rapid 
agricultural decline and economic collapse. GDP declined by 30 percent between 1982 and 
1985 while external debt increased from zero in 1982 to $4.7 billion in 1989. 58 The 
emergency situation created severe food shortages and displaced millions of people. The 
diminishing capacity of the state to provide security for the people and the war itself led to 
an ever shrinking state. To protect villagers, the government distributed large numbers of 
weapons to create peasant militias which increased the levels of insecurity and criminality. 
Attacks on railways linking the interior countries to the coast brought troops from Tanzania, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe to guard the transport corridors. From an initial 1000 troops, 
Zimbabwe had 10,000 troops in Mozambique by the end of the war engaging in offensive 
strikes against Rename. The failure to defend the people against RENAMO, signalled the
56For an account of the leadership and personality of Machel, see lain Christie, 
Machel of Mozambique, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988.
"Interview with Migel de Brito, Researcher, War-Torn Societies Project, 
Mozambique, Maputo.
58David N. Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its 
Donors,"77ze Journal of Modern African Studies, 31(3), 1993, p. 410.
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59failure of the government itself.
The space left by the shrinking state was filled by a host of donor agencies, UN agencies 
and international NGOs arriving because of the emergency. The influx of these 
international actors posed a further challenge to the state, weakening the public spirit of the 
regime, and undermining the possibility of re-establishing the state's rural network in the 
countryside. Many observers noted how "existing NGOs in Mozambique... [set] themselves 
up as a kind of parallel state apparatus, an alternative to what is viewed as a corrupt and/or 
inefficient Frelimo state."60 In 1980 there were just seven NGOs61 , but from 1987 to 1990, 
the number of foreign NGOs opening offices in Mozambique rose to over 100.62 Many 
observers concluded there was a "dramatic erosion of domestic authority as donors, foreign 
consultants, and non-governmental organisations (N.G.O.s) assume[ed] responsibilities 
previously reserved to the state."63
The challenge to the government's authority in Mozambique was accompanied by a transfer 
of authority out of the country. Towards the end of the 1980s, Mozambique became the 
largest recipient of US emergency aid in Southern Africa, the largest single recipient of 
Italian foreign aid,64 received humanitarian and development assistance from the 
Scandinavians and military training assistance from Britain as early as 1986. By the 1990s, 
Mozambique's foreign aid accounted for more than two thirds of GDP making
59Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique, Geneva: UNIDIR, 
p. 53.
60Bridget O'Laughlin, "Mozambique: What Is To Be Done?" Southern Africa Report, 
March 1992, p. 33.
61 Joao Cravinho, Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State, 
Doctoral Dissertation, Oxford University, 1995, p. 226.
62Jon Bennett, "Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction and the LINK NGO Forum, 
1987-1994," in Jon Bennett, (ed.) Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice, 
London: Earthscan, 1995, p. 70.
63Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty," p. 407.
64Alex Vines, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? London: 
James Currey, 1996, p. 42; and William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing 
of Mozambique, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992, p. 35.
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Mozambique the most aid dependent country in the world.65 Donor dependence led to the 
appellation of the Donor's Republic of Mozambique but had serious implications on where 
decisions were being taken. Mozambique had also radically reoriented its economic 
development policies by joining the IMF and World Bank in 1984 and the Lome 
Convention in 1985, and accepting a structural adjustment package in 1987. The 
government moved towards a more market oriented strategy, cutting back the state in both 
services and personnel, embarking on rapid privatisation schemes and devaluing the 
currency. As a result of both internal and external pressures, in 1989 at the fifth party 
congress, Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and in 1990, enacted a liberal constitution 
which transformed Mozambique into a multi-party democracy, guaranteeing freedom of the 
press, judiciary and religious expression. Many mass organisations declared independence 
from the party, becoming independent members of civil society.
The decision to accept a structural adjustment programme with the IMF and World Bank 
in 1987 had a profound effect on political space.66 The goal of the PRE (Economic 
Recovery Programme) was to restore production levels by giving priority to agriculture and 
to peasant producers. However, Mozambique was unique in the world for initiating such 
a programme in the midst of war. The logic of transferring resources from urban to rural 
areas was seriously questioned by a war in the countryside. Although GDP improved in the 
first three years, the assumption that structural adjustment measures would increase 
agricultural production was irrelevant in the face of mass population movements out of 
agricultural areas due to the war. Similarly because of the war, reductions in state supplied 
inputs and marketing services were not replaced by private ones. The focus on macro-
65Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty," p. 411.
66Given the limited space and also given the deliberate underplaying of economic 
factors in the thesis, the impact of structural adjustment on the political space of 
Mozambique will not be discussed in great depth. For further reading, see Hans 
Abrahamsson, "The International Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Case 
of Mozambique," European Journal of Development Research, 7(2), December 1995, 
pp. 297-319; Merle L. Bowen, "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in 
Contemporary Mozambique," Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(2), 1992, pp. 255- 
279; Judith Marshall, "Structural Adjustment and Social Policy in Mozambique," 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 47, pp. 28-43.
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economic policies to restructure the economy neither realised its goals of generating 
increased levels of production, nor strengthened the Mozambican economy because of its 
configuration along micro-economic lines. Mozambique soon developed many conditions 
experienced in other African countries undergoing structural adjustment: rises in basic food 
prices, a devalued currency and social unrest. The social impact of structural adjustment 
was devastating. Declining standards of living were accompanied by greater inequalities 
and social differentiation, increased corruption, crime and riots. In 1990, a wave of strikes 
took place across the country, by port, media, industrial and health workers, teachers, and 
other mass trade unions and cooperatives. As in the rest of Africa, discontent was directed 
against the government, not the international financial institutions.
In addition to undermining the social fabric of Mozambique, the PRE had political 
repercussions stemming from the retraction and reduction of the state from society in the 
services provided and in the number of officials planning, administering and delivering 
such services. The health and education sectors deteriorated further because of reduced 
resources from the state and the state's partial withdrawal from these sectors as a public 
good. The state's ability to monitor and regulate society was decreasing, and its capacity 
to manage and respond to the crisis increasingly limited. Mozambique's control over policy 
and the country's development was eroding and passing to the technocrats of the IMF and 
World Bank. International pressure regarding structural adjustment, good governance and 
privatisation, demoralised the government and eroded Frelimo's commitment to progressive 
politics. What had characterised the government in the past, "a strong sense of public 
purpose, one premised on the envisaging of society-wide transformations that might 
actually change the lives of the vast majority of Mozambicans in positive ways,'*7 was 
being lost and replaced by so-called 'Afro-pessimism' which still colours the current 
political landscape.
Whatever the successes or failures of FRELIMO's configuration of political space, it can 
only be judged against the backdrop of the region and war which engulfed Mozambique.
67John Saul, "Twenty Years After: Recolonization of Mozambique," Southern Africa 
Report, January 1996, pp. 16-17.
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Compounding the government's weaknesses were a series of natural disasters, from 
massive flooding of the Limpopo, Incomati and Zambezi rivers in 1977-78, drought in 
1981-1983 in the centre and south of Mozambique from which an estimated 100,000 people 
died, and drought across Southern Africa in the early 1990s. But it was war which 
debilitated the country. After Mozambique's independence, the ongoing liberation struggle 
for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe dominated the region. Mozambique continued to serve as the rear 
base for ZANU guerrillas. Their support for the Zimbabweans brought attacks from 
Rhodesian forces and the creation of a surrogate guerrilla force, the Mozambique National 
Resistance (MNR/Renamo). Most Mozambicans assumed Zimbabwe's independence 
would finish the MNR and its attacks on Mozambique, but as the next section discusses, 
this did not happen.
A return to war: The Mozambique National Resistance/Renamo
Interpretations of the war in Mozambique have become part of the war itself. To describe 
the war in Mozambique as a civil war implied the legitimacy of Renamo as a political 
movement with popular support. To refer to the war as a war of destabilisation pursued by 
South Africa characterised Renamo as puppets of the apartheid regime without domestic 
support. Newitt suggested that Renamo must be understood in the context of Mozambique's 
history. He argued that "because of the relatively small and disorganised political units in 
much of the country, there has always been the opportunity for bandit leaders, warlords, 
mercenaries and the like to carve out domains for themselves."68 However, this local pattern 
was overlaid with the dynamics of the region and the imprint of the Cold War. Renamo's 
war with the government was similar to other counter-revolutionary movements, it was a 
war of "slow attrition - and the gradually compounded vulnerability - of the Mozambique 
state itself."69 Over the progress of the war, Renamo's character changed but the impact of 
the war on the state and society fundamentally rearranged the rules, structures and practices
68Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p. 575.
69John Saul, "Development and Counterdevelopment Strategies in Mozambique,' 
Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild, (eds.) Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and 
Public Policy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 135.
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of political space in Mozambique.
The external origins of Renamo have been well-documented. In response to the 
deteriorating security situation in colonial Mozambique and the success of Robert 
Mugabe's ZANU forces from bases inside Mozambique, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) formed psuedo-terrorist groups for cross-border operations in 1973, 
These groups were modelled after Portuguese secret police units, theflechas, and were used 
to provide intelligence information on ZANLA bases and operations in Mozambique. 
However, after Mozambique's independence and its decision to close its border with 
Rhodesia,70 Rhodesia created a surrogate force, the Mozambique National Resistance 
Movement (MNR)/Renamo)71 , providing military assistance and training at a camp inside 
Rhodesia. Ken Flower, director of the CIO at the time, remarked on "the surprising ease 
with which the Mozambique Resistance Movement developed... particularly as we kept the 
movement small and clandestinely manageable during the first five years whilst it could 
provide the eyes-and-ears of our Intelligence in Mozambique."72
In addition to theflechas and other former colonial commando units, Renamo comprised 
a disparate set of groups. It included dissident independence factions who had lost in power 
struggles within Frelimo and disaffected students who had refused to fight in the guerrilla 
war. To these were added expelled Frelimo members detained at re-education centres, 
including Andre Matsangaissa, Renamo's first leader, charged with corruption,73 and 
Afonso Dhlakama, Matsangaissa's successor who fled to Rhodesia before being detained 
for theft. A number of wealthy Portuguese settlers also joined Renamo, including Jorge 
Jardim, a godson of Salazar, and Orlando Christina, a former Portuguese agent, who formed
70Machel closed the border with Rhodesia in compliance with UN sanctions in 1976, 
estimated to have cost Mozambique $500 million.
7 'Originally designated as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, it 
adopted the Portuguese acronym, Renamo in 1983. Renamo shall be used in the rest of 
the thesis.
72Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into 
Zimbabwe, 1964-1981, London: John Murray, 1987, see Appendix, p. 302.
"The truth of this story has been challenged by some as Frelimo propaganda.
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its external wing, representing Renamo in Lisbon.
In its early phase, Renamo numbered no more than a few hundred serving as scouts for the 
Rhodesian army. Due to the proximity of the border, Rhodesia recruited mostly from 
central Mozambique which gave Renamo its initial orientation as a Shona dominated, 
central Mozambican movement. Renamo's leadership, usually the most experienced 
fighters, was primarily Ndau, a smaller branch of the Shona group found in both central 
Mozambique and Rhodesia. Ndau subsequently became the semi-official language of the 
movement. However, as recruitment spread throughout the country, the composition of 
Renamo's rank and file later consisted of many different ethnic groups. In 1979, 
Matsangaissa was killed and succeeded by Dhlakama, supposedly against the wishes of the 
Rhodesians. In 1980-81, after a series of successful raids by the government army, Renamo 
was driven from central Mozambique, losing their main base at Garagua. With the 
impending independence of Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House agreement, Renamo was 
in disarray. According to Flower, Rhodesia began to divest itself of Renamo, severing all 
future links yet arranging for their transfer to the South African military. He noted that "the 
South African response was immediate and enthusiastic...Within days, the final 
arrangements were completed and the MNR were transferred lock, stock and barrel."74
South Africa was concerned by its neighbours' security situations and had assisted both the 
Smith and Portuguese regimes. The independence of first Angola and Mozambique, then 
Zimbabwe, heralded the end of the white colonial bulwark shielding South Africa from the 
rest of the continent. The installation of pro-Marxist governments in Angola and 
Mozambique, and the growing militancy of the ANC and the South African communist 
party fuelled South African fears of a 'total onslaught'. After direct military intervention 
in Angola failed, South Africa launched a campaign of destabilisation against its 
neighbours, the 'total strategy'. South Africa was especially hostile towards Mozambique 
for two reasons. First, South Africa wanted to discourage Mozambique's support for the 
ANC who had almost unlimited access from Mozambique to launch raids into South 
Africa. The second reason was to heighten Mozambique's vulnerability to South Africa,
74Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 262.
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and through it, to demonstrate the region's economic dependence on South Africa as well.75 
For South Africa, "the immediate objective, according to a 1983 memorandum, was to 
cause the maximum destruction possible. The medium-term objective was to force the 
Mozambican government to adopt a more favourable attitude to South Africa."76 In addition 
to Renamo, South Africa launched commando raids into Mozambique, hitting Maputo a 
number of times.77 South Africa also severed economic links with Mozambique, reducing 
the number of Mozambican mine workers allowed into South Africa from nearly 120,000 
in 1975 to 45,000 by 1983. Port and rail traffic was redirected to South African ports from 
Maputo, which in 1983 received only 16% of 1973 levels. These acts severely reduced 
Mozambique's much needed foreign exchange earnings.
With South African support, Renamo entered into a new and more deadly phase of 
operation. South Africa provided training bases in the Northern Transvaal and SADF 
personnel acted as military advisors and instructors to the guerrillas. South Africa also 
provided weapons, ammunition, transportation, food, medicine, and radio equipment. South 
African support was critical for Renamo's military success, particularly the logistical and 
communications network that allowed Renamo to organise attacks across the country. With 
this assistance, Renamo began to operate outside the central provinces of Manica and 
Sofala into northern Gaza and Inhambane, and parts of Tete province. Renamo launched 
a major offensive in the populous and fertile Zambezi valley threatening to split the country 
in half in 1981-82 and again in 1986-1987. This was accompanied by a substantial increase 
in size, from 1000 in 1980 to 8000 in 1982, increasing to 20,000 by the end of the war.78
75In 1989, the Front Line States formed SADCC (Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference) to circumvent South Africa's economic hegemony in the 
region. Mozambique's transport corridors were pivotal for the delivery of goods for 
SADCC countries.
76Minter, Apartheid's Contras, p. 134.
77"South African ground, air and naval forces violated Mozambican sovereignty with 
impunity on a regular basis, spreading captured arms and equipment (from Angola) 
across the countryside."Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace 
in a Rough Neighbourhood, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, p. 243.
1%The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York: Department of 
Public Information, Introduction, p. 9, fn 20.
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Under South African direction, Renamo specifically targeted state institutions and 
development projects in an organised and methodical fashion. Renamo attacked the 
transport corridors, not only sabotaging railroads and mining roads but "hundreds of private 
cars, vans and lorries were also attacked. The goal seemed to be to make people afraid to 
travel."79 They attacked food convoys, and other aspects of the rural economy, mining farms 
and pathways leading to agricultural fields, destroying peasant grain stores and destroying 
the food distribution network. They attacked internationally funded farms and development 
projects, kidnapped foreign aid workers and technicians and demobilised the Cahora Bassa 
dam. They also struck at Frelimo's proudest achievements, education and health, forcing 
the closure of 2655 schools and destroying over 800 health posts by the late 1980s.80 
However, Renamo never really challenged the government's control of the cities or their 
hold on the capital, Maputo. Renamo targets were "chosen precisely to exacerbate or create 
conflicts between the socialist government and the peasantry rather than to confront the 
power of the state or to construct a counter-power."8 '
Renamo's relations with Mozambican society were characterised by three features: the 
nature of its recruitment, its extreme violence and lack of a political programme. One study 
on Renamo82 claimed Renamo's method of recruitment was a systematic and consistent 
pattern of forced kidnapping from villages, schools and fields. After basic training, 
abducted recruits were initiated into Renamo by being forced to kill, binding them to 
Renamo out of guilt and fear of retribution. However not all scholars agree with this 
characterisation. Geffray, a French anthropologist, argues that Frelimo policies, particularly 
the elimination of traditional authority, created a pool of discontented peasants willing to 
join Renamo. He contends that
79Joseph Hanlon, Beggar your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, 
London: Catholic Institute for International Relations and James Currey, 1986, p. 141,
80One noticeable target exempted from Renamo attack were religious institutions 
with the church or mosque the only structure still standing in villages. 
81 Bridget O'Laughlin, "Interpretations Matter," pp. 25-26.
82William Minter, The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by 
Ex-Participants, Report for the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International 
Development Authority, 1989.
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joining the war had the character of a reassertion of political initiative by the 
people against Frelimo and its village state apparatus. The simple fact that 
the people had been given the military means to put themselves beyond the 
reach of the state permitted Renamo to plant itself firmly within the 
dynamic of local conflicts... without having to formulate a political plan to 
legitimize itself. 83
Finnegan suggests the reasons were more prosaic; hunger, the importance of the gun for 
procuring food and the promise of social status prompted many young Mozambicans to join 
Renamo. It is misleading to speak of Mozambicans or the peasants as a whole, different 
strata reacted in different ways, changing over time as the situation demanded. For example, 
contrary to expectations, "the most economically advantaged sectors of rural society in 
central Mozambique, as elsewhere, have generally sided with 'socialist' Frelimo against 
'capitalist' Renamo."84 while peasants sided with Renamo because of disaffection from 
forced relocations under the government.
Renamo has also been characterised by its cultivation and instrumental use of extreme 
violence and brutality. Hall argued that Renamo had a conscious strategy of directing 
violence against civilians to create an image of terror and instil fear in the population, 
thereby gaining control over society against the state. Renamo deliberately targeted the 
state.
Officials of FRELIMO, and of the administration, are priority targets. In 
rural areas, their physical elimination serves to isolate communities and 
remove them from the rival authority of the central power. It complements 
the destruction of the economic infrastructure and the severing of 
communications. Essentially it works to disarticulate the state. 85
Renamo's brutal reputation developed from stories of retribution, public mutilation, 
crucifixion, and grotesque methods of execution Refugees recounted how "Renamo kills 
people slowly with unsharpened axes or knives. They can pick any family and kill them one
83Christian Geffray, cited in Finnegan, A Complicated War, p. 278, fn 19.
84Otto Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels? The Retreat to Tradition," Southern Africa 
Report, May 1992, p. 28
85Margaret Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement(Renamo): A 
Study in the Destruction of an African Country," Africa, 60(1), 1990, p. 52.
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by one... But they always leave someone to escape to tell the tale.'*6 Finnegan also noted 
how comprehensive Renamo's violence was, observing that
Every window, every window frame, every door, every door-frame, every 
piece of plumbing or wiring or flooring had been ripped out and carried 
away. Every piece of machinery that was well bolted down or too heavy for 
a man to carry... had been axed, shot, sledge-hammered, stripped or burned. 
... It was systematic, psychotically meticulous destruction. 87
Renamo emphasised the visual and ritualistic impact of the killing, leading Wilson to 
characterise Renamo as a "cult of violence."88 Renamo also extensively used Shona spirit 
mediums to haunt peasants and create cults around its dead leaders.
Although Renamo had a reputation for brutality, there were regional variations and these 
changed over the course of the war. Gersony's89 1988 report on Mozambican refugees 
brought to light the degree of violence exercised by Renamo and their regional differences. 
According to Gersony, Renamo designated three administrative zones; tax areas, control 
areas and destruction areas. In tax areas, primarily in the north or in Ndau speaking areas, 
there was less destruction with Renamo demanding food from villagers and using villagers 
as porters to transport supplies. In control areas, Renamo set up bases, holding the civilian 
population in guarded settlements, surrounding Renamo bases to shield soldiers from 
attack. Here, farmers were forced to produce food for Renamo, escape was prevented, 
women were used to service soldiers and all were subject to a greater degree of beating and 
extraction of labour. "In those areas of central Mozambique that it effectively control [ed], 
Renamo [also] reinstituted the old colonial system of indirect rule, reinstating traditional 
chiefs to administer the civilian population and collect taxes on behalf of Renamo."90 In 
destruction areas, primarily located in the south where Frelimo's support was strongest,
86Ken Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique," Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 18(3), p. 527.
87Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp. 11-12.
88Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence," pp. 527-582.
89Robert Gersony, Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally 
Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique, Report submitted to the US Bureau for 
Refugee Programs, April 1988.
90Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels?" p. 29.
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Rename attacked more villages, with more looting, wilful destruction, and greater brutality. 
The release of this report, following closely upon the Homoine massacre in 1987 where 
hundreds were reportedly killed, severely damaged Renamo's international reputation and 
prevented Rename from securing American support.
Renamo was never able to attain credibility or legitimacy as an insurgent movement, not 
only because of its extreme violence, but because it lacked a political programme or 
political character. In contrast to other guerrilla insurgents, Renamo was primarily a 
military organisation that lacked political ideas and did not attempt to win over the 
population. In the reports by Gersony and Minter, political indoctrination and political 
speeches were rare according to both refugees and ex-soldiers. The apolitical character of 
Renamo's internal organisation had its origins in the objectives of the foreign sponsors 
which created it. Neither the Rhodesians, nor the South Africans envisaged Renamo as an 
alternative government to Frelimo, nor did they provide the kind of support which could 
have brought this about. The South African objective was "not primarily to change 
governments, but to change policies."91 Documents found at Renamo headquarters at 
Gorongosa "record the South African side telling the MNR that they should seek a cease­ 
fire as a step towards 'power sharing' because the Mozambican government 'is recognised 
internationally and you are not. The RSA does not have the money to help Renamo 
recuperate the economy if it wins the war.'"92
However, South Africa encouraged Renamo to develop a political orientation and 
credibility, primarily to mask South African support. Ironically, as South Africa was 
attempting to restrain Renamo, their direct control and influence, and also that of former 
Portuguese colonials, was diminishing.93 Renamo established a national council and tried 
to create a structure of political leadership. But the real power was held in the hands of
91Anders Nilsson, "From Pseudo-terrorists to Pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in 
Mozambique," Review of African Political Economy, Part 1, 57, p. 66-67.
92Rob Davies, "The SADF's covert war against Mozambique," in Jacklyn Cock and 
Laurie Nathan, (eds.) War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1989, p. 113.
93Vines, RENAMO: From Terrorism, pp. 21-24.
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Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's president and military commander. Dhlakama and Rename 
portrayed themselves as freedom fighters, democrats and Mozambican nationalists, but 
their rhetoric was crude, anti-communist and anti-Frelimo. Inconsistencies, such as 
demanding the restoration of private property to colonial owners, pointed to the influence 
of external forces and were often drafted by non-Mozambicans.
However ordinary Mozambicans were not passive in the face of Renamo's aggression or 
the deteriorating emergency situation. Renamo's use of spirits was taken on by peasants 
who called on vengeful ancestral spirits who disapproved of Renamo's violence to protect 
them. One successful example was the Naprama movement which created zones of peace 
in Zambezia and empowered other peasants to resist. Founded by Manuel Antonio, soldiers 
underwent an elaborate ceremony where they were cloaked in a special vaccine which made 
them impermeable to bullets.94 The significance of this resistance was also an attempt by 
Mozambican peasantry "to reconsitute a new system of meaning and social order out of the 
war-shattered wreckage of Frelimo's post-independence experiment and the colonial-cum- 
traditional society which Frelimo sought to transform."95 Through their resilience and 
resourcefulness they transformed and subverted their relations with Rename and with the 
state. The breakdown of the trading networks and the decline in agricultural production also 
created a war economy and the development of parallel markets, "which undermined state 
power by providing avenues for accumulation of wealth, which was translated into political 
power." Notwithstanding the destruction caused by the war, war was also a powerful social 
process, breaking down the norms and values binding society and transforming relations 
in society, and society's relations to the state. War opened up Mozambique's political space 
to new political elements once again.
94For an account of the use of spirit mediums and counter-violence, see Wilson, 
"Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence," pp. 527-582.
95Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels," p. 30.
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Conclusion: legacies of the war
Sixteen years of war had a profound legacy on the political space of Mozambique. The state 
apparatus was dismantled through much of the countryside, the idea of the state was 
weakened in the eyes of the population, and its authority challenged and appropriated by 
Rename, international agencies and traditional leaders. Foreign powers had become active 
players in Mozambique, as allies of the two combatants guarding the transport corridors, 
or as major donors sustaining the Mozambican budget. Although the war generated its own 
crisis, it also compounded pre-existing obstacles to the process of state formation. From the 
ancient kingdoms, through Portuguese rule, to the Marxist government of Frelimo, power 
was always decentralised and disorganised throughout Mozambique's history. However, 
the Frelimo government's state-building project of a centrally controlled and planned 
economy and its failure to deliver economic prosperity, succeeded only in generating 
resistance which further weakened the state's foundations. Moreover, the liberalisation 
policies adopted by the government but all but imposed by international financial 
institutions, retracted the reach of the state into Mozambican society, reduced the ability of 
the state to regulate and articulate political struggles in the country, while demoralising state 
administrators under pressure to accommodate demands from society and all reaches of 
international agencies. The state in Mozambique was weak, but the project of building the 
state itself was also under threat.
Although the state apparatus was demobilised by the ongoing war and it's institutions and 
laws failed to reach a majority of Mozambicans except in urban centres, the state had not 
completely collapsed or disappeared. The state in Mozambique existed to a degree in that 
the boundaries of the country were never challenged and it was accepted that Mozambican 
society was defined within the state, whose centre of government was always recognised 
to be in Maputo, even if its reach did not extend far into the countryside. The Mozambican 
state existed at the signing of the peace accord because of two factors. The first was the 
equation of the state with the party. Through party representatives and the historical 
importance of the party in the liberation struggle, the strong Frelimo regime kept the state 
alive. The state also found resonance with the peasantry in the personalisation of the state
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through the popularity of leaders, like Machel and Chissano even if rulings in Maputo had 
no impact. Nevertheless, the state was not a strong presence, in part because of the natural 
resistance to it from alternative sources of power, such as traditional chiefs, and the 
churches. These elements of civil society found themselves strengthened because of the war 
and because of the loss of the authority of the state.
Although civil society in Mozambique is nascent, Mozambique's society has always been 
strong.96 Its diverse ethnic, regional and local identities and communities were characterised 
by strong traditions of resistance against attempts to centralise authority through all of 
Mozambican history. Mozambique has always been challenged by the size of the country 
and the importance of regional differences, with the centre and north of the country 
resenting the power of the south. Under Frelimo, Mozambicans opted out of the state (by 
force and by choice), the official economy and the war. It has also been argued that the war 
was in part a reflection of discontent with Frelimo's attempts to centralise authority and 
remake traditional society into a model of modern society. During the war, Mozambican 
society was not passive in the face of Renamo's aggression or the predations of the 
government army. Mozambicans fled the country to become refugees, engaged in the 
parallel economy but also used its own strengths to fight Renamo, as in the Naparama 
movement, or call for peace as in the Churches. What has been occurring in Mozambique, 
"is the painful birth of civil society."97
Oscar Monteiro, former minister of state administration, believes that surviving through the 
war, drought, and famine clearly showed the capacity of social groups to organise 
themselves and activate a public sphere. If civil society is defined in terms of formal NGOs, 
then civil society is weak in Mozambique and is related to areas donors consider priorities 
or the NGOs they give their money to. However, a wider notion of civil society may exist 
because of the creation of a social network solving common conflicts in society which were 
related to the public interest. The challenge for Mozambique is to relate to these informal
%See Joel Migdal Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and 
State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
97Agostinho Zacarias cited in Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors," p. 337.
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groups and mechanisms, to bring them into the state, to formalise the informal and 
informalise the formal, and to bring in and accept these social groups without emasculating 
them.98
As a result of the war, the rules of politics, the exercise and allocation of power, and the 
nature of authority underwent another transformation. On the one hand this revolved around 
Rename and Renamo's impact on Mozambique's political space. Although initially an 
externally sponsored surrogate force, over 16 years of war, Renamo's survival opened up 
political space for its own participation and exercise of power, challenged the socialist 
principles of the government and became the only alternative to Frelimo for those 
dissatisfied with the government. On the other hand, the war's legacy on political space also 
revolved around the penetration and pervasiveness of foreign influence through NGOs, 
donors and international financial institutions. Mozambique's foreign debt and reliance on 
donor assistance, ensures that the externalisation of authority which began with the war will 
continue. Mozambique's economic importance in the region and its vulnerability to South 
Africa has also had and continues to have a major influence on the shape of its political 
space. As a result of the internal shifts and reorientations in power and the external 
imposition of norms and practices, political space in Mozambique was weak and ill-formed 
because basic agreement on the political order is still in the process of being worked out. 
This weakness will be magnified and exacerbated by the impact of the external actors as 
they converge in Mozambique's political space to implement the peace agreement.
98Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Accepting dialogue: negotiating peace in Mozambique, 1983-1992
Throughout the conflict, the Frelimo government dismissed Renamo as armados bandidos 
or armed bandits. The government would not acknowledge that a war in the countryside 
was taking place and "showed a marked reticence to deal publicly and politically with the 
war." 1 This stemmed from the government's perception that Renamo was a surrogate force 
for Rhodesia and then South Africa. However, after South African assistance transformed 
Renamo into a more effective and deadly force, the government was finally forced to 
acknowledge that: (1) Renamo attacks and the resulting rural insecurity were devastating 
the economy; (2) Renamo enjoyed significant support from South Africa which made it 
militarily successful; and (3) the Mozambican army was proving incapable of solving the 
problem. The severity of the situation prompted President Machel to initiate a process of 
dialogue in 1983. Without abandoning the military solution, Machel embarked on a new 
strategy of negotiation continued by his successor, Joaquim Chissano, which eventually 
culminated in the General Peace Agreement signed in 1992.
The search for peace in Mozambique through dialogue entailed redefining and reactivating 
politics and political space which had been increasingly paralysed because of the war. The 
question of how to end the war and secure a peace agreement opened up broader questions 
of politics, political participation, the state and its relations to society in Mozambique. 
Initially, the government excluded Renamo from this process and negotiated directly with 
South Africa. However, only after Renamo was allowed to participate in the future political 
space of Mozambique was a successful agreement possible. This change in attitude towards 
Renamo emerged after the government had reoriented its relationship to the state and 
society of Mozambique. In addition to the two parties, other third party actors, both 
international and Mozambican, played an important role in the process of dialogue. The
'Judith Marshall cited in John Saul, "Development and Counterdevelopment 
Strategies in Mozambique," in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild, (eds.) Afro- 
Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy, London: Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 148
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shifting involvement of these third party actors, and the tensions between those dominating 
the peace process industry and newer actors, had an impact on the design of Mozambique's 
political space and future articulation.
This chapter makes the argument that the configuration of political space in Mozambique 
was redesigned through the negotiation process leading up to and including Rome, and 
through the role of external third parties in shaping the content and outcome of the talks. 
It traces the dynamics between the government, Rename, and third party actors in the 
negotiations and their influence on political space from 1983 to 1992. The first section 
outlines the beginning of a negotiated approach which led to the signing of the Nkomati 
Accord. The second section looks at attempts to facilitate dialogue through the unofficial 
channels of the churches and the official diplomacy of regional mediators which led to talks 
at the Sant'Egidio Community in Rome. The last three sections examine the Rome process, 
within which I identify three phases of negotiation. The third section looks at the first four 
rounds of talks which were preoccupied with establishing a political framework for the 
talks. The fourth section recounts the discussions on political principles in rounds five 
through nine. The last section deals with the final round of discussions on military issues 
and the concrete issues of implementation. Finally, the conclusion examines the impact of 
the negotiation process and the content of the agreement on the configuration of 
Mozambican political space. It also assesses how the discussions allowed for the 
mobilisation of the peace process industry and the institutionalisation of their role in the 
implementation process.
How to end the war? A new strategy, 1983 to 1985
Under South African sponsorship, Rename began operating in nine out often provinces by 
1983. The effectiveness of Rename's economic sabotage and the resulting rural insecurity 
created an economic and humanitarian crisis. The severity of the emergency and the 
increasing inability to rectify it prompted President Machel to seek an end to the war by 
opening a process of dialogue. However, to the government, Rename was not a legitimate 
force but a surrogate for South Africa's policy of destabilisation in weakening
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Mozambique. Therefore, the question of how to end the war revolved around how to find 
a way for South Africa and Mozambique to peacefully coexist. According to the 
government, the war was an external manifestation and therefore did not reflect any 
weaknesses in Mozambique's political space. This interpretation reflected the government's 
conception of political space. This conception equated the party with the state with political 
space and excluded the legitimate participation of other political forces not associated with 
or challenging the party. Only the party could define and construct political space in 
Mozambique, other conceptions of politics were not welcomed. This corresponded to what 
Jose Luis Caba9O recounts as Frelimo's "conception of national unity of the time, [which] 
was once more understood as a simple assimilation of other social groups to the positions 
of the single Party."2 This was premised on a belief that opposition groups formed since the 
liberation struggle, including Rename, had their origins in Frelimo.3
Machel began negotiations with South Africa on a comprehensive security pact based on 
the termination of all financial, logistical and military support to Renamo by South Africa. 
After intense negotiation, the Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good 
Neighbourliness was signed in 1984. Under the Accord, Mozambique prohibited all 
military activity by the ANC and limited the size of the ANC's office in Maputo; although 
they retained the right to continue their moral, political and diplomatic support for the 
ANC. In exchange, South Africa agreed to respect Mozambique's territorial integrity and 
to cease all aggression against it.4 According to the Mozambican negotiator, General Jaginto 
Veloso, "[t]he essential point of the agreement is that my country will not serve as a base 
for attacks or violence against the territory of South Africa and vice versa."5 The foundation
2 Jose Luis Caba90, "The long march of Mozambican democracy," in Brazao Mazula, 
(ed.) Mozambique: elections, democracy and development, Maputo: Sponsored by the 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 84.
3This idea is not without merit since many dissidents who had defected from Frelimo 
during the liberation struggle joined Renamo. Renamo's language of liberated areas and 
party congresses seemed reminiscent of Frelimo propaganda.
4Keesings, Record of World Events, Bethesda, MD: Keesings Worldwide, Vol. 30, 
No. 5, May 1984, p. 32835.
5Quote from the New York Times, cited in Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's 
War, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 11.
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for peace and security was obtained through respect for national sovereignty. The frontline 
states condemned the agreement and accused the Mozambican government of capitulating 
to the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, conceded, "it 
must be accepted that the South African regime had decided to destroy Mozambique, to kill 
it as a state, and the leadership was forced to decide between life and death."6
Even after the signing of the agreement, Renamo's attacks continued.7 At first, it seemed 
Renamo was acting independently of South Africa and Mozambique accepted South 
Africa's offer to set up direct talks with Renamo. The basis for talks was limited given that 
Machel was only willing to allow Renamo guerrillas to rejoin Mozambican society as 
individuals not as part of a political organisation. 8 Renamo refused and demanded the 
immediate dissolution of the Mozambican government, multi-party elections and a number 
of ministerial posts. Nevertheless in late 1984, the Pretoria Declaration was signed by the 
government and Renamo. In the declaration, Renamo accepted the legitimacy of Samora 
Machel as president of Mozambique, the cessation of all conflict, and a tripartite 
commission with South Africa to implement the agreement. The government interpreted 
this agreement as recognition of the legitimacy of the Mozambican state and government. 
Renamo denied this and resumed their demands for a new government. Although South 
Africa continued to pursue discussions, the talks collapsed when Renamo withdrew on the 
eve of a new agreement.
In spite of the Nkomati agreement, the government realised that the South Africans had not 
acted in good faith and continued to support Renamo. The Mozambican armed forces 
uncovered evidence which proved that South Africa had supplied Renamo with six months
6Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at 
War, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p. 28.
7Alex Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?, London: 
James Currey, 1996, p. 23; and Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making 
Peace in a Dangerous Neighbourhood, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, p. 
245.
8The government offered a general amnesty to Renamo soldiers in 1987 and 1988, 
3000 accepted.
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of provisions just prior to the signing of the accord and had continued to supply Rename 
with munitions and technical assistance after Nkomati. 9 Although, the South African 
government denied any involvement with Rename, certain elements within it, along with 
private interests, continued to do so. 10
By 1986, Nkomati was an overwhelming failure. Not only did the attacks continue but 
Renamo attempted to cut through Zambesia province to the coast, which would have split 
the country in half. This was followed by the death of Samora Machel in a mysterious plane 
crash later that year, believed to have been carried out by South Africa. The war reached 
a peak in 1987-88, with Renamo forces estimated at 17,000-20,000 operating throughout 
most of Mozambique, while the government controlled the major cities and towns. The 
government army was in disarray. Despite attempts at reorganisation, the army was unable 
to feed, clothe and arm its soldiers, and was accused of gross corruption and of forcibly and 
illegally recruiting conscripts. The effectiveness of the armed forces was further weakened 
by the decline of Soviet support with the end of the Cold War. The loss of subsidised oil 
from the Soviet Union created a severe shortage for the government which could not afford 
to buy oil on the world market." Troops from Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania were 
brought in to guard the transport corridors, but outside the corridors there was little security.
9Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization 
Report, London: Commonwealth Secretariat and James Currey, 1989, p. 25. In 1985, 
government forces overran the Renamo base at Casa Banana and recovered documents, 
the Vaz diaries, which were records of South African instructions recorded by 
Dhlakama's secretary. They included instructions to:
1. Destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones.
2. Destroy the communications routes to prevent exports and imports to and 
from abroad, and the movement of domestic produce.
3. Prevent the activities of foreigners (cooperantes) because they are the most
dangerous in the recovery of the economy.
See Margaret Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A 
Study of the Destruction of an African Country," Africa, 60(1), 1990, p. 58.
'°The US embassy in Maputo reported that Renamo was still receiving support from 
South Africa in 1989, and the US defence agency confirmed this again in 1991. Johnson 
and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, p. 19.
"In 1991, the oil import bill alone exceeded total export earnings for the year. 
Financial Times Survey of Mozambique, 15 January 1991.
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A stalemate existed across the country, while the cost of the conflict continued to escalate. 12 
The prolonged state of emergency, military impasse and general war weariness, compelled 
the government to reopen the negotiation process.
The government had never really abandoned the diplomatic strategy, but it was premised 
on isolating Renamo from its external supporters. After Nkomati, Machel succeeded in 
sidelining Renamo's other regional backer, Malawi, after "Zimbabwe and Tanzania, 
landlocked Malawi's big neighbours, threatened Malawi's ancient president, Dr. Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, with a trade boycott unless he stopped protecting the rebels." 13 The 
government distanced itself from the Soviet bloc and pursued better relations with the 
West. Frelimo improved relations with the Reagan government to deflect American support 
for Renamo and assisted them during the Namibian negotiations by facilitating access to 
key figures in the Angolan government. 14 Similarly, the government had established good 
relations with Great Britain after assisting them at the Lancaster House talks and 
subsequently became a major recipient of UK development and military assistance. The 
government also attempted to pursue less hostile relations with South Africa, who itself 
began to adopt a more friendly attitude towards Mozambique. 15 Although Renamo became 
more isolated from its international benefactors, Renamo neither disappeared nor ceased 
its attacks in the countryside. The government was forced to accept that they would have 
to deal with Renamo directly if they wanted to achieve peace.
l2The government estimated that the losses to its ports and railways from the closure 
of the Rhodesian border, revenue lost from the redirection of traffic from the Maputo 
port, direct loss due to sabotage and destruction and indirect losses from lost transit was 
$1.94 billion from 1976 to 1988. Defence expenditure since 1980 averaged 38% of the 
national budget. A UNICEF report estimated that 500,000 children under the age of 5 
had died between 1980 and 1988. All figures taken from Johnson and Martin, Apartheid 
Terrorism, pp. 34-50.
nThe Economist, 1 March 1987.
14Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 238.
15In 1988, "South Africa rescheduled Mozambique's debt on favourable terms, 
...revived the Joint Security Commission, [and agreed] to revive the vast Cahora Bassa 
dam." The Economist, 25 June 1988.
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Starting a new process: twin-track diplomacy, 1987 to 1989
To alter diplomatic course, President Chissano needed to convince his own party of the 
imperative for direct talks against the military hardliners who wanted to continue the war. 
He used Frelimo's Fifth Party Congress in 1989 as a platform to inform the party of the 
possibility of negotiations with what had always been referred to as terrorists. Chissano 
received the party's endorsement to talk to Renamo after it was revealed that Soviet military 
advisors would soon pull out from Mozambique, and that Zimbabwe and Tanzania also 
wanted to withdraw their troops. At the time of the Congress, the government was also 
introducing a series of radical changes to the constitution to transform the one-party state 
into a multi-party democracy, separating the party from the state, and guaranteeing greater 
civil and political freedoms. At the Congress, the party officially abandoned Marxism- 
Leninism. In principle at least, Frelimo began to relinquish its hold on Mozambique's 
political space and open it to other political voices. 16
In an effort at reconciliation, the government stopped officially referring to Renamo as 
armed bandits and began to accept the Mozambican identity of the movement, although this 
was not universally followed by the national press. However, the government was still wary 
of conferring any legitimacy onto an organisation long depicted as a foreign puppet and 
terrorist group. Chissano stated that he was "always careful that whomever we contacted 
was not being recognised as something they're not - that is, as a real, political movement 
or a party, because they're not."17 Instead, Chissano sought an internal solution between a 
government and a rebel organisation which reconfirmed the government's primacy in 
Mozambique's political space. This implied Renamo's incorporation into the political space 
defined by the government and not allowing Renamo as an organisation to contribute 
towards developing Mozambican politics. In other words, the government was still not
16Renamo held its first congress in June 1989, calling for elections, constitutional 
talks and the government to lay down their arms. In anticipation of a settlement, 
Dhlakama replaced commanders associated with past atrocities with politicians, like 
Raul Domingos, the foreign secretary and distanced the external wing. Interview with 
Margaret Hall, London, April 1997.
^President Chissano quoted mMozambiquefile, Issue 157, August 1989.
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prepared to allow Rename into the official political arena of Mozambique. It is primarily 
for this reason that Rename has never trusted the government, fearing a "fall into the trap 
of integration ... the strategy through which Frelimo had wanted for years to assimilate 
Renamo, not giving it any political worth."18 According to Dhlakama, Rename wanted to 
end the war, but not to be integrated. 19
Although the government had accepted the idea of direct talks with Renamo, establishing 
contact and agreeing on a basis for discussion presented numerous problems. Not only was 
Renamo obscured by a lack of information and propaganda from both sides, it was not 
easily discernible who comprised the leadership, what they wanted and what it would take 
to get them to agree to talks. This information was uncovered through the intervention of 
third parties, both external and internal. These third party actors, normally outside 
Mozambican politics defined by the single-party state, began to take advantage of the 
political space opening up in the search for peace and because of the erosion of authority 
and state legitimacy. Officially, mediation by Kenya and Zimbabwe served to bring the 
government and Renamo to direct talks. Behind the scenes, the churches reached out to 
Renamo to bring them into a Mozambican process of dialogue. By accepting Renamo as 
a genuine political group, the new process of dialogue by these third parties was changing 
the political landscape of Mozambique. Yet the participation of these third parties itself, 
reflected how the landscape was already changed.
The churches were uniquely placed to facilitate dialogue between the two sides because 
they had remained neutral during the war by refusing to condemn Renamo's atrocities or 
cutting them off from dialogue.20 After the Nkomati agreement, the Christian Council of 
Mozambique had set up a Peace and Reconciliation Commission and made its first
' 8Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico dala Guerra alia Pace, p. 179, cited in 
Brazao Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections: A Path of Peace and Democracy," in 
Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 27.
''Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.
20Although generally acceptable, the role of the Christian churches did raise a protest 
from Muslim leaders who also wanted a role in the process. See Mozambiquefile, Issue 
159, October 1989.
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approach to Renamo.21 They were subsequently invited to the United States to make contact 
with Renamo's external wing. These proved fruitless, leading the churchmen to conclude 
that any real discussion would have to revolve around the internal command.22 The Catholic 
church had also issued a number of pastoral letters calling for direct talks. In May 1988, the 
Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gon9alves "travelled to rebel headquarters in Gorongosa to 
explore with the Renamo leader, Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, the possibility of developing 
negotiations between RENAMO and the government."23 Gon9alves established close 
personal ties with Dhlakama based on a shared Ndau identity and antipathy towards 
Frelimo. Although the government had been hostile to the churches and suspicious of their 
neutrality, President Chissano gave his tacit approval for these approaches to Renamo.
In 1988, Kenya's president, Daniel Arap Moi proposed to the Mozambican government that 
his foreign minister, Bethwell Kiplagat, meet with Dhlakama in Germany. Kenyan interest 
in Mozambique was biassed towards Renamo, having allowed them to open an office in 
Nairobi and providing supplies. Kenya became the transit point for Renamo delegations 
travelling overseas, providing them with passports and covering their expenses. In 1989 the 
Mozambican government approached Arap Moi to jointly mediate talks with Zimbabwe's 
Robert Mugabe, an ally of the government who was keen to withdraw Zimbabwe's troops 
from Mozambique. 24 This process of mediation by two heads of state heralded an attempt 
at traditional African peacemaking which might later be expanded to include other African 
leaders.
Under the auspices of the two regional mediators, Renamo met with Mozambican religious
2 'Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism, p. 120. 
-Mozambiqueflle, Issue 160, November 1989.
23 The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York: Department of 
Public Information, Introduction, p. 15. In an interview, Dhlakama attributes Renamo's 
involvement in the peace process in part to listening to pressure from the churches. 
Maputo, May 1997.
24These troops cost the Zimbabwe government $750,000 a day. The Economist, 22 
July 1989.
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leaders25 in Nairobi in August 1989. The churchmen, using their good offices, began to act 
as couriers, transmitting ideas and messages between the two sides. They presented the 
government's twelve-point paper to Renamo which centred on Renamo's recognition of 
Mozambique's constitution and their renunciation of violence before talks could begin. 
Renamo, in turn, presented a sixteen-point declaration calling for an end to violence, 
change to the existing order and the sovereignty of the people to elect their own leaders. 
Although there was a basis for discussion between the two documents, Renamo's proposal 
contained a demand to be recognised as "an active political force in Mozambique's political 
arena."26 Chissano rejected this demand and refused to "recognise MNR as a political party 
but as a group of Mozambicans constituted as a group under other influences."27 This 
reaction compelled Dhlakama to resume a harder line. Renamo repeated their rejection of 
the sovereignty of the Mozambican government, and insisted on talks with Frelimo in parity 
with Renamo as a political party, not as a government. A deadlock ensued despite persistent 
efforts by the mediators and Tiny Rowland, chairman of Lonrho, urging Dhlakama to 
resume discussion. 28
In December 1989, the two mediators suggested a direct meeting between the two sides be 
held but this initiative stalled over a choice of venue. The government favoured an African 
location and suggested Malawi.29 Renamo rejected Malawi, fearing that its close proximity 
would give the Mozambican security service the opportunity to assassinate Dhlakama. The 
government rejected Renamo's preference for Lisbon on the basis of its colonial association 
and moreover wanted to distance Western involvement. A final attempt at holding a direct 
meeting in Blantyre, Malawi in June 1990 failed when Dhlakama left the city on the day
25This included Cardinal Alexandre dos Santos, Archbishop of Maputo, Archbishop 
Goncalves, Bishop Dinis Singulane and the Christian Council of Mozambique. 
26Mozambiquefile, Issue 158, September 1989. 
21 Mozambique file, Issue 162, January 1990.
28Tiny Rowland provided money, transportation and support to Renamo all through 
the process.
29Interview with Fran9isco Madeira, negotiator and diplomatic advisor to President 
Chissano, Maputo May 1997. Malawi's close proximity would also make 
communication between the delegations and Mozambique simpler and less costly.
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of scheduled talks despite the presence of both sides in the city.
Outside the regional process, other countries were involved on the sidelines of the peace 
initiatives. The United States was heavily involved in the region from 1988 onwards 
because of its role in brokering Namibia's independence. The US Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, indicated the US favoured a negotiated end to the 
conflict in Mozambique but would be on the side of the government. 30 The United States, 
in early 1990, subsequently prepared a seven-point document as a basis for talks. This 
document echoed the government's twelve-point document and was rejected by Rename 
because it recognised the Mozambican government. However, not all international interest 
was welcomed by the government. US facilitation was acceptable, US brokering as in 
Namibia was not. Portugal had been exerting pressure to be included in the process through 
their influence with Renamo. Right-wing Portuguese politicians also formed a Group for 
Peace and Democracy in Mozambique leading Chissano to remark that there were too many 
mediators trying to influence Mozambique's politics.31 South Africa expressed interest in 
the process after their successful participation in the Angolan talks, but was excluded. The 
government also grew wary of Kenyan involvement and believed Renamo was being used 
as a vehicle to interfere in Mozambique's internal affairs. 32 Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia 
was also intermittently involved in the process, but his influence was overshadowed by 
Zimbabwe's involvement.3"1
The government had been pursuing an alternative venue for face-to-face discussions and 
retreated from their opposition to a non-African location. They approached the Vatican to 
request their good offices to host the talks/4 The hostility between the government and the 
Vatican had been lessening through reciprocal visits and diplomatic initiatives from the
30Hilary Anderson, Mozambique: A war against the people, London: Macmillan 
Press, 1992, p. 47.
3tMozambiquefile, Issue 166, May 1990.
32Interview with Franfisco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997.
33Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism, p. 141.
34Interview with Francisco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997.
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mid-1980s. However the Vatican was reluctant to take on such high profile negotiations. 
The government also discussed with the Italian government the possibility of their 
assistance in negotiations.35 But it was unlikely that either party had the necessary contact 
with Rename to be able to arrange and preside over the talks.
The Vatican instead suggested that a Catholic lay order and voluntary charitable 
organisation, the Sant'Egidio Community, host the process of negotiation between the two 
sides. Founded in 1968, the Sant'Egidio Community had developed many contacts in 
Mozambique, with Renamo in particular, through humanitarian work and by helping to 
negotiate the release of priests and nuns captured by Renamo in 1982. The Community had 
secretly invited Dhlakama to Rome in February 1990 to meet lay members and politicians 
from the Italian government.36 The Sant'Egidio Community had also been involved in 
soothing relations between the government, Mozambican churches and the Vatican through 
Archbishop Gon9alves, who was a friend of the community.37 The director of Sant'Egidio, 
Professor Andrea Riccardi attended Frelimo's 5th Party Congress and gave a speech on 
peace to the delegates.38 Although there were other church and missionary societies with 
longer histories in Mozambique, the Sant'Egidio Community proved most acceptable to 
both parties at the right time.
The Rome process: the political framework, round one to four39
After the collapse of the Blantyre meeting, the Sant'Egidio Community quickly moved to 
establish talks at their headquarters in Rome. These talks were convened under the direction
35Italy was Mozambique's largest foreign partner in 1986 with investments of more 
than US$ 308 million. Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in 
Southern Africa, London: James Currey, 1986, p. 149.
36Don Matteo Zuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community and the General Peace 
Agreement," in Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 112.
37Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism, p. 128. 
38Zuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community," p. 111.
39Much of the following discussion is based on an account of the talks provided by 
Hume, Ending Mozambique's War.
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of four observers, two members of the community, Professor Andrea Riccardi and Don 
Matteo Zuppi; Archbishop Gon9alves; and an Italian MP, Mario Raffaelli who had many 
personal contacts with Frelimo from his student days. The Rome discussions, which began 
in July 1990, were initially intended to lead to direct talks between the two sides akin to the 
preceding efforts. However, over ten rounds of discussions, this role was transformed into 
an unusual process of mediation enabling the two sides to reach agreement on a series of 
protocols which formed the corpus of the General Peace Agreement signed in October 
1992.
The move to Rome and the onset of a negotiating process created an artificial and enclosed 
forum in which delegations from the warring parties worked out the terms of peace and the 
future shape of politics in Mozambique. This aspect of the political process was effectively 
confined to the combatants, represented by a few individuals accountable only to their 
leaders and not a wider constituency or society. Thus the Rome talks officially concluded 
the mediation by Kenya and Zimbabwe, but also the role of Mozambican churches. It also 
heralded a partial transfer of decision-making to Rome, which created tensions between 
Mozambique and Rome on the location of political authority. Most importantly, Renamo 
became an equal partner in the peace process, which it was not in Mozambican politics. It 
immediately acquired an influence and power in setting the rules of the political process 
which artificially reconfigured the balance of power between the parties in Rome at least. 
Yet the conditions in Mozambique in turn, limited and defined Renamo's use of that power, 
pointing to the interactions between Rome and Mozambique in shaping Mozambique's 
political space.
However, this dimension of the political process was complicated by the complex and 
unusual character of the third parties mediating the process and shaping the talks. On the 
one hand, the unofficial designation of holding the talks at the Catholic lay order helped to 
overcome the problem of officially recognising Renamo and also allowed more informal 
discussion to take place. On the other hand, foreign officials were extensively involved in 
the Rome talks. Raffaelli was a former secretary of state responsible for Africa in the Italian 
Foreign Ministry. He had been deeply involved in Italian co-operation with Mozambique
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and through this with the Sant'Egidio Community. The Italian government also provided 
substantial financial and diplomatic support to the mediators and both parties throughout 
the process. Francisco Madeira, President Chissano's foreign advisor and negotiator, 
observed that after every session, both sides would retire and consult with American, 
British, Italian, French and Portuguese diplomats on the day's proceedings.40 Foreign 
observers were there from the beginning of the process, and were not a new element when 
they were formally brought in later in the process.
As the process progressed, the role of the Sant'Egidio community diminished and the 
participation of other international actors became more prominent. Long-standing 
international agencies in Mozambique and actors dominating the peace process industry 
were suspicious of the participation and central role of this relatively new player. As the 
discussions proceeded to the technical details of the agreement, representatives of the 
industry interfered more frequently in the discussions and subsequently established their on­ 
going participation in Mozambique's peace process. In contrast, the Rome mediators 
relinquished any future role in the process. The dynamics between the established members 
of the peace process industry, the Sant'Egidio team, and the parties shaped the substance 
and form of the talks and thus the content of the agreement which included a key role for 
the peace process industry in Mozambique. The tensions and contradictions between the 
actors reflected how political space was being designed in Rome and subsequently 
reconfigured in Mozambique.
ROUND ONE AND TWO
When the first round of talks opened in July 1990, the official observers set to create an 
open environment for frank dialogue and reconciliation. Quoting from the bible, Professor 
Riccardi spoke of working from the basis of looking for "what unites us, and put[ting] aside 
what divides us."41 The observers were able to elicit from both sides a commitment to 
discussion and an agreement that future talks would be based in Rome. This collaborative
40Interview with Fran9isco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997. 
4lZuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community," p. 114.
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atmosphere was assisted by the fact that neither side engaged in recriminations or assigned 
blame for the war, which remained a defining characteristic throughout the peace process.
Despite the warm opening, the first two rounds of talks in July and August stalled over 
issues of procedure, specifically the identity and role of any third party mediator, and the 
agenda for talks. The Renamo delegation, led by Raul Domingos,42 persisted in demanding 
official mediators, specifically Kenyan. The government delegation, headed by Armando 
Guebuza,43 objected to further international or any third-party assistance. Cameron Hume, 
the American observer to the talks, described the nature of the impasse as stemming from 
two polar positions:
[t]he Mozambican government had long insisted that talks between the two 
sides be direct, with any third-party role being minimal and designed to 
decrease in significance as the peace process went forward. The Renamo 
delegation did not trust either the government's good faith or its own ability 
to hold the government to commitments made in direct, bilateral talks.44
The government had always objected to external participation in shaping the politics and 
political space of Mozambique which the war with Renamo represented. In contrast, 
Renamo consistently sought international assistance to acquire political legitimacy and to 
compensate for its lack of confidence in its ability to prevent the government from 
assimilating Renamo into Mozambican politics and setting its own agenda.
The second problem was deciding on an agenda for talks. The government's participation 
in the discussions centred on reaching a cease-fire, with the future politics of Mozambique 
left to be resolved in Mozambique itself, most likely by the government. Renamo was under 
no illusions that a cease-fire threatened its position at the talks and in influencing
42Domingos was head of external relations. The rest of the Renamo delegation 
included Vicente Ululu, department of information, Agostinho Murrial, department of 
political affairs, and Joao Almirante, an advisor to Dhlakama.
43Guebuza was Minister of Transport and Communications. The rest of the 
government delegation included Aguiar Mazula, Minister of Labour, Teodata 
Hunguana, Minister of Information, and Fran9isco Madeira, diplomatic advisor to the 
President.
44Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 34.
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Mozambican politics in future. Consequently, Renamo was more concerned with the details 
of the process and how these would formally give it a measure of power and influence in 
Mozambique after the war ended. Having been excluded from the political arena in 
Mozambique, Renamo sought to use the Rome talks to stake a position in Mozambican 
politics. Although there was little substantive discussion, Domingos began criticising the 
government's 1990 constitutional reforms. He alleged that these changes were illegitimate 
because they were taken unilaterally without accounting for what was going to be discussed 
in Rome. The implications of Domingos' statement was that politics and the political 
process in Mozambique was accountable to the Rome negotiations, where Renamo had 
influence, and not independently determined in Mozambique, where it did not.
The impasse on both issues was left unresolved. Domingos agreed to a one-on-one meeting 
with Guebuza, the first of its kind,45 but the talks still ended prematurely. During the recess 
between rounds, the observers travelled to Mozambique, the first of many visits to the 
region. The mediators were unable to meet with Dhlakama but President Chissano told 
them that "the Rome talks should move forward to keep pace with domestic reform."46 In 
other words, the negotiations ought to reflect the changing political landscape in 
Mozambique. The Rome observers suggested they become formal mediators, while Kenya 
could serve as an advisor to Renamo. They also suggested the next round focus on the 
Zimbabwean troops to isolate the international aspects of the conflict from its internal 
dimensions. Both sides agreed to these recommendations as an acceptable compromise to 
keep the process moving forward. Although the parties willingly relinquished control over 
the process to overcome the lack of trust, the change in status conferred more authority to 
the mediators to lead and shape the process. However, this was tempered by the precedent 
that deadlocks within the Rome process were only resolvable by constant referral to the 
leaders in Mozambique. The shape of the process and the dynamics between the parties 
were beginning to take form, yet they were still constrained by the limitations of what was 
happening in Mozambique.
45
46
'Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 37.
'Delia Rocca cited in Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p 41.
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ROUND THREE AND FOUR
The third round from 8 November to 1 December 1990 opened in a spirit of agreement and 
the four observers became the mediators. Rather than allowing the talks to stall over 
confrontational declarations, the mediators began holding individual consultations with 
both sides to discover their positions and possible room for compromise. The mediators 
also drafted initial working proposals and transmitted compromises and modifications to 
both sides. Direct dialogue between the two sides rarely took place except in plenary 
session, while Rename also "refused to participate in joint working sessions until the final 
days of the negotiation."47 This feature of the talks had significant political implications. 
While the enclosed and unpressured environment of Sant'Egidio encouraged the enhanced 
role of the mediators, it did not contribute towards the political socialisation of the parties 
or encourage more conciliatory political practices. The political process in Rome was 
constructed on the mediators shuttling back and forth between the two sides. The two sides 
were not building a working partnership or relationship, nor were they learning to resolve 
their differences without third party assistance. Nevertheless, this was not unusual in 
mediated negotiations and it was the mediators who skilfully transformed Rename's initial 
uncompromising language into more diplomatic and less threatening language to keep 
dialogue moving forward.
The process was further complicated by the arrival of a US State Department delegation to 
assist in the military discussions relating to the Zimbabwean troops. This delegation began 
to operate in parallel with the mediators in its own meetings with both parties. The addition 
of another third party pointed to the mobilisation of the peace process industry and tensions 
amongst different third parties pursuing their own objectives, a common feature of the 
process and the industry. The numerous parties aiding the talks created alternative centres 
of authority, rule-setting and interpretation for the government and Rename to reconcile, 
yet also manouevre around. The American team also initiated the practice of external third 
party experts working out the technical details of the agreement with or without the parties. 
This technical assistance institutionalised the future role of the peace process industry in
47Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 74.
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instructing the parties on the 'practicalities' of what would be the mechanisms outlined in 
the agreement. The technical experts influenced the content of the agreement in such a way 
that opened up opportunities for them to ensure their continued participation and role in the 
future process of implementation. These early rounds thus revealed the gradual 
accumulation of influence by the peace process industry over the shape of peace and 
politics in Mozambique both in Rome and in Mozambique.
On 1 December 1990, the mediators secured agreement on the declaration of a partial 
cease-fire. This agreement limited the activities of the Zimbabwean troops to within three 
kilometres of the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors with assurances from Rename that 
they would not attack the corridors, and from the government that they would not use the 
corridors for offensive operations. The cease-fire would be monitored by a Joint 
Verification Commission (JVC), based in Maputo but reporting to Rome, composed of both 
parties and international observers. Chaired by the Italian Ambassador in Maputo, 
Manfredo Incisa di Camerana, the JVC was financed by the Italian government. As the 
commission was setting up, talks resumed in Rome but did not capitalise on the momentum 
generated by the agreement. The continuing absence of any sense of urgency to improve the 
situation in Mozambique was another defining feature of the discussions.
When talks resumed in January 1991, the JVC submitted its first report which ended 
discussion. The JVC concluded that Rename was responsible for six of the eight violations 
of the partial cease-fire. Rename vehemently denied the findings and accused the JVC of 
bias towards the government by failing to investigate Rename's allegations of troop 
movements by the Zimbabweans. Rename also argued that the Commission had acted 
beyond its facility as a technical body, by reinterpreting the agreement over the precise 
definition of the corridors. The JVC and Rename disagreed over whether the corridor was 
a continuous enclosure which included all the towns along the route.48 The JVC also 
disputed Rename's non-inclusion of an airport located just beyond the corridor used by 
Zimbabweans as their main supply transit, and on water holes accessed by Zimbabweans 
which were also just beyond the confines of the corridor. These issues were left unresolved
48JVC Report/Minutes
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as the mediators terminated discussions with the injunction to 'pause for reflection' on the 
purpose and nature of the talks.
The break was also called to allow Renamo to prepare for political discussions and to set 
up a communications link between Rome and Renamo headquarters in Mozambique,49 
requested by Domingos to enable direct consultation with Dhlakama. The two issues were 
not unrelated. Renamo's representatives had little political, administrative and 
constitutional knowledge or experience. They were clearly less skilled at political 
negotiation, the technical details of monitoring and verification, and politics in general. 
Moreover, Domingos' style of negotiating, which involved stating his position first and 
then rejecting all other opinions,50 seemed to indicate he lacked the authority to take 
decisions without approval from Dhlakama who was often inaccessible. In response to an 
increasing sense of international isolation, Dhlakama meanwhile attacked the Limpopo 
corridor without informing Renamo representatives on the JVC. However, he did not walk 
out of negotiations. After the talks had started, Dhlakama frequently travelled to Western 
capitals where his hosts impressed upon him that international recognition depended on 
ending the war. For Dhlakama, rarely out of the Mozambican bush, personal attention from 
mediators, leaders and officials confirmed his importance in Mozambican politics which 
made him more politically socialised and susceptible to international pressure.51 Yet despite 
the influence gained by participating in the peace process, Renamo, and Dhlakama in 
particular, still revealed a great deal of insecurity in many of their actions and negotiating 
tactics.
Round five to nine: political principles
At the start of the fifth round on 6 May 1991, Guebuza "affirm[ed] that the government 
wanted a negotiated solution, but he insisted that the legitimacy of the government not be
49The satellite link was paid for by the Italian government and set up through Malawi.
50Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 42.
5 'Interview with Ken Wilson, Johannesburg, May 1997.
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questioned by the peace process."52 The government resented Rename's attitude that laws 
passed by state institutions needed to be legitimated by the Rome process. In their view, 
Rename's demands to discuss and amend the new constitution, the law on political parties 
and the electoral law were attempts to rewrite Mozambique's politics from Rome. 
Furthermore, Rename's insistence on including external actors was perceived as another 
challenge to the sovereignty of the government whose authority was already under threat 
from international agencies operating in the country because of the emergency. The 
government repeatedly defended their sovereignty as an independent and fully recognised 
member of the international community.53 The underlying question of how Mozambique's 
political space ought to be constituted and Renamo's place in it was preventing agreement 
on an agenda for discussion and stalling the talks.
The discussions were impeded because the government's democratic reforms had 
undermined Renamo's limited political agenda. By instituting these reforms before the start 
of talks, the government had outmanouevred Rename and left them little room to define for 
themselves in the new emerging political arena. Most of Renamo's demands had been met 
and substantively, there was very little distance between the two. As a result, Dhlakama 
insisted that the agenda consider first the abolition of the security service, the secret police 
and private armies to guarantee Renamo's future safety. Renamo also began to retreat from 
multi-party democracy towards a two-party system with Frelimo and Renamo, demanding 
financial support from the international community to help transform into a political party. 
In the talks, Domingos became less flexible and wanted the agenda "to be a signed, detailed 
document; [so that every] part of the peace process had to be specified, and what was not 
specified could not be included later."54 Renamo also depended heavily on foreign advisors 
to help formulate their political proposals, one of which contained demands for a
52Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 62.
"Irrespective of the Rome process, the government proceeded to draft a cease-fire 
and consulted with donors regarding financial assistance for demobilisation and to cover 
back-pay for its soldiers. Donors refused to fund these initiatives while negotiations 
were taking place in Rome.
54Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 62.
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55transitional administration during the peace process.
The mediators shuttled back and forth between Rome and Mozambique and between 
Maputo and Rename headquarters with proposals on a detailed agenda which was finally 
signed on 28 May 1991. Starting with 1) the law on political parties, 2) the electoral system, 
3) military issues including the new army and secret police, 4) cease-fire, 5) guarantees, and 
ending with 6) a donor's conference, it put political discussions before the cease-fire. But 
although the law on political parties was the first item on the agenda, when round six began 
from 1-13 August 1991, the issue of the government's legitimacy resurfaced. Although 
they backed away from demands for a transitional government, Rename insisted that key 
ministries be placed under the control of the UN Security Council during the transition. The 
government reacted by demanding "explicit acknowledgement that the government's 
administration of the country would be accepted by Rename during the period from the 
cease-fire to the elections."56
The mediators put forward a draft proposal on basic principles to resolve the conflicts over 
the basic political framework for the discussions. A breakthrough finally came during the 
seventh round of talks from 18 October 1991, when the two parties signed the protocol on 
basic principles. In this protocol, the government agreed not to "tak[e] any action that is 
contrary to the provisions of the Protocols to be concluded and from adopting laws or 
measures or applying existing laws which may be inconsistent with those Protocols."57 
Rename agreed after a cease-fire "to refrain from armed combat and instead to conduct its 
political struggle in conformity with the laws in force, within the framework of the existing 
State institutions,"58 and in accordance with the peace accord. The spirit of the agreement 
thus required Renamo to accept the legitimacy of the state and the government during the 
transition period, and the government not to exclude Renamo in the political process by
55These included Bruce Fein, an American lawyer, and Andre Thomashausen, a 
German law professor in South Africa.
56Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 64. 
"GPA, Protocol I, Item 1. 
58GPA, Protocol I, Item 2.
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acknowledging the parameters being set in Rome. Both parties also agreed to establish "a 
commission to supervise and monitor compliance with the General Peace Agreement... 
composed of representatives of the Government, RENAMO, the United Nations and other 
organizations or Governments."59 At this point, the UN and other international actors would 
be included as monitors on the joint commission.
The mediators reconvened talks on 21 October to discuss the law on political parties. 
However, after the mediators presented their proposal, Domingos presented an alternative 
draft to serve as a basis for discussion. This draft created a crisis by including a requirement 
that the government submit a draft on political parties to technical teams of both sides, 
making the legislative process subordinate to Rome, and the stipulation that all political 
parties must register with the UN instead of the Ministry of Justice.60 These seemed to 
challenge the principles in Protocol I by again questioning the legitimacy of the government 
and Guebuza threatened to leave. The mediators persuaded Renamo that these conditions 
were unacceptable to any government and that the UN would not propose such a role for 
itself. After careful revision by the mediators, both parties signed Protocol II on the law on 
political parties on 13 November. The protocol's main provisions conferred special status 
to Renamo, established that political parties must be democratic and national in scope and 
nature, parties would have access to the media and public funding, and parties must register 
with the government. Any disputes would be settled by the Supervisory Commission 
established in Protocol I.
The mediators proceeded to the next issue of the electoral law at the ninth round of talks 
from 17 until 20 December 1991 and resumed in January 1992. The parameters for this 
discussion were again in dispute over issues relating to the basic principles and the 
relationship between Rome and Maputo. The government's position was that the protocol 
should set out broad principles upon which a law would be drafted in Mozambique, while 
Renamo wanted the law specified in the Rome agreement. Domingos furthermore insisted 
that the constitution be the first order of business for the newly elected Mozambican
59GPA, Protocol I, Item 5. 
wMozambiquefile, Issue 182, September 1991.
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assembly, whereas the government argued the assembly should decide its own agenda. 
Rename also wanted the UN to conduct the elections, while the government objected to a 
UN or power-sharing arrangement in the electoral administration. Although agreed on a 
system of proportional representation, Rename also suggested a 5% electoral threshold for 
the parties in every province and 20% nationwide, which was higher than the original 
proposal with the potential to exclude other groups from the political process. Renamo's 
insistence on using the Rome process to set and fix the political rules stemmed from its 
awareness that it would have less capacity to do so in Mozambique in future. Protocol III 
on the electoral law was finally signed on 12 March 1992 which established both 
presidential and parliamentary elections within one year after the signing of the cease-fire.
However, behind the scenes and on the sidelines, other international advisors were 
becoming more prominently and actively involved. The US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Herman Cohen and his deputy, Jeffrey Davidow, frequently met with and 
encouraged both sides, the mediators, other governments and regional leaders. Davidow 
also suggested forming a contact group of interested governments to solidify and provide 
a framework for international support, while the technical experts started discussions on the 
technicalities of arranging and managing a cease-fire. After the Bicesse agreement was 
signed in 1991 to end Angola's civil war, the Portuguese and American governments began 
to press for more involvement in the Rome talks to raise the profile of discussions and to 
give it some urgency. Rename also wanted to move away from informal to official 
mediation by the Italian and American governments. Despite the success of the protocols, 
the mediators were coming under increasing pressure for the lack of progress and their 
inability to manage and structure the talks. Their low-profile meant they lacked the leverage 
needed to keep the momentum of the talks going, while the rest of the peace process 
industry was getting restless.
The mediators were also facing criticism in Mozambique. The humanitarian crisis was 
worsening as one of the worst droughts in Southern Africa afflicted the entire region. The 
government army was threatening mutiny and donor fatigue resulted in pledges of only 60%
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in response to the latest emergency appeal for 1991-92.6 ' The Christian Council of 
Mozambique criticised the Rome process for dragging on at the expense of the people's 
suffering; "[tjhree letters signed jointly by a group of missionary societies in 1992 called 
for an immediate cease-fire and blamed both sides in Rome for protracting the human 
suffering in Mozambique."62 It was also at this time that regional players reasserted their 
influence. With assistance from Tiny Rowland, Dhlakama met President Mugabe. Mugabe, 
a long time adversary, now began to reassure Dhlakama, and offered guarantees for 
Dhlakama's and Rename's survival. After this meeting, Mugabe became centrally involved 
in bringing about a summit between the two Mozambican leaders to speed up the process 
in Rome.
At the end of 18 months of negotiation, the parties did not seem any closer to signing a 
cease-fire than when they started. Beyond agreement on an agenda and the protocols on the 
basic principles and political issues, the parties were still occupied by abstract rather than 
substantive issues. Although the political process in Rome gave Renamo and other political 
forces in Mozambique a prominent role; it was not enough to reassure Renamo or bring 
about a cease-fire, but enough for the government to feel under threat. In the final six 
months of talks, pressure to conclude an agreement took precedence over discussion of the 
remaining issues as external third parties crowded into Mozambique's political space.
The final round: military issues and implementation
In the final months of talks, the character of the negotiations radically changed. The 
discussions moved away from abstract principles to the technical, concrete and detailed 
questions of the cease-fire, guarantees and the implementation of the agreement. As the 
discussion moved to questions on demobilisation, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the 
formation of a new national army, a shift of influence occurred away from both the
"Mozambiquefile, Issue 187, February 1992.
62Alex Vines and Ken Wilson, "The churches and the peace process in Mozambique," 
in Paul Gifford, (ed.) The Christian churches and the democratisation of Africa, New 
York, NY: E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 143.
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mediators and the delegates. International officials were brought in to observe the talks, 
while their technical experts provided further assistance where the mediators lacked 
experience and competence. Given the resources they were expected to provide for the 
implementation of the agreement, various contingents of the peace process industry, 
particularly the UN, began to institutionalise their presence into the agreement and into 
Mozambique's political space. Humanitarian agencies also took a more active part with the 
ICRC putting forward a number of proposals to increase the delivery of food relief, while 
the churches and regional actors regained some of the influence they had lost to the Rome 
process. Finally, the leaders began to take over decision-making from the delegates, as the 
final details could only be resolved in face-to-face summits. Mozambican politics began to 
operate at two levels, at the level of the leaders or their immediate representatives, but also 
at the level of technical, functional and bureaucratic experts; with the divergence and 
relationship between these two levels influencing the future configuration of political space 
in Mozambique. While Mozambicans retained formal political power at the executive level, 
the lack of transparency in the bureaucratic and technical level hid the access to political 
space and the powerful influence the peace process industry was gaining in that space.
At the start of the tenth round on 10 June 1992, invitations were extended to the US, UK, 
France, Portugal and the UN to attend the talks as observers on both military and political 
questions but to keep their contribution to the "margins of the meetings."63 The presence 
of these third parties changed the dynamic of the plenary sessions, as substantive discussion 
gave way to accusation and rebuttal. Despite the agenda item on military issues and the 
pressing humanitarian crisis, Rename returned to the question of constitutional matters. 
Rename also demanded a review of the JVC and then released a report attacking nearly all 
of the international actors for their bias against them. In turn, Guebuza attacked Rename 
for failing to comply with the partial cease-fire, denied any government violations and said 
it was time to move onto discussion of a full cease-fire. Hume commented that "the 
presence of the observer delegations had not facilitated discussion and the search for 
solutions. If anything, their presence stimulated Guebuza and Domingos to present and
63Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 102. France and the UK because they were 
major donors, and Portugal for its links to Renamo.
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defend initial positions for benefit of their new audience."64 The futility of the plenary 
sessions, and the absence of joint working sessions, served to reinforce the practice of 
individual consultations between the mediators and each side; and encouraged the foreign 
technical experts to work independently on the humanitarian, military and cease-fire issues.
While the talks stalled over the JVC, the foreign military experts began drafting the military 
protocol on the formation of a new national army, the security and police services and the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. The military experts,
despite the small number of working group sessions or even separate 
discussions with the military teams from the two parties, had produced the 
basic draft of a protocol on military questions. Ambassador Incisa chaired 
these working sessions, and often the experts used the documents produced 
during the Angola negotiations as a point of reference.65
Irrespective of possible differences, the experience in Angola was becoming a model for 
a future operation in Mozambique. In a statement before a US congressional hearing, 
Herman Cohen, explained the American position of "seek[ing] to keep the UN presence as 
lean as possible., no larger than the UN operation in Angola."66 Jeffrey Davidow had also 
''advised the mediators to resist RENAMO's desire for an extensive UN peacekeeping 
mission or direct UN role in administration. It made more sense for the parties to be 
responsible for implementing the process they agreed on, as in Angola, with the United 
Nations providing outside support."67
Pressure was mounting from humanitarian agencies in Mozambique to agree on a cease-fire 
and allow the delivery of emergency food assistance. The ICRC had put proposals before 
the parties regarding the delivery of humanitarian relief, while the Christian Council of 
Mozambique offered to contact Rename about delays in the talks. Once Chissano agreed, 
in March 1992, a contact group was set up which met Dhlakama to raise concerns about the
64Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 105. 
65Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 111.
66Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
US House of Representatives, 8 October 1992.
67Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 75. Chapter five discusses how this idea was 
completely reversed after the collapse of the process in Angola.
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slow pace of the negotiations.68 Although the food crisis was more severe for Renamo 
whose soldiers depended on the local population, Renamo refused to open up roads for fear 
the roads would be used for military purposes by the government. Raffaelli suggested 
representatives from humanitarian agencies participate in a working group on the 
emergency in Rome. NGOs had been exerting considerable pressure on the parties and 
mediators to focus attention on humanitarian concerns.69 Representatives from the ICRC, 
UNHCR, WFP and NGOs like Caritas joined the discussions and drafted a declaration of 
principles on humanitarian assistance. 70 Soon thereafter, on 16 July 1992, the Declaration 
on the Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Assistance was signed allowing the unimpeded 
access of roads, the freedom of movement of people delivering and seeking assistance, the 
prohibition of using roads for military advantage and the establishment of a UN-chaired 
committee in Maputo to coordinate and supervise humanitarian assistance operations.71 The 
agreement's focus on access and coordination seemed to reflect the objectives and influence 
of the peace process industry rather than the parties themselves.
This was demonstrated by the continuing lack of urgency in the negotiations by the parties. 
This led to renewed calls for a direct meeting between President Chissano and Dhlakama. 
A summit between the two leaders took place in Rome on 5-7 August 1992, mediated by 
Robert Mugabe and Tiny Rowland. This meeting was presented as an African summit in 
Rome, suggesting a return to African solutions, while endorsing the Rome talks. The 
meeting attempted to build trust and respect between the two leaders and to resolve the 
issue of guarantees, the constitution and Renamo's safety and transition to a political party. 
Chissano agreed to put the protocols before the national assembly to be ratified into law,
68Dinis Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Goncalves, "A Calling for Peace: Christian 
Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique," Accord: An International 
Review of Peace Initiatives, 3, 1998, p. 33.
69See Sam Barnes, "Humanitarian Assistance as a Factor in the Mozambican Peace 
Negotiations: 1990-2," in Stephen Chan and Moises Venancio with Chris Alden and 
Sam Barnes, War and Peace in Mozambique, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 115- 
141.
70Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 108.
71This reversed the government's original position on UN involvement.
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"giving it the force of constitutional amendment and thus precedence over previous 
legislation."72 The leaders also accepted the "role of the international community, 
particularly the United Nations, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the 
General Peace Agreement, particularly the cease-fire and the electoral process."73 The 
summit declaration set the target date of 1 October 1992 as a deadline for completing 
negotiations and signing a general cease-fire.
After the summit, the negotiations slowed even further and the responsibilities of the 
delegates diminished with it. At the end of August, with the October deadline approaching, 
there was still no discussion of the arrangements for the cease-fire or demobilisation 
between the delegations. The talks stalled over disagreements on the security service, the 
size and name of the army, the police and civilian administration, and guarantees for the 
conduct and success of the agreement's implementation. The government wanted a large 
national army to force Rename to reveal the number of its soldiers, while Renamo wanted 
a smaller one. Renamo wanted to abolish the security service, while the government wanted 
it reformed. The two parties were also in disagreement over the nature of the commissions 
envisaged to supervise the formation of the new army, the police and the security services, 
particularly whether they would include UN or external third party participation. As for the 
issue of civilian administration, "Zuppi sensed that there might be no conclusive solution 
for the internal aspect of the sovereignty issue because the government expected to 
reestablish its civilian administration throughout the country but that Renamo did not 
expect to cede its local control anywhere."74 Meanwhile in Mozambique, not one road had 
opened for the delivery of emergency food relief, nor had the UN committee been 
established because Renamo's representative had not arrived in Maputo.
While the two delegations considered the military protocol, the foreign military experts 
began preparing the cease-fire protocol. The basis for their proposal was a 'UN non-paper 
on the modalities of United Nations verification of aspects of a peace agreement in
72Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 113. 
12'Joint Declaration, 1 August 1992. 
74Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 121.
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Mozambique' which was transmitted to both parties on 13 August.75 According to this non- 
paper, the cease-fire would have four phases: 1) cease-fire comes into force, 2) separation 
of forces (six days), 3) concentration of forces (30 days), and ^demobilisation and the 
formation of new army (180 days). The whole process would take no more than six months 
or 180 days. This timetable proposal was incorporated into the agreement almost 
verbatim. 76 Similarly, the military protocol, drafted and revised by the experts and 
mediators after the summit, was adopted by the parties. The pressure to meet the October 
deadline, the transfer of responsibility from the delegates to the leaders, and assistance from 
the international experts meant the technical details of the implementation of the agreement 
was neither put forward or fully discussed by the parties themselves. Although, Armando 
Guebuza argues that the government knew what it was signing and nothing was forced on 
it,77 a case can be made that the Mozambican parties relinquished a great deal of 
responsibility on the shape of the process of implementation to the foreign technical 
experts.
The institutionalisation of the peace process industry was especially evident in the evolving 
role of the United Nations. At first, the government was extremely reluctant to involve the 
UN at all. Although it was later agreed in principle to include the UN, it was the UN 
Secretary General who first wrote to the Mozambican government to offer assistance in 
May 1992,78 in response to approaches from the Sant'Egidio Community, not the 
government. Although no longer opposed to UN participation, the government objected to 
the UN chairing either the supervisory commission established in Protocol I, or the other 
commissions on the armed forces, police and security services, and humanitarian assistance, 
as an infringement on its sovereignty. The UN Secretary-General argued that "the best
15 The UN and Mozambique, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 6, 19 
August 1992, pp. 97-100.
76Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique, Geneva: UNIDIR, 
1995, p. 30. The proposal itself mirrors a US embassy cable on a cease-fire timetable.
77Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
™The UN and Mozambique, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 2, 28 May 
1992, p. 94.
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results are achieved if the chairmanship is entrusted to the United Nations."79 The 
government eventually yielded on this point, apparently on the eve of the accord,80 
accepting "an effective, instead of a symbolic UN participation"81 in order to accommodate 
Renamo, because they realised it was the only way Renamo would sign an agreement.82 
However, UN participation necessitated that the agreement conform to UN standard 
operating procedures which added another complicating factor to the discussions.
In August 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the UN had been 
invited to participate in Mozambique's peace process. In September, after disagreements 
on the framework for a visit to Mozambique, two small UN technical teams arrived in 
Mozambique. 83 While the elections survey team could plan from the political protocols 
(Protocol II and III), the military survey team, looking into peacekeeping requirements, had 
no framework. The two-week mission, raised the issue, unforeseen in the discussions, of 
providing security for the transport corridors, not just monitoring them. This function would 
require a much larger UN force than the force size under consideration. In mid- September 
"it seemed that the main work of preparing specific arrangements for guarantees and the 
cease-fire would in fact be based on the reports of the UN survey teams."84 Protocol V on 
guarantees elaborated the role of the UN and the structure of the various commissions that 
were to manage the process. The government committed itself to requesting technical and 
material support from the United Nations, and its participation in "monitoring and 
guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement."85The UN became the 
chair of the Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) which would guarantee the
79The UN and Mozambique, Document 6, p. 98.
80Berman, Managing Arms, pp. 29-30.
81 Comments by Dhlakama in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 August 1992.
82Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.This was also true for the 
humanitarian assistance committee.
83These teams and the UN experts at the talks have been criticised for their lack of 
knowledge and expertise on these matters. Interviews with Henny Matos and Armando 
Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
84Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p. 130. 
85GPA, Protocol V, Item III.l.
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implementation of the agreement, assume responsibility for the interpretation of the 
agreement, and settle any disputes between the parties.86 The CSC also had under its 
jurisdiction the commission on the formation of the new army (CCFADM), the cease-fire 
commission (CCF) and the reintegration commission (CORE).
Preparations began for another summit between the leaders in Botswana to finalise the texts 
of the four protocols to be signed in October because it was "clear that neither Guebuza nor 
Domingos had the authority to settle these issues on their own."87 The remaining issues 
were still: 1) reforming the security and police services, 2) the timing of the cease-fire, 3) 
the location of sites and logistical support for the demobilisation and cease-fire, 4) civilian 
administration, and 5) Renamo's transformation into a political party. Rename was 
especially concerned about its transformation into a political party and lobbied foreign 
governments for financial support. Rename also began to lobby for power-sharing 
arrangements after the agreement, with joint command of security and police services and 
control of its territories and delivery of food supplies. By trying to institutionalise its role 
and presence in structures and institutions, Renamo showed less interest in the political 
process, where it was substantially weaker than the government, and more in securing 
formal power and recognition in the constitution.
The two leaders met on 18 September 1992 and the next day announced agreement on all 
outstanding areas. While Renamo would control its own areas to keep the peace, the 
government could establish their administration in all areas, somehow ensuring a single 
administration in Mozambique. The army would be 30,000 troops, the security and police 
would have their own commissions without international observers and would not be 
subordinate to the CSC. However, these agreements were political only and the specific 
details were left to the mediators to clarify, with the concrete aspects of implementation still 
to be considered and worked out. With one week to go, there was no resolution on where 
assembly points would be and the draft protocols on the cease-fire and guarantees had still 
not been discussed. Unlike the previous 27 months of negotiation, the pressure to conclude
86GPA, Protocol V, Item II.5.
87Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism, p. 139.
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an agreement overrode discussion of the most important issues of implementation.
As 1 October 1992 approached, regional and international leaders began to arrive in Rome. 
President Chissano arrived on 29 September but Dhlakama, who arrived on 1 October, 
refused to meet Chissano or anyone else to discuss the remaining issues. At this point, 
Savimbi had just lost the Angolan elections and it was unclear whether he would accept the 
result. After some confusion and delay, Dhlakama finally agreed to the remaining protocols 
(IV, V, VI, VII). On 4 October 1992, witnessed by the mediators, the official observers, 
Robert Mugabe, Herman Cohen, Pik Botha, and James Jonah, President Chissano and 
Afonso Dhlakama signed the General Peace Agreement comprising the seven protocols, 
joint communiques and declarations ending the war in Mozambique.
Conclusion: hope and contradiction
The signing of the General Peace Agreement concluded two years of prolonged and arduous 
negotiations between the parties, the mediators, and the official observers and advisors. 
Initially, the talks in Rome were intended to facilitate direct negotiations between the 
government and Rename. However, the role of the mediators evolved from a facilitative 
to a more directed one to compensate for the level of distrust, the lack of momentum and 
the inequality between the two sides, particularly in the political inexperience of Renamo. 
As a result, the negotiations rarely involved face-to-face discussions, but were dependent 
on bilateral talks between each party and the mediators or foreign advisors who transmitted 
ideas to each side. The government and Renamo did not learn to work together. A pattern 
of conciliatory and inclusive political practices did not evolve, nor was there the sense of 
a shared problem being solved by the parties together. Despite the mediators' intentions to 
build a new relationship between the two parties, the process invited and institutionalised 
the participation of non-Mozambican actors. By the time the agreement was signed in 
October 1992, the international community had invested a significant amount of time, 
money, effort and prestige in bringing about a peaceful conclusion to the conflict in
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Mozambique. 88 This coincided with the gradual entrenchment of the peace process industry 
and its accumulation of influence over the process which allowed it to secure a powerful 
role in the process of implementation. Through the technical details of the cease-fire, the 
military protocol and especially the protocol on guarantees, the peace process industry 
ensured its further participation in and management of Mozambique's peace process.
The process of discussion to reach a cease-fire also marked a transition in how political 
space in Mozambique was to be configured after the agreement. Because of Renamo and 
the war, political space in Mozambique was paralysed and near collapse. With the initiation 
of talks, Renamo became an equal partner in the political process and gained a position in 
Mozambican politics because of the legitimacy it acquired by participating in the search for 
peace. The Rome process inevitably began to question the contours of political space in 
Mozambique in terms of the legitimacy of both Renamo and the state. The Rome talks also 
subordinated politics in Mozambique, and dominated what was happening on the ground. 
In turn, changes in Mozambique defined and limited discussions in Rome. After the talks 
concluded, the General Peace Agreement set out a number of parameters for political space 
in Mozambique. The protocols on the electoral law, political parties and the formation of 
the new national armed forces set out parameters that embraced political pluralism and a 
democratic role for the security institutions. Political space in Mozambique now included 
Renamo as a legitimate political partner in Mozambican politics. Dhlakama noted the 
importance of the room opening up in Mozambique's political space, where before the 
government "had never opened doors for Mozambicans to be able to tell their brothers in 
the government, as Mozambican citizens, what was wrong or what continued to be 
wrong."89
The terms on which Renamo was to be allowed to participate in Mozambique's political
88The Italian government spent US$ 20 million to host the talks, Renamo's satellite 
link and expenses, and to cover the costs of the JVC. Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism, 
p. 144.
89Afonso Dhlakama, text of speech 7 Aug 1992 on summit declaration, BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 Aug 1992, Radio Mozambique.
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space was largely set by the international community because many of the assurances to 
Rename depended on the involvement of external third parties. To keep Rename in the 
process, the talks focussed primarily on institutional procedures and mechanisms which 
provided reassurances for Renamo's survival after a cease-fire. However, the lack of clarity 
on these mechanisms and the role of the peace process industry in them affected the process 
and impacted on political space by increasing the role of external agencies in influencing 
the design and construction of Mozambique's political space. This was achieved through 
the technical details in the agreement, but also in the agreement's omissions.
In the end, the modalities of how the agreement would be implemented were not discussed 
in detail, or finally resolved. This included the location of the assembly areas for the 
cantonment of soldiers, the composition and operation of the numerous commissions, the 
administration of the country, and other mechanisms and machinery, especially the precise 
nature of the impending UN role. The rush to conclude the agreement and the
[overriding concern that the UN and the Governments represented at the 
negotiations in Rome had in the process - that is of getting from point (A) 
war to point (B) peace,... was of infinitely greater importance than ironing 
out the possible, if not probable, difficulties in implementing the finer 
points of the agreement.90
Nevertheless, the General Peace Agreement was a comprehensive agreement that heralded 
the end of 16 years of conflict. The next step would involve translating the agreement into 
real peace. The enclosed atmosphere of Rome was about to be replaced by the complex 
reality in Mozambique, involving the soldiers, the civilian population, the politicians and 
their constituencies, and an army of international participants. Through the implementation 
of the military, humanitarian and political provisions of the agreement, the operation of the 
peace process industry and the impact on the configuration of political space in 
Mozambique would become more striking and significant.
90Berman, Managing Arms, p. 31.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Cease-fire, demobilisation, and disarmament: 
the peace process industry at work
After the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA), the reconstruction of political 
space in Mozambique consisted of incorporating the framework created by the agreement 
and a number of conditions initiated by the Rome process. As in the negotiating process, 
the government and Rename continued to be equal partners in the political arena during the 
process of implementing the agreement. In addition, the accord institutionalised the role* of 
external third party actors in the transition of Mozambique's political space, especially the 
UN in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA. The agreement also 
established a complex structure of joint commissions to manage the process of 
implementation, five of which included external third party representatives. The precise 
roles of these different actors, the relationship amongst them and with the parties, and the 
functioning of the commissions, were not elaborated in the agreement, but evolved as the 
process unfolded. Similarly, the agreement did not anticipate the insertion of different 
segments of Mozambican society, particularly the combatants, into the political arena and 
their impact on political space. Therefore, as implementation of the agreement began, the 
constitution of political space in Mozambique was more complicated and dynamic than 
during the Rome negotiations.
However, the reconfiguration of political space in Mozambique was also conditioned by 
Mozambique's history of civil conflict involving the state and a guerrilla movement. More 
than just equal partners in the process, the government was both a belligerent and 
representing the public institution of the state, while Renamo was both a guerrilla 
movement and trying to transform into a legitimate political party. This was especially 
pertinent in the military component of the process, the purpose of which was to remove the 
capacity for war and to redefine the role of state security institutions to society. Because 
armed force was a political instrument, these military provisions were both a distinct set of 
activities, but contingent upon how political space was being configured and the place and 
role of both parties in it. Given the duration of the war, this took place in a context of deep-
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rooted levels of distrust between the parties and within society, and the almost total 
destruction of the infrastructure, the economy and public institutions.
As explained in the previous chapter, the military protocols, Protocol IV and VI, were 
signed with minimal discussion in the final stages of negotiation. As a result, explanations 
on how the military provisions were to be implemented, and the role of the UN and the 
peace process industry in this, were neglected in the agreement. This would be resolved 
through the interpretation and implementation of the agreement by the parties and the peace 
process industry, primarily through the UN operation, ONUMOZ.1 The extensive 
involvement of the peace process industry in the military component of the process had a 
cumulative impact on the structure and operation of political space in Mozambique. This 
will be discussed in five sections detailing the main components of the military provisions 
of the General Peace Agreement. These were establishing the UN presence, the cease-fire 
and withdrawal of foreign troops, the process of demobilisation, disarmament, and 
reforming state security institutions with the formation of the new national army, and 
monitoring the security and police forces.2 Each section will be discussed in relation to how 
political space was shaped by the process of implementation.
Starting up the process
After the signing of the agreement in Rome, President Chissano returned to Maputo, 
Dhlakama to Rename headquarters in Maringue, Sofala province, and other foreign leaders 
to their respective capitals. As scheduled in Protocol V on Guarantees, the Mozambican 
Assembly legislated the GPA into national law on 15 October 1992, bringing the peace 
accord and cease-fire into effect. However, a number of other conditions set out in the 
agreement failed to materialise. According to the cease-fire timetable, on the 15th the UN 
was expected to begin monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, the two combatants were to 
begin the separation of forces, while Zimbabwean and Malawian troops were to begin
'ONUMOZ is the Portuguese acronym for the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique.
2The reintegration of soldiers and landmines will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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withdrawing from Mozambique. Similarly, the Supervisory and Control Commission 
(CSC) and its subsidiary commissions established to oversee the process, were to be 
activated and begin operating. In order to meet these provisions, the cease-fire timetable 
had presumed both that a UN presence would already be established in Mozambique and 
that preparations for the operation of the various commissions were in place. Neither was 
true. In lieu of the arrival of the United Nations, the inertia and distrust which characterised 
the talks surfaced in Mozambique.
Prior to the signing of the GPA, the UN Secretary-General had warned the parties that there 
would be a delay in getting the UN operation off the ground.3 As a result of their late 
inclusion in the negotiations, the UN did not have time to prepare the concept of operation, 
determine the budget requirements or send requests to troop contributing countries before 
the signing of the agreement. In contrast to Angola where the UN had detailed information 
about the parties, their locations, and an agreement on the location of assembly areas, these 
basic prerequisites were absent in Mozambique. Planning the operation was further 
complicated by the overstretched capacity of the UN, which at the time was also operating 
in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Angola. However, the UN Secretary-General 
appointed Aldo Ajello4 , interim Special Representative, in charge of all UN activities in 
support of the agreement. Ajello arrived in Maputo with 21 military observers on 15 
October 1992 and set up headquarters in resident UN offices. On 4 November 1992, one 
month after the signature of the agreement, Ajello was able to appoint the Supervisory and 
Control Commission and hold its first meeting. The three main subsidiary commissions, 
the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the Reintegration Commission (CORE) and the Joint 
Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM) were also
3 The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York, NY: Department of 
Public Information, 1995. Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 10, 29 September 
1992, p. 103. The Mozambique government did not formally request UN participation until 
October 1992, Document 12, S/24635, p. 105.
4Aldo Ajello was a former Italian parliamentarian and one of the most senior Italian 
nationals working in the UN, as an assistant secretary-general in UNDP. He also had 
personal ties to Mozambique.
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appointed. 5
Although the agreement stipulated that implementation would begin on 15 October 1992, 
ambiguities or omissions in the agreement on who was responsible for initiating the process 
paralysed political space in Mozambique. Although the peace process hinged on the parties 
compliance to the agreement, it became contingent on the UN to manage the 
implementation of the agreement as chair of the CSC. The role given to the UN to monitor, 
verify and guarantee the compliance of the parties to the agreement, put the UN at the 
centre of the process and Mozambique's political space. Pending the arrival of the UN, the 
parties had not been in communication with each other since Rome or taken steps to begin 
implementation. Renamo remained at their headquarters and refused to move to Maputo 
to meet their obligations under the GPA, claiming the government had not secured the 
promised accommodation, offices and transportation in order for Renamo to take up 
residency in the capital. The government meanwhile was realising the extent of its logistical 
commitments and coping with its limited capacity to meet them. Although the process 
stalled with the slow start-up of the UN operation, the UN was also impeded in its work by 
the government's reluctance to accept the UN and by delays of both parties in finalising the 
remaining details of the agreement. However, in leaving for New York in November to 
assist in drafting the mandate for the UN operation, Ajello effectively suspended the CSC 
and hence the process itself, until his return in mid-December.
Given the lack of clarity in the agreement on the precise role of the United Nations, this 
question was transferred to New York to be resolved in the drafting of the UN 
peacekeeping mandate. The UN's position in Mozambique's political space was to be 
decided through the ONUMOZ mandate in New York, not in Rome and not through the 
CSC in Maputo where the government and Renamo were members. In New York, 
preparations for ONUMOZ were overshadowed by the collapse of the peace process in 
Angola and Savimbi's return to war after his electoral defeat in October 1992. The UN 
could not afford another expensive and embarrassing failure in Africa and sought to ensure
5 The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 26, S/24892, 
3 December 1992, p. 150.
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that at least in Mozambique, there would be full demobilisation before elections.6 Contrary 
to previous assumptions that the operation would mirror the size of UNAVEMII in Angola, 
the UN, Ajello and the international community in Maputo and their country representatives 
in New York and Washington, all favoured a large military force.7
However, it was not only preoccupation with Angola which informed the size of the force, 
but also the UN's decision to guarantee the security of the transport corridors. The security 
of the corridors against banditry was essential for the delivery of emergency relief 
assistance. This was anticipated in Protocol IV of the GPA which stated that the, "CS.C, 
through CCF, will, following the withdrawal of the foreign troops, assume immediate 
responsibility for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes, adopting 
the measures it deems necessary for the purpose."8 The UN Secretary-General linked this 
responsibility to the peacekeeping operation, explaining that "the need to secure the 
corridors emerged as the principal determinant of the size of the military component of the 
operation,... [as well as the] complexity and cost of the proposed United Nations operation 
in Mozambique."9 Protection against banditry was clearly a different conception of security 
(in which the UN lacked experience), from most operations where peacekeepers act as a 
buffer or deterrent between opposing forces. However, not only was this framework for 
security not debated during negotiations, the agreement left open how it would be 
accomplished. Through the design of the operational mandate for ONUMOZ, the UN and 
the peace process industry reinterpreted the agreement to reflect their agenda of avoiding 
another Angola and their interpretation of security requirements in Mozambique.
6UNAVEM II was criticised for having a small deployment of 350 military observers 
which amounted to 5 military observers per province or per 100,000 inhabitants in a 
country of 10 million people with an estimated 200,000 government troops and 50,000 
UNITA forces. See Margaret Joan Anstee, Orphans of the Cold War: The Inside Story of 
the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-1993, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, 
pp. 13,14, 32. See also United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, S/22627, 20 May 
1991.
7Richard Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994, Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 31.
8GPA, Protocol IV, II.4.
9The UN and Mozambique, Document 10, p. 103.
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On 16 December 1992, two months after the GPA was signed, the Security Council 
approved the mandate for ONUMOZ. Although the government had lobbied the Security 
Council to limit the size of the operation, the Security Council "felt it was better to spend 
a bit more than necessary to avoid the costly embarrassment of another UNAVEM II."10 
ONUMOZ expanded the scope and size of the UN role by assuming a multi-functional 
mandate with political, military, electoral and humanitarian responsibilities. The framework 
for the military component was the following:
i) To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, 
their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
ii) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
iii) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
iv) To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and
v) To provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support 
of the peace process, especially in the corridors."
A civilian police component not envisaged in the GPA, but proposed by Boutros-Ghali 
earlier, was also mentioned. ONUMOZ would deploy 354 military observers; 5 logistically 
self-sufficient infantry battalions, with up to 850 personnel in each; 1 engineer battalion, 
3 logistic companies; and air, communications, medical and movement control support 
units. 12 In total, ONUMOZ would deploy over 7000 troops in Mozambique at a cost of 
$332 million over twelve-months. 13
The government was aghast at the proposed size of the UN force. One government official 
complained that "Mozambique was not a protectorate, the UN were to observe not send in 
a peacekeeping force."14 Another Mozambican parliamentarian "warned that the United 
Nations could become a 'state within a state'." 15Although ONUMOZ resembled other UN 
peacekeeping operations, when compared to the poverty of Mozambique, with its logistical
'°Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique, Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995, p. 39.
" The UN and Mozambique, Document 26, pp. 151-2.
nThe UN and Mozambique, Document 26, pp. 151-2.
r'The UN and Mozambique, Document 26, Addendum 1, p. 157,
^Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 1, January 1993.
l5Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 36.
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capacity, a budget far greater than the GNP of the country, and its political import, 
ONUMOZ had all the components of a 'parallel state apparatus'. In addition to the military, 
humanitarian and electoral components,
the administrative component in Maputo, with three regional offices, [would 
provide] support in the areas of finance, personnel, procurement, 
communication, travel, compensation, building management, property 
control, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing and 
security. 16
However, the government was naive or disingenuous to think UN participation would not 
take the form of a peacekeeping operation. Moreover, the government had neither clarified 
the role of the UN, nor made the connections between the provisions in the agreement and 
their implementation. When the government's representations failed to change the UN's 
course, they retaliated by denying landing permission to an advance mission of Italian 
troops arriving in Beira. 17
The government used the status of forces agreement (SOFA)18 to communicate their 
resentment of the UN. They prolonged negotiations over what is a standard international 
legal instrument agreed between every host country accepting a UN peacekeeping mission. 
The SOFA is a basic document which provides legal immunity, freedom of movement for 
all UN personnel and legal exemption from import duties. Without the SOFA, the UN had 
to inform the government in advance of all movements of its personnel which hampered 
its mobility. The government had two main objections. The first was the issue of national 
sovereignty. Many in the government objected to the free movement of what was viewed 
as an "occupying force". They also objected to the language in the document which seemed 
to model the experience in Cambodia where the UN served as a transitional administrative 
authority.' 9 The second was financial. Import duties were an important source of revenue
I6ONUMOZ operational structure, The UN and Mozambique, Document 26, p. 156. 
:7Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 36.
l8United Nations, Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations, 
A/45/594, 9 October 1990.
I9Migel de Brito, "The relationship between peacekeepers, host governments and the 
local population," in Mark Malan, (ed.) Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and 
Peacebuilding: Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past, ISS Monograph Series, No. 10,
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for the government which was under pressure from donors and the World Bank to raise 
revenue from all sources. The government was also expected to secure offices and 
accommodations for the UN. The SOFA was not signed until 14 May 1993, with all 
exemptions and immunities, but the UN agreed to pay for its own offices and housing.
Despite the Security Council's political commitment, the UN ran into difficulties securing 
troops from member countries and winning financial approval.20 As a result, the first troop 
contingent did not arrive in Mozambique until February 1993 and the operation was not 
fully deployed until February 1994. ONUMOZ was
severely hampered by financial constraints which affected its recruitment 
and deployment of key personnel as well as its arrangements for 
accommodation and other essential services. After a start-up allocation of 
$9.5 million, the operation did not receive approval of its first interim 
budget, amounting to $140 million, from the General Assembly until 16 
March 1993.21
According to Ajello, delays in the budgetary process meant that "we couldn't place any 
orders, we couldn't order any vehicles, any equipment... I cannot use military observers 
without vehicles, without radio, without anything."22 Some personnel, computers, and 
vehicles were transferred directly from Cambodia after the conclusion of UNTAC, even 
though Mozambique had a vastly different terrain and used left-hand drive.23 Bureaucratic 
infighting in New York also undermined the launch of the operation. Ajello's position and 
authority was made tenuous by persistent rumours that he was to be replaced by James 
Jonah. 24 Jonah's reappointment as Under-Secretary-General in February 1993 ended this 
speculation, yet Ajello was only confirmed as the permanent Special Representative in
1997, p. 61.
20Ajello believes Mozambique received less priority because of high-profile operations 
in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia. Berman, Managing Arms, p. 39.
2 '77ze UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 29. 
22Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 38.
23Michael F. Stephen, "Demobilisation in Mozambique," in Jakkie Cilliers, (ed.) 
Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa, 
Johannesburg: South Africa Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, p 67.
24Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 37.
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April 1993.
The British ambassador to Mozambique, Richard Edis, has argued that the first six months 
of the process was "a valuable, at times frustrating, exercise in gaining experience and 
confidence-building between all those involved, the Government, RENAMO and the 
international community."25 However, the dynamics in this initial phase did not suggest that 
the government and Renamo accepted the same framework of political space. Rather, both 
parties responded to and used external third parties as leverage against the other. The UN's 
expanded role made it a powerful political actor in Mozambique's political space whiqh 
threatened the authority of the government. However, delays in setting up ONUMOZ 
undermined this position. The token UN presence, procurement problems and Ajello's 
tenuous position suggested weak resolve on the part of the UN and the international 
community which both parties tried to manipulate to their advantage. Dhlakama demanded 
65% deployment of UN forces as a precondition before meeting their obligations under the 
agreement.26 The government wrote to the Security Council to complain about Renamo's 
behaviour and pressure their compliance, using the Council as a forum to air grievances to 
strengthen their own position in Mozambique. Rather than developing conciliatory political 
practices or building confidence, these initial political manouevres added to the distrust 
between the parties and between the parties and the international community.
The cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops
In his first report creating ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General stated that because of the 
delays, "[t]he viability of the cease-fire will therefore in its early stages, depend critically 
on the political will and strict compliance of the two parties with the agreed modalities."27 
Despite great uncertainty, a cease-fire emerged amongst ordinary soldiers who, in
25Richard Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process: An Insider's View," 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 9(2), 1995, p. 7.
26The UN and Mozambique, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 30,22 January 
1993, pp. 170-171.
27The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 13, S/24642, 
9 October 1992, p. 128.
179
remarkable instances of reconciliation, shared food with each other. Wilson reported that 
cease-fire agreements between local commanders emerged and many Mozambicans 
instituted 'a people's peace.' 28 Renamo was proving more disciplined than most observers 
had expected. However, government soldiers awaiting instruction on their demobilisation 
were less disciplined, looting and threatening civilians along roads. Foreshadowing events 
that would later dominate the peace process, government soldiers, "including men from 
units trained with British help, allegedly the country's elite... went on a two-week strike, 
blocking railways and roads."29 At the moment there was little concern, but the threat of 
these recurrent disturbances hinted at the potential significance of these soldiers in the 
process.
Surprisingly, serious violations of the cease-fire never took place; most violations reflected 
the movement of troops, the occupation of new positions or restrictions of free circulation.30 
Most threats to security arose from acts of banditry, not the kind of targeted attacks which 
characterised Renamo in the past. However, some violations of the cease-fire were reported 
in the days immediately following the signing of the GPA. On 20 October, Renamo was 
alleged to have captured 4 towns in Nampula and Zambezia provinces, while Renamo 
complained of government and Zimbabwean troop movements in Nampula, Zambezia and 
Tete. The Cease-fire Commission (CCF), composed of both parties and international 
representatives, began investigating 40 cease-fire violation complaints. However, its 
capacity to verify the violations was constrained by limited resources and the slow 
deployment of the operation. Effective monitoring did not begin until July 1993. The CCF 
also had no guidelines concerning the positions held by each party, no map to identify 
military installations, no inventory of manpower for the cantonment offerees and no prior 
knowledge as to how many paramilitary, private and irregular troops existed on
28Ken Wilson, "The People's Peace in Mozambique,"Southern Africa Report, March 
1994, p. 22.
29 77ze Economist, 15 August 1992.
30Comments by Pier Segala, Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, in Winrich 
Kiihne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine Fandrych, (eds.) International Workshop on the 
Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 
Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, July 1995, p. 19.
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Mozambican territory.31
The CCF was further undermined by the government's decision to retake the four towns 
and three villages in Tete province even after lodging a complaint with the commission. 
The government argued that the responsibility for maintaining security in the country still 
remained the government's. As a sovereign state,
the government assumes the responsibilities that befall it in the defence and 
security of the peoples and reserves the right to take the measures it deems 
suitable to put an end to the violations that have taken place and to restore 
the conditions for the compliance with and implementation of the General 
Peace Agreement.32
Given the UN's absence and inability to perform its functions, the government sought to 
reclaim its authority in political space, and its right to ensure the implementation of the 
agreement. However this was interpreted by Renamo as a violation of the agreement which 
proved the government could not be trusted. The international community and the UN 
condemned Renamo's violations and the government for not respecting the agreement and 
not allowing the appropriate commissions to deal with the problem, resorting to force 
instead of political dialogue.
Zimbabwe began withdrawing troops from the transport corridors on 21 October 1992 
without international supervision. The absence of international monitors meant that little 
confidence was given to the process, especially by Renamo. Their departure also created 
a security vacuum in the corridors since there was no replacement force until the following 
April. However, reflecting another omission of the agreement, the numbers, modalities and 
deadlines for the withdrawal of foreign troops were not explained in the agreement but left 
to the government to negotiate and present to the CSC for approval.33 This was problematic 
given that the CSC was not meeting because of Ajello's absence. These delays were again 
interpreted by Renamo as bad faith on the part of the government and reinforced their
3 'Comments by Pier Segala, in Kuhne, International Workshop, pp. 19-21.
32 The UN and Mozambique, Communique by the Council of Ministers of Mozambique, 
Document 21, S/24724, 28 October 1992, p. 145.
33GPA, Protocol IV, Item II. 4.
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uncooperative behaviour. Zimbabwe finally withdrew all of its troops in April 1993 after 
the arrival of the Italian contingent and in June 1993 the last Malawian troops departed 
from the Nacala corridor.
Despite its responsibilities to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the UN was either absent 
or ineffective in these early stages. The UN force commander assumed his duties on 14 
February 1993, but it was only between March and May 1993 that ONUMOZ became a 
significant military presence in Mozambique. By April 1993, 1043 Italian troops were 
stationed along the Beira corridor, Botswanan troops took over the Tete corridor, a battalion 
from Bangladesh took over the Nacala corridor, Zambian soldiers patrolled the Limpopo 
corridor while Uruguayan troops protected the Beira-Maputo highway. As in most UN 
operations, there were differences in the capacities of each national contingent. While the 
Italian contingent was self-sufficient, troops from other countries were less prepared, for 
example, "[w]hen the Uruguayan contingent set up camp, it was provided with neither food 
nor water for the first two days, and half the battalion found itself deployed to a point 40 
kilometres from the highway it was to patrol."34 By August 1993, there were also 303 
unarmed military observers responsible for verifying cease-fire violations, setting up 
assembly areas and verifying demobilisation and disarmament. The UN force did not reach 
its peak deployment of 6615 until February 1994, after which it began to scale down.35
The main responsibility of the armed forces was to guard the transport corridors until such 
time as the new national army could take over. This function, which was the justification 
for the strong UN presence in Mozambique, was not performed well. Along the Beira 
corridor, the number of armed attacks increased after Italian units replaced the 
Zimbabweans, since the first force commander "insisted on a strict interpretation of the 
mandate, at first refusing to allow troops to intervene to prevent banditry."36 Eventually in 
early 1994, troops were redeployed in Zambezia to provide a symbolic UN presence in 
Mozambique's most populated province through which no transport corridor passed. In
34Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 42.
35Berman, Managing Arms, p . 41.
36Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 44.
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response to the increase in crime and banditry, Ajello referred the issue to the Mozambican 
police as a criminal rather than a security matter,37 since "responsibility for the maintenance 
of law and order will clearly remain with the Government."38 However, the lines between 
security, banditry, crime and violence were thinly drawn. Ajello's position seemed to 
contradict the UN's original conceptualisation of security in terms of threats from bandits, 
private militia and roaming groups of heavily armed irregulars, and protecting the "four 
transport corridors in order to avoid any vacuum that could be exploited by bandits, pending 
the formation of the new unified armed forces."39
In addition to not meeting their basic military objectives, "most of the contingents were also 
criticized for failing to make a positive contribution to rehabilitating the country's shattered 
infrastructure."40 One observer reported that the Italian troops "have extremely little to do. 
They patrol the roads, phone home to their families twice a week, and eat pizza made at 
their own bakery."41 According to the British Ambassador, "[m]ost of the ONUMOZ force 
enjoyed a relaxed existence, apart from the relatively small group of military observers who 
bore the brunt of the work and the danger monitoring the ceasefire and demobilisation."42 
Although the military was the least effective component, it cost $162 of the $328 million 
budget in the second year, with the overall personnel and administrative costs reaching 62% 
of the total, from November 1993 to November 1994.43 The conduct of some peacekeepers 
in relation to the local population also created problems. In 1994, the press reported cases 
of child prostitution near the Italian contingent and an Italian unit was sent home after an 
investigation ordered by Ajello. ONUMOZ also had an impact on the local economy and 
provided a number of jobs for Mozambicans, especially those who could speak English. In
^Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 12, September 1994.
™The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 55, S/l 994/89 
Addendum 1, 28 January 1994, p. 225.
39 77ze UN and Mozambique, Document 26, p. 151.
40Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 44.
4 'Dan Isaacs, "Watching and waiting," Africa Report, July/August 1993, p. 41.
42Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process," p. 17.
43Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 33(1), 1995, p. 127.
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Maputo, the UN presence led to inflated rental rates but created a buoyant local market.
During this time, Renamo's representatives, Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu, took up 
residence in Maputo, but Dhlakama himself remained in Maringue. Given his unchallenged 
control over Rename, Dhlakama's continued absence from Maputo undermined the 
workings of the joint commissions. Thus, every point that required his approval meant that 
Ajello, his lieutenant, or representatives of the international community flew out to 
Maringue.44 The government complained that Dhlakama was being treated as a head of state 
while continuing to deny access to areas under its control. Rename increasingly set forth 
conditions for their compliance to the agreement, primarily linking demobilisation to 
demands for money to transform itself into a political party. Rename revealed that the 
Italians had secretly promised to pay $ 15 million to Rename to sign the GPA, but had failed 
to deliver.45 Rename also demanded appointments to provincial governors and accused the 
government of transferring members of the army into the security and police services. 
Ajello insisted the process depended on Rename, which meant accommodating Dhlakama. 
Ajello proposed creating a special trust fund for donors to contribute money to help 
Rename transform into a political party. However in March 1993, Renamo pulled out of 
all of the commissions to hold a political training seminar in Maringue, not returning to 
Maputo until June. For three months, the commissions could not meet, nor could the CCF 
investigate allegations of violations.
ONUMOZ and the international community were not impartial neutral third parties with 
respect to the parties, or between the state and society. To keep Renamo in the process, 
Renamo was given special treatment by the international community by Ajello's treatment 
of Dhlakama and the creation of the Trust Fund. This was resented by the government 
which also perceived the intrusive military presence of the UN as an encroachment on 
Mozambique's sovereignty which endowed the UN with undue and unnecessary power in
44During the negotiations, US diplomats had refused invitations to meet with Dhlakama 
at Renamo headquarters and "insisted on a neutral site". Cameron Hume, Ending 
Mozambique's War, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 65.
4-'Africa Confidential, 34(10), 14 May 1993, p. 3.
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Mozambique's political space. The feebleness of ONUMOZ in performing its military 
functions only served to reinforce the resentment of the government of this symbolic yet 
futile presence. Ajello later agreed "the military component was too big and to a certain 
extent inefficient."46 Like Rome, the two sides were not dealing directly with each other but 
through a third party, this time the UN. However, mutinies by soldiers from both sides was 
drawing more attention. The significance of this would become apparent during the process 
of demobilisation.
Demobilisation
PREPARING FOR DEMOBILISATION
One of the most important aspects of the peace process was the demobilisation of the armed 
forces. Demobilisation is "the process of converting a soldier into a civilian."47 Berdal 
defines demobilisation "as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the 
individual level, as the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state. It covers a 
number of activities associated with establishing and maintaining assembly areas."48 
According to the cease-fire timetable, demobilisation would start 30 days after the GPA 
enters into force and conclude six months thereafter, including the disbanding of irregular 
troops and militias. Contrary to the timetable, delays in the process were aggravated by the 
slow pace of selecting and preparing the assembly areas, the actual cantonment, and finally 
demobilisation itself. The accumulation of missed deadlines contributed to the distrust of 
the parties and put pressure on other aspects of the process, particularly the timetable and 
the elections.
Protocol IV on demobilisation designated 49 cantonment sites, 29 for the Government and
46Comments by Aldo Ajello in Kiihne, International Workshop, p. 13.
47Kimberly Mahling Clark, "The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: 
Perspectives from USAID," Africa Today, 1 st and 2nd Quarters, 1995, p. 50.
48Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 
303, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1996, 
p. 39.
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20 for Rename. The location of these sites was not outlined in the agreement but "shall be 
those agreed to between the Parties and the United Nations no later than 7 (seven) days after 
the signing of the General Peace Agreement."49 However, the process of identifying and 
agreeing on the assembly areas (AAs) proved to be long and tedious. The UN first 
established guidelines on acceptable standards for the AAs according to which, most of the 
sites proposed by both parties were found to be unacceptable because of lack of access to 
water, inaccessibility from roads, and proximity to mined areas. They reflected strategic 
rather than practical suitability by both parties trying to assert control in disputed zones or 
to capture new territory. By late April 1993, ONUMOZ military observers had approved 
only 13 of 19 proposed sites.
ONUMOZ's plans for demobilisation incorporated recommendations from a Swiss study 
commissioned earlier by the government when it was considering partial demobilisation.50 
The study recommended that a civilian technical unit (TU) be created to support the 
military observers. ONUMOZ implemented this technical unit, giving it overall 
responsibility for coordinating all the logistics of the assembly areas including distributing 
food, medicines and other basic services; organising a database and issuing personal 
documents; supplying civilian clothing; organising transportation home for ex-combatants; 
and establishing a link with provincial and district authorities. The TU also took over 
responsibility for registering the non-assembled troops, mainly the disabled, administrative 
units, air force, marines etc., and overseeing the storage of weapons.
However, in these technical aspects of preparing and managing the AAs, the TU and the 
peace process industry demonstrated their overwhelming and comprehensive involvement 
in the process and tendency for quick-fix solutions. Once a site was approved, the TU with 
UNICEF, UNOHAC, USAID and other major donors provided everything from wells, soap, 
blankets, tarpaulins, to cooking pots, utensils, plates and cups. The TU with the World 
Health Organization (WHO) provided medicines and set up a clinic at each AA which was 
also available to surrounding local communities. They also contracted NGOs such as
49GPA, Protocol VI, Item 6 (e).
50The UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 39, see also Document 26, p. 152.
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OXFAM and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) to provide medical personnel, medicines, 
salaries and vehicles. The government supplied its own doctors and offered to provide 
doctors for all 49 AAs but RENAMO preferred international assistance to emphasise its 
lack of trust towards the government.51 The World Food Programme (WFP) provided basic 
food rations to soldiers and their dependents. However in response to the degree of external 
assistance, the government insisted on providing meat and fish rations for its own soldiers, 
even though it lacked the resources to fulfil this commitment.52 The TU has since been 
praised as one of the most innovative and effective aspects of the UN operation, but it 
depended on creating an entire administrative system with a central office in Maputo and 
its own warehouses in three regional depots. It "was formally part of the Office of the 
Special Representative and was expected to report directly to Ajello,"53 but it also had to 
coordinate activities with ONUMOZ military observers and share information with 
UNOHAC. However, despite its formal organisational links, "the TU operated largely 
independently. It even possessed its own satellite feed and, therefore, was not dependent 
on the rest of ONUMOZ for its communication requirements."54
The entire process received an immense boost when Dhlakama finally arrived in Maputo 
(although not taking up residence) at the end of August 1993. In a tour of the city, 
Dhlakama was encouraged by his enthusiastic reception from supporters and his ability to 
move freely in the city. After the UN trust fund for Rename had been set up in May 1993, 
with pledges from a number of countries, Renamo became less obstructive. Long awaited 
meetings between Dhlakama and President Chissano took place in September 1993, the 
first in Mozambique, to settle issues relating to territorial administration, provincial 
governors and the police. An agreement was reached to request UN police monitors, the 
appointment of Renamo advisors to provincial governors and the disbanding of irregular 
armies, but both Dhlakama and Chissano left Maputo, and the process stalled again. The 
slow pace of the process was straining the patience of the international community. Ajello
5lBerman, Managing Arms, p. 64. 
52Berman, Managing Arms, p. 64. 
"Herman, Managing Arms, p. 62. 
54Berman, Managing Arms, p. 62.
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proposed a new timetable, starting demobilisation in October 1993, with elections one year 
later in October 1994. Rename objected and their delegates left Maputo once more.
The UN Secretary-General proposed a visit to Mozambique to give momentum to the 
process. Between 17-20 October 1993, Boutros-Ghali, conveyed the impatience of the 
international community on the lack of progress a year after the signing of the GPA and 
warned of the possible withdrawal of international assistance and the suspension of donor 
assistance. The threat produced results. He secured agreement on the revised timetable and 
a commitment to start cantonment in November 1993 and demobilisation in January 1994. 
The Security Council reinforced his threat by renewing ONUMOZ's mandate for six 
months, with a review in 90 days, two days before the mandate was due to expire.55 The 
Security Council resolution also stressed "the unacceptability of attempts to gain further 
concessions or to attach new conditions to the peace process... and strongly urged the 
parties not to raise further issues which might jeopardize the implementation of the 
Agreement."56 The peace process industry had significant political leverage over the parties 
but this was undermined by their operations on the ground which generated politically 
motivated reactions from the parties in relation to each other and to international agencies 
in Mozambique's political space.
CANTONMENT
The first 20 Assembly Areas were officially declared open on 30 November 1993, 15 more 
in December, and the final 14 in February 1994. The assembly of troops began in December 
1993 after "[fjood and medicines were made available, in the hopes of exerting political 
pressure on the parties to start demobilizing, despite the risk that the supplies would 
deteriorate before the assembly process had actually started."57 Nevertheless, the actual 
assembly offerees was still painfully slow. Rename linked cantonment to other demands
55 The UN and Mozambique, Security Council Resolution, Document 49, S/RES/882 
(1993), 5 November 1993, p. 212.
5677ze UN and Mozambique, Document 49, p. 212. 
"Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 50.
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but was also reluctant to begin cantonment because it would reveal child soldiers in its 
forces which had always been denied.58 On the other hand, the government was initially 
eager to begin cantonment because of growing discontent among its soldiers, but not 
without reciprocal cantonment by Renamo. All through 1993, there were reports of 
mutinies by government soldiers. These mutinies only "reinforc[ed] the government's fear 
of being forced into a more rapid demobilization than that required of Renamo, which was 
able to enforce tighter discipline among its troops."59
In the assembly areas, it was clear both sides were holding back their best troops, and that 
troops of little strategic importance entered first. To ensure transparency and put pressure 
on the parties, the UN released figures on the rate of assembly, which led to a dispute with 
the government, who accused the UN of under-reporting government numbers. The 
government was extremely resentful of ONUMOZ, particularly Ajello, complaining that 
ONUMOZ had been exerting
considerable, unilateral pressure on the Government for the cantonment of 
its troops - both through the media and the Security Council - but it has 
failed to do the same thing with regard to Renamo... The Government 
deems it necessary that ONUMOZ act with objectivity, avoiding any kind 
of partiality that might discredit and jeopardize the implementation of the 
General Peace Agreement.60
The international members of the CSC supported ONUMOZ by issuing statements on the 
progress of the peace process, which were linked to the Security Council's renewal of the 
ONUMOZ mandate.61
The registration of soldiers was also uneven, with some assembly areas having 3%
58After many denials, Renamo admitted to having child soldiers among its ranks, 2000 
children were assisted by UNICEF and SCF, and reunited with their families.
59Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 60.
60Statement of the Government of Mozambique to the CCF, transmitted to the Security 
Council, 7 July 1994, The UN and Mozambique, Document 66, S/l 994/806, p. 249.
6 'Statement by the International Members of the CSC on the Assembly of Forces, 12 
December 1993.
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utilisation, while others were overwhelmed with 420% capacity.62 The AAs were designed 
to hold 1000 soldiers for six weeks at a time, but soldiers were unable to leave until they 
were formally demobilised. Once soldiers were registered, received identity cards and 
handed in their weapons, lists were sent to the parties to decide who would join the new 
army and who would be demobilised. As will be discussed in the last section, this took an 
extremely long time. As a result of on-going delays, there was overcrowding in the camps 
and increasing levels of boredom, frustration and uncertainty. Other problems emerged 
because of poor conditions in the camps. Government soldiers were dissatisfied not only 
with camp conditions but broken promises from the government regarding salaries and 
compensation. Dhlakama protested that his troops lacked basic necessities like food and 
water. Rename combatants, who saw themselves as part of a winning army promised 
rewards from their leaders, found the poor conditions of the AAs difficult to accept and 
held their own commanders hostage.63 Renamo AAs also "tended to be located in areas 
formerly under guerrilla control, often in very inaccessible locations,"64 close to mined 
areas, difficult to resupply except by air, which added to the cost, delays and discontent. 
Mutinies in both camps became commonplace, spilling over into the corridors.65 They 
showed "that the representatives of the Government and Renamo in the field, namely the 
Camp Commanders, [had] no control over their respective personnel."66 After reports of 
mass self-repatriation by refugees and displaced Mozambicans, soldiers became even more 
anxious to leave the camps "to get back to their home areas before all land and resources
62The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 63, S/1994/511, 
28 April 1994, p. 233.
63Alex Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? London: James 
Currey, 1996, p. 153.
64Joao Paulo Borges Coehlo and Alex Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re- 
Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique, Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 
Queen Elizabeth House, 1995, p. 17.
"Protests by soldiers included: (1) assault to food and clothing warehouses; (2) assault 
to arms deposits in the camps; (3) chain of command broken; (4) threats to the security of 
ONUMOZ team; (5) road-block; (6) uncontrolled acts outside the camps including assault 
on civilians, shops etc. Coehlo and Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilization, p. 18.
66ONUMOZ, Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission at the 33rd Plenary 
Session of the CSC, 18 July 1994.
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were allocated to civilian returnees."67
Discontent in the camps also resulted from decisions made by external third parties 
regarding the process of demobilisation. Ajello's priority of quick and timely 
demobilisation was undermined by projects established by UNOHAC whereby soldiers 
arriving at cantonment camps were responsible for building their own facilities. According 
to Ajello,
while this plan might have made sense according to development theory... 
it caused numerous and unnecessary problems. The soldiers who arrived at 
the assembly areas (some having walked considerable distances) were 
offended by being treated as peasants...The situation made them question 
the reliability of and effectiveness of the UN. Simply put, 'they did not 
appreciate the highly educational implication of this approach.' 68
Roger Carlson, director of US AID, echoed Ajello's criticisms. He said "devising ways to 
educate the soldiers in assembly areas is less important that figuring out ways to get them, 
into, through and processed out of the camps as quickly as possible."69 Although the idea 
of providing skills-training to soldiers made sense from a development perspective, the 
poor morale and resistance generated by this project made the soldiers more difficult to 
manage and more of a security threat. Insecurity was rampant in the camps and in the 
countryside, such that mutinies and social banditry were almost indistinguishable. 70
DEMOBILISATION: MARCH-SEPTEMBER 1994
As will be discussed in the next chapter, in February 1994, donors agreed to fund a 
reintegration support scheme for demobilised soldiers, adding 18 months pay to the 6 
months compensation provided by the government. With this financial incentive, most 
soldiers demanded immediate demobilisation. Demobilisation officially began on 10 March 
1994 involving President Chissano and 250 government soldiers. In a ceremony on 18
"Stephen, "Demobilisation in Mozambique," p. 59.
68Berman, Managing Arms, p. 64, fn 15.
69Roger Carlson cited in Clark, "The demobilization and reintegration of soldiers," p. 55.
70Coehlo and Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilization, p. 13.
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March 1994, Rename demobilised 101 soldiers, the first of which turned out to be a child 
soldier to Dhlakama's embarrassment. The International Office for Migration (IOM) 
transported soldiers home, relocating those who lived furthest away and those who had 
entered the assembly areas first as part of a phased demobilisation.
In April 1994, a major dispute arose when the government presented revised figures of 
49,630 troops to be demobilised, down from earlier figures of 61,838. The government 
claimed the miscalculation was based on the inclusion of the previously demobilised troops 
and on corrupt commanders who failed to declare dead soldiers in order to claim their pay. 
Rename claimed again that the government was transferring its army into the police but the 
mistake was eventually accepted after extensive deliberation by both the CCF and CSC. 
Due to the slow pace of Renamo's demobilisation, the government suspended its own 
demobilisation until 15 June but came under attack from the international members of the 
CSC. 71 New deadlines were eventually accepted by the Security Council for the completion 
of cantonment by 1 July and demobilisation by 15 August 1994. The Security Council also 
sent a mission to Mozambique to convey concerns over continuing delays in the process 
and to urge completion of the process. 72 The Security Council issued a series of impatient 
resolutions warning the parties of the approaching October 1994 deadline to complete the 
process. 73 In the end, demobilisation was completed one month before the elections, with 
the TU registering over 91,000 troops, (67,042 government, 24,649 Renamo), demobilising 
about 80,000, while 11,000 joined the new army.74
However, the shape of the demobilisation process was determined by the actions of the
71 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 10, July 1994.
12The UN and Mozambique, Note by the President of the Security Council, Document 
68, S/l 994/931, 4 August 1994, p. 251.
nThe UN and Mozambique, Security Council Resolution, Document 57, S/RES/898, 23 
February 1994, pp. 228-9; Security Council Resolution, Document 64, S/RES/916, 5 May 
1994, pp. 241-2; Statement by the President of the Security Council, Document 67, 
S/PRST/1994/35, 19 July 1994, p. 250.
™The UN and Mozambique, Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, 
Document 90, S/1994/1449, 23 December 1994, p. 296. There was also desertion, 90% of 
those registered at the AAs were demobilised or joined the FADM, while 10% disappeared.
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soldiers. Mutinies by both government and Rename soldiers in protest at the slow pace of 
demobilisation prevented both sides from holding troops back in the event of an 
unfavourable election. After demobilisation, there was still much discontent and fear 
amongst soldiers that they would be forgotten by their leaders. Demobilised troops from 
both sides threatened to disrupt the elections and joined the Association of Demobilised 
Soldiers (AMODEG) which became a platform to make demands. 75 The ex-combatants 
demonstrated a degree of power and political leverage in Mozambique's political space 
which had not existed before, but which was also shortlived.
Disarmament
In Protocol VI, the parties committed themselves to providing the UN with complete 
inventories of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives and to allow 
the UN to verify these aspects. Beyond this, the GPA did not contain a comprehensive 
system of disarmament, arms management or regional cooperation with respect to arms 
control. It also left open the arrangements for the collection, storage and destruction of 
weapons and ammunition. The mandate for ONUMOZ raised these issues but the 
implementation of the mandate did not subsequently deal with them. Disarmament was 
subsumed under the definition of demobilisation which restricted ONUMOZ from 
undertaking disarmament outside the assembly areas.76 Guidelines as to what constituted 
disarmament, which organisations would be involved and how to achieve it were absent, 
nor was there a systematic programme to remove weapons from the civilian population, 
although the Christian Council of Mozambique ran a weapons buy-back scheme with 
limited results. When ONUMOZ requested an additional $35 million to undertake more 
comprehensive disarmament, the request was turned down in New York. 77 In the end,
75Jose Luis Caba9o, "The long march to Mozambican democracy," in Brazao Mazula, 
(ed.) Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development, Maputo: Sponsored by the 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 93, fn 18.
76Christopher Smith, "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade," in Christopher 
Smith, Peter Batchelor, Jakkie Potgieter, Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in 
Southern Africa, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996, p. 33.
"Smith, "Light Weapons," p. 34, fn 83.
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elections took place without effective disarmament, largely because the UN exerted little 
pressure on the parties for disarmament. Ajello viewed disarmament from a political 
perspective by focussing on the political value of arms and ensuring there was no political 
recourse to use arms.
Neither the government nor Renamo fully cooperated in the disarmament process. They 
"provided incomplete lists of their troops and paramilitary forces... Information on their 
weapons and ammunition were not forthcoming (until June 1994)."78 Upon entering the 
AAs, soldiers were expected to hand in their weapons which would be stored by the TU 
until they were either destroyed or transferred to the FADM. As with the soldiers, the 
weapons handed in were of poor quality and there were concerns that both parties were 
hiding weapons caches. From earlier reports, it was assumed heavy weapons were limited.79 
Those in the government's arsenal were small in number and found to be in disrepair from 
lack of a supporting infrastructure and spare parts. Renamo's heavy weapons and vehicles 
were mainly captured from the government and also in poor condition. The main problem 
was the proliferation of small, light weapons. It was impossible to estimate the number of 
light weapons that were circulating in Mozambique but estimates suggested a figure of 6 
million AK-47s, including 1.5 million assault rifles distributed by the government to the 
civilian population for protection during the war. 80 Paramilitary forces such as the 
Naparama movement were also well armed. However, the precise number of guns was not 
as important as the proliferation of weapons through all segments of society and the 
insecurity this generated.
It was intended that weaponry collected at the AAs would be transferred regularly to 
regional arms depots, but both parties raised objections causing delays in the process. This 
led to excess and unsafe storage of arms in the assembly areas, "placing at risk not only 
government and RENAMO soldiers but also United Nations personnel."81 Many weapons
78Berman, Managing Arms, p. 2.
79Berman, Managing Arms, pp. 50-52.
80Berman, Managing Arms, p. 50-51.
81 77ze UN and Mozambique, Document 55, p. 217.
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stored in the AAs were stolen and sold to the civilian population. In other cases, 
"explosives and ammunitions which had been collected in the AAs were subsequently 
considered too dangerous for transport and handling. In such cases, the CCF decided to 
destroy the equipment in the AAs."82 It was also more difficult to transport weapons from 
Renamo areas which tended to be in remote areas. Most of the equipment stored in the AAs 
was eventually handed over to the FADM in November 1994. However in his final report, 
the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, felt that the quantity of arms and military 
materiel exceeded the requirements of the FADM which could contribute to internal and 
regional insecurity and recommended that surplus material be destroyed.83 After the 
conclusion of the peace process, his conclusions proved prescient since the new armed 
force was "unable to effectively monitor and control the weapons which had been 
transferred from the assembly areas. Theft of weapons from the FADM storage facilities 
was a common problem."84
Post-demobilisation verification of arms caches declared by the parties around the country 
began on 30 August 1994 by ONUMOZ teams with representatives from both parties. This 
was carried out in a limited amount of time since the elections were only two months away. 
The parties declared 722 military positions or depots (435 for Government, 287 for 
Renamo), in addition, the teams inspected 146 locations not declared by either party. The 
UN discovered a
substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, 
armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or stored 
throughout the country. A small number of previously unregistered 
personnel were also identified at some Government and RENAMO bases. 85
Verification was incomplete before the expiry of ONUMOZ and was left to the newly 
elected government to continue. The incomplete process of disarmament and the
82ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, Maputo, 
December 1994, p. 11.
83ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, p. 16.
84Peter Batchelor, "Disarmament, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of 
Southern Africa," in Smith, Small Arms Management, p. 73.
KThe UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 43.
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availability of light weapons contributed to increased crime and banditry, undermined the 
security situation and led to an illegal cross-border trade in weapons with a significant 
number of weapons surfacing in South Africa. ONUMOZ failed to meet the objectives of 
the disarmament process which was one of its key responsibilities.
Reforming state security institutions: the army, police and security services 
FORMING THE MOZAMBICAN DEFENCE FORCE (FADM)
In Protocol IV of the GPA, the two parties agreed to form a national, non-partisan, 
professional armed force under the control of the civilian authority. Totalling 30,000 troops, 
drawn equally from the Government and Renamo, the FADM would comprise three 
services: a 24,000 army, a 4,000 air force and a 2,000 navy. The FADM was intended to 
operate before the withdrawal of ONUMOZ to provide security in the country during the 
elections. In addition, the GPA outlined three purposes for the new armed forces: defending 
the integrity and sovereignty of the state, to protect civilians against crime and violence in 
cooperation with the national police, and assisting in emergency and disaster situations. As 
part of the process of democratisation, this professional force was intended to serve society 
as a competent state institution. The new force was also one of the instruments designed to 
facilitate reconciliation between the government and Renamo through the integration of 
their personnel into one national command.
The process of forming the FADM was scheduled to begin with the cease-fire, conducted 
simultaneously with the concentration and demobilisation of personnel, and completed 
before the start of the electoral campaign. The GPA established a Joint Commission, 
CCFADM, to oversee the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force with military 
representatives from the government and Renamo and other countries selected by the 
parties, under the authority of the CSC. Specifically, the CCFADM had the authority to 
draw up the rules governing the FADM, control the budget, and decide the criteria for the 
selection of personnel. 86 The FADM High Command was subordinate to its authority and
86GPA, Protocol IV, Item I. ii. 2 d.
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although the High Command was to be involved on the commission, it was not until July 
1994 that Lt. General Lidimo from the Government and Lt. General Ngonham from 
Rename began participating on the commission. 87
In June 1993, after persistent pressure from Renamo, the parties requested the United 
Nations to chair the CCFADM which finally met on 22 July 1993. The parties had invited 
the UK, Portugal and France to participate on the commission, who met in Lisbon to define 
and coordinate their contributions, formalised in the Lisbon Accord of February 1993. 
According to the Guebuza, the government was compelled to accept foreign participation 
not only to encourage Renamo soldiers to join the new army but to convince the 
international community that the army would be under new control.88 The UK was invited 
to train 540 Mozambican officers as military instructors, 270 from each party, at Nyanga 
camp in Zimbabwe. These instructors would then train 15 Infantry Battalions in 
Mozambique at 3 training centres, Boane, Manica and Dondo, monitored and advised by 
British personnel. The French would train one company of deminers and trained the first 
company of 100 personnel on a four month course completed in July 1994. The Portuguese 
would assist the formation of three battalions of Special Forces, one company of marines, 
officer training in administration and logistics and leadership training for generals and high- 
ranking officers.
Both parties were extremely slow in providing lists of personnel because of the lack of 
volunteers willing to forego demobilisation to join the FADM. The TU found that less than 
10% of registered combatants wanted to join the new army, approximately 10% Renamo 
and less than 5-6% of government soldiers. 89 Few soldiers had confidence in the conditions 
and pay of the new force and there was evidence of involuntary recruitment.90 Thus
87ONUMOZ, Report of the Chairman of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the 
Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM) to the Supervision and Monitoring Commission 
(CSC), Maputo, July 1994.
88Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997. 
89Berman, Managing Arms, p. 69.
90When ONUMOZ attempted to transport troops for the new army, two thirds refused 
to go. Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 11, August 1994.
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although the UK training at Nyanja was originally planned to start in March 1993, it 
eventually ran from 4 October to 12 December 1993, reducing the 16 week course to 10 
weeks.91 The 540 instructors were then transported from the training camp to Mozambique 
in April 1994 by ONUMOZ where 5 of the intended 15 battalions, 900 officers and SNCOs 
were trained on 6 week courses.92 According to the British military attache in Maputo, "this 
phase of the training was entirely successful. It proved that integration of the two sides was 
possible, built confidence in the process and between the two sides and showed that the 
FADM had the quality of soldier and potential to produce good instructors."93 Yet, in an 
interview with Dhlakama two years after the process, he complained that Renamo recruits 
were subjected to abuse and were not accepted as equal members of the armed forces.94 
Although many of the immediate objectives were met, time was limited in which to 
inculcate professionalism, competency, integration and discipline.
While infantry level training was undertaken by the British, the Portuguese military trained 
and structured command level officers, military police, logistics personnel and 
administrators. The Portuguese technical team provided "conceptual, legal and 
organizational advice, specifically in the elaboration or rules/regulations for the FADM."95 
Although seeming an infringement of national sovereignty, the Portuguese drafted
the directives indispensable to the training and regular functioning of the 
new Armed Forces... (Rules of Military Discipline, Rules of Command, 
Separate Rules on Uniforms, etc.)... Even rules aimed at making training 
programs workable and operational were drafted.96
They also organised the structures of the offices of the High Command and sent medical 
teams to assess the conditions of selected personnel before each training operation. These
91Lt. Col. J. Wyatt, Defence Attache, British Embassy, Report on United Kingdom 
Assistance to Formation of FADM, Maputo, 31 October 1994, p. 2.
92ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the 
Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), Maputo, December 1994, p. 2.
93Wyatt, Report on United Kingdom Assistance, p. 2. 
^Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.
95Portuguese Delegation, Summary Report on the Portuguese Participation in the 
Formation of the FADM within the Framework of the GPA, Maputo, October 1994, p. 1.
96Portuguese Delegation, Summary Report, p. 3.
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expenses were covered by Portugal, as well as costs for rehabilitation assistance, billeting, 
administration, offices, training and uniforms.97
International material, financial and technical assistance were critical in forming the FADM 
and sustaining its limited logistical capacity. In Zimbabwe, all logistical support, the cost 
of retaining the border camp and providing for the teams was met by the British 
government.98 Transportation from the AAs to the training centres, for the medical teams, 
and the transfer of equipment was provided by ONUMOZ and IOM." Inspection of the 
seven selected FADM training centres in Mozambique revealed that they were in extremely 
poor condition and needed extensive rehabilitation of the water supply, sanitation, 
electricity, and accommodation. 100 In December 1993, the Italian government established 
a trust fund of US$500,000, which was needed
to purchase fuel, uniforms, mosquito nets, contracting services, ground 
leveling and other logistical and infrastructure requirements. In addition to 
the use of the trust fund in making the training centers operational, 
ONUMOZ loaned equipment to assist in their rehabilitation. This combined 
assistance was also eventually used in preparations of the bases for the 
newly trained Infantry and Special Forces... 101
Although the government contributed towards rehabilitation costs, most costs were covered 
by the international community to keep to the timetable.
In addition to training and logistical assistance, external third parties played an important 
decision-making role through the CCFADM and the CSC, both chaired by the UN. The
CSC
approved a total of 19 documents relating to the organization, operating 
procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified armed 
forces and other matter. These documents had been elaborated by the 
Government and RENAMO with substantive assistance provided by
"Portuguese Delegation, Summary Report, p. 2. 
98Wyatt, Report on United Kingdom Assistance, p. 2. 
"ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission, p. 4.
100ONUMOZ, Rehabilitation Needs of Training Centres for the New Mozambican 
Defence Force (FADM), Maputo, 16 November 1993.
""ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission, p. 3.
199
Portugal. 102
Although there was coordination with the Ministry of Defence on the formation of what 
was a state institution, approval of the FADM salary scale and budget103 rested with the 
commissions, considered and adopted by the CCFADM before being sent to the CSC for 
approval. Similarly, "[mjanagement of the trust fund was the responsibility of ONUMOZ. 
Disbursements were made upon requests from the Government Delegation to the 
CCFADM." 104 Formal requests had to be submitted by the government to the CCFADM 
for the authorisation of the transfer of weapons and ammunition and the transfer of 
specialised units from the FAM to the FADM105 The CCFADM also decided "that the 
formation of an armed force of 30,000 personnel would not be a necessary precondition to 
holding elections in Mozambique." 106 This followed debates which focussed on training 
15,000 personnel before the elections and keeping another 15,000 in transit camps for 
training afterwards. Even this proved to be overly optimistic. By July 1994, only 4,500 
soldiers had been recruited. 107
By the elections, the armed forces consisted of 11,000 troops, (approximately 8000 
government, 3000 Rename) 108 not nearly the strength needed to perform the functions 
expected of it. But a number of other serious problems remained. The Portuguese pointed 
out a series of major weaknesses in its final report which concluded that
the FADM has serious shortcomings in various sub-systems (Command and 
Control, Logistics, Personnel, etc.), its infrastructures are rapidly
w2The UN and Mozambique, Document 55, p. 220.
103A dispute over the FADM budget arose after it was approved by the Mozambican 
Council of Ministers, then revised by the CSC to include investment in equipment or 
infrastructure which had been excluded because of cost. The original budget was later 
approved. ONUMOZ, Report of the Chairman of the CCFADM to the Forty-Third Plenary 
Session of the CSC, 3 October 1994. Statement on the Budget of the FADM.
104ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission, p. 3. 
I05ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission, pp. 3-4. 
I06ONUMOZ, Final Report of the Joint Commission, p. 2.
107ONUMOZ, Report of the Chairman of the CCFADM to the CSC, Maputo, July 1994, 
p. 1.
108'Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 12, September 1994.
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deteriorating, essential equipment is lacking (vehicles and communications) 
and there are many gaps in the areas of standards, doctrines and 
regulations. 109
The British as well were cautious about the limitations of the forces, and made clear that 
the battalions could carry out basic duties but were "NOT trained to deal with civil unrest 
situations involving crowd control."" 0 After ONUMOZ withdrew, the FADM remained a 
weak and incompletely formed institution with many unresolved questions over its 
management, functions and capacity. Although the national army existed as an institution, 
it was formed by the peace process industry using quick-fix solutions rather than 
sustainable long-term institution-building.
SECURITY FORCES AND THE POLICE SERVICE
Reform of the security and police institutions was even less successful. In Protocol V, the 
GPA left the responsibility of their transformation firmly in the hands of the government. 
According to the GPA, the State Information and Security Service (SISE) would continue 
to function throughout the transition phase in accordance with the spirit of the agreement. 
It was to be monitored by a National Information Commission (COMINFO) to verify that 
it did not violate the legal order or result in violations of the political rights of citizens. 
COMINFO, which excluded international participation, only received funds from the state 
in June 1994, and received little cooperation from regional government administrators, who 
gave limited access to prisons, or from SISE personnel who threatened the security of the 
commission's staff. 1 " Dhlakama protested to the international community on numerous 
occasions that the government was transferring its troops into the security and police 
services. Dhlakama contended that "FRELIMO is violating the conditions established in 
the Peace Accord by demobilizing 15,000 troops and a further 3,000 SNASP members to
' 09Portuguese Delegation, Summary Report, p. II.
110Wyatt, Report on United Kingdom Assistance, p. 6. Bold in original.
'"CSC Meeting Minutes 042, 12 September 1994, comments by the Chairman of 
COMINFO.
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reinforce the police force." 112 Renamo also complained about the heavy-handedness of the 
Rapid Intervention Police (RIP). This was corroborated during a visit by the mission from 
the UN Security Council in August 1994, who discovered a police training camp where 
there were heavy weapons and recruits were effectively receiving military training. 113
When the mandate for the ONUMOZ operation was drafted, the UN Secretary-General 
proposed a civilian police component to work in conjunction with the National Police 
Affairs Commission (COMPOL). 114 This was initially rejected by the government on the 
grounds that it was not part of the peace agreement signed by the parties and it challenged 
Mozambique's sovereignty. The government eventually relented to Renamo pressure for 
UN participation and requested the UN to monitor all police activities in the country, public 
and private, to monitor the respect for the rights and freedoms of Mozambican citizens and 
to provide technical support to the National Police Affairs Commission." 5 The UN 
deployed 1144 police observers, CIVPOL, while the number of military troops were scaled 
down. The main function of CIVPOL was to help the national police deploy in Renamo 
areas, to reassure Renamo that the government was not transferring its army into the police 
and security service, and to fill gaps where there were disagreements between Renamo and 
government. CIVPOL gave "ONUMOZ a visible presence in the remotest and the most 
inaccessible districts in the country throughout the final months of the process..."" 6 The 
government criticised CIVPOL's interference after there was a shift in focus from 
verification of police activities to more a more advisory role, given that CIVPOL had "only 
a 5-day course in human rights prior to taking up their assignment."117 Moreover, CIVPOL
mThe UN and Mozambique, Letter from Dhlakama, Document 29, 7 January 1993, p. 
170.
113'Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 12, September 1994.
" 477ze UN and Mozambique, Document 26, p. 153 and Document 55, p. 222.
]>5 The UN and Mozambique, Letter from Mozambique, Document 41, S/26432 Annex, 
13 September 1993, p. 197.
" 6Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 120.
" 7Alistair Hallam et al., Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation 
and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1997, p. 116.
202
represented 29 different countries and policing traditions, and even Ajello criticised the 
"differing human rights standards of the various national units, and noted that there had 
been an uneven level of training, an insufficient knowledge of working languages and 'very 
limited driving skills'." 118 The contribution of CIVPOL to the peace process was 
unimpressive.
Conclusion
In the military component of the process, political space in Mozambique was occupied,by 
the government, Rename, the peace process industry, the various commissions established 
by the GPA, but also the soldiers whose independent actions and protests took on political 
meaning. The mutinies and protests by soldiers from both sides put pressure on their 
commanders, leaders and the international community to hasten the process of 
demobilisation, while their reluctance to join the new army dictated the shape of the 
FADM. Local cease-fires, war-weariness and the threat they posed to security, signified that 
the soldiers strongly influenced the dynamics of the process and compelled both parties and 
the international community to give priority to their demands. Given that their political 
significance was unforeseen, no mechanisms for the peaceful expression of their discontent 
which might have contributed to the development of political space in Mozambique were 
created. Yet, their political significance circumscribed the actions and flexibility of the 
parties and the peace process industry in defining political space on other terms. During the 
peace process, the soldiers challenged the authority, the power and the rules comprising 
political space in Mozambique, undermined the formation of the new national army, and 
by forming their own association, AMODEG, created a future role in Mozambican politics 
and civil society.
Given the soldiers desire for peace, conditions for a cease-fire and demobilisation were 
propitious, yet this did not induce the parties to meet their obligations under the peace 
agreement. Rename was not ready for the process politically. In addition to delaying the 
overall process, they translated their political disadvantages into obstructing the process and
' ' 8Comments by Aldo Ajello in Kuhne, International Workshop, p. 14.
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not complying with their obligations in the military component. The opposite was true for 
the government. The government was in many ways unprepared for the military component, 
lacking accurate knowledge of its own forces, soldiers' morale, and had little command 
over their troops. Their military disadvantages were obscured through posturing in the 
political arena. Neither side worked towards building confidence in the political arena 
through the military provisions. On the contrary, both sides used the presence of external 
third parties to negotiate with the other. Renamo relied on the UN and the international 
community to pressure the government, while the government often appealed to the UN 
Security Council in New York, excluding Renamo from the political process <in 
Mozambique, but also circumventing Aldo Ajello. Thus, in their relations with external 
third parties, both parties continued to reject the other party and depended on the UN to 
mediate their relations. Although the commissions might have been able to resolve these 
disagreements, they failed to facilitate constructive political engagement by the parties and 
served more as an instrument for interference by the international community.
ONUMOZ and the international community were essential to fulfilling the military 
provisions in the agreement. They were necessary to verify the parties compliance o the 
agreement and also frequently and effectively applied pressure on the parties. However, the 
residual impact of their actions was at times counter-productive because they increased the 
distrust between the parties. ONUMOZ was a powerful third party actor which altered the 
power relations between the parties. It was not neutral and maintained a false equality 
between the two sides by accommodating Renamo, particularly by setting up a special trust 
fund to facilitate its transformation into a political party. ONUMOZ also responded more 
critically towards the government than Renamo, perhaps because it had the resources to do 
so in the second year of the process when the government was more to blame. Delays in 
setting up the UN operation also set the tone for and undermined the peace process. As in 
any peacekeeping operation, problems of coordination, procurement and operational 
effectiveness convey a political message to the parties. Conflicts within the UN operation 
and within the peace process industry did not inspire trust or respect for the international 
community or the process which were manipulated by the parties. The lack of a coherent 
plan of action linking the assembly of soldiers with their actual demobilisation, and
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conflicts between peacekeeping and development in the peace process industry also 
complicated the process.
The peace process industry was more concerned about a successful peace process that 
prevented another Angola, than taking into account the specificities of Mozambique. Even 
though it was unprepared and bruised by the experience in Angola, the UN involved itself 
in the Mozambican process on a grand scale without questioning its capacity to do so. 
Notwithstanding the effort and work by the Technical Unit for demobilisation, ONUMOZ 
was particularly ineffective in guaranteeing security and in securing disarmament which 
never received sufficient priority. Despite being the most expensive component, 
ONUMOZ's military presence was less effective, and more a symbolic reminder of the 
weakness of the government in the face of the heavy international presence. The 
government complained that "ONUMOZ is acting as if its mission was to control and 
demand everything from the Government, and not to monitor the implementation of the 
General Peace Agreement by the parties."119
Although sometimes necessary in an uncertain security environment, quick fix solutions 
by the peace process industry in providing logistics, facilities and services did not help to 
integrate the military, state and civilian components. Throughout the process, the peace 
process industry set up their own administrations, managed fundamental aspects of the 
process, established and interpreted their own guidelines, and provided many essential 
services. The power they wielded and the political practices they helped to reproduce 
through technical assistance had an impact on the political space of Mozambique by 
overriding national institutions and introducing a wide array of new values, structures and 
procedures.
U9The UN and Mozambique, Document 66, p. 249.
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CHAPTER SIX
Relief and reconstruction: humanitarian and rehabilitation 
assistance by the peace process industry
The preceding chapter explained that delays in establishing the UN operation undermined 
the security situation in Mozambique's countryside. Rural insecurity was closely entwined 
with the humanitarian crisis as the precarious security situation continued to endanger both 
the people trying to reach relief agencies and the agencies trying to provide them with 
assistance. Given the level of destruction in Mozambique after 16 years of war and severe 
drought, the country was in a chronic state of emergency. However, over the two years of 
the peace process the emergency dissipated, and Mozambique passed from a humanitarian 
crisis to a situation of rebuilding and reconstructing society while trying to create and 
sustain peace. The changing social situation influenced other aspects of the process and the 
capacity of both parties to comply with the agreement, thus complicating the conception 
and delivery of international assistance.
Humanitarian and rehabilitation activities were pertinent to the configuration of political 
space in Mozambique because of how these activities linked the state to society. Decisions 
and practices in these social activities redefined political norms, institutions and procedures 
because they were fundamentally concerned with the authority and capacity of the state and 
its relation to society. The need for such activities demonstrated the state's failings to 
guarantee the survival and welfare of society. Humanitarian activities implied the state 
could not guarantee the survival of its population, while rehabilitation activities implied the 
state was incapable of providing basic services for society's welfare. The institutions 
through which such humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes were implemented were 
also connected to political space. The personnel involved in the delivery of services and the 
execution of programmes provided the contact between the state (or other agency) and the 
beneficiaries in society. They were the focus for accountability and responsibility of the 
state or agency; and hence conferred authority to the state or away from the state. The 
delivery of services and food by the government, Renamo or international agencies could 
also be translated into political power through votes in the upcoming election. Programme
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design, programme objectives and the sustainability of humanitarian and rehabilitation 
activities were premised on political conceptions about the development needs and 
priorities of the country. Thus the actors providing humanitarian and rehabilitation 
assistance were political actors, while their decisions and procedures conveyed assumptions 
about politics.
The sphere of humanitarian and rehabilitation activities included not just Mozambican 
participants but also a host of international agencies operating in Mozambique. Prior to the 
peace process, there was an already well-established international presence of relief and 
development agencies. The peace process brought many new actors to Mozambique, not 
least ONUMOZ. Thus during the process, the full contingent of actors in the peace process 
industry operated in the political space of Mozambique, generating an even greater level 
of international activity. The concentration of actors, the intensity and confusion of 
activities and the relationships amongst international agencies and between these agencies 
and the Mozambican state and society, had an aggregate impact on Mozambique's political 
space. This impact involved the weakening of the state and its authority, the fragmentation 
of institutional structures serving society and the obstruction rather than the enhancement 
of state-society relations.
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the humanitarian crisis in 
Mozambique and the expansion of international actors into Mozambique's political space 
through the openings created by the emergency. In the second section, I consider the 
provisions for humanitarian assistance under the General Peace Agreement followed by the 
humanitarian mandate for the UN operation in Mozambique. I also explain the 
consolidation of the peace process industry in Mozambique through these activities. In the 
last and largest section, I consider the five main activities undertaken by the peace process 
industry as they related to political space: emergency food relief, the repatriation of 
refugees and displaced people, the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, the rehabilitation 
of basic services and mine clearance.
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The emergency and expansion of international actors into Mozambique's political space
Over 16 years of war, economic collapse, and recurring natural disasters, perpetuated a 
humanitarian crisis in Mozambique. Of an estimated population of 15 million people, at 
least 4.6 million Mozambicans were displaced, with an additional million having fled to 
neighbouring countries. 1 The movement of people away from the land severely reduced 
food production, which contributed to widespread malnutrition, famine and death. In 1992 
the government estimated over 3 million people were at risk of starvation, 1.3 million from 
the drought. 2 Attacks along the transport corridors and scattered land mines made the 
delivery of emergency relief supplies dangerous and impeded efforts to counter the effects 
of war. Rename also specifically destroyed state structures such as health clinics, removing 
the state from many rural areas and the state's capacity to deal with the crisis. However, the 
situation was more acute in Rename areas, where there was almost no contact with the 
government, international relief agencies or NGOs, no commercial activity, and only 
rudimentary services provided by poorly qualified staff.
The core structures created by the government in response to the emergency included: the 
Coordinating Council for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters (CCPCCN) for 
policy decisions; its implementing department (DPCCN); and the National Executive 
Commission for the Emergency (CENE) to supervise and coordinate operations and liaise 
with donors and other agencies. In 1987, the Mozambican government launched its first 
international emergency appeal with the UN, estimating 3.5 million people in need of food 
aid, seeds and tools, as well as vehicles and other logistics.3 Subsequent appeals linked the 
emergency to reconstruction, stating that "the immediate priority [was] to transform the 
Emergency Programme into the first phase of a reconstruction process in which inputs
] The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York, NY: United Nations 
Department of Public Information, Introduction, p. 12.
2Government of Mozambique, Mozambique: Emergency Drought Appeal, 1992- 
1993. Prepared in collaboration with the United Nations, May 1992, p. 2.
3This figure was revised upwards through 1992, Mozambique: Emergency Drought 
Appeal, 1992-1993.
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provide the necessary relief while at the same time enhancing rural rehabilitation."4 The 
government also stressed the importance of maintaining the DPCCN's central role in 
managing, coordinating and distributing relief assistance.
As mentioned in chapter three, the 1987 appeal coincided with the government's decision 
to accept a structural adjustment programme with the IMF and World Bank. Although GDP 
improved in the first three years, the assumption that structural adjustment measures would 
increase agricultural production was irrelevant due to the war. The results of structural 
adjustment brought the poverty of the countryside to the cities with rises in basic food 
prices, declining standards of living, a devalued currency, greater inequalities, corruption, 
crime and social unrest. In 1990, a wave of strikes took place across the country. In addition 
to these pressures, by the 1990s, Mozambique was the poorest country in the world with 
per capita GNP $80,5 the most aid dependent country in the world, with foreign debt 
exceeding $4 billion,6 and was cynically referred to as the Donor's Republic of 
Mozambique.
The launch of the emergency appeal and the adoption of structural adjustment opened the 
door for international and non-governmental agencies to operate in Mozambique and for 
donors to become more actively involved in Mozambique's political space. In 1987, the 
UNDP resident representative was appointed UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief 
Operations (UNSCERO)7 to coordinate relief activities with the government. The number 
of international NGOs operating in Mozambique increased dramatically from 7 in 19808,
4Government of Mozambique, Mozambique: Emergency Programme Towards 
Reconstruction, 1993-1994, Prepared in collaboration with the United Nations, 
December 1992, p. 1.
5 World Bank, World Development Report 1992, New York: Oxford University Press.
6World Bank, World Development Report 1992.
7This was modelled on relief operations in Ethiopia in 1984-86.
8Joao Cravinho, Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State, 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1995, p. 226.
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to over 100 from 1987 to 1990.9 According to the UN, "[b]y 1990, virtually all major 
United Nations agencies were active in Mozambique, in addition to other multilateral 
agencies, bilateral donors and official agencies from 35 countries and numerous external 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from 23 countries."10 Foreign technical experts 
also provided assistance to government departments and collaborated in the preparation of 
emergency appeals. DPCCN received support from CARE, UNICEF, and USAID while 
"[b]oth the IMF and the World Bank placed advisors in the central bank, the Bank of 
Mozambique. The Bank also placed staff in the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Service of Statistics."" An influx of foreign experts was occurring across Africa through 
the 1980s, although Mozambique represented an extreme case.
The sheer volume of international agencies operating in Mozambique's political space 
created alternative and competing centres of authority and power both outside and inside 
Mozambique. As a result, the government's authority was eroding, its decision-making 
powers transferring to donor countries, NGO headquarters and multilateral settings, and its 
institutional capacity weakening. As highlighted in chapter three, this occurred through the 
less formal and visible decisions taken by international agencies in setting their own 
agendas, planning relief and development projects, and allocating money. It also occurred 
through more explicit control over policy by donors with the availability of assistance 
conditioned on Mozambique's adoption of certain economic and political policies relating 
to economic liberalisation and good governance. The shift of decision-making power to 
donors and IFIs demanded the creation of a particular kind of state that was minimal and 
technocratic.
Through 'capacity-building' and the encouragement of decentralisation and 
privatisation, the World Bank and other agencies seek to reduce the size and 
ambition of the public sector, and to shift its orientation from political 
survival to economic rationality. At the heart of this strategy is the creation
9Jon Bennett, "Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction and the LINK NGO Forum, 
1987-1994," in Jon Bennett, (ed.) Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice, 
London: Earthscan, 1995, p. 70.
wThe UN and Mozambique, Introduction, pp. 12-13.
' 'Judith Marshall, War, debt and structural adjustment in Mozambique: The social 
impact, Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1992, p. 10.
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of interlocutors for the aid agencies themselves. 12
The government met bilateral and multilateral donors annually at the World Bank 
Consultative Group meetings in Paris to discuss structural adjustment and development 
issues. Prior to these meetings, the government submitted documents on economic and 
social strategy to be debated by its creditors. Mozambican politics was and still is 
accountable to external agencies. One Mozambican Member of Parliament has been quoted 
as saying, "unlike other countries and parliaments, we accept that our budget is really set 
by donors at the annual Paris conference. We accept that our priority is to develop a donor 
acceptable budget."'" As will be discussed in the conclusion, this balance of power remains 
in the hands of donors and international agencies.
Within Mozambique, external agencies assumed responsibilities normally reserved for the 
state. These international actors challenged the government's relations with society by 
interposing between them and creating additional exit options for rural peasants to 
disengage from the state. With each donor, multilateral agency and NGO, came more 
offices, foreign staff, and bureaucratic procedures; each group establishing a relationship 
with sections of Mozambican society and working through independent channels with the 
government.
While UNDP, as well as most bilateral donors, dealt mainly with the 
Ministry of Cooperation and with the Comissao Executiv a Nacional de 
Emergen9ia (CENE), the World Bank's key contacts were in the Ministry 
of Finance, while WFP supported the Ministry of Commerce. UNICEF, 
meanwhile, worked mainly through the Department for the Prevention and 
Combat of Natural Disasters (DPCCN). 14
This had a paradoxical effect in that although these programmes went through the state, 
they "also contributed to their further disintegration. Individual agencies, multilateral and
l2David N. Plank, "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its 
Donors," Journal of Modern African Studies, 31(3), 1993, p. 425.
l3Cited in John Saul, "Twenty Years After," p. 15.
14Aldo Romano Ajello. "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in 
Mozambique in the Context of ONUMOZ," in Jim Whitman and David Pocock, (eds.) 
After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 196.
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non-governmental, often forged privileged links with specific government departments at 
the expense of overall coherence and capacity development." 15 Duplications, resource 
wastage and delays were inevitable because of difficulties in coordinating and integrating 
multi-donor funded programmes.
The government's ability to plan nation-wide or province-wide was impeded by the 
fragmented nature of assistance amongst numerous actors across different sectoral 
activities. Donors tended to strategically target certain provinces, districts and sectors 
without taking into account the overall effect. For example, to generate a maximum impact 
to privatise agricultural production, USAID concentrated on Zambezia and Nampula 
provinces because they were the most agriculturally productive provinces with the highest 
population density. 16 The British similarly focussed on Zambezia province and protected 
the Limpopo corridor. 17 The result of this fragmentation was an uneven engagement across 
the country which weakened the possibility of 'national' development. Districts were 
offered the choice of clinic or no clinic, regardless of their sustainability, even though 
recurring costs like salaries, maintaining buildings, and providing materials were covered 
by the government. It was also difficult for the government to make long term plans when 
assistance was short term, inconsistent or unreliable.
The authority of the state was further weakened when it was bypassed altogether. Although 
most donors operated through the government, few agencies favour a strong state and many 
encouraged the reduction of the state through economic liberalisation. The state was also 
displaced by the
strategy among donor organizations during the Emergency period... to 
sponsor the formation of national NGOs as "partners" or intermediaries 
between themselves and the communities they wished to serve... to bypass 
the political and bureaucratic obstacles of government by opening-up direct
15Bennet, "Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction,'^. 69.
^Interview with USAID officials, Sidney Bliss and Julie Born, Maputo, May 1997.
I7lnterview with Margaret Hall, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Research and 
Analysis Department, London, April 1997.
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channels for the delivery of goods and services to recipient communities. 18
Forging closer links between the EU and NGOs resulted in the role of ACP countries under 
the Lome Convention becoming more of "a consultative one, rather than as co-decision 
maker." 19 NGOs were more conspicuous in avoiding the state, with "many NGOs 
bypass [ing] existing central Government coordination mechanisms altogether, and 
work[ing] directly with local authorities or with local NGOs."20 Some NGOs operated as 
an alternative state apparatus to a perceived corrupt and inefficient Frelimo government by 
setting up parallel administrative and logistics structures. With their large budgets, Land 
Rovers and levels of assistance, donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs demoralised an 
already understaffed, underfunded and overworked civil service. The state was further 
weakened when its few qualified personnel opted to work for higher paying foreign 
agencies leaving the state with a shortage of skilled labour.
During the emergency, there was a multitude of non-Mozambican actors operating in the 
political space of Mozambique. By virtue of their resources, their financing, and breadth 
of activities, these actors had a significant amount of political influence. Collectively they 
had influence over the setting of policy, decision-making and institutional capacity which 
displaced national institutions and personnel. With the launch of the peace process, most 
of these organisations reoriented themselves to meeting the objectives of the process. They, 
along with the rush of organisations which arrived in Mozambique after the agreement, 
evolved into the peace process industry, which reinforced the relationships established in 
the emergency. The basis and framework for their operations and their impact on political 
space is explained in the next section.
l8Alexander Costy, "Donor Dollars and Mozambique's NGOs,"Southern Africa 
Report July 1995, p. 15.
I9COWI Consulting Engineers and Planners AS, Evaluation of EC Actions Financed 
by Article 255 of the Lome Convention "Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and 
Displaced Persons" under the 7"' European Development Fund, Synthesis Report, 
Brussels, July 1997, p. 13.
20Ajello, "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance," p. 196.
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Humanitarian assistance in the context of the General Peace Agreement and the UN 
mandate
There was very little official discussion of humanitarian activities at the Rome talks, with 
neither party pressuring for improvements in the situation. The government was convinced 
ending the emergency required a cease-fire, after which they would resume responsibility 
for humanitarian programmes. Renamo's interest in the humanitarian crisis was limited to 
the effect of the drought on its soldiers. The two parties disagreed over the nature and 
means of access to distressed populations, cross-border activities which threatened the 
government's sovereignty and could be used to transport arms to Renamo, institutional 
mechanisms for the delivery of relief and whether these would be run by the government 
or have an international component. Behind the scenes, the issue of access to distressed 
populations was raised by humanitarian actors.21 Donors and NGOs in Mozambique who 
were not involved in the Rome talks complained that the humanitarian crisis was ignored 
by the parties and worsened by the slow process of discussion.
As discussed in chapter four, the Rome mediators invited the UNHCR, WFP, ICRC and 
NGOs to participate in discussions on the humanitarian crisis. The result of these 
discussions was the Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance, 
signed by the government and Renamo in July 1992. The declaration concentrated on the 
free movement of people and their access to humanitarian assistance by every means, 
particularly by opening up the roads. Both parties also agreed to set up a UN chaired 
committee to supervise and coordinate all humanitarian assistance operations in 
Mozambique. However, detailed objectives and priorities for humanitarian operations were 
not included in the declaration, while the language of access and free movement seemed 
to be a reflection of the priorities and focus of international agencies. Instead, both parties 
agreed "to participate and cooperate with the international community in Mozambique in
2 'For an account of humanitarian discussions and the role of humanitarian agencies 
in the negotiations, see Sam Barnes, "Humanitarian assistance as a factor in the 
Mozambican negotiations: 1990-2," in Stephen Chan and Moises Venancio with Chris 
Alden and Sam Barnes, War and Peace in Mozambique, London: Macmillan Press, 
1998.
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formulating action plans. "22 Effectively this formalised a relationship where external third 
party actors were placed in the centre of humanitarian activities with the two Mozambican 
parties brought in to discuss internationally devised priorities. The declaration also 
"reflected a growing concern on the part of UN agencies to establish precedents for agreed 
rules and procedures for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations."23 The only other 
protocol of the agreement dealing with humanitarian issues, apart from the reintegration of 
soldiers, was Protocol VII which called on the Italian government to convene a donors' 
conference in Rome to deal with questions of financing the entire peace process from the 
emergency programmes to the elections.
Like the military component, the objectives and framework for humanitarian action was not 
decided by Mozambicans but outlined by external third parties in New York at the UN, in 
Rome at the Donors' Conference, but also in Mozambique by international agencies on the 
ground. In preparation for the UN operation, the Secretary General sent a mission to 
Mozambique to assess existing UN operations and to devise a more effective and 
coordinated UN response to the anticipated expansion of humanitarian activities.24 On the 
basis of this mission, the Secretary-General prepared a report for the General Assembly on 
the implementation of emergency and rehabilitation programmes.25 This report detailed the 
role of the UN in support of Mozambique emergency programmes, the requirements of the 
emergency, and the scope of international support, development assistance and assistance 
from UN agencies and member states. Although it stressed the importance of close 
collaboration with the government and the integration of rehabilitation and reconstruction 
assistance with emergency assistance, the details, framework, and scope of humanitarian 
activities in the report demonstrated how comprehensively and extensively international 
agencies were already involved in Mozambique.
-Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance, Item 6, italics 
added.
23Barnes, "Humanitarian assistance,"p. 135.
24The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 18, 
A/47/539, 22 October 1992, p. 132.
25 The UN and Mozambique, Document 18, pp. 131-141.
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On the basis of this report, and in contrast to the agreement signed by the parties, the 
mandate for the UN operation closely integrated humanitarian activities into the operation 
as one of its four main components. The function of the humanitarian component was
to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in 
particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, 
demobilized military personnel and the affected local population, and, in 
this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assistance Committee.26
It was the first UN peacekeeping operation to include a humanitarian component in order 
to provide the recently created Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) an opportunity 
to undertake a major coordinating role. The committee created in the GPA became the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC). UNOHAC was under 
the direct authority of the special representative, but also reported to the director of DHA.
At the donors' conference convened in Rome in December 1992, donors had a further 
opportunity to interpret the GPA. Although the government and Renamo were required to 
provide a plan of assistance to refugees and displaced persons to the conference,27 in the 
conference recommendations, the donors sought to "[fit] in the general framework of 
current efforts by the international community."28 These recommendations included the 
creation of a UN trust fund for donor contributions above bilateral assistance and the 
expansion of the scope of the Reintegration Commission (CORE) to include, in addition 
to demobilised soldiers, displaced persons and returnees.29 What was clearly evident in both 
the UN report and the donors' conference summary was the extensive involvement of 
international actors in Mozambique and the potential for overlapping objectives and unclear 
lines of responsibility. This confusion became apparent on the ground where most of the 
decisions on humanitarian assistance were taken. This was particularly true in the transition 
from relief to rehabilitation activities as the emergency faded.
26The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 26, S/24892, 
3 December 1992, p. 152.
"GPA, Protocol V, Item III.6
28Summary of conclusions of the conference, The UN and Mozambique, Letter from 
Italy, Document 28, S/25044, 4 January 1993, p. 159.
29 77ze UN and Mozambique, Document 28, p. 161.
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As explained in the previous chapter, there were numerous delays in the establishment of 
the UN operation. These delays severely undermined UNOHAC, especially its coordinating 
role. Most donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs were already well-established in 
Mozambique and resented having another layer of bureaucratic administration imposed on 
their activities by a new body. A degree of coordination already existed through the annual 
consultative meeting in Paris, and through the Aid for Democracy Group, a monthly 
meeting of donors resident in Maputo. UNOHAC was also confronted with competition 
from other resident UN agencies. In the past, UNICEF and WFP had refused to work with 
UNSCERO, subsequently two leading agencies, WFP and UNHCR were not represented 
in UNOHAC. UNHCR operated separately from UNOHAC and continued to work 
independently.30 UNOHAC was not helped by its ambitious mandate which was unclear 
and "overlapped with so many on-going donor-coordination activities that UNOHAC from 
the outset found it hard to define its own sphere of operations or to fend off competition 
from the rest of the donor community."31 UNOHAC was thus caught between the donors 
and ONUMOZ under Ajello, who seemed less interested in humanitarian issues except as 
they related to the political situation. In the American Ambassador's opinion, "had the 
donors been left to their own devices and spared UNOHAC coordination, a more effective 
program would probably have been in place earlier."32
Directly tied to UNOHAC's operational problems was the question of financing, but not 
from a lack of contributions. At the Rome donors' conference, $400 million was pledged 
over and above regular development assistance. Rehabilitation and reintegration 
programmes between October 1992 and December 1994 were calculated to total $755 
million of which the international community committed $633 million or 82%.33 However, 
the money set aside for UNOHAC to manage was controlled by donors which undermined
30Interview with Henny Matos, UNDP, Maputo, May 1997.
3 'Richard Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 72.
32US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.
33UNOHAC, Final Report: Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 
1992-1994, December 1994, Maputo, p. 6.
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UNOHAC's authority and ability to start up projects. UNOHAC's position was further 
weakened by criticisms regarding the programmes it was responsible for implementing. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the first UNOHAC director, Bernd Bernacher, took an 
overly developmental approach, seen by Ajello and some donors as undermining the peace 
process by obstructing swift demobilisation. UNOHAC's second director, Felix Downes- 
Thomas, a senior official in DHA, was credited with more effectively carrying out his 
mandate.
For the donors, resident multilateral agencies, and NGOs, the signing of the GPA and the 
arrival of peace across the country meant they could put in place their own programmes that 
wQre prevented by the war. The start of the peace process also reversed the trend of donor 
fatigue which had set in from the late 1980s. Agencies found themselves understaffed and 
many were unprepared for the reorientation in thinking, programme design and funding that 
peace required. US AID observed that "[m]ost well-informed people did not expect the 
cease-fire to be widely respected on the ground, and it was anticipated that the already high 
levels of banditry would only increase after a formal peace agreement.'*34 Because it was 
unprepared for peace and wanted to quickly launch projects on the ground, the EU for 
example approved projects with implementing NGO partners and channelled significant 
funds through them, such as MSF, despite concerns about the MSF approach.35 The 
agreement also brought a massive influx of NGOs, increasing from 150 in 1992 to 250 by 
the end of the process. NGOS directly received $180.2 million to implement projects, not 
including funding allocated under subcontracting from donors and other agencies.36
The Mozambican government was suspicious of the influx of humanitarian actors and their 
extensive operations throughout the country. It was noted earlier that the government 
delayed signing the Status of Forces Agreement with the UN in part as a statement of 
sovereignty and in part to collect taxes. Unable to tax the UN, the government succeeded
^USAlD/Mozambique Results Review, FY1995, Maputo, 1995, p. ii 
35COWI Consultants, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 16.
36Sam Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations: Their Role in Mozambique", 
Paper given to the ACUNS Ninth Annual Meeting, 25-26 June 1996, Turin, p. 4.
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in levying duties on imports for NGOs and the other humanitarian agencies37 crowding into 
Mozambique's political space. The government's ability to regulate and influence the 
humanitarian and reconstruction programmes shaping the political affairs of the country 
was increasingly marginalised. Financial management was almost exclusively in the hands 
of international agencies and not transferred to state institutions, while UNOHAC assumed 
responsibility for preparing funding appeals, which had previously been a responsibility of 
DPCCN.38 The state and Mozambicans were effectively sidelined in the process of 
providing relief and rehabilitation assistance. The next section explains the nature of these 
activities in more detail.
Humanitarian activities during the peace process
During the peace process, various actors in the peace process industry undertook an 
immense number of wide-ranging activities. The five main humanitarian and rehabilitation 
areas included emergency food relief, the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, the 
repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the rehabilitation of basic services and 
demining. In each activity, there was a plethora of international activity, although some 
initiatives were critical, many activities were counterproductive or irrelevant to the needs 
of Mozambicans. However, attending the explosion of uncoordinated and often 
unconnected activities was the introduction of an array of rules, procedures, and institutions 
into the political space of Mozambique which conditioned the exercise of power and 
authority. The accumulating mass of political practices arose from the consolidation of the 
peace process industry and the multifaceted roles and identities of actors as donors, 
financiers of NGOs, and members of the CSC. Thus the collective presence and activities 
of the peace process industry had many impacts on political space in Mozambique. This 
was evident in the operational strategies of the peace process industry, their implementation 
and the impact of those activities in terms of long-term sustainability. In the peace process
37Kimberly Mahling Clark, Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID 's 
Lessons Learned, Washington, D.C.: Africa Bureau Information Center, Research and 
Reference Services, USAID, p. 12.
38Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997.
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industry, there was a widely-shared preoccupation with technical, short-term activities 
which minimised the political nature of their humanitarian and rehabilitation activities. 
However in general, in the "conception of humanitarianism as separate from politics it is 
only the political struggles of the supposed beneficiaries that are ignored, and not the 
interests of the host and donor states."39 This section highlights how the peace process 
industry undertook these five main humanitarian activities in a mostly technical manner that 
overlooked the political impact.
EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF
Up to four million people were considered to be at risk in meeting their food needs. For 
humanitarian agencies, accessing those in need depended on security in the transport 
corridors which was supposed to be guarded by the military contingents of ONUMOZ. The 
Beira Corridor had attracted one million starving people who were threatening security in 
the corridor, particularly when the Zimbabwean troops protecting the corridor departed and 
were not immediately or replaced by UN peacekeepers as the GPA stipulated.40 Delays in 
the assembly and demobilisation of soldiers also left thousands of soldiers without a clear 
command leading to mutinies and riots. However, as food reached more people, the attacks 
decreased. In 1992-93, the onset of good rains brought harvests for the first time in years 
which vastly improved the food situation, although the influx of returnees ensured an 
ongoing need for food assistance. From 1992 to 1995, the number of people needing food 
aid decreased from 3.1 million to 1 million.41
During the war, food relief was able to reach government held areas, but Rename areas 
were almost completely isolated with the exception of limited access by the ICRC. After
39K. B. Wilson, Assisting Repatriation: Recent Lessons from Self-Repatriation in 
Mozambique, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 
Unpublished Report, 1993, p. 18.
""Andrew Meldrum, "Lessons from Angola," Africa Report, January/February 1993, 
p. 24.
4l 77ze UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 47.
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the agreement, Rename was still reluctant to allow food convoys access for fear that 
opening the roads would give the government military advantage. Rename continually 
insisted on air lifts which the international community resisted on account of cost and 
inefficiency. Dhlakama alleges that Rename was discriminated against in the distribution 
of assistance and denied access to food if not Frelimo supporters.42 These areas opened up 
in the second year of the process with access granted to international NGOs but not 
government agencies. Humanitarian assistance "was a government function which became 
a UN function,"43 because it was the only means of delivering food to Renamo areas, whose 
leaders would have rejected government coordination.44 Thus the distribution of food relief 
effectively recognised two administrations in the country, "forcing UNOHAC and its 
constituent agencies to barter with officials over access,"45 which in turn reinforced the 
problems of dual administration. The distribution of food relief was a political tool for both 
parties and it was politically important for both parties to be seen to be distributing food to 
the people.
The distribution of food fell mostly under the direction of the World Food Programme 
(70%) and donors (30%), both of whom relied on NGOs as implementing partners, like 
World Vision International (the largest NGO in Mozambique), ICRC, the Mozambican Red 
Cross, and CARE. Although DPCCN "was at one time responsible for distribution of 
multilateral food aid donations in 40% of the EDPs (extended delivery points), while NGOs 
distributed the remaining 60%, [by] mid 1994, the division of responsibility changed to 
20% and 80% respectively."46 The capacity of state institutions was inevitably weakened 
while its scope and reach was restricted by its minimal access to Renamo areas. The
42Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.
43lnterview with Henny Matos, UNDP/Mozambique, Maputo, May 1997.
44Sam Barnes argues that Renamo did not fully understand the idea of operational 
neutrality and considered NGOs operating in its areas as Renamo NGOs. Barnes, 
"Humanitarian Assistance," p. 125.
45Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 33(1), 1995, p. 121.
46UNOHAC, Final Report, Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 
1992-94, Maputo, December 1994, p. 66.
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government stressed the need to avoid dependency on food relief and to encourage food 
production but the international community donated food rather than seeds and tools, or 
vehicles and other logistical inputs. The peace process industry had a stronger capacity to 
provide emergency relief than long term reconstruction assistance, and thus focussed on the 
technical and immediate needs of the emergency in Mozambique, while choosing to ignore 
longer term political consequences. Agencies worked through their own procedures and 
institutions at the expense of state institutions and local-capacity building and 
independence. Operational imperatives did not facilitate the unification or integration of 
administration but prolonged the problems of dual administration.
THE REINTEGRATION OF DEMOBILISED SOLDIERS
While demobilisation fell under the military component under the authority of the Cease- 
Fire Commission (CCF), the reintegration of ex-combatants fell to the Reintegration 
Commission, (CORE), chaired by UNOHAC. CORE'S mandate was to effect the social and 
economic reintegration of demobilised soldiers using the resources provided at the donors' 
conference.47 However, CORE's task was made difficult by the "many projects for 
demobilized soldiers [which] were formalized under bilateral programmes and were outside 
CORE's control,"48 and outside the remit of UNOHAC. CORE "did not enjoy the support 
and confidence of the larger system, which greatly undermined its authority and its ability 
to mobilize actions on policies and programs it advocated."49 One reason for CORE's 
marginalisation was the hostility towards UNOHAC's long term programmes. UNOHAC 
initially devised a three-year programme involving training, employment and credit for 
demobilised soldiers starting from 1994, emphasising community and skills development. 
This conflicted with the views of Ajello and some donors that programmes should not start 
two years into the process and should reintegrate ex-combatants as quickly as possible to 
ensure a smooth process of demobilisation. USAID argued UNOHAC should have
47GPA, Protocol IV, Item 6.2, 6.3.
4SThe UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 51.
49UNOHAC Workshop Report cited in Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p.84.
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concentrated] on the short to medium term because it was so vital to 
preservation of the fragile peace process and to ensuring the timely 
implementation of its various phases. In my view, [Roger Carlson] 
UNOHAC lost much valuable time during its first year of existence in 
developing... proposals that depended on strengthening Mozambican 
institutions which were not ready for them.50
The government was not regarded as a serious partner even though it contributed $10.4 
million or 11.4% of the $95 million spent on reintegration programmes.51 Instead, multiple 
programmes were initiated by the peace process industry which bypassed national 
institutions deemed to be unready for them including a Reintegration Unit already 
established in the Ministry of Finance. Apart from the RSS (Reintegration Support Scheme) 
which will be explained shortly, the plethora of international actors involved in 
reintegrating demobilised soldiers established numerous competing programmes. Initially, 
donors expressed a lack of interest in reintegration because of more pressing concerns in 
emergency relief, the cease-fire, electoral law and delays in demobilisation. Donors were 
also reluctant to target demobilised soldiers as a special category of assistance. This view 
changed with the growing number of mutinies by soldiers.
Given the delays in the demobilisation process and the need for stability in the upcoming 
elections, donors agreed to consider schemes to ease the soldiers' reintegration into civilian 
life that would also provide a catalyst to the process. Recognising that the economy could 
not absorb over 70.000 ex-combatants, an additional cash subsidy to the soldiers was 
proposed called the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS). This idea had worked 
successfully in other demobilisation programmes in Ethiopia, Uganda, Namibia, and in 
Central America. The proposal however, was discussed at the Paris Consultative Group 
meeting in December 1993, bypassing UNOHAC and CORE. Donors and the UN accepted 
the RSS which involved 18 months of cash payments to soldiers, in addition to the 
government's dispensation of six months salary. The money would be disbursed through
50Comments by Roger Carlson, director of USAID/Maputo, cited in Clark, 
Mozambique's Transition, pp. 18-19.
51UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique, 
Maputo, March 1997, p. 58.
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local branches of the Mozambican bank, Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento. 52 All funds 
were managed by UNDP, again not by CORE, UNOHAC or the government, but depended 
on close coordination with the Technical Unit for demobilisation for accurate information. 
The scheme was remarkably successful. As noted in the previous chapter, on learning of 
the scheme, most soldiers demanded immediate demobilisation. Over $35 million was 
contributed from donor countries with only 5% going towards administrative costs. It 
resulted in an infusion of $32.4 million into local economies where soldiers resettled.53 
Soldiers were also given seeds, tools, two weeks of food rations, civilian clothing and 
transport home with their dependents.
UNOHAC proposed three other less successful programmes to assist ex-combatants: an 
Information Referral Service (IRS), an Occupational Skills and Development Programme 
and a Provincial Fund Programme. The Information Referral Service was intended to help 
soldiers "resolve problems related to demobilisation entitlements, obtain information on 
training and employment opportunities, and other information which would support their 
reintegration into civilian life."54 The Skills and Development Programme was to provide 
job training while the Provincial Fund Programme was set up to provide credits and grants 
at the local level to promote employment creation. UNDP estimated that 26% of 
demobilised soldiers used the IRS, while less than 10% benefited from the training 
programme and 28% from the fund programme.55
Although UNOHAC's reintegration strategy was eventually accepted and implemented, 
donors initially rejected the strategy and delayed approval of projects because of debates 
over UNOHAC's proposal that the government be included in projects. Donors such as 
USAID opposed the government's inclusion where it had no capacity and UNOHAC's 
leadership where it had no experience. USAID preferred to work through NGOs especially
52One long-term impact was strengthening the institutional capacity of this bank 
which was later contracted by the government to disburse government pensions.
53UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, pp. ii, 16, 20. 
54UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, p. 29. 
55UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, p. 33.
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IOM (International Office for Migration) which was deemed to have an established 
presence on the ground and could effect a quick impact.56 Planning for the Skills and 
Development Programme took a year, but approval from CORE, UNDP, ILO and two 
principal donors, Sweden and Netherlands, was delayed until July 1994. It was 
implemented in October 1994 and then transferred to the government after CORE was 
dissolved. Again, the project suffered from "a series of consultants reports and proposals 
which were mired in debates within the donor community on the extent of Government's 
future role in the implementation of reintegration programmes for DS [demobilised 
soldiers]."57 Debates surrounding the Provincial Fund Programme were conditioned by 
donor preferences in terms of strategy and implementing agency. As a result, the 
programme was implemented by IOM in six provinces and GTZ (German development 
agency) in the other four, the former favouring a quick impact and the latter a more 
developmental approach, thus frustrating a consistent approach across the country and 
integration with local institutions.
Surveys by UNDP and others estimated that 85% of demobilised soldiers were reintegrated 
into civilian life.58 What neither CORE, nor the government, nor the international 
community could have foreseen or planned for was the spirit of forgiveness in local 
communities in accepting the soldiers. Calling upon traditional mediums, local villages 
used spiritual rituals to cleanse and purify demobilised soldiers to rejoin society. 59 Where 
formal reintegration programmes lacked focus, were ineffective or delayed by debates about 
Mozambican institutions, Mozambicans facilitated their own reconciliation.
56US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.
"UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, p. 37. 
58UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, p. 59. 
59Interview with Irea Baptiste Lundin, CEEI, Maputo, May 1997.
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REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
Mozambican refugees and displaced persons were another specially targeted group for 
international assistance programmes. Between 4 to 5 million people were displaced within 
Mozambique and another 1.5 million located outside the country with over 1.1 million 
refugees in Malawi, the rest in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and South Africa. 
Relocating the refugees and internally displaced persons was an important priority to restore 
normality to Mozambique and to relieve pressure on host countries providing asylum. 
UNHCR, not UNOHAC, was the lead agency in the repatriation effort as it was already in 
operation in each country of asylum. UNHCR emphasised the use of government structures 
at both local and provincial levels, through line ministries and support to the national 
Refugee Support Unit (NAR).60 UNHCR's main implementing partner was IOM, but they 
also used the Mozambican Red Cross and the Christian Council of Mozambique.
Although the Rome negotiations suggested the need to plan for expected population 
movements, UNHCR was unprepared for a large-scale repatriation effort after the signing 
of the agreement.61 When the agreement was signed, most resources were tied up in asylum 
countries and could not be easily transferred to Mozambique, nor could funding be quickly 
transferred from the category of refugee assistance to repatriation. In fact throughout 1992, 
UNHCR had been preparing to expand camp capacities in Malawi in expectation of further 
flight. Consequently, there was a slow process of transferring and centralising decision- 
making in Maputo. Delays in setting up organised repatriation programmes were also 
influenced by concerns about security,62 the conditions of returnee areas and the capacity 
for these areas to absorb large numbers of refugees. UNHCR did not expect to have 
organised repatriation programmes ready until March/April 1993. In fact these began in
60UNOHAC, Final Report, p. 55.
6 'Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 5.
62In the 1980s, UNHCR was criticised for encouraging repatriation in conditions of 
uncertain political stability, and consequently actively prevented refugees from 
returning home. Tim Alien and Hubert Morsink, (eds.) When Refugees Go Home, 
London: James Currey, 1994.
226
August 1993 but were not fully operational until mid-1994.
From 1989 to 1991, UNHCR had prepared a series of contingency plans for repatriation but 
these had been "strongly rejected within Mozambique by donors, the NGOs, and 
government."63 Among the many reasons for rejection were poor adaptation to 
Mozambique's circumstances, distinctions between categories of people, a focus on 
transporting refugees to transit camps, lack of concern with security and little consideration 
for the transition to long-term reintegration. Despite these earlier criticisms, similar 
weaknesses reappeared in UNHCR's operational programmes for repatriation. UNHCR's 
official repatriation programmes involved elaborate and unnecessary transport schemes 
involving transit centres for returning refugees to register and then be transported to their 
home destination. Sometimes these transit centres were farther from the refugees' homes 
than the original camps in neighbouring countries. The programmes also relied on 
complicated convoy transports despite poor road conditions and lack of vehicles; while 
there was little prioritising of transport needs, such as focussing on poorer refugees who 
couldn't afford transport, or making use of peasant options like canoes or boats. These
formal programmes tend[ed] to focus on the physical relocation of refugees 
from a camp in exile to another camp in the return country; to many 
refugees this relocation [was] usually the least important and relevant 
contribution to going home and re-building their lives.64
While UNHCR collected information and prepared transportation, the roads filled with 
people after the signing of the peace agreement. In the weeks following the GPA, thousands 
returned home, well in advance of official repatriation and by late 1992, several hundred 
thousand refugees had already returned to Mozambique.65 In total, 1.7 million 
Mozambicans returned home during the peace process. UNHCR transported refugees when 
distances were longer, and especially the more vulnerable groups such as older people, 
women, children and the disabled. Most Mozambicans went home without UNHCR
63Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 5. 
64Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 2. 
65Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 3.
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assistance and in some cases in the face of UNHCR opposition. According to UNHCR 
estimates, 22% returned with UNHCR assistance, while 78% spontaneously returned, 
mostly from Malawi.66 However, displaced persons with the greatest capacity to self- 
repatriate were "the least important target group for any immediate assistance programme 
to repatriation."67
A seminar held on lessons learned from the repatriation concluded there was a need to focus 
more on "understanding the return strategies of the refugees themselves and facilitating that 
process while at the same time having an efficient management in place to bring the most 
vulnerable back in an organised and supervised manner."68 UNHCR's formal programming 
persistently does not account for the fact that refugees return and reintegrate on their own. 
Research into repatriation in Africa, Asia and Latin America have consistently shown that 
"most repatriation was actually organised and implemented by the refugees themselves 
outside of formal assistance programmes, indeed often occurred in the face of official 
opposition."69 Wilson and Nunes discovered that "[bjetween 1988 and 1991, not one single 
refugee 'officially repatriated' from Malawi to Milange, despite all the institutional activity 
of meetings, delegations, camp tours and elaborate planning."70 Within Mozambique, 
thousands of displaced persons made their way back on their own following the seasonal 
ritual of the planting season after the good rains. Refugees planned for repatriation before 
peace was confirmed, by making "arrangements for an early return by having households
66However, the 22% or 378,000 who used UNHCR assistance was larger than the 
entire repatriation effort in Cambodia, UNHCR's largest operation. See UNHCR, 
Mozambique 1993-95 Review Towards Reintegration, Maputo: UNHCR Mozambique, 
1995, p. 6.
"Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 12.
68UNHCR, Mozambique: An Account from a Lessons Learned Seminar on 
Reintegration, Geneva, 24-25 June 1996, p. 5.
69K. B. Wilson, Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in 
Mozambique, Review commissioned by the Swedish International Development 
Agency, Oxford, November 1992, p. 21.
70K.B. Wilson and J. Nunes, "Repatriation to Mozambique, Refugee Initiative & 
Agency Planning in Milange District, 1988-1991," in Alien and Morsink, When 
Refugees Go Home, p. 215.
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at both sides of the border," 71 checking on family farms to see if conditions were right for 
the rest of the family to move back home. The presence of 6000 peacekeepers had little 
influence on refugee strategies, they "were more concerned with the presence of landmines 
as a threat to life than with the outposting of international peacekeepers in returnee areas."72 
Nor did the refugees return because of the building of schools or health clinics, or the 
number of NGOs operating in an area. They only returned on a large scale (and 
permanently) from Malawi when food distribution was cut off. 73
International assistance for reintegration similarly did not meet the needs of the intended 
beneficiaries. A majority of studies have found that
it is the survival strategies of the refugees themselves that are key to 
survival. They simply are not passive victims waiting for aid, in danger of 
becoming dependent. After a period of assistance by local people and local 
institutions like churches... it is refugees themselves that re-build their
lives. 74
It was only in devising those personal strategies that refugees may or may not take into 
account assistance activities by international actors. Assistance programmes mostly
[come] in with marginal help, or as a cause of disruption and even 
threat...They often seek to construct separate economic and social activities 
from scratch, usually running up against formidable challenges. Indeed, far 
from tackling existing constraints on refugees' own livelihood strategies, 
assistance programmes frequently multiply them.75
The most important issues for the returnees were land and social reconciliation and 
reintegration. In both cases, the international community could be of little assistance. 
Despite the money and effort by UNHCR, most of their programmes were of little relevance 
to Mozambicans. However, because of this money and these programmes, international 
agencies nevertheless imposed ideas, institutions and procedures about how to organise
7IUNHCR, Mozambique: An Account, p. 5.
72UNHCR, Mozambique: An Account, p. 3.
73COWI Consultants, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 25.
74 Wilson, Internally Displaced, p. 10.
75Wilson, Internally Displaced, p. 11.
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Mozambican society, which elements in society to assist, and consequently devalued local 
strategies. These agencies set themselves up in Mozambique's political space as crucial 
actors, with ambitious but ineffective programmes, while dismissing Mozambican 
institutions.
REHABILITATION OF BASIC SERVICES AND REINTEGRATION OF SOCIETY
The peace process industry was also extremely over-ambitious, yet ineffective, in the area 
of rehabilitation and reconstruction, with many humanitarian actors reorienting themselves 
to development projects. The follow-up meeting in Maputo to the Rome donors' conference 
held in June 1993 shifted the emphasis from emergency relief to reintegration to 
rehabilitation. 76 Given the devastation in Mozambique, political, social and economic 
reintegration seemed to draw the industry into ever larger and more extensive operations 
than anticipated or prepared for. This impulse applied to nearly every donor, multilateral 
agency and NGO operating in Mozambique and was based on the assumption that investing 
in rehabilitation projects gives the impression of peace and leaves a positive psychological 
impact which adds momentum to the process.
Many existing agencies in Mozambique found themselves redundant in providing 
emergency assistance and shifted their emphasis to rehabilitation and development projects. 
Often these agencies were ill-suited and inexperienced to take on the main activities of 
education, health care, water supply, and roads. MSF/F admitted that they were "a very 
expensive option, ill-suited to a non-emergency situation, due to a lack of personnel with 
experience of long-term programmes, a dependence on short-term contracts and the lack 
of appropriate support from the Paris office."77 Nevertheless, they found themselves 
undertaking development activities in which they had no experience, resulting in projects 
that were of poor quality, even aggravating some conditions. 78 More generally, US AID
16The UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 48.
77COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 20.
78COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 20.
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observed that "not all PVOs are making the transition from relief to development at the 
same pace, and the tension between the short-term need for food aid and long-term 
developmental objectives has been evident."79 As rivals in the peace process industry, these 
agencies competed for funding for projects they had little experience in but which 
guaranteed their continued operation and necessity in Mozambique.
UNHCR was another unlikely actor engaged in rehabilitation activities. Although not part 
of its operational mandate, UNHCR became "centrally involved in a much broader and 
more ambitious undertaking: rebuilding the social, economic and administrative structures 
of a society which has been shattered by war."80 UNHCR developed a reintegration strategy 
which focussed on providing seeds and tools for food security, and rehabilitating roads, 
schools, health services and water facilities, with a budget of $145 million. 81 Unusually, 
"donor states [met] UNHCR's appeals for funds in full,"82 making UNHCR an important 
actor in this area. The strategy identified "geographical target areas" based on a "high 
concentration of returnees" that would benefit the whole community. UNHCR used quick 
impact projects (QIPs), a "quick response in meeting urgent community or area based needs 
in a simple manner, often through a one-time financial or material input, that generates 
visible outputs whose longer-term benefit can be sustained by local efforts and available 
financial resources." 83 It began 524 quick impact projects84 using 45 NGOs, including 10 
Mozambican NGOs. 85 UNHCR had a positive impact on rehabilitating the water sector, 
rehabilitated and constructed 5000 km of roads and 65 bridges, and contributed to the local 
economy by providing temporary wage labour.
79Clark, Mozambique's Transition, p. 13.
80UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society: A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration 
Programme for Mozambican Returnees, Geneva, July 1996, p. 1.
8 'UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. iii. 
82UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 13. 
83UNHCR Mozambique, 1993/95 Review Towards Reintegration, pp. 14-15.
84There were 1500 projects by June 1996. UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, 
p. 1.
85UNHCR, Mozambique: An Account, p. 9.
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However, UNHCR was criticised for a lack of planning, poor linkages with other 
institutions, poor sustainability, a capacity driven rather than needs driven approach, and 
a focus on impact rather than effectiveness.86 UNHCR's own review of its activities drew 
attention to tensions between implementation, sustainability and cost-effectiveness. 87 
USAID criticised UNHCR for building schools and clinics without planning for teachers, 
nurses or provincial capacities for maintenance. 88 UNHCR also acknowledged that their 
programmes would have benefited from better planning and
involving government structures more fully in the planning process, and 
supporting the development of official capacities in a more systematic 
manner; promoting the participation of returnees and other community 
members in the identification and implementation of reintegration projects; 
establishing early linkages between UNHCR's activities and the longer- 
term programmes of national and international development actors, so as to 
ensure the continuity and maximize the impact of the organization's 
reintegration projects. 89
UNHCR's implementing partners were also criticised. In one sectoral assessment of QIPs, 
there were "numerous variations from standard designs," "on-site interpretation of work 
specifications," "unacceptable standards," as well as "weak supervision and quality 
control."90 These projects were unlikely to be sustainable, more likely to incur higher 
maintenance costs and also likely to endanger the safety of those meant to benefit from 
them. UNHCR admitted it had little technical capacity to review NGO proposals and 
oversee implementation which was problematic given that many NGOs themselves lacked 
experience in rehabilitation work.
Donors, NGOs, and multilateral agencies were all criticised for taking an overly short-term 
approach with an overemphasis on physical rehabilitation, without adequate attention paid 
to financial and institutional sustainability. This was evident in all sectors. In education, in
86UNHCR signed memorandums of understanding with UNDP and UNICEF to carry 
on its projects after it phased out of Mozambique in December 1994.
87UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. iii. 
88Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID/Maputo. 
89UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 19. 
90UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 35.
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the six provinces where UNOHAC had reliable data,
more than 40 organizations [were renovated or constructed] a total of 456 
schools or 790 classrooms by the end of 1994. Few donors and 
implementors however, [had] made provision for school books and 
furniture, the construction of teachers' houses, or for improvement in 
quality of education.91
It was estimated that "about one hundred small health centres and posts, recently 
rehabilitated or constructed, are currently closed or operating below acceptable standards."92 
A UNHCR review of health sector activities found that reliance on NGOs had resulted in 
an unintegrated and fragmented approach and that "[t]he variety of sources of finance had 
promoted the creation of parallel implementing structures, procurement systems and 
reporting systems."93 NGOs exacerbated this trend by their tendency
to "colonise" particular districts, and carry out a range of activities in their 
selected districts. The problem with this, apart from the fact that NGOs find 
themselves carrying out activities for which they have no expertise, is that 
some districts have no NGO present, and then no one to act as advocate for 
the district. This can result in an imbalance in aid across the province.94
International NGOs as well were not always willing to work in remote parts of the 
country.95 This was complicated by assistance delivered in Renamo areas where NGO 
activity did not help to alleviate dual administration, some of whom continued "to operate 
as though they were delivering emergency health care to two sides of a conflict."96 In the 
health sector, "[b]y July 1994, at least 37 different agencies and NGOs (28)were operating 
in the health sector in former Renamo areas across 51 districts."97 The government was not 
always able to provide or deliver teachers and nurses in Renamo areas.98
9IUNOHAC, Final Report, pp. 75-6.
92COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. ii.
93COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 24.
94COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 16.
95UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 37.
96Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations," p. 8.
97 77ze UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 52.
98UNOHAC, Final Report, p. 35.
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Even though there was a consciousness of the need to employ local institutions, such 
organisations were few in number and in demand from many international organisations 
seeking local partners for legitimacy. More often, the state and local institutions were 
bypassed or undermined. Although UNHCR cemented
contacts with the provincial authorities and to reinforce the process of 
decentralization within the Mozambican state structure. At the same time, 
however, it had the effect of marginalizing the line ministries and 
specialized programmes in Maputo, some of which claimed to have been 
left uninformed regarding the volume of UNHCR activity in their respective 
sectors."
Most donors preferred working through NGOs rather than government ministries because 
of their flexibility and speed at getting established on the ground. In spite of the explosion 
of donor and NGO activity, the Ministry of Health concluded that in general, there was 
"over investment in returnee areas, poor rehabilitation standards and a system that has 
grown up unplanned, without the involvement of the national authorities... and certain 
provinces with easy access had received disproportionate amounts of investment." 100 The 
result was an unplanned and uncoordinated collection of projects that was unbalanced and 
unrepresentative for future programmes. Thus the extensive rehabilitation activities 
established a pattern for social policy and administration which was heavily reliant on 
foreign assistance at the expense of building local capacity and inimical to developing a 
coherent system of social services for the public welfare of Mozambican society.
NGOs and the peace process industry also had a negative symbolic and psychological 
impact. The Mozambique Ministry of Health reported that "the MSF approach demoralised 
local health staff. Local structures could not compete with the planes, cars, houses and 
logistical structures put in place by MSF/F, and this negatively affected the self-perception 
of local staff." 101 If this tendency occurred in almost every district, highlighted in the 
capital, it supported the perception that Mozambique was being overrun by foreign
"UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 29.
'""Ministry of Health document, "The Reconstruction Process in Mozambique," cited 
in COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 23.
I01 COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 20.
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missionaries. In Zambezia province, "MSF/F had its own plane to visit the districts to carry 
out consultations. It is reported that the budget for the plane alone was greater than the 
Government health budget for the entire province." 102 Even though international agencies 
in the peace process industry were not as effective as their levels of assistance suggested, 
their activities simultaneously devalued state institutions to Mozambicans and created 
expectations which the government can not realistically expect to meet. Such agencies 
introduced new rules, institutions and practices into the social services sector of 
Mozambique's political space which compromised the capacity and symbolism of 
Mozambique's public sector.
DEMINING
Clearing landmines was designated a humanitarian activity and placed under the 
responsibility of UNOHAC. The demining programme involved prioritising, coordinating 
and contracting mine clearance, developing a Mozambican capacity for mine clearance and 
establishing a mine awareness programme. In the first year of the process, there was almost 
no systematic demining because of rivalry between UNOHAC and UNDP. Although 
UNOHAC had a budget of $14 million, half from ONUMOZ and half from DHA, it was 
initially disbursed by UNDP in New York. UNDP was "unwilling to approve projects and 
programs proposed by UNOHAC, arguing over the wording of contracts, tendering 
procedures, and quality control." 103 UNOHAC decided that all demining decisions had to 
be approved by the Cease-Fire Commission which did not meet in early 1993 due to 
Renamo's boycott. The National Mine Clearance Plan for Mozambique was only approved 
by the CCF in December 1993. UNOHAC and the UN were severely criticised for their 
failure to implement the demining programme.
The UN Secretary-General issued a number of complaints about the delays in the mine 
clearance programme in his reports to the Security Council and finally intervened in 1994.
I02COWI Consulting, Evaluation of EC Actions, Mozambique, p. 7. 
103Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 78.
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He transferred the demining budget from UNDP to UNOHAC, although UNOHAC had 
already taken decisions without seeking UNDP approval, including awarding the mines 
survey to Halo Trust, a British NGO. Halo Trust subsequently provided a national and 
provincial mines surveys which became the database for establishing priorities across the 
country. However, the late arrival of the survey's conclusions could not form the basis for 
programme prioritising. The second UNOHAC director, Felix Downes Thomas, sought to 
expedite demining and introduced an Accelerated Demining Programme, which by 
December 1994 had cleared 40,000 square metres. Another controversy emerged when the 
$4.8 million contract to clear 2000 km of roads given priority by the CSC at the beginning 
of the operation, was awarded to a consortium including LONRHO, Royal Ordnance and 
a South African company, Mechem, the latter two being landmines manufacturers. 
Although these companies made a profit by both making and clearing landmines, they 
completed the project in less than the six months contracted. However, by the time the 
contract was awarded and completed in May 1994, priorities had changed and clearing 
these roads had little impact. 104
Increasingly frustrated with the UN system, some donors independently contracted other 
agencies to begin demining. "Sweden and the Netherlands [froze] use of their contributions 
to the Demining Trust Fund, run by UNOHAC, while the Dutch [were] suing to get their 
money back." 105 In February 1993, the EU contracted LONRHO and the Gurkhas to clear 
200 km in the Renamo held town of Inhaminga. UNHCR contracted Norwegian People's 
Aid to train deminers and clear roads in 4 provinces. 106 USAID appointed a US contractor, 
Ronco, to clear roads in 3 provinces, and the Halo Trust, funded by the British government, 
cleared mines in Zambezia province. Although mines were cleared from the land, overall
l04Alistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo, 
Astri Suhrke, Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and 
Rehabilitation in Mozambique, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1997, p. 79.
l05Clark, Mozambique's Transition, p. 21.
l06During a visit, Sadako Ogata objected to UNHCR involvement in demining 
activities and funding was withdrawn; (later covered by UNOHAC). Hallam et al., 
Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance^. 80.
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strategic planning, the setting of priorities and effective results were missing. The absence 
of central coordination and direction resulted in a wastage of resources. 107 For example, it 
took 3 months to clear 40km of road which had no mines and which was not even 
accessible due to collapsed bridges. Clearing land mines in itself was less important than 
the impact on local communities in terms of access to carry on with their livelihoods. 
Demining was only one means of opening greater access, fencing and greater awareness 
were other possible options that were ignored. The lack of coordination and coherence also 
raised the issue of territorial administration. Because there was no policy on Rename areas, 
clearing Rename areas depended on political approval. The government "prevented a 
British contractor, Defence Systems Ltd., from starting work, arguing that the GPA did not 
allow Renamo to have independent links with international agencies." 108
By the time ONUMOZ withdrew, 3262 km of roads and 1.5 million square metres of 
territory had been cleared of mines under different agencies. 109 International assistance was 
characterised by little coordination, poor implementation, multiplication of efforts and little 
encouragement of local capacity. 110 The US embassy criticised
UNOHAC's proposals for the creation of a new Mozambican government 
department for the coordination and implementation of mine clearance and 
called for the United Nations to delegate responsibility for supervision and 
demining to the existing operations, transferring its unused funds to the 
agencies already active in the field. During 1995 a National Demining 
Commission was established, but most of the work of management and field 
operations was indeed undertaken by outside agencies. 111
In 1996, the National Demining Commission was still unable to fulfil its intended role of
107The Norwegians estimated $2 million may have been spent on tasks where 
demining had almost no humanitarian or economic impact. Hallam et al., Evaluation of 
Norwegian Assistance, p. 83.
l08Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 34. 
l(J9Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 80.
1 '"Halo Trust, was an exception, by employing only 3 expatriates in a staff of 150. 
All supervisors and medics were Mozambican, as well some administrative and 
management functions.
"'Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 79.
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defining policy and setting mine clearance priorities." 2 Mozambican institutions and 
procedures were overlooked because of the presumed need for quick results, but the 
performance of the peace process industry was hardly better, even with a budget of $14 
million. It was not only that the peace process industry was counterproductive, but that their 
operations simultaneously pushed aside and denigrated local institutions and practices." 3
Conclusion: The withdrawal of ONUMOZ and the obsolescence ofUNOHAC
In terms of the main objectives of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, there were 
remarkable improvements in the basic conditions of life in Mozambique. Over 1.5 million 
refugees returned to Mozambique, over 3 million internally displaced persons were 
resettled and 200,000 demobilised soldiers and their dependents returned home. There were 
few incidences of refugees returning to asylum countries, and people permanently resettled 
across Mozambique. The number of people in need of food aid decreased from 3.8 million 
in 1992/1993 to 1.5 million in 1994/1995, the majority of which were returning refugees. 
Malnutrition rates also stabilised or dropped throughout the country in the first year of 
peace." 4 Although the economic situation remained poor, the initial conditions for recovery 
were created.
However, social conditions in Mozambique improved because of the determination and 
optimism of ordinary Mozambicans and good fortune. It was Mozambicans who walked 
home and planted crops, who accepted soldiers back into their communities and who 
resumed their normal livelihoods. As with the soldiers in the military component, the 
actions of ordinary Mozambicans took on political significance. Equally important was the 
return of good rains from 1992, allowing the best agricultural seasons in years (a 400%
" 2Hallam et al., Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance, p. 81.
1 ' 3Mozambican dog teams trained by NPA were later seconded to peacekeeping 
operations in Bosnia and Angola. "After decades of receiving foreign expertise in their 
country, Mozambicans were proud to be exporting skilled Mozambican personnel to 
Europe." Hallam et al., Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance, p. 80.
" 4USAID/Mozambique, 1993-1995 War-to-Peace Transition Program, 1995, 
Maputo, p. 5.
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increase in food crop production from 1992 to 1993) which had a positive effect on 
consolidating peace. Continued drought would have exacerbated the fragile situation.
The international community contributed $633 million towards emergency food needs, 
seeds and tools, rehabilitation and other projects. UNOHAC estimated 5.5 million 
Mozambicans benefited from food and non-food relief items provided by the international 
community during the process." 5 Given the level of resources and the number of 
reconstruction activities throughout the country, positive benefits reached the intended 
beneficiaries. However, given the magnitude of the peace process industry operating in 
Mozambique, the extent and scope of their activities was not matched by the level of 
effectiveness or rate of return. International assistance was frequently too little, too late or 
irrelevant to the needs of the intended recipients. Whether implementing peace-building or 
post-conflict reconstruction, the lack of integration, coordination, excessive competition, 
and the sheer number of activities by the peace process industry pointed to the absence of 
a coherent plan of action, strategy or agenda that necessarily or consistently promoted or 
sustained peace. It was not made clear how these activities individually and collectively 
produced and consolidated peace.
Although designated the co-ordinating mechanism, UNOHAC was undermined by its own 
activities and conflicts with ONUMOZ and donors. In addition to conflicts over authority, 
bureaucratic differences over budget lines and procedures between DHA and DPKO created 
more confusion and competition. There was little integration between the military, political 
and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ and the other agencies. The military 
component was deployed to protect the economic corridors linking Mozambique to other 
countries in the region, but did not effectively protect the humanitarian routes within 
Mozambique or generate security across the country. NGOs and humanitarian agencies also 
distanced themselves from the military operation, yet took advantage of the protection that 
was offered when their security was at risk." 6 The process was over-complicated by the
115UNOHAC, Final Report, p. 5.
" 6Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations", p. 12.
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peace process industry without even accounting for the conflict between the government 
and Rename.
Many disputes amongst the actors in the peace process industry revolved around the short- 
term versus long-term objectives of the process and the role and place of using government 
institutions and building up local capacity. USAID criticised UNOHAC for wanting to pay 
everything to the government which was ineffective, "donors knew you had to go through 
NGOs in the field to get things done."" 7 USAID complained that
the single greatest problem, however, has been the unwillingness and 
seeming inability of UNOHAC to understand and accept the essentially 
short-term politically oriented requirements of the peace process, and their 
continual focus on long-term development issues, to the exclusion of critical 
transition issues on which the peace process depends. 118
Ajello also criticised UNOHAC for being
too involved in the elaboration and planning of medium and long-term 
programmes...UNOHAC should have limited its actions to the short-term 
and should have worked out, together with the relevant ministries, UN 
agencies and NGOs, an appropriate plan to bridge this short-term plan with 
the long and medium-term planning of the government and the development 
agencies." 9
UNOHAC created too many programmes which outlived the mandate of the UN operation 
which were not effectively transferred to the government or long-standing agencies 
remaining in Mozambique like UNDP.
This short-term approach did not bring noticeable benefits but simultaneously served to 
weaken state institutions. Many humanitarian actors used the openings in political space 
to bypass the government. "Some donors took the view that the peace process gave license 
for international action without government interference, and this resulted in a sharp 
downgrading of the government's own relief bodies." 120 One foreign observer claimed "the
1 ^Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997. 
" 8US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.
" 9Ajello, "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance," pp. 202-3. 
l20Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 86.
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donor community was deliberately attempting to weaken the government rather than to 
promote a healthy balance between state and civil society." 121 The use of state institutions 
decreased during the process as nearly all financing for humanitarian and rehabilitation 
activities was channelled through international and non-governmental agencies and a 
decreasing percentage through government ministries. Mozambican institutions were also 
bypassed through the creation of new administration systems throughout the country. 
UNOHAC opened offices in all 10 provinces with 3 regional offices in addition to the 
central office in Maputo. WFP opened 8 subregional offices, UNHCR's resources included,
three Sub-Offices and 17 Field-Offices, reaching out into many of the least 
accessible and most seriously war-affected parts of the country; a 
sophisticated telecommunications system, providing direct and instant 
contact between UNHCR staff, whether in their office, at home or while 
travelling; a dedicated air charter services, allowing programme staff and 
equipment to be quickly transferred from one part of the country to another; 
and an extensive fleet of vehicles on the ground. 122
NGOs also opened offices throughout the provinces. For the poorest country in the world, 
supporting these expatriates required expensive logistical support which seemed ill- 
conceived when the impact on society did not match the expenditure or effort of 
international agencies.
The plurality and impunity of the peace process industry produced a cumulative impact on 
political space. The transfer of authority out of Mozambique, beginning with the 
emergency, became more pronounced over the two years of the peace process and remains 
a defining feature of Mozambique. Under the aegis of the peace process, Mozambique's 
political space opened up to an array of international actors from which the government had 
little recourse to deny entry or operation. Operating under the imperatives of the process, 
these agencies extended their reach and expanded their scope of activities to an 
unprecedented level. Activities by the peace process industry were undertaken in 
consultation with the government, rather than the government drawing upon the assistance 
of the industry. Consequently, the notion of interference was reversed to refer to
l2 'Antonio Donini cited in Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 90. 
122UNHCR, Rebuilding a War-Torn Society, p. 27.
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government or Rename efforts to participate in international activities, according to 
international rules and objectives. Although Mozambican actors were not entirely excluded 
from voicing opinions or influencing decisions, these decisions rested with international 
agencies. In a functioning political system, the opposite would hold true with international 
actors seeking openings with the government to provide assistance and exert influence. 
However, despite their questionable competence, the peace process industry acted 
according to their own agendas which reoriented the norms, institutions and procedures of 
Mozambican politics by devaluing the state and obstructing its relations with society and 
preventing the coherent evolution of Mozambique's political space.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The political and electoral component: international direction 
by the peace process industry
After considering the military and humanitarian dimensions, this chapter turns to the 
political component of the peace process in Mozambique. The political component refers 
to those aspects of the process with specific political objectives: the political management 
of the peace process; the reunification of territorial administration; and the electoral process 
leading to multi-party elections. The dynamics between the government and Rename in this 
dimension influenced all aspects of the process, but was itself influenced by progress in the 
military and humanitarian components. The connections between the three components 
focussed on Renamo's legitimisation and political socialisation; its transformation into a 
political party, inclusion in the political space of Mozambique and acceptance by the 
government. Although the process centred on the two parties, space was also opening up 
for other political actors.
As with the other two dimensions, the peace process industry was extensively involved in 
this aspect of the process. ONUMOZ, under the direction of the Special Representative, 
managed the implementation of the peace agreement as a political process. However, they 
did so in a heavy-handed and intrusive way, positioning themselves between the state and 
the society of Mozambique, which was not necessarily more productive or effective. This 
intrusive international presence existed before the official start of the implementation, but 
was reinforced and exacerbated through the official peace process and the UN presence. 
The actors in the peace process industry were not neutral third parties, but were 
fundamentally political actors with power and influence engaging in political activities with 
respect to the state and society of Mozambique. However, in contrast to the military and 
humanitarian spheres, Mozambican actors had opportunities to defend their interests. Thus 
the configuration of Mozambique's political space was shaped by the contest amongst the 
various players in the process resulting in an uneven impact on political space.
This chapter makes the argument that given its power and resources, the peace process
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industry reconfigured Mozambique's political space in this aspect of the process by 
changing attitudes, behaviour and customs, creating expectations and instilling practices 
in Mozambican politics which might not have been otherwise. The actors in the industry 
had a formative influence on the definition of norms, institutions and procedures 
constituting Mozambique's political space through its political objectives and how they 
were achieved. The chapter is divided into three sections. 1 First, I discuss the commissions 
set up by the General Peace Agreement to administer the process and the leadership 
provided by the peace process industry. Second, I consider the issue of territorial 
administration as the government and Renamo struggled over the reunification of the 
country. In the third and largest section, I discuss the electoral process. This section is itself 
divided into five sub-sections; administering the electoral process, the formation of political 
parties, preparations for the election and civic education, pressure for a government of 
national unity and the elections themselves.
Directing the peace process: the commissions, the Special Representative and the peace 
process industry
As already discussed in chapters five and six, the GPA established a number of 
commissions to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The primary and most 
powerful commission at the centre of the process was the Supervisory and Control 
Commission(CSC). According to the agreement, the CSC would guarantee the 
implementation of the agreement, ensure respect for the timetable, assume responsibility 
for the authentic interpretation of the agreement, and settle disputes arising between the 
parties.2 Composed of both parties, the CSC was chaired by the UN and included a number 
of countries involved in the Rome talks, the US, France, UK, Portugal, and Italy. The CSC 
was assisted by three subsidiary commissions discussed in previous chapters, including the 
Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the 
Mozambican Armed Forces (CCFADM) and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). There
'Human rights monitoring, truth commissions and war crimes tribunals are central to 
some peace processes, however, they were not important in Mozambique and shall not be 
discussed.
2GPA, Protocol V, Item II.5.
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were also two commissions without UN participation: the National Information 
Commission (COMINFO) and the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL).3 With 
the exception of COMINFO, all the commissions sent regular reports to the CSC,4 and 
referred issues to it that could not be decided.
In a study on the implementation of peace agreements, the authors concluded that a 
successful implementation can be attributed to the establishment of institutional structures 
that involve the parties in resolving conflicts of interpretation of the agreement. 5 Although 
established for this purpose, the Mozambican commissions created a complicated structure 
of administration sometimes beyond the capacity of the parties. While the commissions 
were integral to the political socialisation and inculcation of Renamo, they were also quite 
often hostage to Renamo, its political inexperience and its inability to staff them. This led 
to delays in the establishment and running of the commissions, and their complete 
suspension during Renamo's boycott in 1993 which affected every aspect of the process. 
The international community accommodated Renamo's political inexperience by exercising 
more flexibility towards Renamo, but also by assuming a more active and central role in the 
process. According to the British Ambassador to Mozambique, the GPA had indeed 
"provided for an executive role for the UN and key countries in the Commissions set up to 
oversee implementation, that enabled the international community to be active players in 
the process rather than handwringing bystanders."6 Guebuza argues instead that the CSC 
became a mechanism for non-Mozambican political forces to interfere negatively and 
positively.7 Rather than functioning as a conflict resolution mechanism between the two 
parties, the commissions, the CSC in particular, became instruments of the UN and the
3The National Elections Commission (CNE) and Commission for Territorial 
Administration (CNAT) were not under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
"Minutes from CSC Meeting 042, 19 September 1994.
5Geraldo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, "Civil conflicts and the conditions for successful 
international intervention: a comparative study of Cambodia and El Salvador," Review of 
International Studies, 21(2), 1995, p. 164.
6Richard Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process: An Insider's View," 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 9(2), 1995, p. 15. Italics in original.
7Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
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Special Representative, Aldo Ajello.
While the CSC was credited for coordinating the international community, conferring 
legitimacy on the process, and ensuring constant support for the UN operation, its focus 
was the UN and its international members. As ONUMOZ grew in strength, the CSC 
evolved into a judicial arbiter or a local Security Council where the parties were expected 
to account before a UN chairman surrounded by a council of ambassadors. Although the 
agreement stated that the CSC would reach decisions by consensus between the two parties, 
it was the international ambassadors who attempted to impose decisions. In one example, 
there was a proposal for Renamo soldiers to receive government pensions. The government 
rejected the proposal on principle and for financial reasons, but the ambassadors would not 
allow discussion to proceed, suspending the CSC until they eventually conceded to the 
government position. 8 The need to secure approval from external third parties signified that 
decision making power was being taken away from Mozambicans. The commissions also 
received technical support from the peace process industry. The CSC concluded that the 
commissions needed "technical support, including an impartial secretariat, which could best 
be provided by ONUMOZ. Legal services will also be necessary in order to ensure that the 
working procedures of the commissions meet international standards and to resolve 
possible legal disputes."9 The commissions seemed to operate on the basis of values, 
standards, and priorities set by the international community without any meaningful or 
conscious attempt to involve and impart knowledge to Mozambicans as part of the process 
for building peace. There seemed to be little about the commissions that was Mozambican.
From its inception, there were tensions between ONUMOZ and the Mozambican 
government over the jurisdiction and authority of the UN in the process. There were two 
aspects to this tension. First, the government found itself subordinate to the agreement it 
had signed. The GPA became a quasi-constitutional document establishing the 
commissions as a transitional authority and requiring amendments to the 1990 constitution,
Interview with Armando Guebuza, Head of Government Delegation to CSC, Maputo. 
9Minutes from CSC meeting 042.
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such as the creation of an electoral commission. 10 Since the responsibility for interpreting 
and implementing the agreement rested with the CSC, the government was then also 
subordinate to the CSC run by the UN. Ajello was unconcerned that "[the] CSC, and its 
principal subordinate bodies, de facto replaced the government in matters concerning the 
implementation of the peace accord."" The UN through the CSC became the sovereign 
authority in Mozambique regarding the peace process. But since the accord took precedent 
over all other legislation, the agreement extended the CSC's and hence the UN's 
jurisdiction to all national matters. The UN overshadowed the state and its jurisdiction and 
challenged the state's authority not only in terms of the peace process, but Mozambican 
politics in general. Second, as the UN established itself in Mozambique, especially during 
the second year of the process, its full operational capacity extended far beyond the capacity 
of the government. ONUMOZ began to form a parallel administration, a state within a state, 
with its 7000 armed troops, logistical capacity, sophisticated communications and control 
capacity, and relief supplies equal to half Mozambique's GNP. 12 On the technical and 
institutional level, the UN presence very forcefully put the state and the Mozambican 
government in its place, while UN actions accentuated the primacy of international actors 
in the running of Mozambican politics. The UN operation had a strong symbolic impact on 
the political space of Mozambique which minimised and challenged the sovereign authority 
of the state.
The UN special representative, Aldo Ajello, was a profound source of tension with the 
government. Ajello has been praised for his astute and capable direction but has also been 
accused of acting like a colonial governor. 13 The head of the government delegation to the 
CSC, Armando Guebuza commented that Ajello "tried to show he was strong enough to
'°Norberto Carrilho, "The electoral legislation in Mozambique and the political and 
social achievement," in Brazao Mazula, (ed.) Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and 
Development, Maputo: The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 127.
"Aldo Ajello, "The role of ONUMOZ in the pacification process," in Mazula, 
Mozambique: Elections, p. 120.
l2Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace, 1994, p. 143.
^Interview with Joseph Hanlon, London, April 1997.
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play a powerful role by surrounding himself with elements of formal political power, like 
an army, police and council of ambassadors."14 Ajello set himself up as the figurehead of 
the international community. To achieve this, he
held regular meetings with the ambassadors who sat on the Supervisory and 
Monitoring Commission (CSC), with the African group of ambassadors, 
with the European Union, with the Nordic group and, in general, with all 
those who were interested. As a result of this approach, I was never seen as 
the representative of a separate bureaucracy in New York, but as the 
representative of the international community as a whole. 15
Ajello was also conscious of running a transparent process and held regular briefings with 
the national and international press. What was undisputable was that Ajello directed and 
steered the process. The UN was not a passive monitor of the process, which Ajello and 
many others felt contributed to the failure of UNAVEMII in Angola. According to Ajello, 
ONUMOZ was the "engine of the process" with himself as the driver of the engine. He 
managed the implementation of the peace agreement as a political process. He 
acknowledged that "the entire operation was led on the basis of the primacy of politics. All 
the other components of ONUMOZ, starting with the military, were subordinate to politics 
and were its instrument." 16 Ajello further contended that the success of the process rested 
with the flexibility exercised by the international community in allowing time for the parties 
to meet their obligations and applying pressure when they were dragging their feet. While 
this may bear some truth, as a political actor the UN took ownership of the process away 
from Mozambicans, making political choices with long-term consequences for 
Mozambican politics, without having to account to Mozambicans. This reinforced the 
primacy of the UN in Mozambique's political space.
Ajello has claimed that "[wjithout an external partner accepted by both sides as neutral, the 
implementation of the accord would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible." 17 In 
fact, Ajello would have preferred "a neutral body assuring impartial governance in the
I4lnterview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997. 
l5Ajello, "The role of ONUMOZ," p. 120. 
16Ajello, "The role of ONUMOZ," p. 123. 
l7Ajello, "The role of ONUMOZ," p. 119.
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transitional period [or] a power sharing arrangement for the period after elections." 18 What 
Ajello has failed to reconcile was the role of the UN as both political actor and neutral third 
party. By engaging in overt political activities such as the Renamo Trust Fund, preferring 
and acting as a transitional administration, pressuring for a government of national unity, 
and given its logistical capacity, ONUMOZ's intervention was political, ambitious and 
intrusive which contradicted its neutrality. Ajello's attitude towards the politicised role of 
the UN belies the notion of assistance since he sought to supplant the authority of 
Mozambican actors with the authority of external actors.
The politicisation of the UN was most apparent in its dealings with the parties. Since 
Renamo was the weaker party in the political arena, often threatening to return to war, 
Ajello felt Renamo needed compensation. He stated that "it was indispensable to help 
Renamo attain a certain minimum level, so that the entire mechanism set forth in the peace 
accord could work." 19 Thus Ajello created the Trust Fund for Renamo, dealt with Dhlakama 
directly in Maringue and exerted considerable patience with Renamo's continued delays 
and obstacles, notably when Renamo boycotted the commissions in 1993 .However, the $18 
million Renamo Trust Fund raised questions of whether Renamo was compensated beyond 
any means which could be sustained and ensured Renamo's future dependency on 
international assistance. Even so, Dhlakama still perceived the UN to be siding with the 
government because the government was a member state of the UN.20 The government for 
its part resented this preferential treatment, perceiving the process to be oriented against 
them.21 Teodata Hunguana, a government hardliner said "ONUMOZ lost its credibility by 
trying to create a 'balance between the two parties,' taking sides with the weaker Renamo 
and putting pressure on the Government to 'renegotiate the Peace Agreement;' [which
l8Comments by Aldo Ajello in Winrich Kiihne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine Fandrych, 
(eds.) International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
July 1995, p. 12.
l9Ajello, "The role of ONUMOZ," p. 121.
20Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.
2 'The government attempted to circumvent the CSC by lobbying the Security Council 
directly in New York and by reminding Ajello of his interim status. Interview with Migel 
de Brito, Researcher on War Torn Societies Project, Mozambique, Maputo, 1997.
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gave] rise to suspicions about the 'impartiality of the referee.'"22 More importantly by 
focussing on material means, Prime Minister Mocumbi argued the UN did not "advise 
Renamo to be engaged in a direct dialogue with the government."23 Although buying off 
Rename was successful in the short term, Renamo's political inculcation did not include 
developing accommodating political practices needed for future Mozambican politics.
In addition to ONUMOZ, other actors in the peace process industry strengthened their 
influence in the process by collaborating and coordinating their activities. This was effected 
through two forums. The first was the commissions. Through the CSC, the international 
ambassadors issued joint statements, gave public support for Ajello and "the formulation 
when necessary, of joint recommendations to the UN in New York, especially for action 
by the Security Council."24 For example, commenting on delays in opening the Assembly 
Areas, the international members of the CSC "remindfed] the parties that many donors 
expressed concern over the pace of implementation of the peace process and the implication 
failure would have for future assistance to Mozambique."25 In peacetime, the diplomatic 
community would never have such collective power or voice. The CSC allowed the 
international community to be more powerful and vocal in their demands upon the 
government, Renamo and Mozambican affairs in general. This was reinforced through the 
second forum, the Aid for Democracy Group established in July 1992 by the major donors 
in anticipation of the peace agreement. Chaired by UNDP, this group met monthly to 
monitor and coordinate donor support for democratisation. They became more directly 
active after the signing of the electoral law, inviting participation by the government and 
the National Elections Commission. Although this group was useful for coordinating 
policies on the part of donors, it took the political initiative, with the government then 
required to seek a role in relation to such structures.
22Comments by Teodata Hunguana, in Kiihne, International Workshop, p. 16. 
"Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 9(27), May 1993. 
24Comments by Richard Edis in Kuhne, International Workshop, pp. 43-44.
^Statement by the International Members of the CSC on the Assembly of Forces, 12 
December 1993, Maputo.
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The government was not alone in objecting to the intrusiveness of the international 
community. The Sant'Egidio community claimed the UN violated the spirit of Rome 
established by the mediators. They criticised the UN for trying "to solve problems by direct 
intervention rather than by pursuing the 'spirit of Rome' and 'seeking what unites."26 
Distrust between the parties was not lessened but enhanced by the peace process industry, 
because they assisted Rename and alienated the state by placing themselves at the centre 
of the process and decision-making. While efforts were made to politically socialise 
Rename, their external character was reinforced rather than facilitating direct dialogue with 
the government. Problems were solved through "permanent mediation."27 According to 
government officials including Guebuza, even when discussing issues directly with 
Rename, it seemed problems could only be solved if approval was granted by the 
ambassadors which meant the government was constantly negotiating with the international 
community.28 However, the international community did not attempt to politically socialise 
the Mozambican state, to influence the evolution of a more impartial and neutral state, in 
part because external third parties ignored the state except as one of the combatants. There 
were few attempts to transfer skills rather than relying on foreign technical assistance, while 
the commissions' procedures adopted international legal and political standards rather than 
seeking to serve local functions and needs. Through such practices, the donors, ONUMOZ 
and the peace process industry were reconfiguring Mozambique's political space.
Territorial administration and reunification
On the ground, the core political issue was the reunification of national administration. 
Because of the war, the country was divided between the capital and major towns controlled 
by the government, and the vast majority of the countryside either under Renamo's control 
or without any kind of administration. Rename claimed 80% of Mozambique's territory, 
the UN put this closer to 25%, but their threat to security denied the government access to
26Andrea Bartoli, Sant'Egidio spokesman cited in Richard Synge, Mozambique: UN 
Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994 Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 
1997, p. 57.
27Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997. 
28Inteview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
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much of the country. Thus social, territorial and political reunification revolved around 
bringing Rename areas back into a single administration under the Mozambican state. It 
also involved bringing state institutions to society and society back into the state. This 
ambition was undermined by the state's limited capacity and means to restore its 
administration and, with demobilisation, to provide security against crime and banditry. 
However, the state was not only a set of institutions, it was also one of the combatants 
involved in the war. Renamo distrusted the idea of a neutral state, given the association and 
development of the state with Frelimo. Despite Frelimo's assurances on the separation of 
the state from the party, state officials and state resources were still closely linked to 
Frelimo.
The issue of territorial administration was frequently raised in the Rome discussions but 
never resolved. There was a vaguely worded agreement which stated that Renamo could 
continue to administer its areas, but must allow government administrators to expand into 
them.29 Protocol V of the agreement stated that "public administration in the areas 
controlled by RENAMO shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be 
members of RENAMO,"J° but also guaranteed access to state officials. The reunification 
of administration was to be effected through the National Commission for Territorial 
Administration (CNAT) which did not include external third parties. The commission rarely 
functioned and ceased altogether when Renamo refused to participate in July 1994.
Renamo claimed the GPA divided the country into two independently governed zones. The 
government insisted there was only one administration. In addition to the political leverage 
it needed by controlling territory, one of the reasons for Renamo's reluctance to give up 
territory was access to resources. The control of economic assets was not discussed in 
Rome, meaning their control would rest with whoever won the elections. Until that time 
Renamo attempted to secure concessions from timber companies. This was opposed by the
29Gaborone Mini-Summit, 18 September 1992. See Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, 
p. 133.
30GPA, Protocol V, Item III. 9d.
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government which argued foreign companies could only work through the government.31 
Some diplomats argued Rename needed an economic deal with farms, businesses, and 
loans to ensure them a place in post-election society.32 "Rename expected, and wanted, 
special rights over the areas under its influence: it wanted a share in taxes and fees raised 
and in investments undertaken there, but the limits imposed by the peace accord made that 
illegal."33
In September 1993, President Chissano and Dhlakama signed an agreement allowing 
Renamo to appoint advisors to provincial governors "with the function of advising the 
Governor on all questions directly or indirectly to do with the reintegration of the zones 
under Renamo control, including socio-economic questions,"34 while Mozambican police 
could re-enter areas controlled by RENAMO. The agreement also requested the UN to send 
a civilian police component to monitor all police activity in the country. These 
commitments were never realised. Renamo nominated administrators for only four 
provinces while the government was slow to appoint them; and some "local RENAMO 
authorities have denied the government police access, while the latter appears reluctant to 
extend its posts to former RENAMO areas."35 According to Dhlakama, the government 
never created the conditions for Renamo's advisors to work with the provincial governors.
The issue of administration was partially resolved on the ground through the resettlement 
of 5 million Mozambicans who had been displaced by the war and by progress in 
demobilisation which removed Renamo soldiers from guarding their areas. It was also 
facilitated through humanitarian activities which opened up Renamo areas in the second
3 'Unlike UNITA's diamond trade, there were few lucrative and easily exploitable 
resources to finance Renamo with the exception of ivory.
^-Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 5, August 1993.
33Jose Luis Caba9o, "The long march of Mozambican democracy," in Mazula, 
Mozambique: Elections, p. 95.
34The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York, NY: Department of 
Public Information, 1995, Letter from Mozambique, Document 41, S/26432, 13 September 
1993, pp. 196-198.
35 77ze UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 65, S/1994/803, 
7 July 1994, p. 246.
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year of the process. International NGOs were the first to enter Renamo areas, while 
government officials were denied access, although this changed in some parts of the country 
towards the end of the process. This implied that there were vast areas of Mozambique 
more likely to have contact with international NGOs than with national institutions. 
Between October 1992 and October 1994, 35 different NGOs were active in Renamo 
districts. 36 Rather than facilitating a reunified administration, these NGOs reinforced a 
fragmented and dual administration throughout the countryside. The absence of political 
pressure on this issue from the UN and the international community demonstrated their lack 
of concern with the administration and institutions of the state, despite the importance of 
such structures for the future governance of Mozambique. By ignoring state institutions 
except as a party to the conflict, the peace process industry reinforced the weak state. Long 
after ONUMOZ departed, this unresolved issue continues to colour Mozambican politics.
Holding elections
Holding the first multi-party elections in Mozambique was perceived to be the culmination 
of the peace process. Thus, the elections hinged on successful demobilisation, disarmament, 
and reintegration of both soldiers and displaced persons; and consequently suffered from 
the delays which obstructed the rest of the process. The elections and the electoral process 
were also integral to the shaping of political space in Mozambique because the elections 
would determine who held power, the electoral system created would distribute that power 
in a particular way, while the process of administering the elections would determine the 
independence and integrity of the state's institutional capacity. The procedures and 
institutions of the electoral process imbued and imparted political norms and rules through 
the expectations, customs and practices they encouraged. The transparency and legitimacy 
of the electoral process would reflect on the authority of the new government but also the 
state itself.
However, elections in peace processes are more complicated than routine or even
36UNOHAC, Final Report: Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 1992- 
1994, Maputo, December 1994, p. 64.
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transitional elections because of the many and often conflicting functions they serve. 
"Routine elections in stable democracies are held to change the government according to 
a preestablished constitutional agenda."37 They hold governments to account for their record 
of achievement. Reconciliation elections are aimed primarily at incorporating into a 
democratic political system antagonists who formerly related to each other by the use of 
force.38 One the one hand, these kinds of elections are intended to consolidate peace by 
facilitating reconciliation. Elections are about opening up political space for insurgent 
groups and transforming them into political organisations. On the other hand, they also 
institute and promise democratic procedures. But democratic competitions do not 
necessarily promote peace because they are fundamentally competitions for power. 
Democracy rests on the contest of ideas and political actors. Elections also provide an 
opportunity for society to express a choice regarding the candidates. Finally, elections serve 
to legitimate governments not only for society, but for the international community. Not all 
of these functions are compatible.
These conflicting objectives were reflected in the different agendas pursued by the 
multiplicity of actors involved in Mozambique's elections. After the abysmal failure in 
Angola, the international community was committed to investing in a carefully prepared 
and transparent electoral process. For the Mozambican government, elections would signal 
the end of international intervention and the restoration of the country's sovereignty. For 
Rename, elections provided an opportunity to acquire power in Mozambique. Although the 
peace process industry followed a formula of holding elections to conclude the peace 
process, the wish to hold elections in Mozambique was also Mozambican. Rename's only 
persistent demand was for multi-party elections, while the government had introduced a 
multi-party political system, originally scheduling elections for 1991. The Rome 
discussions devoted almost a year to negotiating details about political parties and the 
electoral law. However, this pressure for elections was top-down, it did not emanate from
37Rafael Lopez-Pintor "Reconciliation Elections: A Post-Cold War Experience," in 
Krishna Kumar, (ed.) Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International 
Assistance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 55.
38Lopez-Pintor, "Reconciliation Elections," p. 55.
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society wanting to make a political choice. In fact, there was some fear that elections 
threatened peace because of the experience in Angola.
This section discusses five aspects of the electoral process in which the peace process 
industry played a part: administering the electoral process, political parties, civic education 
and preparation for the elections, pressure for a government of national unity, and the 
elections. The full array of the peace process industry provided significant assistance 
throughout the electoral process. However, for the industry, the process of holding elections 
seemed far more important than the functions elections serve in the transition from war to 
peace. This created expectations and reproduced political practices with long term 
implications for Mozambique's political space.
ADMINISTERING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The agreement originally scheduled elections for October 1993, one year after it was 
signed. However, delays in the process made elections inconceivable in 1993 and were 
successfully postponed until October 1994. With assistance from the EU, the Mozambican 
government drafted the electoral law which would establish a National Elections 
Commission (CNE) to oversee the electoral process. The government released the draft 
electoral law in March 1993. However, when the government hosted an all-party conference 
in April to discuss the law, Renamo was absent because of its general boycott, and 12 of 
the minor opposition parties walked out following the opening speech by President 
Chissano. They did this in an attempt to increase their bargaining power in demanding 
office space and international funding. The conference collapsed from "a failure of the 
meeting's participants to reach consensus over the very term 'consensus'."39 The conference 
reopened in July 1993 with Renamo, but by September had only reached article 16 which 
discussed the composition of the elections commission.40
39Michael Turner, "The international community and the Mozambican elections," in 
Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 622.
40Brazao Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections: A Path of Peace and Democracy," in 
Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 37.
256
The slow and recriminating discussion by the parties frustrated the international 
community. Intervention by the Secretary-General and the Security Council pressured the 
participants to conclude discussions and finalise the law which was approved in November 
1993, with little modification to the original draft. Despite the protracted and antagonistic 
character of the debate at the conference, the very fact of debate itself seemed to confirm 
the growing acceptance, practice and experience of dialogue.41 It also served as an 
opportunity for the media to participate and gain experience in democracy through their 
coverage, impartial and not so impartial, of the parties. However, the message from the 
international community was not only to pressure the parties, but that the objectives of 'the 
peace process' took priority over the experience of political discussion. Given the assistance 
provided by EU advisors, the rushed passage of the law seemed to place greater value on 
a technical document prepared by foreigners, than the right of Mozambicans to examine and 
discuss the norms, institutions and procedures contained in the document which prescribed 
rules in their own political system.
The law established the composition of the electoral commission (CNE) and required that 
the President be elected by an absolute majority with a second run-off if necessary, while 
parliamentarians would be selected from provincial party lists based on proportional 
representation. The law maintained the 5% threshold of the national vote to be represented 
in parliament which institutionalised a two-party system around Frelimo and Renamo. The 
law also prevented anyone living abroad, including refugees, from voting in the elections, 
which reflected Renamo's distrust of embassy staff to impartially conduct elections and 
their perception that refugees would favour the government.
Brazao Mazula, a respected professor from Eduardo Mondlane University, unaffiliated with 
any party, was selected as chairman of the CNE with one advisor each from the government 
and Renamo. Mazula has insisted the electoral process was Mozambican. Operating from 
February 1994, the elections commission conferred legitimacy onto the process because it 
was perceived to be an independent and sovereign body which was an important symbol 
amidst the strong international pressure. The CNE managed to portray itself as a non-
4 'Turner, "The international community," p. 623.
257
partisan working body rising above the distrust between the parties. One observer claimed 
"[t]he pronouncements of the CNE were seen as credible, particularly on those occasions 
when the Commission publicly recognised its own administrative shortcomings and 
mistakes. It publicly accepted responsibility for these, as well as taking credit for its 
successful actions."42 Mazula especially was praised for being a consensus builder. Matteo 
Zuppi described Mazula as
a man of great wisdom, calm and determination who, in the difficult 
preparations for the elections, showed a rare ability for achieving dialogue, 
establishing a common language that overcame divisions in favour of the 
common good. The National Elections Commission, chaired by Dr. Brazao 
Mazula, was, I believe, exemplary. It worked on the basis of a common 
alphabet, and perhaps this was not achieved in the other commission 
envisaged under the [agreement].43
But insisting on consensus and agreement on each issue was slow and time-consuming. The 
CNE was extremely politicised and needed to reach decisions on a multitude of issues from 
whether to use computers to the number of hours of radio time for the parties. Given the 
international community's concerns about the timetable, Ajello and the American 
Ambassador, were "demonstrably impatient"44 with the CNE and through UNDP applied 
pressure on the CNE to speed up decisions. Mazula replied that "it was not possible to 
restrict the commission to a technical and practical dimension, as in the first days of the 
CNE's activities some donors, concerned with the time factor, wanted."45 Mazula believed 
it was critical for the CNE as an institution to take on "a political, social and even cultural 
role... [This included] adopting the 'method of dialogue and collaboration' mentioned in 
the GPA."46 Although Mazula sought to introduce and institute political practices that 
reconciled differences and encouraged political dialogue, the international community was
42Turner, "The international community," p. 646.
43Don Matteo Zuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community and the General Peace Agreement," 
in Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 109.
44Alistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo, 
Astri Suhrke, (1997) Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and 
Rehabilitation in Mozambique, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, p. 108.
45Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 42. 
46Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 42.
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more concerned with the timetable and did not attempt to reconcile these differing 
priorities.
Nevertheless, in spite of Mazula's protestations, Mozambique's electoral machine was 
infused with international assistance. The EU contracted a team of specialists,47 who 
assisted the government in drafting the electoral law presented to the conference in Maputo 
and prepared the budget presented to the Rome donors' conference which estimated the cost 
of the elections to be $76-78 million. 48 They also "assessed the requirements for logistics, 
civic education, and training, and designed the future organization and functional 
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections."49 In 
May 1993, UNDP signed a comprehensive agreement with the Mozambican government 
on "Support to the electoral process in Mozambique" to provide assistance for the operation 
of the elections. ONUMOZ also had a small electoral component responsible for the 
international monitors during the election. Given the absence of any basic electoral 
administration in Mozambique, the role of the peace process industry in devising these 
technical aspects and responsibilities carried political overtones. The need for this degree 
of assistance created openings for the peace process industry to be more powerful, simply 
by being involved in devising the most basic rules of the electoral system.
It was also unclear which organisations would perform what tasks and how these would be 
coordinated. Given the array of interested parties, there were many overlapping and not 
always compatible jurisdictions and activities. For example, the Aid for Democracy Group 
realised that "it obviously had collateral interests with the ONUMOZ electoral programme, 
but not always the same emphasis or agreement over the approach to be used."50 The 
primary source of disagreement seemed to stem from whether to work through state
47Erick de Mul, "The role of the UNDP in coordinating international support for the 
National Elections Commission,"in Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 616. Many of these 
technical experts also served in Angola, see Turner, "The international community," p. 621.
48Donors thought this too expensive. Turner, "The international community," p. 624.
4977ze UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 33, S/25518, 
2 April 1993, p. 177.
50Turner, "The international community," p. 632.
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institutions or not and the level and degree of international assistance. There were also 
tensions over logistical issues, for example, UNDP was not allowed to use ONUMOZ 
vehicles for electoral preparations. Donors were not pleased that,
[t]he UNDP electoral project would not have access to ONUMOZ aircraft 
to transport registration and electoral materials to the provinces and 
districts. Instead it had to secure donor support through the Trust Fund to 
lease, rent and purchase all of the helicopters, large and small fixed-wing 
aircraft, vehicles and equipment... 51
The tensions within the peace process industry meant that their impact on political space, 
and the message conveyed about politics, was not only uneven but also confused.
In a functioning political system, legal, administrative and political responsibilities in 
elections are carefully and constitutionally divided. However during a peace process, 
jurisdictional and legal matters are often hazy and have to be quickly and inconclusively 
devolved from the government to a mix of international agencies. Very little consideration 
was given to this area, since there appeared to be an assumption that this transfer of 
responsibility and authority was automatic. The Mozambican government was less 
sanguine. The government delayed the formal signing of the project with UNDP until 
questions over sovereignty were resolved.
Earlier versions of the UNDP's administrative procedures for the Electoral 
Project appeared to some members of the Justice Ministry to give foreign 
experts administrative authority which they believed, for reasons of 
sovereignty, had better remain with Mozambican officials.52
There were extensive negotiations with government ministries over the conditions, role and 
responsibility of foreign technical experts. The lack of clarity on this issue provided 
additional scope for the peace process industry to encroach upon the operation of national 
institutions.
In addition, the extensive assistance to both CNE and STAE gave "UNDP privileged access 
to information on the technical and financial aspects of the elections."53 Erik de Mul, the
5 'Turner, "The international community," p. 634. 
"Turner, "The international community," p. 639. 
53de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 617.
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UNDP Resident Representative, observed that
[u]nlike the functions normally attributed to specialist technical staff in 
United Nations projects and which are concerned mainly with training and 
advice, the specialists stationed with the CNE and STAE took on a high 
profile role right from the start of their placement, and were strongly 
involved in the day-to-day operations and activities of these bodies.54
This high profile indicated a shift in the power balance within government ministries 
between foreign technical experts and state officials. While not trying to suggest that 
foreign technical experts directed policy, their greater role reduced the space for domestic 
officials to work out problems, to develop their own expertise and the value that was placed 
on their work. This can partially be seen in the CNE's final report which took note of a 
"lack of familiarity with Mozambican reality on the parts of ONUMOZ personnel - the 
latter were sometimes unable to recognize the limits of their intervention in the process."55
However, the composition of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) 
at central, provincial and district levels, was highly politicised, and international personnel 
were seconded to STAE to neutralise the distrust between the government and Renamo.56 
A UNDP trust fund was also established, placing in the hands of UNDP, the management 
of finances, the electoral budget and the disbursement of funds. De Mul insisted there was 
a good working relationship between the different components and as a result a high level 
of transparency in the process.57 The UN argued it enhanced local capacity in the 
preparation of official budgets, operational plans and training electoral officials. In contrast, 
the CNE found that because funds were disbursed by UNDP, the training of Mozarnbicans 
to manage financial resources was neglected, whereas most training concentrated on 
technical competence in only the area of running the election day.58
54de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 617.
55CNE, National Electoral Commission Final Report, Maputo: AWEPA, 1994, p. 16.
56As a concession to Renamo, the government allowed 25% of the STAE staff centrally 
and provincially to be appointed by the UN. See Turner, "The international community," 
p. 638.
57de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 618.
58CNE, National Elections Commission Final Report, p. 16.
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The total cost for the elections was $64.5 million. Donors spent $59.1 million on the 
elections, underwriting 95% of the costs, while the government contributed 5% or $5.4 
million.59 UNDP also installed communications and computer systems at the provincial and 
national levels, deployed 300 vehicles, 6 airplanes, 26 helicopters including 12 from the 
South African air force, and used Portuguese air traffic controllers, both of which had 
dubious overtones.60 Although the international community provided substantial funding, 
the elections were an expensive and elaborate process. The pervasiveness of the peace 
process industry ensured future dependency since the technical knowledge of the foreign 
experts upon which so much of the process depended was not transferred to Mozambicans. 
Moreover, the peace process industry introduced an array of rules, norms and procedures 
to the electoral administration without necessarily locating them in Mozambique's political 
culture or institutionalising them in Mozambique's political space. Future elections may 
reflect the expectations generated by this first electoral experience which set a standard of 
what elections look like. This cannot reasonably be met in future without further assistance 
which may devalue future elections. Whatever spirit, initiative and experience 
Mozambicans had in administering their first multi-party electoral process, these elections 
depended heavily on international assistance.
POLITICAL PARTIES
The elections were also part of a larger project to create a democratic pluralistic system 
based on multiple political parties. In addition to structuring Mozambique's political space 
into multiple political organisations competing for power, the electoral process was 
intended to create and strengthen the role of the opposition to create checks and balances 
on the government. The primary mechanism through which this could be achieved, and also 
one of the key objectives of the peace process, was to bring Renamo into the political space 
of Mozambique.
Renamo's legitimisation and inclusion in Mozambique's political space depended on its
59CNE, National Elections Commission Final Report, pp. 59-60. 
60Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, pp. 117,122.
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transformation from an externally derived military organisation into a national Mozambican 
political organisation. Dhlakama had initiated change by removing military commanders, 
particularly those associated with atrocities in the war, and bringing in newer officials who 
bore little military responsibility. This created internal divisions within Rename, forcing 
Dhlakama to buy off and placate middle level commanders. The international community 
created the unique, but controversial trust fund for Rename to offset these problems and to 
finance Renamo's transformation into a political party. Rename claimed that during the 
Rome negotiations, the Italian government had promised to pay Rename $15 million if it 
signed the cease-fire. The collapse of the Italian government from the corruption scandal 
in 1993 scuppered the deal and Rename demanded compensation from the international 
community. In May 1993, the UN created a trust fund for donors to channel funds to 
Rename for such things as training, office space, equipment and accommodation.61 After 
the fund was set up, Rename became less obstructive in the second year of the process after 
receiving the funds. At the end of the process, Rename received $18 million, spending it 
not only on party logistics, but also on clothes, cars and other goods, yet still managing to 
incur substantial debts.
Although buying Rename was successful and Is largely attributed to the success of the 
peace process, it created future financial dependency which is not likely to be met. This 
form of international assistance moreover maintained Renamo's dependence on external 
sponsors, only for peace, not war. It did not contribute towards making Renamo a national 
political actor with a social base in Mozambique. This was reinforced by the fact that 
Renamo could not offer a credible opposition to the government because it had little in the 
way of a political programme. During the war, Renamo used the language of the Cold War 
to promote democracy against Frelimo's Marxist government. With liberalisation of the 
political and economic systems, the government had accommodated most of Renamo's 
demands. Renamo had few political ideas and had limited understanding of basic political 
and democratic concepts, relying on advice from foreign advisors drawn from the fringes 
of the right-wing.
6] The UN and Mozambique, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 37, S/26034, 
paragraph 12, 30 June 1993, p. 186.
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Many of Rename's weaknesses also applied to the other opposition parties.62 The so-called 
unarmed opposition made similar demands for money from the international community 
to transform into functioning political parties. In response, Ajello created another trust fund 
for the unarmed opposition, promising $200,000 to each party. UNDP distributed over 
$50,000 to each party with the provision that further funds depended upon accurate expense 
accounting. Many parties failed to do so, and subsequently not all of the money was spent. 
Most of these parties were small groups of people coalesced around individuals, many of 
whom were discredited Frelimo politicians. There were a few attempts to form coalitions 
and Rename sought endorsement for Dhlakama as the single opposition candidate. By the 
elections, the CNE registered 12 presidential candidates and 14 political parties, including 
two coalitions, the Democratic Union (UD) and the Patriotic Alliance (PA). Two years after 
the election, only six of the new parties remained.63 Although the $2 million spent on the 
unarmed opposition was small in comparison to the Renamo Trust Fund, it isolated these 
political actors from the electorate who resented their extravagance and empty promises. 
This weakened the legitimacy of these parties and the multi-party system. Moreover, the 
money from the international community emphasised plurality over responsibility, that the 
number of political parties was more important than strengthening a constructive 
opposition. It focussed on the formal, that is political parties, rather than informal means 
of contributing towards public debate and accountability.
The fundamental weakness in Mozambican politics was understanding and responsibly 
engaging in constructive opposition after two decades of single-party rule. Apart from 
Renamo which served as a focal point for discontent with the government, Mozambique's 
political actors lacked the resources, capacity and experience to offer a credible alternative 
to the government. This did not mean they did not have any means to criticise the 
government and hold it accountable. However, to compensate for these weaknesses, the 
international community focussed on the material and organisational means of political 
parties rather than strengthening their ability to participate in public debate in the political
62For a detailed account of the unarmed opposition parties, see Mozambique Peace 
Process Bulletin, Special Supplement, October 1993.
63Hallam et al., Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance, p. 114.
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arena. Representatives of the international community also placed themselves in the role 
of (un)official opposition to the Frelimo government, through the CSC during the process, 
and through the donors afterwards. It established the precedent of holding the national 
government accountable to the international community within its own domestic 
jurisdiction. This set up the international community as an alternative centre of authority 
within the state. This antagonised the government, made it less receptive to democratisation 
and opening up Mozambique's political space, but it also kept politics in Mozambique 
polarised around the issue of, for Frelimo or against. The peace process industry 
inadvertently limited politics in Mozambique and obstructed the enlargement of political 
space. The problem of instituting an unfamiliar pluralist political system also pointed to the 
larger problem that the "political elite being formed... find themselves almost without any 
political culture suitable for the new rules of the game."64 Civic education and preparations 
for the elections would be essential for the transition to democracy, but also through which 
the international community could influence what form of democracy would take hold.
VOTER REGISTRATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION65
A monumental logistical effort and educational campaign was taken in preparation for the 
elections. Previously, the only electoral experience Mozambicans had was through open 
voting for Frelimo party candidates at local levels. In 1990, there was also limited popular 
participation in political debates surrounding the amendments to the constitution. The 
multi-party elections in 1994 would be the first opportunity for Mozambicans to vote 
directly for the president and for representatives to the National Assembly. However, the 
formal procedures of voting, the concepts behind the political system and the nature of the 
civic education process had to be communicated and explained to the majority of the 
population. A common strategy and training instruction also had to be devised for civic
64Luis de Brito, "Voting behaviour in Mozambique's first multiparty elections," in 
Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, p. 457.
65For an informative account of civic education, see Juarez de Maia, "Civic education 
in the Mozambican elections," in Mazula, Mozambique: Elections, pp. 151-219.
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education workers66 who themselves were continually learning about the new process. 
Extensive assistance was provided by the peace process industry to meet these challenges 
which created openings for the industry to introduce their own values, preferences and 
customs into Mozambique's political space.
Registration was scheduled to begin after demobilisation had concluded, but delays in the 
assembly and demobilisation processes required voter registration to begin before these 
were finished. Registration began on 1 June 1994, and by September, over six million 
people were registered, 81% of CNE's estimated eligible population. From March 1994, 
STAE, with help from UNDP, recruited 8000 people as registration agents and trained more 
than 4000 civic education agents. Mazula believed this heavy electoral machinery was 
unnecessary and reflected distrust between the parties. He believed that "with less than half 
the number of staff, the same results would have been obtained, probably more speedily and 
more efficiently, while avoiding problems of power struggles that were petty, but took up 
a lot of time..."67 The large operation heavily depended on international assistance to 
supplement Mozambique's limited capacity. STAE started off with only 20 vehicles to 
deploy the 1,600 five-person brigades throughout the country.68 Provinces and districts also 
lacked buildings, furniture and other basic materials. Camping equipment and food had to 
be provided for the brigades with WFP providing food rations. Supplying these materials 
was not only a technical issue. For example, the government was wary over "whether to 
accept aid from the United States government in the installation of a radio to assist in voter 
education programmes; over the provision of helicopters by the South African air force, and 
in the discussions of the regulations on international monitoring,"69 for fear of American 
and South African support for Renamo through these material.
66Civic education agents were required to have 6 years of formal education and 
knowledge of local languages. Given the small number of educated Mozambicans, 
recruiting sufficient agents was a problem, and in the end, not all agents had the requisite 
language skills.
67Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 41. 
68Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 122 
69Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 32.
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Teams of civic education workers were deployed throughout the country to explain the 
process, build confidence in the process and its institutions, answer questions, inculcate 
basic competence in voting procedures and convince people they could influence the 
outcome. The CNE focussed on the slogan "In your vote, the future of Mozambique". Civic 
education agents need to explain a comprehensive array of new concepts relating to 
democracy including
multi-party system, pluralism, political party, parliamentary election, voting, 
the ballot, freedom, secret voting, civic education, citizen, registration, 
polling station, international observer, fraud, indelible ink, campaign, voter 
registration card, constituency, ballot box, propaganda, proportional 
representation, second round etc. 70
The level of instruction that was required easily demonstrates the alien character of 
democratic elections in Mozambique, and while this need not be innately problematic, 
nevertheless, it raises questions of how much and how deeply democracy and democratic 
procedures could be instilled in the population in such a short time. As mentioned earlier, 
it was not only the general population which had to be introduced to these concepts but the 
political elite and civic education agents as well. Cartoon strips, mobile theatre, 
newspapers, television programmes and radio broadcasts were all used to reach as many 
people as possible. Many of these teaching materials were produced in nine different 
Mozambican languages in addition to Portuguese. The use of Mozambican languages 
democratised the electoral process by extending the reach of democracy to all 
Mozambicans. 71
The civic education campaign was faced with a number of challenges. First, many young 
people were frightened that registration was actually a means of military conscription. It 
was also feared that elections would bring an end to peace, because there were winners and 
losers, where the losers return to war as witnessed in Angola. The successful election in 
South Africa partially allayed these fears. This was accompanied by explanations that there 
are no winners or losers in parliamentary elections since all parties could be represented in
70de Maia, "Civic education," p. 156.
7lMarcelino Liphola, "The use of Mozambican languages in the elections," in Mazula, 
Mozambique: Elections, p. 285.
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the assembly and thus participate in the political system which entailed explaining the 
difference between the government and parliament. A conscious attempt was also made to 
promote the equality and role of women in voting by prominently including pictures of 
women in printed and visual materials. This had to be explained against traditional value- 
systems which privileged the husband or father as head of the household. One recurring fear 
concerned the secret ballot. Many feared witchdoctors would be able to read people's 
choices and harass them if they did not vote for the witchdoctors' candidate. It was 
explained that the ballot was secret even from witchdoctors.
Civic education was an issue in which the peace process industry gave a lot of priority, 
perhaps because of their expertise in this, rather than its critical importance. Prior to the 
legislation of the electoral law and the creation of CNE, donors and international NGOs 
held seminars discussing civic education in which Mozambicans were invited to participate. 
While useful, this again demonstrated that the political initiative lay with the international 
community and not the domestic political arena. Many NGOs, religious groups and donors 
were involved including AWEPA, NDI, IRI, USAID, Caritas, Redd Barne. Although CNE 
attempted to coordinate civic education activities by taking the lead role and stipulating that 
all actors use CNE materials, many NGOs and donors had their own agendas and 
sometimes subverted CNE objectives. For example, ignoring the role of the CNE,
[cjivic education was an area in which USAID wanted to contribute 
significantly... USAID added a small bilateral program, in order to 
demonstrate USG commitment to the elections and to influence how the 
civic education campaign was developed and conducted. USAID 
recognized that UNDP focussed on a government-implemented campaign, 
while USAID placed its priority on a more balanced approach, with 
extensive use of NGOs. The NDI proposal emphasized participation and 
working through NGOs.72
In contrast,
AWEPA's civic education programme worked through Mozambican 
organizations (women, trade unions, churches, youth) to train civic 
educators who would then pass the information on to their own
72Kimberly Mahling Clark, Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's 
.-Lessons Learned, April 1996, p. 15. Italics added.
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constituencies. 73
The centrality and importance of the question of whether not only to use state and local 
institutions, but whether to promote them and what kind of value ought to be assigned to 
them, implicitly reinforced the continued weakness of Mozambican institutions. By 
questioning the need for state involvement and the need to strengthen state institutions, 
external third party actors valued themselves over local Mozambican actors. Even after the 
new government was installed, some international NGOs, like NDI and AWEPA continued 
their work in civic education throughout the country,74 and more generally through 
democratisation and good governance programmes.
Doubts can be also cast on the necessity of relying on the peace process industry by the role 
played by Mozambican civil society leaders, such as priests and teachers, in mobilising 
participation in the elections. Some credit the work of church groups in reconciliation and 
civic education for laying the foundations for the CNE because they were already on the 
ground promoting peace and encouraging popular participation.75 The Catholic Church for 
example issued a pastoral letter extolling the duty of all Christians to vote in the elections. 
They distributed teaching materials which explained the meaning of politics; that through 
politics problems such as hunger are solved and that "making politics doesn't mean lying 
or deceiving - that's corruption. The word politics means organising the country for the 
common good."76 The media played a role in transmitting information about the parties, the 
international community and the implementation of the agreement, offering analysis and 
opinions to society, and voicing opinion from society on the elections. But the role of the 
Mozambican media was limited by its own transformation from working under a one-party 
state which controlled the dissemination of information to a pluralistic political system 
which encouraged freedom of expression.
73Sam Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations: Their Role in Mozambique," Paper 
delivered to ACUNS Ninth Annual Meeting, 25-26 June 1996, Turin, p. 21.
74Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations," p. 22.
75Obede Baloi, "Conflict management and democratic transition," in Mazula, 
Mozambique: Elections, p. 494.
76Baloi, "Conflict management," p. 503.
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Civic education was directly tied to political space because through the campaign, ideas 
about politics, the meaning of political concepts and expectations about the political system 
were communicated to Mozambican society. By their participation alone, the peace process 
industry was involved in the communication of political ideas and values which raised 
questions not only of sovereignty but the cohesion and coherence of Mozambique's 
political space. Civic education involved the peace process industry on a technical level but 
given the limited resources of the state, the role of foreign agencies in deciding matters 
relating to civic education did not strengthen Mozambique's political space. The public or 
common good of political space was not a value that was communicated or promoted by 
international assistance.
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY
Despite the effort to produce a legitimate election, concerted efforts were also taken by 
some members of the international community to pressure the parties to accept a 
government of national unity or power-sharing arrangements. This stemmed from a desire 
to avoid an Angola scenario but also from the power-sharing success in South Africa which 
was being promoted as a model for Africa as a whole. From the government's perspective, 
this pressure was unwanted but also challenged the very principle of holding elections and 
giving the people the opportunity to participate in the political process. It violated the 
agreement reached in Rome by the two parties and appalled some members of the 
government that political power could simply be handed to Renamo. Renarno acquired 
political ammunition and leverage from this international pressure. After a visit to the US 
with the American Ambassador in August 1 994, Dhlakama demanded a government of 
national unity and then in a final meeting with President Chissano, demanded special status 
for the opposition, to be appointed vice-president and governor appointments in provinces 
won by Renamo. The government agreed only to strengthen the role of the official 
opposition but promised if Frelimo won the election to include members from other 
political parties.
The pressure for a power-sharing arrangement came from Ajello and the Western
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ambassadors, at first discreetly, and then more openly, "both bilaterally and in the Security 
Council, especially by Britain and the United States."77 The American Ambassador, Dennis 
Jett, was particularly aggressive on the subject and was unconcerned about overriding the 
peace agreement signed by the parties. The government resented the interference by the 
international community, particularly in the middle of 1994 when the government was 
receiving most of the criticisms for delays in the process of demobilisation. In May 1994, 
Chissano refused to receive Ajello or the CSC ambassadors. 78 Relations were further 
strained when Ambassador Jett used a US Independence Day Speech to warn the 
government that Mozambicans ought to vote for those who ensure stability through sharing 
rather than accumulating power. The government interpreted this speech as instructing 
Mozambicans to vote for Rename which was a deliberate and direct interference in 
Mozambique's political space.
After this crossroads, the international community eased the pressure. On separate visits to 
Mozambique, the US Assistant Secretary of State George Moose and the UN Security 
Council mission retreated from the idea of a government of national unity and pressed for 
democratic stability after the elections. Other states in the region were sympathetic to the 
Mozambican government's concerns. The Summit Meeting of Frontline States,
rejected the imposition of any political system of government from outside. 
The Summit called upon the international community to prevent and 
condemn in the strongest terms, interference by foreign interests that could 
compromise the implementation of the Mozambican peace process. 79
Ambassador Jett seemed rueful at the missed opportunity, "[w]hile international efforts had 
succeeded in overcoming resistance to demobilization and elections, acceptance of power- 
sharing was one element of the legacy of the war that outside pressure could not affect."80 
By explicitly interfering in Mozambique's political space, this experience did not aid the
77Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process," p. 11. 
78Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process," p. 21, fn 8.
79Final Communique of the Summit Meeting of the Frontline States held in Harare, 
Zimbabwe. The UN and Mozambique, Letter from Zimbabwe, Document 76, 27 October 
1994, p. 284.
80Dennis Jett,"Cementing Democracy: Institution-Building in Mozambique," South 
African Journal of International Affairs, 3(2), Summer 1996, p. 6.
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cause of reconciliation or the inculcation of democratic practices. By attempting to fix the 
arrangement of power between the two parties, it devalued the electoral process and 
increased the parties' distrust.
ELECTIONS: 27-29 OCTOBER 1994
As the elections approached in mid-1994, demobilisation was still taking place, there was 
no significant disarmament and there were misgivings over the safety and security of the 
elections. A significant number of refugees had not yet returned or were not registered and 
thus unable to participate. The UN deployed 3000 election monitors which was nearly ten 
times the number of monitors used in Angola, leading to criticisms about the "quantity over 
quality of observers, the number was excessive, and lack of proper training [which] caused 
instances of improper interference."81 The excessive number of monitors seemed to 
reinforce the centrality of external actors in the domestic political arena of Mozambique 
without serving a clear purpose. In addition to this, 32000 Mozambican political party 
monitors were recruited, registered, trained, paid and transported by the International Office 
for Migration (IOM) and CARE, financed by USAID.82 One former government minister 
was disappointed by the payments to the party monitors, formerly volunteers, which created 
expectations that this was now a form of employment which the government could not 
afford in future without donor assistance. 83 Not only did this encourage dependency, it 
established another precedent for the future.
The electoral campaign started smoothly on 22 September 1994. Only Frelimo and Renamo 
were able to reach all eleven provinces with both concentrating on the populous provinces 
of Zambezia and Nampula. Frelimo was aided by the state media, a Brazilian public 
relations team and gave out capulanas and t-shirts at rallies. In his speeches, Dhlakama 
claimed to be the father of democracy, claiming that Renamo could only lose if there was
8iAWEPA final report, cited in Hallam et al., Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance, p. 
115.
82The government did not trust US involvement but USAID was the only donor able to 
fund the project. See Clark, Mozambique's Transition, pp. 16, 34.
83Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.
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electoral fraud. The campaigns lacked concrete political or economic programmes but were 
calm and peaceful with little reference to the war, demonstrating that no party wanted to 
threaten peace.84
It was peace that concerned most people and influenced their voting behaviour moreso than 
political choice. One story in the media referred to "a village in southern Mozambique, 
repeatedly attacked by both sides during the war, [which] held a meeting and jointly 
decided that half the villagers would vote for FRELIMO and the other half for RENAMO, 
thereby ensuring that peace would be elected and forestalling any post-election 
retribution."85 The Catholic Church as well urged Mozambicans to split the vote as the best 
means of securing peace, suggesting voting for Frelimo's presidential candidate and the 
Renamo party.85 The experience of democracy was secondary to sustaining peace, raising 
questions about the relevance of civic education.
On the eve of the elections, 26 October 1994, Dhlakama suddenly withdrew on the grounds 
of potential irregular voting and electoral fraud.87 The CNE rejected Renamo's withdrawal 
because it failed to comply with regulations but Mazula agreed to extend the voting to a 
third day to allow Dhlakama to call off the boycott. Ajello, the UN Security Council, the 
Secretary General, and the rest of the international community urged that elections 
continue, while the US government declared it would not support the boycott. On the day 
of the elections, 27 October 1994, polling stations opened around the country and people 
began to vote. Although there was some confusion, it became evident that most people, 
including Renamo's own polling monitors, had not heard of the boycott.
As a result of intense international pressure, Dhlakama arrived in Maputo and called off the
84All political parties signed a code of conduct for the election campaign drafted by the 
CNE.
85Cited in USAID/Mozambique War-To-Peace Transition Program FY1993-1995, p. 11.
86Richard Haines and Geoffrey Wood, "The 1994 Election and Mozambique's 
Democratic Transition," Democratization, 2(3), Autumn 1995, p. 365.
87Dhlakama resented the Frontline States' threat to intervene if Renamo did not accept 
the election results. He was also counselled by his advisors that electoral fraud was likely.
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boycott on 28 October 1994 after assurances that the elections would not be declared free 
and fair until all of Rename's allegations of electoral fraud were investigated. After three 
days of voting, over 5.4 million Mozambicans voted in a calm and orderly manner, almost 
88% of the electorate. 88 After the polls closed, Ajello and the rest of the international 
community declared the elections free of major irregularities but that careful scrutiny of the 
counting process would take place.
The CNE chairman announced the results on 19 November 1994. President Chissano won 
53.3% of the vote, compared to Dhlakama with 33.7% of the vote, only three other 
candidates received more than 2% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, Frelimo won 
44.3% (129 seats) to Renamo's 37.8% (112 seats), and the coalition party UD89 won 5.1% 
or 9 seats.90 However, Frelimo lost 5 of 11 provinces: Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia and 
Nampula. Renamo's strong polling comforted its overall loss and entrenched its position 
as the official opposition. Dhlakama accepted the results and stated he was prepared to 
cooperate with the government.
Ajello declared the results of the election free and fair with no major irregularities. 
However, the CSC accepted "that any irregularities in the elections were insufficient to alter 
the outcome, ... [but] also set out a series of demands to the government that strongly 
implied that the main donors' future relationship with Mozambique would have a political 
component."91 The statement by the CSC said that for democracy
to be strong and effective, the legislature and the judiciary will need the 
resources and independence to ensure that the checks and balances required 
for real democracy are created. And real democracy is what the donor 
community will wish to see if it is to play the role expected of it in the 
reconstruction on [sic] Mozambique. 92
UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 64.
89Many people think the UD secured votes because it was at the bottom of the ballot 
which is where Frelimo had instructed people to vote for President Chissano.
90If a majority system had been selected, Renamo would have won with 152 seats to 
Frelimo with 98 seats. See Carrilho, "The electoral legislation in Mozambique," p. 139.
9l Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 137.
^Statement by the International Members of the CSC, 6 December 1994, Maputo.
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The tone and manner of the statement reconfirmed the perception that politics in 
Mozambique was accountable to the international community. As ONUMOZ began to 
withdraw, the government's resentment manifested itself. When parliament opened on 8 
December 1994, Frelimo was inflexible over a secret ballot to select the assembly 
chairman. The Frelimo candidate won, Renamo walked out and boycotted parliament for 
three weeks. The new government, while removing hardliners and replacing them with 
technocrats with greater regional representation, nonetheless, was entirely Frelimo. All 
provincial governors were Frelimo, not one Renamo official was appointed. However, 
Frelimo's old guard was marginalised from the executive to languish in parliament, the only 
arena of political space in which Renamo and the UD could participate. Renamo continued 
to refuse to open up its areas of administration and boycotted schools, health services and 
shops believed to be associated with the government. Between the parties, there seemed to 
be less spirit of reconciliation at the end of the process than before.
Conclusion: the outcome
According to the UN, "[t]he elections brought together in an open democratic contest the 
ruling FRELIMO party and RENAMO... the elections symbolised a new spirit of 
reconciliation among the people of Mozambique..."93 This was not necessarily true. It was 
neither democratic, nor conciliatory. Mozambique's Foreign Minister, Pascoal Mocumbi 
claimed that "the distance between Renamo and the government increased after the signing 
of the general peace accord."94Certainly at the elite level, there was little political 
reconciliation and little decline in the levels of distrust between the two main parties. 
However, on the popular level, the elections allowed Mozambicans to participate in the 
political arena and express their commitment to peace. In the minds of the people, "the 
confidence-building measure of elections being held at all seemed more important than the 
opportunity to influence the political future of their country through the ballot box."95
nThe UN and Mozambique, Introduction, p. 3. 
94Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 9(27), May 1993.
95UNHCR, Mozambique: An Account of Lessons Learned Seminar on Reintegration, 
Geneva, June 1996, p 3.
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Mozambicans voted in the elections for peace not because it was part of a democratic 
process to legitimate a government,96 suggesting that the elections in Angola and South 
Africa were more influential than civic education programmes. Nor was the legitimacy of 
the new government or of the political parties the focus, since the elections were not about 
the parties' achievements. These first multi-party elections may not have brought 
democracy and political reconciliation to Mozambique, but they did help to consolidate 
peace and transform the contest between the parties into a peaceful one.
On the surface, the elections seemed to bring all Mozambicans together in one political 
arena, but below the surface, there were new divisions and greater distances between 
society and the political elite. While the people anxiously sought to consolidate peace, their 
politicians fought amongst themselves and enriched themselves from international financial 
assistance. The divergences between society and the political leadership, between short and 
long term consequences and international and local objectives reflected contradictions 
arising from the involvement of international agencies. The peace process industry had a 
significant but uneven impact on the evolution of the norms, institutions, and procedures 
constituting Mozambique's political space. This impact resulted from the nature of their 
objectives and the manner in which these objectives were realised. The opportunities for 
the peace process industry to reconfigure political space in Mozambique resulted from the 
fact that few rules of conduct, institutions or procedures were defined in Mozambican 
politics. In response to this permeability, the peace process industry provided every 
imaginable form of assistance and by their involvement played an influential role in setting 
new rules, creating expectations and changing attitudes and altering patterns of behaviour 
and custom. The actors in the peace process industry were political actors, they were not 
neutral, either with respect to the parties or to the state and its relations with society.
The peace process industry shaped political space on three levels: logistically - through 
technical assistance; politically - by influencing ideas about politics and the kind of political 
system that should develop; and more direct political interference - by dictating the
Interview with Migel de Brito, Researcher, War-Torn Societies Project Mozambique, 
Maputo.
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distribution of power in Mozambique. The international community provided everything 
from cars and helicopters, voting materials to building roads. They gave instruction in civic 
education, managed budgets, decided programme objectives, designed manuals, set rules 
and political priorities. They assisted Rename achieve a measure of competitiveness with 
the government through the Trust Fund and directly challenged the government by 
pressuring for a government of national unity. However, the focus on the technical and the 
formal by international agencies seemed to concentrate on things which were less relevant 
to the host population and further to ignore what was of concern to those populations. The 
lack of interest, priority and resources given to dialogue and political discussion by the 
peace process industry seemed to render dialogue as a hindrance to the timetable and the 
process. Although the application of pressure was often necessary, the question remained 
of how pressure ought to have been applied and in what direction, and whether the 
timetable requirements could have accommodated the need to develop political practices 
that support peace and strengthen political space.
The process was not owned by Mozambicans, it was directed by external third parties. 
Guebuza was convinced that Ajello left without believing that Mozambique had experience 
in government.97 After ONUMOZ's departure
the international community was consciously seeking a lower profile, many 
agencies were either phasing out projects and reducing their staff or 
withdrawing altogether,... they wanted to assist the Mozambican authorities 
to step into their rightful roles of leadership, 'displacing' the international 
leadership that had been so visible (and somewhat resented). 98
UNDP concluded "that its strategy of providing the machinery to solve all possible 
problems produced 'an excessively heavy electoral apparatus, with complex and time- 
consuming decision-making processes,... increased costs and subsequent dependence on the 
donor community.'"99 There was little in the way of skills transfer, institution or local 
capacity building. The parties were not allowed the space or flexibility to consider and
"Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
™ War-torn societies project in Mozambique, Geneva: UNRISD and Programme for 
Strategic and International Security Studies, 1998, p. 27.
"UNDP report referred to in Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping, p. 142.
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adopt different options, rather than being forced to accept internationally dictated priorities. 
The peace process industry assisted a complex and expensive election that did not enhance 
the capacity of the state which created expectations that deepened dependence on foreign 
donors. By undertaking so many responsibilities, the international community undermined 
the authority not just of the government but of state institutions which the government 
represented. The international community did not conceptually or practically distinguish 
between the state and the government, or foster the impartiality of state institutions in 
relation to society. This communicated certain values, particularly the weakness and the 
unimportance of the state to society which obstructed state-society relations. The 
pervasiveness of the peace process industry and its cumulative impact on Mozambique's 
political space prevented the coherent and cohesive arrangement of political space.
The foundations of Mozambique's political space remain unstable. The opposition is not 
involved in Mozambican politics in a meaningful way, there is a lack of transparency, 
information and dissemination of information and decisions, little popular participation, and 
few consultative processes to influence the policy-making process. 100 Such objectives may 
not be attainable in a two year peace process, but they should not be made more difficult 
by the actions of external actors. While there is peace in Mozambique, politics remains 
tenuous in part because it was not strengthened during the peace process and not 
encouraged by the peace process industry.
I00lnterview with Migel de Brito, Maputo, May 1997.
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CONCLUSION
Political space, the peace process industry and intervention
Given the majority of failed peace processes, the peace process in Mozambique was 
remarkable not least because Mozambique appears to have made a successful transition 
from war to peace. This thesis has sought to examine whether the Mozambican peace 
process was a success, what kind of success and a success for whom. These questions were 
answered through the framework of the thesis which called attention to the operation of a 
peace process industry and its impact on political space in the transition from war to peace. 
The argument was made that the variety and number of international agencies working to 
assist Mozambique make the transition from war to peace constituted an industry. Further, 
by its very character as an industry, these international actors had an unavoidable impact 
on the norms, institutions and procedures constituting Mozambique's political space. This 
impact was not uniform and undifferentiated, but was multifaceted, mixed and uneven. This 
was made clear in the case of Mozambique because of the number of external agencies 
operating in Mozambique and the comprehensiveness of their assistance. With ONUMOZ, 
UN agencies, donors, and NGOs all converging in Mozambique, the level of international 
support was unprecedented. However, as was seen throughout the thesis, this level of 
support was not matched by the level of effectiveness. The example of Mozambique's 
peace process offers many insights into the phenomenon of the peace process and the 
intervention of the peace process industry into the political space of a society making the 
transition from war to peace.
Using the case of Mozambique, the argument of the thesis was that in providing assistance 
to countries making the transition from war to peace, international actors reconfigure the 
political space of those countries. Political space was defined as the configuration or 
arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which organise and gives order to 
political life. The arrangement and organisation of political life enables the practice of 
politics, where politics is an activity which constructively manages differences without 
recourse to violence which is the basis for peace. Without basic agreement on a system of
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rules, institutions and procedures the exercise of politics is problematic, confused and a 
source of unmanageable conflict. Understanding the transition from war to peace requires 
a conception of politics and political space that is open to its complex and dynamic 
character. Thus explaining and understanding the impact and role of external third parties 
in this transition depends on fully recognising the political repercussions of international 
intervention.
The thesis raises four sets of conclusions discussed here. The first set of conclusions 
concern the peace process in Mozambique, while the second consider the reconfiguratiQn 
of Mozambique's political space. The third set examine the features and impact of the 
peace process industry. Finally, the fourth set offers some assessments about intervention 
in peace processes. The aim of the thesis has been to broaden the framework for looking 
at international intervention in the transition from war to peace and how the range of 
international actors and their activities involved in this transition directly and indirectly 
impact on political space. Although I have used the case of Mozambique to make the 
argument, the idea that external third parties reconfigure political space applies elsewhere. 
The example of Mozambique demonstrates the importance of acknowledging the innately 
political nature of the peace process industry and their practices in order to understand, 
evaluate and accommodate the inevitable impact on political space in such a way that 
sustains and consolidates peace. If this political impact is not recognised, and if the 
limitations of what intervention can accomplish are not respected, then there is a strong 
case against international intervention in post-conflict transitions.
The peace process in Mozambique: outcomes and future prospects
After almost thirty years of ongoing war, Mozambique is at 'peace'. It appears that 
Mozambique also has a peace that will be sustained allowing for the much-needed 
development of the country following decades of destruction and decay. Thus the peace 
process has been judged a success. Three factors have been widely attributed to the success 
of the peace process in Mozambique: the will of the people for peace, the support and work 
of the international community and the success of the UN peacekeeping operation. In
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addition there was a fourth factor leading to a successful outcome which was the 
comprehensive and sophisticated agreement upon which the process was based. An 
examination of these four claims explains the reasons behind the success but in so doing 
also questions the nature of this success.
The success of the peace process in Mozambique depended primarily on the will of the 
parties to secure peace and on their compliance to the General Peace Agreement. Although 
the level of distrust between the parties did not decline during the process and the level of 
uncertainty was high, neither party appeared to seriously entertain a return to the military 
option. While there were many prevarications and delays as the complexity of the political 
option was considered, the cease-fire held with few major violations. This was partially a 
result of the nature of the conflict which had evolved to the point where the "argument was 
over who should govern [and later] how the government should be chosen and how to 
govern."' It was reinforced by the exhaustion of both parties from the drought and from lack 
of access to resources which could have sustained the war.2 It was also a result of the 
momentum of the process where by the second year, both parties found themselves in a 
process with a dynamic from which they could not retreat. However, the parties did not 
maintain the political will for peace on their own. Although the international community 
is credited with applying pressure on the parties, local dynamics drove the peace process.3 
A senior UN official observed that the peace process was going "remarkably well despite 
ONUMOZ, Rename and Frelimo."4 Social groups in Mozambique guaranteed peace: the 
soldiers, refugees and displaced people, and the vast number of people who voted in the 
election and enabled reconciliation within their own communities. It was their support for 
the peace process that helped bring about its success, and more importantly their political 
significance which was a crucial but unpredictable factor in bringing peace to Mozambique.
'Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 144.
2The ending of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa respectively weakened 
both the government and Renamo militarily.
Interview with Ken Wilson, Ford Foundation, Johannesburg, May 1997.
"Unnamed UN official cited in Ken Wilson, "The people's peace in Mozambique," 
Southern Africa Report, March 1994, p. 22.
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The political significance of soldiers on both sides breaking their own chain of command 
should not be underestimated. The mutinies and riots by soldiers demanding to be 
demobilised, separated them from their commanders and prevented their leaders from 
holding back from the momentum of the process. Their unwillingness to remain mobilised 
in their respective armies forced President Chissano and Dhlakama to reject the military 
option and operate through political dialogue. Nevertheless, the broken chain of command 
and the loss of control over well-armed men heightened insecurity in Mozambique by 
increasing the potential for banditry and keeping civilians at risk. Banditry was not a new 
feature to Mozambique, but this insecurity led to a rise in crime during and following the 
peace process which seemed to threaten the peace. In addition to the combatants, over 5.5 
million displaced Mozambicans relocated and resettled in Mozambique. They did so 
primarily on their own initiative and using their own resources. Their actions consolidated 
peace and their reconciliation strategies did more to normalise society in Mozambique than 
formal programmes. Finally, at the end of the process, over 8 million Mozambicans 
participated in the first multi-party elections, voicing their commitment to peace. Although 
not fully understanding or embodying democracy, the voters in Mozambique voted for 
peace, deliberately splitting the vote if necessary to avoid having winners and losers which 
had resulted in a return to war in Angola.
The second factor attributed to the success of Mozambique's peace process was the support 
of the international community. From the negotiations in Rome to the withdrawal of 
ONUMOZ, Mozambique was provided with assistance from all the major bilateral donors 
including the US, UK, Italy, and Nordic countries. Mozambique also received ongoing 
regional support from neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe 
with timely interventions from Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe and the Frontline States. 
In addition to government support, Mozambique was assisted by both international and 
non-governmental organisations, with a host of UN agencies and NGOs operating in 
Mozambique, supported by substantial funding from donors and the EU. The international 
community provided over $600 million5 to finance the projects and programmes undertaken
5See chapter six.
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in the process, excluding the costs of the UN operation. As seen in the chapters on the 
demobilisation, humanitarian and electoral components, external actors provided financial, 
technical and political support to everything from building schools, managing budgets to 
funding Rename. Although there were problems with budget flexibility, procurement 
policies and delivery, the commitment of the international community and their concern 
was unique and consistent. In addition, there was a credible attempt at coordination and 
cooperation through the Supervisory and Control Commission and the Aid for Democracy 
Group. Nevertheless, there was significant overlap between international agencies who 
initiated numerous projects which were not integrated into long term development 
planning. Moreover as highlighted in the chapters on the peace process, much of this 
assistance was ineffective, inefficient, superfluous and did not influence the decisions of 
Mozambicans to return home, vote for peace, or sustain the cease-fire. Thus, the level of 
international assistance did not correspond to the effectiveness of that assistance, while 
exacerbating dependency through the failure to transfer skills and by ignoring local 
experience. The international community benefited from, yet reinforced the conditions of 
peace which were already manifest in Mozambique.
The third factor accounting for the success of Mozambique's peace process was the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation, ONUMOZ, led by the Special Representative Aldo Ajello. 
The UN has been keen to promote the success of ONUMOZ after having faced intense 
criticism for other operations in Africa from Somalia, Rwanda to Angola which have all 
failed comprehensively. According to Boutros-Ghali,
ONUMOZ succeeded admirably in all its objectives. It provided the vehicle 
with which Mozambicans could sustain their peace efforts, created an 
environment of security which allowed the cease-fire to hold, accomplished 
the demobilization of former combatants and, finally, provided the basis for 
democratic practices, rather than military confrontation, in the conduct of 
Mozambique's national affairs.6
The UN has claimed three reasons for its own success: first, the leadership of the Special 
Representative, Aldo Ajello; second, under Ajello's direction, the UN took on a more
bThe United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, New York, NY: Department of 
Public Information, 1995, Introduction, p. 69.
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forceful and supervisory role rather than simply monitoring the process; and third, the UN's 
flexibility and innovation in creating the Rename trust fund and involving Renamo as a real 
partner to the peace process. According to Ajello, the UN allowed the parties flexibility 
when it was needed and applied pressure when the parties were delaying the process.
Notwithstanding the important role of the UN, the UN's record of achievement needs to be 
qualified. First, the more than 6000 peacekeeping troops were ineffective. They did not 
have a meaningful mandate and accomplished little. It is arguable whether their mere 
presence put pressure on the parties, and it was not made clear how their deployment was 
an effective leverage on the parties. Second, as already discussed in chapter six, the 
humanitarian component of ONUMOZ was highly ineffective and resented by the pre­ 
existing agencies operating in Mozambique. UNOHAC oversaw many one-off projects of 
unequal standard across the country and failed abjectly in one of its most important 
objectives, clearing landmines. Finally, although the UN as an entity was committed to 
securing peace in Mozambique, it was seriously limited by its operational weaknesses. As 
in other peacekeeping operations, the UN suffered from the credibility gap between its 
ambitious mandates and its ability to realise them. Although it was already overstretched 
by operations in other countries in 1992, the UN did not hesitate to jump into Mozambique 
and arrogate to itself an ambitious and comprehensive role. This created problems on the 
ground, not least the initial delay in launching the operation which set the whole process 
back six months. Nevertheless, the unarmed military observers and the technical unit for 
demobilisation must be credited for their tremendous effort. With only a few hundred 
personnel, the military observers undertook a staggering number of responsibilities from 
monitoring the cease-fire, collecting weapons, transporting arms and soldiers, running 
logistics, etc., while the innovative technical unit coordinated a complicated logistical 
exercise under extremely difficult conditions. As a whole, the UN contributed to the 
success of the peace process in Mozambique, although not in ways that were intended or 
given priority, but the overall conclusion is that ONUMOZ was not central to securing 
peace in Mozambique.
The final factor attributed to the success of the peace process in Mozambique was the
284
General Peace Agreement signed by the government and Rename in October 1992 after two 
years of negotiation. The character of the subsequent implementation process was largely 
determined by the shape of the agreement and the process of negotiations which led to it. 
The nature of the agreement made clear that in Mozambique there was a peace to be kept. 
Whatever its weaknesses, the General Peace Agreement was a comprehensive agreement 
which
minutely laid down all the steps of democratization, including the law of the 
political parties, the electoral law, the formation of a joint army and the 
financing of the whole operation. These basic principles were never put in 
question, not even in the most critical moments... The accumulated text 
provided for a very detailed framework within which the UN could exercise 
its role.7
The agreement contained not only obligations for the parties, but also concessions and 
promises for the parties which gave them an incentive to comply with the agreement. 
Nevertheless, some problems in the military component might have been avoided had there 
been more discussion of those details prior to the signing of the agreement. The need to 
work out the remaining details during the implementation process created opportunities for 
the parties to become immersed in disputes that furthered delay. Furthermore, mechanisms 
for resolving these disputes established in the agreement did not work as intended.8 The 
government objected to the transformation of the Supervisory and Control Commission 
from a working body involving the government, Renamo and the UN, to a vehicle for the 
UN and international community. The Sant'Egidio mediators also criticised the UN for 
ignoring the spirit of the agreement and the basic principle of Protocol I which committed 
the parties to operate within the sphere of state institutions.
Both the negotiations and the implementation process were characterised by ongoing delays 
resulting from lack of trust between Renamo, the government and the international 
community. This distrust was a stable and constant feature of the peace process. The
7Comments by Don Matteo Zuppi, in Winrich Kiihne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine 
Fandrych, (eds.) International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United 
Nations Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, July 1995, p. 41.
8See the discussion in chapter seven.
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collective delays through the process in all its components, however did have the advantage 
of giving both parties time to adjust to the changes taking place, but also for external third 
parties to set up their operations and become more institutionalised. Although these delays 
seemed at the time to threaten to derail the peace process, nevertheless, in hindsight, there 
was little possibility of a return to war. This was because prior to the arrival of ONUMOZ, 
the war had ended in Mozambique, with few major violations of the cease-fire following 
the agreement. The reasons for the war's ending were the exhaustion of the soldiers, people 
and politicians for war and the acceptance that war could not go on any further. It was aided 
by a workable peace agreement that provided a framework for the government and Rename 
to cooperate, supported by the experience of political compromise gained during the 
prolonged negotiation process. It was this pre-existing condition of peace as an absence of 
violence which faced the peace process industry when they finally arrived in Mozambique 
and whose task it was to consolidate peace, not to secure it. Although the peace process 
industry did help to strengthen peace, frequently the industry was superfluous to the needs 
of the local community and obstructed Mozambicans from realising those needs. The peace 
process was a success in Mozambique, because of Mozambicans and the conditions on the 
ground, rather than as a consequence of the practices of the peace process industry. 
However, the transition from war to peace concerns more than the technical implementation 
of a peace agreement. It also involves whether and to what extent there was a transition to 
peace which centres on political space.
Political space in Mozambique
In assessing Mozambique's political space, it must be remembered that Mozambique was 
undergoing three difficult transitions simultaneously: the transition from war to peace, from 
a one-party state to democratic pluralism and from a command to a liberalised market 
economy. These transformations were taking place within a regional environment moving 
from instability and apartheid to peace and democracy, and within a larger international 
environment from Cold War to post-Cold War politics. The legacies from the peace process
< ;',* } t-v '.
on Mozambique's political space were thus part of a longer process of transformation, both 
in support of and in tension with these other structural developments. Three aspects of
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Mozambique's political space were formatively influenced by the peace process and the 
peace process industry: first, the relationship between the government and Renamo or the 
nature of political contest at the elite level; second, the evolution of the state and civil 
society and the larger institution-building process; and third, the continued role of external 
third parties in Mozambique's political space which continues to shape the norms, 
institutions and procedures of Mozambican politics. While peace as an absence of violence 
exists in Mozambique, the foundations for a sustainable peace based on the activity of 
politics are fragile because of the weakness of political space.
As ONUMOZ withdrew, there was a fear that without UN administrators and military 
personnel, Mozambique's fragile democracy might collapse. Such fears seemed well- 
founded after the opening of parliament when Renamo walked out and President Chissano 
refused to include Renamo officials in his government despite promises made earlier. 
Dhlakama complained that after the elections, "the government did not consult with 
Renamo, sent government administrators into Renamo areas to take over the districts and 
force Renamo administrators out. Renamo has no control over taxation."9 Reconciliation 
at the political level continued on its downward spiral. The government's resentment of the 
high-profile and heavy-handed operation of Ajello, the UN and international agencies in 
Mozambique was asserted through its refusal to accommodate Renamo. This justified 
Renamo's continued distrust of the government and refusal to open up Renamo areas to 
government administrators. Guebuza believes one of the lessons from the peace process 
was that the government should have insisted on talking with Renamo more directly on 
more issues. 10 Without the mediation of external third parties, politics as an activity of 
reconciling differences was proving beyond the capacity of all the political parties.
Despite their mutual hostility, the government and Renamo stabilised their relationship, 
while parliament evolved into a forum for political debate. It was observed that "[a]fter 15 
years of civil strife, Frelimo has worked hard for peace. Dissent is tolerated and the
9Afonso Dhlakama, Speech to the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College 
London, 17 March 1995.
I0lnterview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
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'or its part, Rename has been politically inactive, participating in parliament and criticising 
le government while continuing its transformation into a political party. 12 This
•ansformation was still beset by three fundamental weaknesses. The first was an inability 
5 offer a credible political programme since it shared many of the government's priorities 
f privatisation, attracting foreign investment and pleasing donors. Second, Rename was 
fflicted by conflicts between the old leadership and more recent recruits who joined 
l.enamo during the peace process. Many of the old guard perceived these new members as 
pportunists seeking access to economic prosperity through political office, while these 
arty representatives and Rename officials like Raul Domingos posed a challenge to 
>hlakama's leadership. Third, with the Trust Fund spent and increasing debts, Renamo was 
till predominantly preoccupied with its financial needs. Dhlakama's attention was mainly 
oncentrated on securing further financial assistance from Western capitals. He frequently
•avelled to donor countries seeking money and political validation which had been lavished 
pon him during the peace process but had faded quickly after the elections.
'he neglect of developing political ideas and the preoccupation with money can be seen as 
5gacies from the peace process. International financial assistance was one of the key 
lechanisms of the international community to keep Renamo in the process. The material 
leans of the party, not political ideas or training were the focus of the peace process 
idustry. This encouraged Renamo's dependency on foreign assistance, rather than 
>cussing on a grass-roots or local capacity. Similarly, the attention accorded to Dhlakama 
3 a virtual head of state generated expectations which influenced Renamo's political 
ractices. When Dhlakama boycotted the 1994 elections, he used the boycott as a political 
ictic in Renamo's contest with Frelimo to compensate for their political weaknesses which 
ras met by crisis management from international diplomats. In local elections held in June
"The Economist, 23 May 1998.
I2ln May 1997, Renamo coordinated a series of riots in Beira and other cities which 
irprised the government and foreign observers. The purpose'of the riots were unclear 
at the response from the rapid intervention police was heavy-handed and violent.
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1998, Rename tried to use the same brinkmanship tactics by boycotting the elections but 
without much success. Rename has yet to evolve and reproduce peaceful political practices, 
but it was also not encouraged to do so during the peace process.
The local elections were also part of the institution-building process in Mozambique's 
political space. After a number of postponements, these elections were held in June 1998 
in 33 municipalities. Voter turnout was less than 15% of the population with Frelimo 
winning a majority on every council, even in Rename strongholds. 13 Voter apathy was 
blamed on poor organisation by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration 
(STAE) and unsuccessful voter education. This lack of competence by the electoral 
machinery is a result of its complete neglect after the 1994 elections and re-creation for 
these elections. This was not surprising given the pervasiveness of international assistance 
and foreign personnel in STAE during 1994. The absence of a transfer of skills and poor 
disengagement by international agencies ensured that STAE would be a weak state 
institution. Similarly, although the government introduced the law for local elections, much 
of the pressure for decentralisation of authority comes from donors. This points to the 
ongoing role of external agencies in Mozambique's political space but also to a lack of 
thinking through the idea of local elections, their purpose, what they were expected to bring 
to Mozambican politics and how they would help develop Mozambique's political system, 
which is also reminiscent of the peace process. Finally, the second national elections are 
scheduled for October 1999. The budget for the elections is $42 million, less than the 1994 
elections, but still expensive for Mozambique. Like the first elections,
the government is only able to provide $9 million, $23 million dollars is 
being offered by the European Union, and the remaining $10 million will 
be channelled by other donors via the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). The budget required for the elections came from 
studies carried out by the government, the European Union and the UNDP. 14
In a repeat of the 1994 elections, Mozambique will conduct an unsustainable, expensive 
electoral process with lots of international assistance.
uAIM Report, Mozambique News Agency, Issue 139, 20 July 1998. 
^AIM Report, Mozambique News Agency, Issue 151,8 February 1999.
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State institutions in Mozambique remain weak, while relations with society have not been 
built. Since the emergency, there has been little opportunity for Mozambicans to develop 
their own sense and experience of politics to accommodate the dismantlement of the one- 
party state. The combined power of external agencies through the emergency, structural 
adjustment and the peace process has limited the opportunities for Mozambicans to 
strengthen their own capacity for politics. During the peace process,
powerful foreign pressure creatfed] an unhealthy tension between process 
and product: in the haste to establish the formal symbols of the system, the 
need for Mozambican state and society to develop a corresponding political 
culture can be neglected. The democratic state and democratic armed forces 
will only exist when Mozambicans have taken possession of the concepts 
and values that underpin democracy, and anchor them in their own specific 
cultural, political and social universe. 15
When actors in the peace process industry, such as ONUMOZ, withdrew from 
Mozambique, there was little possibility for the state to take over projects left by agencies, 
since most projects reverted to resident multilateral agencies. Other actors in the peace 
process industry such as donors and NGOs rejoined the development industry, sustaining 
the extensive level of international assistance in Mozambique's political space.
Mozambique continues to receive high levels of foreign assistance, while the degree of 
assistance continues to reach into the basic structures of authority. In 1997 "some 160 
foreign aid agencies operate in the country. A Danish agency is overhauling the legal 
system; others run huge health and education projects."16 There are always problems of 
coordination amongst different agencies, as well as conflicts of value between them. In 
contrast to Nordic countries, US AID's programming does not allocate money to the 
government, focussing instead on the decentralisation of authority, privatisation, and 
private and market-oriented agricultural enterprises. 17 NGOs also continue to provide 
essential services in Mozambique and continue to marginalise the state. It is still common
:5Joao Honwana, "Reflections on defence, security and democracy in Mozambique," 
in Brazao Mazula, (ed.) Mozambique: Elections Democracy and Development, Maputo: 
Sponsored by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, pp. 539-556.
]6 The Economist, 11 October 1997.
'Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997.
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for NGOs to run programmes which
do not conform to government criteria or priorities for a region. One US- 
based food relief group which is now expanding into agricultural extension 
work explained that they welcomed the presence of Department of 
Agriculture officials 'in so far as they are willing to operate in the training 
programmes we operate,' admitting that they run a 'separate programme in 
the province.' 18
The fragmented and uneven delivery of social services persists in preventing the 
organisation of a public sphere in Mozambique, while the initiative remains with 
international agencies at the expense of local institutions. Local NGOs remain weak from 
a lack of funding and shortage of personnel, they are also unable to participate in 
coordinating mechanisms like LINK which charge membership fees. 19
The options available to the government are further constrained by the sustained power and 
influence of donors, the IMF and World Bank. The government and National Assembly 
continue to wait for decisions from the Paris Club before deciding on the budget.20 The IMF 
rejected the government's plan to raise the minimum wage to less than $14 per month as 
'excessive and unacceptable' and demanded more budget cuts, threatening to freeze IMF 
and World Bank funds.21 In a surprising contest, the IMF was challenged by the World 
Bank and leading donors, including the US, who argued in favour of the increase given 
Mozambique's reforms, commitment to structural adjustment and the minimal impact such 
an increase would have. Nevertheless, this example demonstrates again the power and 
control the international community holds over Mozambique's decisions and its 
government. Under pressure from the World Bank and donors, the IMF also relaxed its 
policies towards Mozambique which may now
1 "Alexander Costy, "Who Governs? NGOs in Rural Mozambique," Southern Africa 
Report, My 1996, p. 18.
''Interview with Ana Piedade Monteiro, Centre Estudos Africanos, Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, May 1997. Link was established in 1993 as a coordinating 
mechanism with funding from the Norwegian Refugee Council. Peidade Monteiro 
argues there is also a need for a national mechanism to coordinate local NGOs.
20Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997. 
21 The Economist, 28 October 1995.
291
spend an extra $ 140m this year -20% of total government spending-to repair 
damage from its civil war... Rebuilding the infrastructure has slowed; the 
Fund's spending caps prevented Mozambique from taking up World Bank 
loans for health care and roads, and Nordic help for schools. Last year it had 
to put Dollars 158m of aid money into a frozen bank account.... Between 
1994 and 1996, Mozambique had been obliged to cut aid spending for war- 
damage repair by $170m a year.22
In spite of the rhetoric of peace-building, consolidating peace and sustainable development, 
the priorities and values of external agencies dominate Mozambican politics and limit the 
ability of Mozambicans and their government to make their own political choices.
However, there is flexibility if domestic actors uphold international values which is the case 
in Mozambique's embrace of the free market and economic liberalisation. Mozambique has 
one of the most ambitious privatisation programmes in Africa, with "more than 900 
companies, a considerable chunk of the economy, ...now in private, often foreign, hands."23 
Natural resources, tourism, banking, transportation and other infrastructural projects have 
attracted substantial foreign investor interest. The extent of the government's willingness 
to embrace privatisation was evident in the tendering of control over Mozambique's 
customs service to a British firm, Crown Agents, in 1997.24 Privatisation however has only 
partially changed the relationship between foreigners and Mozambicans. Private companies 
are beginning to take on some of the public functions of the state and perform duties similar 
to those undertaken by the concessionary companies of the 18th and 19th centuries. In some 
instances traditional authorities are "starting to treat the company like a state by asking for 
houses and uniforms, claiming that they had these during the colonial period."25 While 
privatisation is not recreating colonialism, such activities "blur the boundaries between 
public duty and private obligations jeopardising the state's autonomy and legitimacy.'26
-The Economist, 28 June 1997. 
23 The Economist, 11 October 1997. 
24The Financial Times, 17 June 1997.
25M. Anne Pitcher, "Recreating Colonialism or Reconstructing the State? 
Privatisation and Politics in Mozambique," Journal of Southern African Studies, 22(1), 
March 1996, p. 72.
26Pitcher, "Recreating Colonialism,"p. 72.
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Much of the political impact has been offset by impressive levels of growth in Mozambique 
since the end of the war. While this growth and high levels of foreign investment have 
improved a tiny economy, the benefits have not been felt by most of society. There is peace 
in Mozambique because of the end to the war, but peace remains tenuous while almost 50% 
of Mozambicans live in poverty.27 Mozambican politics also remain underdeveloped 
because of the strong and influential presence of external third parties. This presence affects 
the relations between Rename and the government by keeping the parameters and focus of 
political conflict on the state and the state's relationship to external agencies. 
Mozambique's political space remains weak because its decision-making capacity is 
constrained, its social responsibility overwhelmed by obligations to its creditors, and its 
institutions ignored or reoriented to suit the demands of projects set up by international 
agencies. This weakness is in part a legacy of the peace process industry but is also part of 
incorporation into the global economy.
Conceptualising the peace process industry and its political impact
One of the core objectives of this thesis has been to demonstrate that given the number of 
peace processes, and because of their intense and domineering presence, international 
agencies comprise an industry focussed on the peace process. The industry is a loose 
collection of agencies using different institutions, with different values and different notions 
of political space. This collection of agencies was extremely active in Mozambique, but was 
not unique to Mozambique and has certain features which cut across different peace 
processes. The industry is firstly characterised by the number and variety of actors which 
include states, NGOs, and international organisations, most of them based in Western, 
developed and peaceful countries. Thus in the example of Mozambique, the range of 
intervening actors included the Sant'Egidio community, the Italian government, ICRC, 
ONUMOZ and other UN agencies. However, within each actor, a number of identities were 
also assumed. For example the UK provided financing through the EU, directly financed
"UNDP, Human Development Report 1998, New York, NY: UNDP 1998.
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NGOs, was represented on the Supervisory and Control Commission, was on the Security 
Council and was a major donor involved through the Aid for Democracy Group with direct 
access to the Mozambican government. The UN was also not a single actor as it comprised 
a number of competing departments and specialised agencies including the Secretary- 
General, Security-Council, ONUMOZ, UNDP, UNHCR and WFP resident agencies. As 
a consequence of the number and variety of international agencies and personnel operating 
in a country, the significance of the collective presence extends beyond the performance 
and operation of any single actor. Collectively many such actors have an aggregate impact 
on society. This impact is all the more compelling because the collective resources and 
comparative strength of the industry make it a powerful actor in relation to the host country 
and the conflicting parties.
However, this impact is tempered by another important feature of the industry's operation 
which is the relationships and interactions amongst the different actors. These relations 
reflect a combination of coordination, cooperation and competition because each agency 
has its own objectives, values and operating procedures. The complex relations amongst 
international agencies frequently lead to overlapping jurisdictions, gaps, delays, conflicts 
and general confusion which add a complicating dynamic to the peace process and to 
relations with the parties. In the case of Mozambique,
as is also too frequently the case in the first years after conflict, the 
international community tended to work at cross-purposes, investing in 
many projects that proved to be not viable or sustainable, and failing to 
establish desired levels of confidence in their relations with national and 
local officials. The presence of so many institutions and diverse interests 
was proving in many ways to be as much a burden as a help.28
Although there was a degree of coordination and cooperation, Mozambique's experience 
raises questions of how coordination should be approached and how much coordination is 
possible and desirable given the expansive number of agencies involved and the variety of 
activities in which they engage. It also points to how indelible this feature of ungoverned 
activity is in the operation of the industry because of the number of agencies involved.
28UNRISD, War-torn societies project in Mozambique, Geneva, 1998, pp. 15-16.
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The operation of the peace process industry is also characterised by a focus on technical 
activities, on the short-term and on the completion of 'the peace process'. It was argued that 
although there may be three broad blueprints guiding these activities, namely, 
implementing a peace agreement, peace-building and rebuilding war-torn societies, when 
these blueprints are implemented they seem to be reduced to similar lists of activities.
Within the domestic politics of major peacekeeping states, a broad value 
consensus can generally be assumed, and the resolution of conflict can 
correspondingly be reduced to essentially procedural issues: the 
commitment to 'peace' itself is inherently procedural, since it presupposes 
that conflicts can be resolved by means from which violence is excluded...29
Such short-term technical activities are premised on completing them and eliminating the 
obstacles which stand in the way of this objective. The completion of activities underlies 
the driving imperative of the industry which is to conclude the process and prevent any 
attempts to derail it. In Mozambique, as in other internationally assisted peace processes, 
the industry set up programmes to reintegrate ex-combatants, build schools and health 
clinics and help run a multi-party election. Mozambique's first elections culminated the 
peace process, and although postponed for a year, were fixed by deadlines set by the UN 
Security Council which only renewed ONUMOZ's mandate in short installments to 
pressure the parties. Demobilisation, the formation and training of the new army and the 
electoral process were condensed into shorter timetables to meet the elections deadline.
This focus on the short-term, technical and the end of the process, takes prominence over 
understanding the meaning of peace, the long term consequences of the peace process and 
the political legacies of the process. This not only refers to the challenge of integrating 
development with reliefer security activities, such as reconciling training projects for ex- 
combatants with demobilisation, or of building a continuum from relief to development. 
It fundamentally concerns peace. Thus in each aspect of demilitarisation, humanitarian 
relief and political assistance, it was not apparent how within each sphere of activities, 
peace was further consolidated or how together the three spheres of activities constituted
29Christopher Clapham, "Being peacekept," in Oliver Furley and Roy May, (eds.) 
Peacekeeping in Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 305.
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the necessary and comprehensive components of peace. While engaging in a cross-section 
of activities, there was little explanation of how individual and cumulative programmes of 
the peace process industry produced outcomes that systematically, coherently or 
consistently contributed to and sustained peace. While it may seem obvious that such 
activities bring peace, give the impression of peace, or are peaceful, this was not defended 
or explained because peace was not defined. Thus the industry also appears to have given 
little consideration to defining what peace is or a strategic analysis of what functions, 
activities and roles sustain peace. There also seems to be little appreciation of the process 
of realising peace, that is, the experience of making a transition to peace and the practices 
which become instituted through the process which are needed to maintain peace.
Returning to the building metaphor discussed in chapter two, the industry resembles a 
group of competing architects preoccupied with the construction of the parts to produce a 
finished structure, rather than with the arrangement and logic of the structure so that it 
functions for those who use it. External agencies do not and cannot possess a political sense 
of public responsibility to the people they are trying to assist.30 The manner of their 
operation suggests an inability to conceive of and foster the public sphere necessary to 
political space. It would seem that many objectives of the industry are decided on the 
ground, in an ad hoc, temporary and short-term fashion, and sometimes in a more 
technically oriented rather than politically conceived fashion. Although operating on the 
technical level, because of the overconcentration on the technical and on the parts, they also 
inadvertently impart and shape ideas about the whole. By focussing on the short-term over 
the long term, on the emergency or on reconstruction, using state institutions or 
international NGOs or agencies, taking decisions by consensus or by dictating etc., 
influences the development of norms, institutions and procedures which comprise political 
space. One such formative influence emerges from a contradiction in the manner of 
operation of external third parties. The provision of the industry's assistance is justified by 
the claim of conferring legitimacy to the peace process, by monitoring the transparency of 
government and other political parties in the peace process. However, in host societies
30Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.
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receiving assistance, the scale and scope of international activities are not transparent or 
accountable, while little of the programme planning and implementation is covered or 
criticised by the press, let alone the public. Given that the scale and range of these activities 
may constitute a large proponent of the development process, this lack of accountability 
communicates a political message which subsequently undermines the importance of 
accountability, transparency and responsibility. The peace process industry may also 
diminish the authority of local political actors and institutions, and simultaneously enlarge 
their own authority by shifting the balance between international and local actors and by 
taking up more space in the political arena. In Mozambique, the peace process industry 
crowded out Mozambicans.
Although there are many impacts of the peace process industry on political space, this 
plurality in itself produces a cumulative impact because of the volume of different practices, 
rules, standards, institutions, procedures, expectations, values, attitudes, customs introduced 
to the political space of the host country. The variety and multiplicity of actors, norms, 
institutions and procedures brought by the peace process industry generates political 
confusion which undermines the coherence of political space in host societies. The sheer 
mass of international agencies displaces local political actors from their own political space. 
If domestic political actors are not presented with a choice but are forced to accept the 
entire range of half-formed rules, institutions and procedures, this gives them less room to 
manouevre and inhibits the consolidation of the political system. What is problematic about 
the peace process industry is that their actions fail to establish consistent or standardised 
rules, there is little building of institutions or transfer of skills and few systematic 
procedures established which will outlive the peace process. Although better coordination, 
improved and consistent standard operating procedures, may lessen this variety, presenting 
one system of rules, institutions, and procedures as a single option, still does not offer 
domestic political actors the choice, freedom or flexibility to adopt, adapt or reject ideas. 
Imposing one idea of politics undermines the very value of politics as a contest 
accommodating differences while bringing people together into a shared political arena. 
The operation of the peace process industry is problematic because they obstruct the 
process of systematising of rules, institutions and procedures, which weakens political
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space and therefore undermines peace.
The peace process industry has an inevitable impact on the development and configuration 
of political space. The activities they undertake, the manner of their operation, and their 
impact on the nature of authority in war-town societies demonstrates that the actors in the 
peace process industry are innately political actors. If as political actors they undermine the 
purpose for their intervention, namely to assist the transition to peace, this raises 
fundamental questions about the practices, concept and framework of intervention.
What is intervention for?
This thesis has been considering the framework for understanding intervention by external 
third parties on two levels, the practices of intervention and the concept of intervention. The 
first question regarding the practices of intervention raises the issue of whether assistance 
provided by the peace process industry benefits the recipients of assistance. Although the 
peace process was successful in Mozambique, this was attributed to conditions on the 
ground, the will for peace by Mozambicans and the commitment of the parties to not return 
to war. It was only partially assisted by international intervention. In addition to the limited 
contribution of the peace process industry to peace, the chapters on demilitarisation, 
humanitarian and political/electoral assistance provided examples where UN peacekeepers, 
NGOs and other agencies did not accomplish their intended objectives, their standard of 
work was uneven and sometimes below acceptable levels. It often seems that
[international assistance is only useful in supplementing domestic 
resources within the context of a disciplined national policy environment 
that encourages the efficient and equitable use of all available resources, 
both foreign and domestic. In the presence of such conditions the need for 
external assistance is greatly reduced. In their absence, aid is of little help 
and is usually counter-productive. 31
It would be misleading to suggest the assistance provided by the peace process industry was 
primarily of poor quality, but the unevenness of the assistance across the country and across
3 'David Korten "International Assistance: A Problem Posing as a Solution," cited in 
David Sogge, (ed.) Compassion and Calculation: The Business of Private Foreign Aid, 
London: Pluto Press, 1996, p. 11.
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actors, the failure to integrate programmes together or from short term to long term, and 
poor preparation for disengagement undermined the overall level of that assistance. More 
detrimentally, the priorities of the industry sometimes obstructed the goals of 
Mozambicans, such as refugees seeking to return home, or were irrelevant to their needs, 
such as providing elaborate transport schemes for refugees preferring to walk home. This 
unevenness and irrelevance, along with their own operational weaknesses, contributed to 
confusion about what international agencies were doing and what they were doing it for.
Even if assistance was ineffective, this does not necessarily imply that it brought harm to 
Mozambique. Fortunately, delays by the UN and the overexuberance of agencies did not 
adversely encourage or prolong the war. Furthermore, despite a certain wastage of 
resources, an extra school or health clinic built did not necessarily leave a negative impact. 
Nevertheless, there are consequences from uncompleted or half-hearted efforts which are 
often overlooked. The first consequence is encouraging dependency, in the case of 
Mozambique, exacerbating pre-existing levels of dependency. There was a clear indication 
that through the emergency and the peace process, the Mozambican government retreated 
from its ideals of serving the people, allowing instead unfettered privatisation and 
international assistance. As one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, 
Mozambican officials have become extremely reliant on foreign experts. Second, schools 
and health clinics built by NGOs or others carry with them expectations of services and 
continued access to services, which if they are not integrated and maintained will lead to 
confusion, disappointment and frustration. This leads to the third consequence, namely the 
creation of a culture of failed expectations, frustration and disappointment. Popular and 
political cynicism has the potential to undermine social integration and political 
development, which may adversely affect a situation of chronic underdevelopment.
The proliferation of practices of intervention that obscure the political significance from the 
concept of intervention has dangerous precedents. In spite of wider and more ambitious 
mandates, international assistance has not been more effective, yet has been accompanied 
by political repercussions which do bring harm. These political implications stem from the 
fact that all actors in the peace process industry are political actors in relation to the host
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society in which they operate. Thus in offering technical assistance, in addition to creating 
dependency, external agencies have the tendency to obstruct state-society relations by 
mediating between them. By performing technical administrative functions, external 
agencies expropriate one of the means that connects a state and its society and obstructing 
state-civil society relations does not contribute to peace. This takes place through foreign 
officials who become interlocutors between society and public agencies, the creation of 
unsystematised procedures, and use of institutions unconnected to the state or public 
authority. Second, given the pervasive character of the peace process industry and the 
weakness of the targeted structures, the industry has a tendency to exercise dictatorial or 
coercive interference. In Mozambique, the nature of the intervention was coercive because 
both parties were placed in a subordinate position to the external agencies, having to accept 
what had already been done or set in motion. This undermined the institutionalisation of 
the practices of politics and of peace. Third, in an internal war situation where one of the 
protagonists is the state, international assistance is likely to limit and constrain the state 
which undermines the operation and authority of the state. The space given to insurgent 
movements by international actors complicates the relationship between international actors 
and the state, while the state and external third parties compete with each other by 
undertaking similar and overlapping political functions. States, as well as guerrilla 
movements, need to be rehabilitated and reformed, to develop relationships with civil 
society and promote norms, institutions and relationships that are open to opposition 
voices. Weakening or reducing the state is not the same thing as rehabilitating it. Unlike 
negotiations, where discussion involves a limited number of people isolated from political 
space, post-conflict activities involve institutions, and thus directly touches society and the 
state in a much more complex manner.
The aggregate impact of the peace process industry points to the fact that intervention is a 
collective and multiple endeavour, and ought to be evaluated accordingly. The willingness, 
level and purpose of coordination and the nature of the relations amongst different actors 
in the peace process industry are further criteria for evaluation. Thus, intervention should 
be evaluated by the operational and technical performance of international agencies and 
their success in meeting objectives, both individually and collectively. However, it should
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also be evaluated according to the legacies that are left behind in terms of the expectations, 
attitudes and behaviours generated by the practices and symbolic impact of such activities. 
The criteria for evaluating the practices of intervention must include outcomes. Evaluating 
the practices of intervention according to the success of a peace process must clarify what 
is meant by success, what the outcomes are and which outcomes are produced from the 
peace process and which from the peace process industry.
However, a focus on outcomes from the process is incomplete without understanding the 
context in which the peace process takes place. This context is political space. The 
arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which comprise political space is the 
basis for the exercise politics which is the foundation for peace. Thus, even if international 
agenices are unable to affect the behaviour of parties in conflict, their actions necessarily 
change the terms and conditions,on which the parties interact. Even if the peace process 
industry is unable to accomplish its objectives, in trying, any half-or incomplete effort will 
have other consequences, not least of which could be to prolong conflict. An account of 
political space not only highlights the political impact of the peace process industry but 
helps to explain the nature and outline of that impact. Understanding this impact provides 
a clearer picture of the outcomes from a peace process by determining whether political 
space is strengthened or weakened and whether the activity of politics is encouraged or not. 
It asks whether at the end of the process there was peace and what kind of peace. However, 
the outcome of a planned and coherent political space may be desirable but a false 
alternative. The alternative is not a fully coherent functioning political space but whether 
the process of building and developing political space is made more difficult by the peace 
process industry. An account of political space makes clearer the dilemmas which underlie 
intervention in the transition from war to peace: the conflict between short and long term 
consequences, between technical and political activities, and between the parts and the 
whole, international and domestic objectives. An account of political space may also point 
the way towards resolving these dilemmas by locating the peace process within a larger 
framework of political space. By situating intervention within an understanding of political 
space, this expands the framework for understanding intervention and offers new criteria 
for evaluating the practices of intervention.
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As a result of the experience of intervention in Mozambique and the operation of the peace 
process industry, notions of assistance need to be re-assessed and re-articulated. This 
requires reworking the framework of intervention to focus on politics and political space. 
Such a focus means the value of the peace process lies not only in the attainment of certain 
goals and on the completion of the process but rather the nature of the process and the 
experience of attaining them; not only political space as a building, but the construction of 
the building. External third parties cannot instruct the society in question on what the norms 
and institutions of political space should be, they ought to assist how society works through 
these dilemmas and arranges the rules, power and authority, institutions and procedures to 
fit together. Future conflicts will not be resolved and cannot be managed unless there has 
been the experience of managing them. It may be argued that encouraging the practice of 
politics and political dialogue is time-consuming and impracticable during a peace process 
which is more concerned about ending violence and preventing the parties from returning 
to war. Although timetables are important, it is not clear why the pressures of a peace 
process and the encouragement of politics are incompatible. There is a delicate balance to 
be tread between guiding and applying pressure and dictating compliance, too little pressure 
will go unheeded by the parties which may drag out the process, too much pressure will 
generate resistance and resentment which similarly may not bring about compliance. 
Therefore, the peace process industry must find an appropriate mix and balance which 
respects local political actors and accepts the political repercussions of their own actions, 
allowing for more subtle and sophisticated forms of intervention. Such external third party 
actors must also be cognizant of the symbolic impact of their interest, presence and 
pressure, both how it may further or disaffect the process. Lingering, expansive and semi­ 
permanent assistance does not become more effective the longer external third parties are 
present.
There is a strong case against intervention because the form and practices of intervention 
which prevail today fail to account for political space in the sense that they discourage any 
sense of the of the whole arrangement of political society that both joins and separates 
people. They concentrate only on the particular and hope that somehow everything will 
come together, if they accept that it should come together at all. Whereas much of the
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debate on intervention has surrounded the concept of sovereignty and the moral priority of 
the state over the ethical good of peace, giving weight to the latter to justify intervention, 
this thesis argues it is not so much the violation of the legal right to sovereignty as the 
impact on the development of political space which ought to be the criteria for intervention. 
Justifications of intervention and arguments against intervention ought to concern the moral 
worth of political space and the development of that space, and the roles and relationships 
of the external with the internal in the development of political space. It is how the outside 
meets the inside in shaping the inside that ought to concern the practices and concept of 
intervention. Because political space is complicated and difficult to cohere, the conditions 
for intervention and the forms of intervention are limited in the objectives that can be 
accomplished. By understanding politics and political space, the limitations of the peace 
process industry would be recognised as well as the limitations of what intervention can 
accomplish.
Conclusion
One of the objectives of this thesis has been to extend and shift the debate on the criteria 
and practices of intervention regarding external assistance in 'peace processes'. The 
argument made in the thesis has been that any intervention, independently and collectively, 
will affect the shape of a recipient's political space. The implication from this argument is 
that the criteria for whether, when and how to intervene in peace processes ought to revolve 
around an account of political space. An account of political space forces external third 
parties to focus on political objectives, clarifying those objectives and their potential impact 
on the functioning of political space and the practice of politics. An account of political 
space does not mean external actors should develop an ever wider and more ambitious 
political mandate. What is presently conceived as political objectives within the peace 
process industry seem to refer to what are essentially technical activities without taking into 
account their political import. Thus, many international agencies work from an ill- 
conceived and unfocused political agenda which is often lacking in substance. An account 
of political space aims to focus attention on the complexity of political life and to restore 
and reinforce the nature of politics to the idea of peace and rebuilding society. The activity
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of politics in reconciling disagreements involves reaching compromises and accepting the 
costs and benefits, the risks and opportunities, and the implications and limitations of 
political action. It is untenable for agencies to think there is a set of activities that will 
directly produce and sustain peace or to think that they can actually 'do' something that 
achieves peace. Peace and politics evolve out of many, repeated, complex patterns and 
practices, it is not just what is done, but the having done it. The complexity of political 
space should serve as a deterrent for those who assume the fact of intervention can attain 
peace.
Unless the peace process industry acknowledges and accepts a more comprehensive and 
coherent approach to politics based on recognising the significance of political space to a 
sustainable peace, the effectiveness of this assistance will remain limited and possibly 
detrimental. While it is conceivable that improvements can be made raising the efficiency 
of international agencies, the delivery of services and the implementation of plans to reduce 
waste, this kind of reform will not realise the aspirations of effecting a transition from war 
to peace. Without an overhaul of the industry of international assistance, it is not enough 
to reform the operational practices of individual agencies. The first step in such an overhaul 
involves recognising the workings of the industry itself. Thus this thesis was intended to 
provoke analysis on the aggregate impact of the industry's intervention in a peace process 
which is a prevailing and inescapable practice in almost every peace process. As an 
industry, individual external agencies must then acknowledge the limitations of their ability 
and capacity to engineer political space, the industry should minimise their assistance in 
peace processes and in some cases many agencies ought to refrain from intervention 
altogether. It is insufficient to alter present practices and further such notions as capacity- 
building, institution-building or local capacity initiatives. What is required is a systematic 
reconsideration of all of these practices, the basis for these practices, how they fit together, 
and the philosophy which underlies intervention itself. This requires no less than 
reconsidering the relation between developed countries and developing countries, between 
those with peace and those without, but also the underlying approach to the peace process 
and what can be achieved to resolve and manage conflicts. It is false for external agencies 
to claim superior expertise, knowledge or experience in managing conflicts, since their own
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learning experiences mirror those who receive their assistance. Although there is a 
substantial amount of analysis that is useful, external actors do not have a greater claim to 
knowledge of how the transition from war to peace is made than those making the 
transition. Reconceptualising intervention requires recognising the limitations of 
international intervention and the limitations of social engineering
At the heart of this reconsideration of international assistance is the nature of the 
relationship between those who offer assistance and those who receive it. Through the 
eighties and following the end of the cold war, power relations between international and 
non-governmental agencies with host countries changed greatly. NGOs, international 
financial institutions and other international actors acquired more power and influence at 
the direct expense of domestic authority, while the legitimacy and authority of local public 
structures has eroded immensely. The stage has arrived in some countries where the 
category of the international, the foreign or the external in relation to the domestic or host 
country has attained an unwarranted degree of legitimacy simply for being international. 
The point of this thesis has been to challenge the legitimacy of this claim and thus to shift 
the emphasis back from the external agencies to the target society that is supposed to 
benefit. It has sought to privilege the host recipients. Although there is a commendable 
sense that the problems in far off places are our problems, some bear the burdens of those 
conflicts every day, they are the ones who should be helped and not told what to do.
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